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ABSTRACT 
The principal aim of this thesis is to explain the rise of civil engineer, J. R. Kemp, to 
a position of unrivalled administrative power and his role in the subsequent 
characterisation of Queensland as 'the state of development'. Kemp was appointed 
head of Queensland's first Main Roads authority and was the first Co-Ordinator-
General of Pub he Works in the history of Westem democracies. He also had 
administrative responsibility for the Bureau of Industry's three major Depression-era 
projects, Brisbane's Story Bridge, the Somerset Dam and the new University of 
Queensland at St. Lucia His supervision as Deputy-Director of the Allied Works 
Council of the Allied Forces defence works program in Queensland during World 
War Two confirmed his national reputation as an effective administrator wdiile, in the 
post-war period, he devoted all his energies to the realisation of his controversial 
vision for central and north Queensland's economic growth throu^ large-scale 
infrastructure development. The most notable projects were the restructuring of port 
facilities, development of the central Queensland coalfields, and the Tully and 
Burdekin water conservation, irrigation and hydro-electricity schemes. 
Kemp conforms to the theoretical model of a technocrat whose cq)acity to acquire 
and exercise administrative power is a function of a pro-development political 
climate. He served five Labor premiers, two of whom, William Forgan Smith and 
Edward Hanlon, strongly endorsed an overall policy of state development with its 
concomitant emphasis on achieving efficiency tiirough forward planning and co-
ordination. I argue that, rather than being the recipient of the benefits of an existing 
situation, Ken^ played a determining role in the evolution of the poUtical 
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INTRODUCTION 
In describing J. R. Kemp as "the grand pooh-bah", J. M. Powell evoked the image of 
an unassailably powerfiil public official vs^ o had forged his own administrative 
"empire"^ In Queensland Parliament, Kemp was variously described as the 
Government's chief technical adviser, "one of the best pubhc servants in Australia", 
a "superman" who held more positions than any other public official in Queensland, 
and a "Hitier" on v^om the government conferred "despotic" powers embodying 
"the principles of fascism."^ A civil engineer,^  John Robert Kemp was widely 
regarded as the most influential official in Queensland government administration in 
the years from his appointment in 1939 as Co-ordinator-General of Public Works 
(Co-Ordinator-General) until his retirement in 1954. Although he was respected both 
personally and professionally, and never lacked supporters willing to defend him in 
public debates, his role in govemment administration was the subject of on-going 
controversy. This was due in large part to the wide-ranging decision-making powers 
delegated to him and the administrative independence they allowed, the 
government's acknowledgement of its dependence on him in planning and co-
ordinating state public works development, and the "empire" of influence he 
consequently assembled. 
' J. M. Powell, Plains of Promise, Rivers of Destiny: Water Management and the Development of 
Queensland, 1924-1990,Bowenm\ls: Boolarong, 1991,p.240. 
^ W. Forgan Smith, State Development and Public Works Organisation Act Amendment Bill, 1940, 
Initiation, Queensland Parliamentary Debates(QPD), 1940, Vol.176, p.250; A E. Moore, Second 
Reading, op. cit., p.270; J. Dart, State Development and Public Works Organisation Bill, 1938, 
Second Reading, QPD, 1938, Vol. 172, p.256; J. Maher, op.cit., p. 162. 
^ Unless otherwise stated, all following references to engineers are to civil engineers. 
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The principal aims of this dissertation are to explain why and how Kemp achieved 
his position of administrative power and to assess the extent of his influence on tiie 
direction of pubhc works development in Queensland. In 1932, the Labor 
Govemment or, more particularly, the Premier, William Forgan Smith, had 
announced the intention to pursue for the first time a policy of planning centrally-
controlled public works of a permanent nature. Its intended aim was to counter high 
unemployment and to secure the livelihood of workers and small producers in the 
State's primary industries. The decision, initially manifested in the creation of tiie 
Bureau of Industry, signaled a political commitment to large-scale infrastructure 
development programmes which was not readily accepted either by the Labor Party 
and its constituents or by senior departmental officials. Endorsed by strong Labor 
leaders, it endured through successive governments and laid the foimdation for the 
characterisation of Queensland as "the state of development" and its politics as "the 
politics of development" "* 
Much of the analysis covering this period is concerned with charting cause and 
effect, or inputs and outcomes, within a strictly political discourse. The role of pubhc 
officials in particular policy areas has tended to be equated with tiie advisory, 
instrumental role assigned to them by the Westminster model of responsible 
govemment and thus undervalued or ignored. One exception was the Public Service 
Commissioner, J. D. Story, wiiose advice tiie govemment of the day heeded in 
matters extending well beyond his principal responsibility for pubhc service 
industrial matters. Another was economist, Colin Clark, who is seen as the dominant 
official of this period and whose influence on the overall direction of Queensland 
* Colin Hughes, "Queensland" in John Rorke (ed.) Politics at State Level - Australia, Sydney: 
Department Adult Education, University of Sydney, no date (n.d.), p.44. 
economic policy has been accorded political significance.^  On the face of it, Kemp 
was unexceptional. He was a man for the times, one of the many administrators with 
technical expertise whose professional goals were in step with those of development-
oriented governments and vdio were given responsibility for the efficient dehvery of 
specific infrastructure projects. Yet he was exceptional in that none of his 
professional colleagues in Queensland achieved anything approaching Kemp's level 
of administrative power. Arguably, the range and comprehensive nature of his 
powers and responsibilities were not matched by other well-known engineer-
administrators influential in aspects of state development, such as John Monash in 
Victoria, Allan Knight in Tasmania and R. J. Dumas in Westem Australia^ 
Within Queensland, not only was Kemp's singularly powerful role acknowledged, if 
not always endorsed, by his contemporaries but his mfluence on the State's 
infrastructure development has also endured. He set the precedent for tiie dominance 
of the engineer-administrator in this field and the continuing identification of the Co-
Ordinator-General as "the most powerful public servant" in Queensland well into the 
1980s,^  as well as instituting public works' planning and construction processes that 
' See Chilla Bulbeck, "Colin Clark and the Greening of Queensland: The Influence of a Senior 
Public Servant on Queensland Economic Development 1938 to 1952". Paper read to Royal 
Australian Institute of Public Administration Administrative History Conference, University of 
Queensland, 1986. Photocopy, 1987; Ross Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s: A History of 
Queensland. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press (UQP), 1984, pp. 181-4. 
* Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982; Doug 
Lowe, The Price of Power: The Politics Behind the Tasmanian Dams Case, Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1984, Chapters 2-4; Lenore Layman, "Development Ideology in Westem Australia" 
Historical Studies, 20, 79,1982, pp. 234-60. 
' Colin Hughes, The Govemment of Queensland, St. Lucia: UQP, 1980, p.220, Kenneth Wiltshire, 
"The Public Service" in Allan Patience, (ed.). The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership: 1968-1983 -
Issues in Public Policy, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1985, p. 192, quoted in J. R. Minnery, 
"Co-ordination and the Queensland Co-ordinator-General" M. Pub. Ad. Thesis, University of 
Queensland, 1988, p. 85. 
are still being followed tod^.^ Yet, for all that, Kemp is a largely forgotten figure 
and even studies of Queensland development pohtics that highlight tiie role of public 
officials ignore him or refer only to his functional responsibilities.^ 
Kemp arrived in Queensland in 1920 to take up an ^pointment as head of the newly-
created Main Roads Board, the State's first centralised roads authority.^° Trained as a 
civil engineer in Victoria, he had held positions in govemment departments and with 
Karkarooc Shire in the Mallee district, before being promoted to senior engineer with 
the Country Roads Board shortly before he moved to Queensland. The Main Roads 
Board was created in response to pressure from Ministers representing northem 
Queensland electorates seeking improved transport access to ensure the economic 
survival of new agricultural settlements being opened up in their region. Main roads, 
defined as passing through two or more local authority areas, were not intended to 
challenge railways as the prime mode of bulk transport facilities and, as he was given 
little in the way of staff, funding and political support, Kemp struggled to form an 
effective organisation. He travelled constantly throughout the state, slowly achieving 
a cooperative relationship with local autiiority representatives who were naturally 
suspicious of any govemment authority with the capacity to undermine local control 
over works programmes. Consohdating his position with his appointment as sole 
Main Roads Commissioner in 1925, Kemp built up a cohesive, efficient organisation 
that was useful to the Govemment as a non-political, reliable channel for allocating 
^ A topical example is the contract for construction of the Brisbane River footbridge. Under a 
process introduced in 1939, the contractor is "overseen by the Department of Main Roads and is 
answerable to the Co-Ordinator-General". Courier-Mail, 2.6.2001. 
' See, for example, M. A. Jones, "The Govemment and Economic Growth in Queensland, 1930-40, 
B. A. thesis. University of Queensland, 1966, Malcolm Thomis, A History of the Electricity Supply 
Industry in Queensland. Vol. 1, Brisbane: Boolarong, 1988. 
channel for allocating local works funding and boosting local employment on a state-
wide basis. By the end of the 1920s, Main Roads had become so effective in carrying 
out its charter that it began to challenge the status of railways as the agent of state 
development through land settlement. As Main Roads Commissioner, Kemp was 
appointed to the newly-created State Transport Board in 1931. Established by the 
Moore Country-Progressive-National Govemment as a body to advise on the co-
ordination of state transport, it was accompanied by the transfer of Main Roads from 
Public Lands to Transport," in an attempt to control the expansion of Main Roads' 
influence. 
At the onset of the 1930s economic Depression era, Kemp was ^pointed to the State 
Employment Council vsdiich the Moore Govemment established to generate 
employment-creating public and private works projects. After Labor was returned to 
govemment in 1932, it established the Bureau of Industry which retained the same 
committee stmcture and carried on the Council's work on a more comprehensive 
scale. Kemp was appointed Chairman of the Bureau s Roads, Mining and General 
Works Committee and later the three Works Boards responsible for the construction 
of the Story Bridge, the Somerset Dam and the new University of Queensland at St. 
Lucia, tiie major large-scale employment projects of the Depression era. The benefits 
of Kemp's close links with local govemment were acknowledged with his 
appointment to chair the Royal Commission on Electricity Supply which, in its 1936 
report, recommended the centralisation of electricity generation and supply under a 
'" For a short biography, see Kay Cohen "Sir John Kemp", in John Ritchie, (general editor), 
Australian Dictionary ofBiqgraphy, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000, 15, pp. 1-2. 
" B. A. Cotterell, "The Machinery of Govemment", in D. J. Mnphy, R. B. Joyce, Colin A. Hughes 
(eds.). Labor in Power: The Labor Party and Governments in Queensland 1915-57, St. Lucia: 
UQP, 1980, p. 86. 
new statutory authority, the Queensland Electricity Commission. ^ ^ The following 
year, he was a member of the Royal Commission on Transport. In January 1939, on 
his return from an overseas tour during which he inspected large-scale infrastructure 
development schemes in Europe and Nortii America and also investigated the co-
ordination of public works in Sweden and Germany, he accepted the Premier's offer 
of an additional appointment as Co-ordinator-General of Public Works, the first 
administrative position of its kind in Westem democracies. Under the enabling 
legislation, powers were delegated to the Co-ordinator-General to co-ordinate and 
make recommendations for the approval of all public works proposals within an 
overall co-ordinated plan of works. After being approved by Treasury and the 
Executive, a step that was reduced to little more than a formality within a few years, 
the co-ordinated plan was presented to the Austrahan Loan Council for inclusion in 
tiie determination of annual loan funding allocations to the Commonwealth and the 
States. Thus Kemp joined the Under-Secretary, Treasury, in accompanying the 
Premier to Loan Council meetings where his bureaucratic networking and technical 
soimdness proved valuable in the bargaining process, while the presentation of a co-
ordinated plan of public works denoted administrative efficiency and tended to 
increase the prospects of a more favorable outcome for Queensland. 
As Main Roads Commissioner, Kemp made decisions, subject in principle to 
Ministerial approval, on main roads' routes, variations in financial agreements with 
local authorities and numerous transport vehicle regulations. Together with the Co-
Ordinator-General's delegated powers, they comprised an unprecedented level of 
powers and responsibilities to be vested in one official. Botii govemment and 
'^  Thomis, op.cit 
opposition MLAs'^  soon recognised the advantages of a rational, technical, and thus 
demonstrably non-political, ^proach to public works' approvals. The delegations of 
their constituents who came to Brisbane to petition for basic public works for their 
local areas realised that gaining the approval of the Co-Ordinator-General was as 
essential as gaining ministerial approval. The positive relationship Kemp had 
achieved with the majority of local authority representatives through his Main 
Roads' work also defused the perceived threat to their autonomy posed by the Co-
Ordinator-General's so-called "coercive powers", the most contentious of wiiich was 
the power to compel local authorities to undertake approved works. 
With the outbreak of World War Two, Kemp provided the technical and 
administrative backing for the Premier's unsuccessful campaign for a share of 
Commonwealth defence works' funding and, in 1942, was appointed chairman of the 
committee appointed to consolidate the State's shipbuilding industry. In May that 
year the Commonwealth set up the Allied Works Council under National Director E. 
G. Theodore. Kemp was appointed the Council's Deputy Director in Queensland 
with responsibility for co-ordinating and implementing the nortiiem defence works 
programme. He had the Govemment's confidence and, as head of the Main Roads 
Commission (MRC), the only organisation in Queensland with the stmcture and 
c^ability to initiate and supervise a state-wide works programme, as well as the 
official wiio controlled all information on the State's public works position, he was 
well-qualified for the appointment. The value of Queensland's co-ordination 
initiative in addressing the problems of organising a national defence works 
programme was acknowledged vwth the appointment of a National Works Co-
ordinator to the Loan Council and similar appointments by State governments. 
'^  Members ofthe Legislative Assembly. 
The shift ofthe Allied war effort in the Pacific to Queensland in 1943 called for the 
immediate construction of defence works on an unprecedented scale. Defence and 
southem state public works authorities were publicly skeptical about Queensland's 
capacity to carry out the task but the programme was implemented in record time and 
to the satisfaction ofthe Allied Forces' command.^ "* The administrative and technical 
skills Kemp displayed in fulfilling his wartime responsibilities were widely 
acknowledged as the critical factor in the success of Queensland's defence 
constmction programme. By 1943, planning for post-war reconstmction had become 
an important item on the national political agenda In Queensland, Labor created the 
Bureau of Investigation of Land and Water Resources to further its decision to 
support state development through regional water conservation, irrigation and hydro-
electricity schemes. The implementation of these schemes became one ofthe most 
controversial and divisive issues ofthe post-war period, wiierein pohticians and 
specialist officials from the three levels of govemment vigorously contested the 
merits of every proposal put forward. Kemp was ^pointed chairman ofthe Bureau 
rather than an irrigation and water supply specialist. Seconding specialist advisers 
from govemment and industry agencies and using Main Roads staff and resources, 
he initiated an on-going series of surveys and reports which laid the foundation for 
the majority of future infrastructure projects in this field. The Bureau provided the 
means by which Kemp advanced his own preference for large-scale water 
conservation, irrigation and hydro-electricity projects in Central and North 
Queensland, in this, he was strenuously but unsuccessfully opposed by Colin Clark, 
the Govemment's chief economic adviser, who advocated what he considered to be 
'* For full details ofthe programme, see Main Roads Commission, The History ofthe Queensland 
Main Roads Commission During World War 11, Brisbane: Govemment. Printer, 1949. 
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the more economically viable and popularly acceptable option of a widely-dispersed 
programme of small-scale projects.^ * 
Under the auspices of Prime Minister Ben Chifley, the Northern Australian 
Development Committee was established in 1944 to investigate proposals for post-
war infrastructure development in northem Austraha. Ken^ was one of two 
Queensland members ofthe Committee's technical sub-committee with 
responsibility for reporting on Queensland proposals to be considered for inclusion in 
a post-war northem development plan. Queensland alone retained the mechanism of 
public works co-ordination in the post-war period and, as Co-Ordinator-General, 
Kemp continued to be the Govemment's principal liaison with the National Works 
Council in the on-going battle to reinstate State public works priorities for loan 
funding allocations. As a member ofthe Secondaty Industries Committee which in 
1946 produced a report judged to be "the most comprehensive attempt to consider 
the role and prospects of manufacturing in Queensland"^^ and as chairman of a broad 
range of investigative committees and advisory boards, he was also the 
Govemment's adviser on private sector proposals for joint venture resources and 
industrial development schemes. 
The Co-ordinator-General was made a constmction authority early in World War 
Two and, in the post-war period, took over responsibility from the Bureau of 
Industry for the uncompleted Works Boards' projects. The organisation not only 
'^  See, for example, D. J. Murphy, "Agriculture 1932-57" in Murphy, et al., 1980, op. cit.. pp.215-
216; Colin Clark, "Has Australia Got Water on The Brain", New Commonwealth (London), 18 
March 1954, pp.265-66; M. Gough, H. Hughes, B. J. McFarlane, G. R. Pahner, Queensland 
Industrial Enigma: Manifacturing in the Economic Development of Queensland, Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1964, p. 14. 
'* Kenneth Wiltshire, "Manufacturing" in Muiphy, et al., 1980, op. cit, p.277. 
became the State's dominant constmction authority but secured the best of its civil 
design and constmction engineers. The resentment expressed by otiier constmction 
authorities at Kemp's control ofthe available engineering expertise under Main 
Roads and the Co-Ordinator-General was just one ofthe reasons for the spate of 
public attacks that followed against the Co-Ordinator-General and, for the first time, 
against Kemp personally. Kemp retained the confidence of Premier Hanlon v^ iio 
successfully defended his Govemment's decision to continue its high level of 
reliance on one official. In the aftermath, Kemp survived a challenge to his 
domination of irrigation and water supply development but, in 1949, relinquished his 
appointment as Main Roads Commissioner. Soon afterwards. Main Roads was 
designated a public service department while Kemp took on anotiier administtative 
responsibility as Chairman ofthe newly-created Burdekin River Authority. From this 
position, he used the resources of Main Roads and the Co-Ordinator-General, and 
personally lobbied for the support of influential men across Ausfralia, to advance his 
visionary plan for North Queensland development. As he approached the statutory 
retirement age and Vincent Gair succeeded Hanlon as Premier, Kemp's influence 
with the Premier ofthe day diminished. In 1949 he had been appointed Deputy-
Chairman ofthe Queensland-British Food Corporation with responsibility for 
implementing the Peak Downs "food-for-Britain" scheme. By 1954, he had retired 
from all his official positions, but the Gair govemment subsequaitly appointed him 
to oversee the scheme's hquidation, a task he completed shortly before his death in 
Febmary 1955. 
Kemp had a life-long commitment to raising professional engineering standards. A 
foundation member of tiie Institution of Engineers, Australia (lEAust), he served as 
President in 1931, having been President ofthe Queensland Division in 1927. 
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Although he was not regarded as an "engineer's engineer", ^ ^ his expertise in the 
science of road constmction was widely recognised. In 1929, he succeeded in having 
established in Queensland, Australia's first Professional Engineers' Registration 
Board, and encouraged local autiiorities to ^point qualified engineers to oversee 
their public works programmes. A Govemment representative on the University of 
Queensland Senate, he liaised with the Engineering faculty on curriculum content 
and, through his organisations, was a major employer of engineering trainees and 
graduates. His enduring contribution to Queensland engineering lay in the 
opportunities his support for large-scale infrastmcture projects provided to 
demonstrate that Queensland's engineering expertise was equal to the best in 
Austraha. 
There are innumerable Australian and international studies on power and its 
distribution in the politics-administration relationship. The constmction of theories 
for its definition and analysis can have any number of starting points and utilise 
widely differing methodologies. However, there are as many critics as there are 
theories, their verdict being that particular theories fail to address the complexities of 
the concept and resist comprehensive application to actual situations. One outcome 
of particular relevance to specialist administrators in the Australian context has been 
to invalidate the politics-adminisfration dichotomy as a means of controlling 
potential political influence or actions on the part of senior officials. The notion is 
predicated on the neutral, instmmental role conventionally assigned to them under 
the 'Westminster' model of responsible govemment, but there is clear evidence that 
governments do give them legitimate decision-making power in certain 
circumstances, while heads of semi-government authorities often hold statutory 
" Personal interview, Ben Russo, formerly design engineer, Co-Ordinator-General, 31.3.2000. 
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powers in their own right. Moreover, tiie assertion that policy advice is value-neutral 
has been labelled a myth. Given the difficulties of using outcomes to prove the 
level of individual decision-making power, some analysts have broadened tiieir 
approach to examine a range of elements as variables capable of influencing how and 
why administrators accumulate and exercise power. There is a particular emphasis on 
the administrator's personal attributes and tiie societal and professional basis ofthe 
values he brings to the administrative process. ^ ^ With reference to technical 
specialists, attention is also paid to their identification with vocational goals and the 
effect ofthe formation of elite professional corps within an administration. 
This type of study has been used in the United States to formulate prescriptive 
models of bureaucratic decision-making while, in Austraha, the focus on the 
administrator as a value-oriented individual has also been directed towards 
substantiating the concept of administrative style. A precise definition having proved 
elusive, writers have been reluctant to assess an administrator's relationship to power 
in terms of administrative style. Biography has been suggested as an ^propriate 
analytical vehicle and Serle's study of Victorian engineer-administtator, John 
Monash, is cited as a successful example of its use.^ ° Its success as biography owed 
'^  Peter Wilenski, Public Power and Public Administration, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1986, 
pp. 52-3; Robert Hyslop, Australian Mandarins: Perceptions ofthe Role of Departmental 
Secretaries, Canberra: Australian Govenmient Printing Service(AGPS), 1993, pp. 107-112; R. L. 
Wettenhall, "The Ministerial Department: British Origins and Australian Adaptations", Public 
Administration, Sydney, 32, 3, September 1973, pp.243-5. 
" See, for example, John A. Armstrong, The European Administrative Elite, Princeton University 
Press, 1973; Margali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise cf Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 
°^ Jean Holmes, "Administrative Style and Sir John Monash" in R. N. Spann & G. R. Cumow (eds.). 
Public Policy arui Administration in Australia: A Reader, Sydney: Wiley & Sons, 1975, p.370; 
Serle, op. a/., 1982. 
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much to the author's access to the comprehensive private records Monash 
maintained, a practice that Kemp and many other specialist administrators in 
Australia did not emulate. In any event, tiie aims ofthe dissertation take it outside the 
realm of biogr^hy, although its analysis of Kemp's career in terms of potentially 
influential elements may have some resonance with an assessment of administtative 
style. 
Some studies in the body of literature on specialist adminisfrators suggest that 
engineer-adminisfrators have a relationship to decision-making power that becomes 
comprehensible through the identification of common elements of influence. I argue 
that, while this ^proach supplies a framework for explaining Kemp's position, it 
does not adequately explain the unique concenfration of responsibilities and powers 
vested in him and the associated outcomes. Being necessarily framed in general 
terms, it is also unable to accommodate the effects of local personality and 
environmental factors. The dissertation tests this argument in charting Kemp's 
progression to a position of power, the exercise of his administtative power and the 
outcomes in terms of influencing tiie direction of Queensland public works' 
development. To expand on the previous infroductory discussion, it begins with an 
overview ofthe literature on specialist administtators witii particular reference to the 
profession of engineers and its influential place in govemment administtation. The 
most comprehensive analyses of professionals in govemment service are found in the 
literature relating to France and the United States, v\4iile many ofthe reference texts 
published before the 1980s were selected in order to reflect more closely the 
particular theoretical orientation ofthe period under review. To retain some thematic 
clarity in dealing with its complexities, the investigation and analysis of Kemp's rise 
to a position of administtative power are separated into chronological periods loosely 
13 
defined by additions and changes to his functional responsibilities and organisation 
bases. 
This is the first study of Kemp's career in its entirety. Evan Richard, an engineer 
with tiie Stanley River Works Board who also worked on the wartime constmction of 
Caimcross Dock, intended to write Kemp's biography but died before he could make 
a start on it.^ ^ The few other studies to examine his administtative role deal with one 
particular area of his responsibilities. Minnery's 1988 tiiesis makes reference to 
Kemp as one ofthe four men to hold the appointment from 1939 to 1988 in 
examining the concepts of co-ordination and their q)plication to Queensland's Co-
Ordinator-General. Mirmery offers some constmctive insights into the exercise ofthe 
Co-Ordinator-General's delegated powers and its implications for administtative 
dominance, and determines that personality was also important in explaining Kemp's 
influence.^ ^ A. J. Wheeler presents a more detailed study of Kemp in the context of 
his relationship as Co-Ordinator-General with the Austtalian Loan Council. Drawing 
on departmental sources, he presents a complimentary picture ofthe complexities of 
Kemp's responsibilities, his approach to handling them and the Govemment's 
reliance on him to bring about the efficient implementation of public works through 
co-ordination.^ Bmce Davidson and J. M. Powell are critical of Kemp's role in 
irrigation and water supply development and his support for the mega-infrastructure 
schemes proposed for North Queensland. Powell was outtaged at the coercive 
'^ See E. L. Richard, "Sir John Kemp" in Geoffrey Cossins (ed.). Eminent Queensland Engineers, 1, 
Brisbane: Institution of Engineers Australia (lEAust) Queensland Division, 1988. 
22 Minnery, op. cit. See also, .John R. Minnery, "Modelling Coordination", Australian Journal of 
Public Administration (AJPA), XLVH, 3, September 1988, p.257. 
^^  A. J. Wheeler, "To Be a Superman: Intergovernmental Relations respecting Queensland Local 
Bodies and Loan Works Coordination, 1938-45" Master Urban Studies, (Govemment Option), 
University of Queensland, 1974. 
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authority Kemp employed to block the Department of Irrigation and Water Supply 
and its engineers from what he considered was their right to confrol water resources 
administtation. His account ofthe post-war interdepartmental stmggle provides a 
useful counter to uncritical assessments ofthe means Kemp employed to hold his 
position of power Elsewhere Kemp is given space in a range of publications on 
Queensland's politics and history, either in the form of a biogr^hical summary or 
with reference to ttie exercise of his powers as Main Roads Conmiissioner and Co-
Ordinator-General. Histories of local authorities acknowledge Kemp, usually seeing 
him as synonymous with the bureauaatic processes involved in advancing local 
works programmes but occasionally noting his assistance with particular 
development goals. Apart from confirming the extensive nature of his contact with 
local govemment, business and producer representatives throughout Queensland, 
they are useful for illusttating the organisational and operational procedures he 
instituted.^ ^ 
By contrast, there is a wealth of primary source material on which to draw. It 
includes parliamentary debates, numerous commissioned reports, annual reports and 
departmental files of relevant authorities at three levels of govemment, the Main 
Roads oral histoty series, and the Evan Richard collection. I also interviewed 
engineers formerly from Main Roads and the Co-Ordinator-General >^ o^ knew 
Kemp towards the end of his administtative career. Kemp apparently did not 
maintain a collection of private papers which might have provided information on his 
personal attitudes and ambitions. However, if the anecdotal evidence that his work 
^* Powell, op. cit.; B. W. Davidson, The Northem Myth, Melbourne: Melboiome University Press, 
1965. 
^^  See, for example, John Kerr, Black Snow and Liquid Gold: A History ofthe Burdekin Shire, Ayr: 
Burdekin Shire Council, 1994; E. H. Short, A/>/4^ajr With Tobacco, Dimbulah: E. H. Short, n.d. 
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was his life is accepted, it is possible to build up some sense ofthe individual from 
official sources. Kemp had the freedom accorded to heads of semi-independent 
authorities to express his opinions on particular issues in annual and other reports. 
Addition^ information came from personal correspondence scattered through 
departmental files, comments he made as file margin notes and tiie themes of talks he 
gave on radio and to select groups. Newspapers were helpful in identifying the 
events and issues deemed to be of public importance and supplying more information 
on Kemp's administtative viewpoint. Their use also raised interesting questions 
about the ministerial-official relationship and the assumption of shared goals 
between specialist administtators and political leaders. Queensland's political leaders 
knew the value of newspapers as a vehicle for promoting the "govemment line" in 
potentially sensitive policy areas and turning public works funding announcements to 
their electoral advantage. As senior technical adviser, Kemp drafted the press 
releases and it was in this capacity that he also built up a high pubhc profile. In the 
reporting of govemment announcements of public works and development decisions, 
he was routinely cast as the impartial, technical assessor. Ministers clearly made use 
of his comments in this role to defuse any ensuing conttoversy over the decisions, 
but Kemp was also adept at utihsing newspaper coverage to promote his own goals. 
That so much archival material has been preserved says a great deal about the ethos 
ofthe organisations Kemp instituted. However, its comprehensive nature aeated a 
problem in the significant investment of time needed to complete the background 
research and organise the results. Fulfilling the aims ofthe dissertation determined 
the selection of reference material and the emphasis on certain sections in preference 
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to others. As a result, some issues arising from Kemp's operational activities and 
aspects of Queensland's public works environment have not been examined or have 
rated only a brief mention. Where possible, reference is made to existing publications 
to supply the contextual background of political events and issues. 
The persistently negative image of State development which has extended to the 
work of Main Roads and the Co-Ordinator-General, and the engineer-administtators 
associated witii them, may account for the failure of serious studies of Queensland to 
give proper weight to their role in what was entailed in the goveming of Queensland 
during this period. The importance ofthe specialist administtator was brought home 
to me initially when I researched the constmction ofthe Mount Isa to Camooweal 
road in World War Two. Having already decided to upgrade the centtal Austtalian 
supply line from Adelaide through Alice Springs to Darwin, Commonwealth defence 
authorities refused to consider Queensland's proposal to link Townsville with 
Tennant Creek by building a road west from the Mount Isa rail terminus. Kemp 
persuaded the Queensland Govemment to finance a start on the road while he 
lobbied in Melboume and Canberra for defence works funds to continue. Even E. G. 
Theodore, (a former Queensland Premier) then Director ofthe Allied Works Council, 
initially tumed him down. The Allied Forces convoys which were using the road 
even as it was being constmcted demonsttated its value as a supply line but it was 
not until the U. S. Army Command backed the project that the Austtalian defaice 
authorities agreed to fund the road's completion.^ ^ TTie legacy of Kemp's persistence, 
successful co-ordination of an exfraordinary logistical exercise and use ofthe 
*^ Kay Cohen, Building the Mount Isa to Camooweal Defence Road: Main Roads Commission 
World War Two Defence Projects in North-west Queensland, typescript, Queensland Dept of 
Transport, Australia Remembers Project, 1995. 
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wartime situation to Queensland ends, was a bitumen road servicing a remote region 
ofthe State and built principally at Commonwealth expense. 
In explaining Kemp's influential position, this study attempts to convey an 
understanding ofthe dynamics ofthe administtative process and the politics-
administtation relationship in the context of Queensland's public works and 
infrastmcture development. As the influence of engineer-administtators in this area 
of state govemment policy is still a conttoversial issue, it also makes a case for the 
adoption of a broader analytical perspective which routinely acknowledges senior 
public officials and their role in Queensland's govemance. 
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ENGINEER-ADMINISTRATORS AND TECHNOCRATIC POWER 
Any attempt to explain John Kemp's position as Queensland's most powerful 
govemment official in the 1940s and early 1950s needs to include some review of 
the concept of power and its distribution in a democratic society. In referring to the 
vast body of available work on this topic, the dissertation runs the risk of becoming 
immersed in the complexities and contradictions ofthe debate on power. The debate 
itself then becomes the subject, instead of providing the context for developing an 
understanding of tiie particular features and circumstances of Kemp's relationship to 
power. Accordingly, the following discussion begins with a summary in this context 
of issues and ttends in the literature on power before proceeding to examine in more 
detail the principal themes ofthe relationship betweai the engineer-administtator and 
administtative power. 
Studies of power demonsttate wide-ranging variations in scope and focus. The 
approaches to the problem of determining what constitutes power in a democratic 
society and how it is acquired and exercised have been ^tly described as "inevitably 
eclectic", being dependent for the most part on the orientation ofthe writer and the 
purpose ofthe analysis.' The debate on power revolves around distribution, access, 
conflict and conttols, and highli^ts issues of legitima<ty, equahty, accountability and 
responsiveness. Just as there is no general theory of democracy, tiiere is no general 
' P. Reynolds, Political Sociology: An Australian Perspective, Melboume: Longman Cheshire, 
1991, p.64. 
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theory of power in a democratic society.^  The critical responses to inconsistaicies in, 
for example, pluralist, elite and ruling class theoretical explanations about its sources 
and its distribution, which have fostered new theories of groupings or divisions, 
confirm tiiat power remains a dynamic concept and thus not amenable to any 
universal formula. Individuals, organisations and the act or process of decision-
making have, at one time or another, been assigned a leading role in theories of 
power. Each of these sttands developed its own distinctive body of work in which, 
more often than not, the issue of power became peripheral. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the literature on administtation. The volume of 
writing that followed the pioneering work of Bums and Stalker on organisation and 
management, Taylor and Fayol on administtation as scientific management, and 
Elton Mayo, his colleagues and sociologists such as Robert Merton and Phillip 
Selznick on human relations, took the organisation as its theoretical paradigm.' 
Ensuing studies were principally behavioural or stmctural-functional in orientation 
and used both theoretical and empirical approaches to analyse the features of 
organisations and their members, and the dynamics of their inter-relationships. A 
further m^or dimension was the presentation of organisation as bureaucracy initiated 
by the writings of European theorists, including Weber, Michels and Crozier. 
^ For a summary of trends in Australian studies of political power, see, for example, Dennis 
Woodward, Andrew Parkin, and John Summers, (eds), Govemment, Politics and Power in 
Australia, (Third Edition), Melboume: Longman Cheshire, 1985, Section 2. 
' For a more comprehensive overview, see P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, Second 
Edition, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977; Andrew Dimsire, Administration - The Word and 
the Science, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1973, Chapter 7; Alexander Kouzmin, "Control and 
Organisation: Towards a Reflexive Analysis" in Paul Boreham and GeofFDow (eds). Work and 
Inequality, Volume 2 of. Ideology and Control in the Capitalist Labour Process, South 
Melboume: The Macmillan Company of Australia, 1980; see also, Philip Selznick, Leadership in 
Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, New York: Row, Petersen & Co., 1957, pp.2-3. 
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Weber's "ideal-type" approach to understanding the role of bureaucracy in society 
fostered an on-going debate on the potential of a rational, legal-autiiority model of 
organisation to deliver the most efficient, if not the perfect mode of administtation." 
At the same time, attention was drawn to the importance of pohty- or decision-
making as a function of organisation and, as such, a characteristic function of 
administtation and adminisfrators. As well as an outcome, decision-making was seen 
to be a process of "problem definition, altemative development, altemative appraisal, 
and solution selection"^ The work of Wildavsky and others not only highlighted the 
interaction of numerous intemal and external participants and the conditions of 
uncertainty and inconclusiveness in \niiich decision-making took place but, as the 
new field of implemaitation studies indicated, also gave rise to new conceptual 
approaches to its understanding.* However, instances in the United States ofthe 
failure of public policy to deliver expected outcomes and inconsistent conclusions 
from the application of accepted analytical models raised doubts about the efficacy 
of prescriptive models. The reasoning behind one writer's comment that; 
"Everything is normatively correct, but human beings don't operate that way",^  
supported the complementary usage of prescriptive and descriptive models to address 
the perceived gap between theory and practice. According to Robbins: 
" Martin Albrow, Bureaucracy, London: The Macmillan Company, 1970, Chapter 3; Christopher 
Ham and Michael Hill, The Policy Process in the Modem Cc^italist State, Brighton: Wheatsheaf 
Books, 1984, pp. 114-15; Dimsire, op. cit., pp. 82-84. 
^ Stephen P. Robbins, The Administrative Process: Integrating Theory and Practice, New Jersey: 
Pientice-Hall, 1976,p.39. 
* Ham and Hill, op. cit., Chapter 7; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, Boston: Little Brown, 1971, p. 3. G. Davis, .T. Wanna, J. Warfiurst, P. Weller, Public 
Policy in Australia, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988, Chapter 6. 
' Leonard R. Sayles, Leadership, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p.4. 
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Normative models determine actions that produce an optimal solution. In 
conttast, descriptive models are functioning properly when tiiey accurately 
describe the activity they represent... An understanding of both kinds of 
models and their differences is mandatory for tiie development of 
administtators capable of deahng with the realities of organizational life; 
politically motivated behaviour, power stmggles, and the desire by 
administtators for peaceful and harmonious relations among organizational 
members.^  
His view ofthe role of descriptive models is particularly relevant to a discussion of 
engineer-administtators. In his textbook approach, Robbins summarised the concerns 
of leading writers to restore the centtality of power to the debate on decision-making 
and to acknowledge tiie political dimension of organisational behaviour.' 
As with "administtation" and "policy", power can have any number of meanings and 
attempts to arrive at a precise definition have been more hkely to promote 
conttoversy tiian to settle it. One point of agreement is that power is a relational 
concept, in that it has meaning only in relation to another person or entity, and that 
power-seeking behaviour requires two or more parties to be involved. Various early 
definitions proposed a consideration of power as the potential to induce or influence 
the decisions and actions of others."* They were criticised as one-dimensional for 
failing to accommodate the multiple layers of power relationships, for being too 
specifically attached to one theory ofthe distribution of power, especially in view of 
Edelman's contention that governments initiated and used policy decisions for 
symbohc purposes, and the work of Bachrach and Baratz on the manipulation ofthe 
^ Robbins, op. cit, pp.52-53. 
' Ibid; See also T H. Rigby, "Bureaucratic Politics: An Introduction", Public Administration, 
(Sydney) March 1973, pp. 8-9, who refers to the work of Michel Crozier (Jhe Bureaucratic 
Phenomenon, 1964) and Amatai Etzioni {A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, 
1961) as correcting the over-emphasis on human relations in the study of organisations; Self, op. 
cit., p.251; Davis, et al., op. cit, pp.202-03. 
'" Ham and Hill, op. cit., p.62. 
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decision-making agenda." However, the concept of power as influence remained 
persuasive as it was readily observable, applicable to tiie actions of individuals and 
groups or organisations as well as their societal relationships, and provided a 
substantive link between decision-making and power conflicts. 
Influence is the common factor in the five sources of power identified by French and 
Raven as reward, coercive, referent, expert and legitimate power.'^  Although the 
point is made that power as simply enforcing one's will is different from authority, 
Weber equated legitimate power with legitimate authority, a key principle of his 
bureaucratic model, which derived from "tihie belief of the subordinate in tiie 
legitimacy ofthe commands of his superior" " As Dunsire explains, in Weber's view 
this belief could be based on; 
First, the sacral nature ofthe superior person, "charismatic' authority; second, 
the inheritance of 'fraditional authority'; third, tiiat commands were derived 
from duties within a code of rules embracing both the superior and the 
subordinate ... legal authority ... the type of authority found in a modem 
organisation.'" 
Legitimacy conferred rights of command but there were differing views on whether 
these rights were attached to an organisational position or were derived directly from 
the information, expertise and functional competence held by the person. Whetfier 
power is exercised hierarchically or collectively in an organisation is a further matter 
for debate. In the first case final decision-making power rests with an individual. 
" Ibid, pp. 15-17; Peter Bachrach and Morton A. Baratz, Power and Poverty, New York: Oxford 
University Press (OUP). 1970, p. 18; Robbins, op. cit., p.86. 
'^  John R. P. French, Jnr., and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power ", in Dorwin Cartwright 
and Alvin Zander (eds.) Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, New York: Harper and Row, 
1968,pp.259-69. 
'^  Dunsire, op. cit., p.83. 
'" /Wrf, pp. 83-84. 
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usually the leader or head ofthe organisation whereas, in the second case, it resides 
within the organisation and is exercised by discrete groups of experts.'* 
Thus, autiiority, influence and decision-making as they apply to govemment oflJcials 
and bureaucratic organisations comprise the key concepts to understanding the 
relationship between administtative power and technical specialists such as 
engineers. 
ENGINEERS AND TECHNOCRACY 
Theories ofthe distribution of power have identified engineers as part of a power 
elite by dint of their monopoly of a particular technical expertise regarded as 
essential to the functioning of modem society. As an entity, they are regarded as a 
profession and wdiere they hold senior positions in technically-oriented organisations, 
they are labelled "technocrats" The considerable debate surrounding their influential 
role in goverrunent decision-making has taided to weigh perceptions ofthe positive 
aspects of rationahty, impartiality, efficiency and overall pubhc benefit against the 
negative aspects of a high level of administtative autonomy, an over-riding technical 
bias in policy advice and political dependence on their particular expertise.'* It was 
feared that the characteristics of technocratic power had the potential to compromise 
'* These points draw on Albrow, op. cit., p.39; Galbraith, J. K., The New Industrial State, Second 
edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971. See also, Edward Page, Political Authority and 
Bureaucratic Power, Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1985, p.36, p. 145. 
"* See, for example, E. A. Lyall,., "Knowledge and Power" mParliament, Bureaucracy, Citizens: 
Who Runs Australia, Proceedings of 38th Summer School, Australian Institute of Political 
Science, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972, p. 106; JeanMeynaud, Technocracy, (trans. Paul 
Barnes), London: Faber and Faber, 1968, p. 183. 
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the ttaditional notion of power in democratic societies as ordered and conttoUed by 
hierarchically orgarused institutions to safeguard the pubhc interest. In other words, 
technocrats were in a sfrong position to evade democratic mechanisms of confrol and 
exercise power without responsibility. Moreover, tiiey would win tiie competition for 
power to the extent of confrolling tiie influential participation in the poUcy process of 
business, labour and community interests. 
Similar alarmist views had been expressed about adminisfrative power from the time 
the bureaucratic form of organisation was accepted as the means of achieving an 
impartial and efficient adminisfrative system. While many researchers found the 
definition of bureaucracy as "govemment by officials" unremarkable, taking it as a 
base for advancing debate on the relative nature of official power," propositions such 
as Michel's "Iron Law of Ohgarchy", and the possibility, attributed to Weber, of 
bureaucratic expansion leading to officials confrolling the economy, appeared to 
validate these views.'* Their development was most evident in sociological and elite 
theoty studies. In challenging tiie public interest theory which advocated the concept 
"that conscientious, educated and well-disposed public servants will behave in the 
general pubhc interest"," these studies built up a more detailed understanding of 
occupational and behavioural characteristics at both individual and organisational 
levels in order to prescribe measures to redress inequalities in the distribution of 
power. One clear example ofthe application of these measures lay in the 
" Arnold Brecht, "How Bureaucracies Develop and Function" quoted in Albrow, op. cit, p.92. 
'" For details of Michels' 'Iron Law of Oligarchy', see Dunsire, op. cit, p. 185; Page, op. cit, p.5, 
p. 135; Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State, New York: The Ronald Press, 1948, pp.89-103 
quoted in Francis Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics & Public Policy, Second. Edition, Boston: Little 
Brown, 1976, p. 165; Ham and Hill, op. cit, p. 30. 
" F. C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service. Second Edition, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982, p.97. 
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administtative artangements for the United States' Tennessee Valley Authority 
which also served as a model for Austtaha's Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area As 
outhned by tiieir most notable proponent, Phillip Selznick, and the Authority's first 
Chairman, David Lillienthal, they epitomised the "grassroots" doctrine of 
administtation which opposed centtahsed, expert dominance as inimical to the 
project's aims. According to Lillienthal: 
When the technicians and the people live together, away from the cenfral seat 
of power, by that very fact the power of knowledge and of decision is 
diffused. ... The technician ... has no more excuse to pursue his expertness 
simply for the pleasure its refinements give him or to increase his own or his 
profession's repute, ...^ " 
Writers have analysed the relationship between senior public officials and 
adminisfrative power in the separate contexts of bureaucracy, professionalisation and 
technocraxty. It is an artificial distinction in many respects as all use the same 
language, explore similar issues and acknowledge expertise as a source of official 
power. The terms "administrative state", "professional state" and "technocratic state" 
are used to identify the heightened influence of officials as an outcome of a particular 
syntiiesis between organisation and expertise. At the same time, assertions that 
"bureaucracy and professionalism are two sub-types of a larger category - rational 
adminisfration",^ ' or that "professional power is... a sub-category of bureaucratic 
power",^ ^ support an argument for them being variations of one central theme. 
°^ Phillip Selznick, T. V. A. and the Grass Roots: A Stutfy in the Sociology of Formal Organization, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953, especially pp.262-66; David E. Lilienthal, T. V. A. 
Democracy On The March, Twentieth Anniversary Edition, New York: Harper, 1944, pp. 122-23; 
Joan Tully, "The Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area: Experiment in Agricultural Extension" in, B. B. 
Schaffer, and D. C. Corbett, (eds.) Decisions: Case Studies in Australian Administration, 
Melboume: Cheshire, 1965. 
^' Larson, op. cit, pp. 190-91. 
^^  Ham and Hill, op. cit., p. 142. 
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Technocracy in this context is a further sub-type characterised by technological 
expertise as the source of official power It is seen as a process of reaching decisions 
that allows tiie views of individual technical experts to dominate and technical 
factors to be "exalted" over broader economic and social considerations. ^ ^ Prior to 
the information technology "revolution", engineers in pubhc adminisfration were 
routinely cited as examples of technocrats. How they came to occupy that position 
derived from a number of factors; their command ofthe technological expertise 
needed to dehver the requirements for stability and growth in an industriahsed 
society, a edacity for organisational management, tiie determination to confrol their 
own work and protect it from confrol by others, a process of fraining and work 
sociahsation that reinforced professional values, efforts to convert their expert status 
into tiie social status and respect accorded to fraditional professions, and their 
identification as part ofthe adminisfrative, or power, elite. 
Throughout history, regimes have depended on the technical expertise associated 
with engineers to develop infrastructure for both civil and military purposes. 
Engineers' inventions made the Industrial Revolution possible and their irmovative 
solutions to the problem of building fransport networks allowed the potential of 
industrialisation to be realised through the growth of frade and commerce. In the 
early eighteenth century, in the course of defining the state in terms of civil rather 
than military administration, France elevated engineering and engineers to the cenfral 
adminisfrative role. The Corps des Ingenieurs des Fonts et Chaussees (variously 
franslated as Highways Department Engineers or Roads and Bridges Engineers), 
created in 1716 to constmct and administer France's transport and communications 
systems, was to be the means by which the state organised its confrol over tiie 
^ Self, op. cit, pp.208-09. 
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nation's defence, foreign affairs and economic activities. It was the first example of 
state adminisfration through the ^pointment of officials grouped according to their 
functional specialty. The establishment in 1747 of Z 'Ecole Nationale des Fonts et 
Chaussees, (ENPC The National School for Highways Engineers), followed ahnost 
immediately by the Inspectorate of Finance, initiated tiie formation of tiie Grandes 
Ecoles. The purpose ofthe five adminisfrative and two technical colleges v i^iich 
comprised the Grandes Ecoles was to frain the members of tiie Grands Corps, the 
semi-independent corporations around which France's adminisfrative system is 
organised. Offering the first formal engineering fraining in Europe, the ENPC frained 
engineers for the state and for private industry within France and abroad. By the 
1970s, just imder half the key positions in French ministries were held by members 
ofthe technical corps (the ENPC and the School of Mines), with engineers in the 
majority.^ '' French engineers pioneered designs for roads, bridges, ports, dams and 
canals wiiich noted British engineers such as Thomas Telford and John McAdam 
later used to advantage in carrying out their own infrastmcture projects across 
Europe. Sweden's Gotha canal which so impressed John Kemp during his 1938 
European tour was buih by Telford in 1834. In North America, West Point Military 
Academy provided the only formal engineering ttaining in this era and the military 
estabhshment, through the Army Corps of Engineers, maintained an influential role 
"^^  Ibid, p.l 97; This is a simplified summary of complex issues and events in an era of widespread 
political upheaval in Europe. For a more detailed coverage, see Jean Michel, "Les Grandes Ecoles 
Fran9aises: Origines et Developpement du Systeme de Formation des Ingenieurs en France" 
typescript, Paris: Ecole Nationale des Fonts et Chaussees, 1981. (For English translation, see Jean 
Michel, "The Genealogy ofthe Grandes Ecoles. Origins and development ofthe French system 
for the training of engineers", European Journal of Engineering Education, 5, 1981. 
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in national and regional development projects for many years." Canals rather than 
roads remained the preferred mode of commercial ttansport in both America and 
Europe until large-scale construction of railways began in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The concept of extending infrastmcture planning from purely 
local roads towards national roads and highways, first developed in Europe, became 
a reahty in other countries by the 1920s. 
Engineers were employed in private industry and by pubhc boards and privately-
financed corporations for the constmction of pubhc infrastmcture and utilities. The 
early European model of state-ttained engineers forming the basis of an 
administtative elite was exceptional. The majority of engineers, particularly in 
Britain, were regarded as essentially techrucal workers, ttained and enq)loyed under 
the ^prenticeship system and operating in a wide range of industrial and pubhc 
works. However, the leading engineers, most of whom undertook commissioned 
works projects, were by then distinguished by university qualifications in 
mathematics and physical sciences, even as universities were still resisting the 
estabhshment of dedicated vocational courses.^ * Accounts ofthe lives of some of 
these engineers highlight tiieir sense of contributing to the pubhc good. This is well 
illusttated in the little-known story, spanning the late eighteenth and early nineteentii 
centuries, ofthe three generations of engineers in author Robert Louis Stevenson's 
" For example. General Greville Dodge supervised the early work on the Union Pacific railway 
during the American Civil War. After the war ended in 1865, he resigned his commission to 
become the Union Pacific's chief engineer and oversee the railway's completion under military-
style discipline. See Stephen E. Ambrose, Nothing Like It In the World: The Men Who Built the 
Transcontinental Railroad 1863-1869, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000; US Anny Corps of 
Engineers, The History ofthe US Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D. C : The Corps, 1986. 
^ The early history of engineering draws on Richard Shelton Kirby, Engineering in History, New 
York: McGrawHill, 1956; see also, Armstrong, op. cit; Larson, op. cit. 
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family. Witii innovative genius and a determination to direct tiiefr efforts to tiie 
public good, tiiey succeeded in building all of Scotiand's hghthouses. Their 
employers, the Nortfiem Lights Commissioners, freated them indifferentiy and their 
work was often threatened by local communities of ship-wreckers for whom 
lighthouses meant destitution. Yet tiie family eventually established a financially 
viable business while ttaining young engineers in the new lighting techniques. The 
lighthouses they built withstood the elements and were instmmental in saving 
coimtiess lives, as well as a significant tonnage of commercial shipping. Thefr story 
is also a microcosm ofthe power issues associated with the administtation of public 
works and an example ofthe ttaditional model ofthe separate but conq)lementary 
roles of politics and administtation. Decisions on the location and budget for the 
lighthouses were usually open to sttongly-contested input from the engineers as well 
as diverse public and commercial interests. The Board made the final decisions on 
these matters but thereafter allowed the engineers a totally free hand to complete the 
projects." 
Historically, society was seen to benefit from the work of engineers as it contributed 
to the conditions for economic growth and, in enabling mechanical power to replace 
man-power, gained more leisure time and greater independence for the worker. In 
this context, it did not seem excessive to claim that "engineering has become an 
increasingly powerful factor in the development of civilizations" ^  Yet, with the 
exception of France and Russia, which followed the French model in determining 
tiiat engineering fraining was the appropriate background for fraining an 
adminisfrative elite, engineers did not occupy positions of effective power in pubhc 
" Bella Bathurst, The Lighthouse Stevensons, London: Flamingo, 2000. 
^ Kirby, op. cit, p.512. 
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adminisfration. In Britain and in the United States, it could be said that public service 
reforms infroduced the concept of a profession of public servants defined by a set 
career path and service principles and, in that sense, tiiey fitted the bureaucratic 
definition of expert or professional officials. More generally, the line was drawn 
between generalist administrators with a fraditionally broad fraining which, in terms 
of ruling class theory, reflected the background and values ofthe dominant class, and 
those with specialised technical and scientific fraining who were regarded as 
specialist adminisfrators and, in some systems, classified as professionals. Self, for 
example, asserts that the distinction becomes "outmoded at higher organisation 
levels" '^ but, in Britain at least, generalist adminisfrators were consistently successful 
in blocking technical speciahsts' access to adminisfrative power. They were assisted 
by the preservation of a separate "professional" public service classification system 
and tiie quarantining of technical professionals in nationalised industries, pubhc 
utilities and infrastructure development authorities. 
How then did engineers arrive at a position where they were identified as technocrats 
and what that implied in terms of adminisfrative power? The value of engineers 
became recognised in the climate of mass production and large-scale pubhc works 
that characterised industrialised societies in the post-World War One period. In 
relation to the United States, Larson's sociological study identifies engineers with the 
movement for the formation of technology-based professions. They campaigned for 
professionalisation and saw in their migration from private to pubhc organisations 
the means of achieving protection from exploitation as well as greater confrol over 
their work. Moreover, as they became part of tiie state adminisfrative apparatus, they 
sfressed a commitment, shaped in terms of professional values, to serving the pubhc 
^ Self, op. cit, p. 199; Armstrong, op. cit, p.237. 
31 
interest ratiier tiian the uiterests of capitalism, and expected their stance to sfrengtiien 
claims to the social status and respect accorded the fraditional professions. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, as Larson outlines, the technical expertise, functional 
competence and "uncompromising" integrity of engineer employees replaced 
ownership as a guarantee of results.^ Yet it was their skill as managers that propelled 
them to the cenfre ofthe adminisfrative power debate. In France, it was argued, two 
features ofthe technical corps' fraining equipped members to be managers; firstly, 
the strict hierarchical principle accustomed them to command at an early age and, 
secondly, provincial isolation at the early and middle stages of their careers '^ 
protected them from political interference and taught them self-reliance. In the 
United States, they became the epitome of Frederick Taylor's theory of "scientific" 
management which, in applying the principles of science to decision-making and 
organisational process in large-scale industries, enabled productivity increases of up 
to two hundred per cent.^ ^ Legitimacy was conferred on the commercial benefits of 
increased productivity through their implied capacity to ttanslate into social benefits. 
While attracting little support in Britain and Germany, 'T^lorism" was popular in 
France and in Russia where its capitalist associations were overlooked since it held 
the key to the rqiid industrialisation needed in tiie 1920s to deliver both political and 
social benefits. The employment of engineers as managers in Russia's state 
enterprises became the guarantee of successfully achieving production targets.^  33 
^ Larson, op. cit, pp. 123-25. 
'^ Armstrong, op. cit., p.222. 
'^  See, among others, Robbins, op. cit, p. 35. 
^^  Armstrong, op. c/t, p. 189. 
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In industrialised countries, the search for the "one best w^"^ reinforced the ideal of 
organisational efficiency and the instrumental role of engineer-managers in its 
achievement. As tiie expanded interventionist role ofthe State became established, 
more engineers were appointed to senior adminisfrative positions in public works, 
public utilities and tiie great regional development works, some of vviiich pre-dated 
the Depression-era employment projects. Dominating the period up to 1937 in tiie 
United States was the concept of "govemment by the efficient", when efficiency 
replaced adminisfrative reform as a moral imperative. '^ In the ideology of efficiency 
promoted by Taylor, the utilisation of science or "rational and systematised 
knowledge" allowed a means of exerting confrol over the physical and social 
environment. In legitimising "practical choices and everyday courses of action",^ it 
provided an antidote to the inefficiencies associated with bureaucracy. For Larson, 
the appeal of science provided: 
The overall cognitive and normative legitimation for the rise of tiie manager 
and the rise ofthe expert: ideologically 'the carriers of embodied science' -
that is to say, trained and credentialed experts ... are assigned a cmcial and 
directive role.^ ^ 
It has generally been accepted that, armed with technical and managerial credentials, 
apphed specialists such as engineers moved into govemment adminisfrative 
organisations witii the expectation of increasing confrol over their functional 
responsibilities. In joining a power stmcture already established on the basis of 
expertise, tiiey would achieve "technobureaucratic power" ^  There is some resistance 
^ Dunsire, op. cit, p. 108. 
'^ Albrow, op. cit, pp.89-90; Mosher, op. cit, p.81. 
^ Ibid, p.83. 
^^ Larson, op. cit, p. 142. 
^ Ibid, p. 193, and pp. 191 -94, for a discussion of conflict in the professional-bureaucratic 
relationship. 
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to equating professional and technocratic power witii bureaucratic power in these 
terms as, for example, technoaaty is seen to add a new power factor to bureaucracy. 
This view is reflected in the concept of professional bureaucracies where 
professionals dominate the process of achieving the primary goals of pubhc 
agencies. '^ Moreover, it is noted that professional expertise increases the well-
documaited tension between the bureaucratic principles of hierarchy of authority and 
the autonomy of expertise and that, while the primary purpose of many govemment 
agencies defines the goals of both bureaucrats and professionals, tiiere is the potential 
for conflict between professional and bureaucratic orientations in terms of loyalty 
and organisational goals.'" Although bureaucratic participation may have been the 
enabling factor for technocracy, technocrats are characterised as enlightened, morally 
responsible and committed to action, and thus represent the antithesis ofthe 
bureaucratic world of inertia. This characterisation fosters a sense of what can be 
called "technocratic egoism" vviierein the technocrat dehvers the optimal, objective 
solution to economic and social problems. His superiority derives from the 
rationality he embodies in giving precedence to facts over preconceived, that is, 
political values."' The engineer is thus the rational administtator v^o, "believes he 
can carry over his ability in engineering situations (where, at least in principle, he 
can know all factors) to 'human engineering' or 'economic humanism'""^ 
^' Meynaud, op. cit, p.64; Amatai Etzioni, Modem Organisations, Englewood ChfFs, N. J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1964, p.86; Self, op. cit, p.206; Mosher, op. cit, p. 118. 
'" Ibid, p. 122, pp. 132-3; Ham and Hill, op. cit., p. 143; Larson, op. cit, p. 190. 
"' Meynaud, op. cit, p.209, quoting L. Bodin and J-M. Royer, Technique de L 'Etat De la 
productivite au service puhlique, Paris, 1953, p.210. 
"^  Armstrong, op. cit, pp. 187-88, where he quotes French sociologist, Nora Mitrani, "Ambiguite de 
la Technocratic", Cahiers Intemationaux de Socialogie, XXX, 1961, pp. 105-08. 
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In undertaking an analysis ofthe prevailing views and tiieories on a particular aspect 
of govemment administtation, the problems of interpretation associated with 
isolating it from the potential causal influences of contemporary political, social and 
economic factors are soon ^parent. They also surface in relation to comparative 
studies of industrialised and/or demoaatic societies exhibiting considerable variation 
in their systems of govemment, culture and socialisation, and the relationship of state 
to society."^  These problems notwithstanding, in this discussion technocracy, within 
the more general category of professionalisation, is considered an issue ofthe 
ttansfer of power. Opposition to technocracy can thus be summed up as a reaction to 
its perceived edacity to exacerbate tiie unequal distribution of power in favour ofthe 
expert official. 
The arguments are played out through the critical analysis of technocratic ideology, 
the goal of organisational efficiency and the concept of a power elite. In terms of tiie 
role of technocracy in administtation, all of tiiem revolve around the centtal theme of 
the pohtical-administtative power relationship. 
Technocratic ideology is seen to rest on the concept of knowledge as "beneficent 
power","" and to derive popular support from society's respect for the kinds of 
knowledge and ability relevant to everyday life. One danger of technocracy, it is 
argued, lies in the uncritical acceptance of technocratic knowledge as providing the 
means of achieving solutions, and the consequences ofthe professional egoism and 
expansion of power it engenders. Thus: 
A technocratic ideology, ... regards democratic participation and political 
debate and accountability with impatience; superior ability and rational 
"' See Page, op. cit, pp.7-8; see also, Dunsire, op. cit, pp.134-36. 
"" Peter Backrach, The Theory ofDemocratic Elitism, Boston: Little Brown, 1967, p.2, quoted in 
Larson, op. cit, p.243. 
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knowledge should not and cannot be hindered by an ignorant citizenry and 
nonrational pohtical processes."' 
Anotiier concem is that technocratic ideology opens the way for imcertainty, if not 
loss of confrol, in setting tiie boundaries of legitmiate authority. Technocrats are 
known to exert their authority in areas not justified by their experience or expertise, 
so that, as the often-quoted example ofthe expansionist activities of New York 
m^or, Robert Moses, demonsfrates, there may be little formal authority but a high 
degree of effective power."* Legitimate authority, defined more simply than in 
Weberian terms as "the right to give orders and the power to exact obedience","' is a 
source of power in a bureaucratic organisational context and is seen to be sttongest 
when linked to "operationally vital knowledge"."* The exercise of informal authority 
based on technical expertise challenges the concept of authority legitimised through 
hierarchical conttol and the formal delegation of decision-making powers. Of 
concem is its extension beyond the organisation to tiie pohcy process where it is 
apphed to decisions on a potentially imlimited range of pohcy matters. Moreover, the 
popular basis of technocratic ideology confers on this type of authority the 
legitimacy of social acceptance. 
Anotiier sttand of opposition to technocracy derived from attacks on the "cult" of 
efficiency promoted by Taylor's scientific management approach. While Britain was 
scarcely affected by these changing ttends in administtation, in the United States the 
results ofthe so-called "Hawtiiome" experiments in the dynamics of small groups 
supported a rejection ofthe rational-efficient model of administtation as too 
"' Larson, ibid. 
"* Self, op cit, pp.23-24. 
"' Henri Fayol, General and industrial management, London: Sir Isaac Pitman, 1949, p.34, quoted in 
Robbins, op. cit, p.238. 
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mechanistic. The 'liuman relations" theories associated with Elton Mayo and the 
work of sociologists led by Phillip Selznick"" pursued tiie theme that tiie model, 
preserving as it did the centtality of engineer-adminisfrators, delivered outcomes tiiat 
ignored the importance of human values both within organisations and in the wider 
society. Crozier's claim that it was 'Trench high adminisfration's relentiess search 
for 'the one best way' which led in the 1930s to abandoning 'the worid of means' to 
engineers",'" questioned the c^adty ofthe engineer-adminisfrator to assess the 
economic and social consequences of his work. Moreover, Marxist theorists in 
particular argued against the assumption of an objectivity derived from the factual 
basis of rational decision-making that effectively excluded technical experts from tiie 
ideology of class. According to Miliband, for example, professions in pubhc service 
worked to achieve their own class ambitions, that is, to achieve middle class or 
bourgeois status and, consequentiy, to assist the state in the process of "coital 
accumulation".*^ Since engineers actively sought to improve their social status 
through membership of an identifiably middle-class profession, they exemplified, 
perhqjs inadvertently on their part, that rationality did not remove them from the 
influence of class values. 
On the other hand, Meynaud reaffirms the commitment of technocrats to advancing 
the pubhc interest which, he claims, rarely corresponds with their material interests, 
and instances the reputation of senior officials in France for preserving national 
"* Self, op cit., p.256. 
"' For an ejqjlanation ofthe 'Hawthorne' group experiments and the scope of 'human relations' 
theory, see Dunsire, op. cit, pp. 101-06; Selznick, 1953, op. cit., p. 135. 
^ Michel Crozier, "Pour Une Analyse Sociologique de la Planification Fran9aise" Revue Frangaise 
de Sociologie, VI, 1965, p. 150, quoted in Armstrong, op. cit, p. 188. 
*' R. Mileband, The State in Capitalist Society, London: Wiedenfeld & Nicholson, 1969, quoted in 
Ham and Hill, op. cit, pp.32-33. 
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continuity in the face of exfreme political uncertainty.'^  Elsewhere, the concepts of 
public interest and public service impartiality were challaiged by the theories of 
Downs and Tullock wdiich, in effect, proposed that senior officials in bureaucratic 
organisations were motivated by self-interest ratiier than public interest, althougji the 
rationale behind these theories was criticised in tum.'^ Elite theory, with its image of 
a self-perpetuating power elite of senior representatives of pohtics, business and 
adminisfration, was developed from C. Wright Mills' dissatisfaction with plurahst 
and Marxist approaches to the issue of power distribution. Even witii the concerted 
criticism it provoked from a range of theoretical schools, the value of Mills' work 
remained its identification of cenfralised decision points in bureaucratic systems 
which were amenable to influence. It raised questions about the nature ofthe people 
who made decisions, the people who influenced them, and consequent effects on the 
distribution of power.'" 
One outcome was a detailed examination ofthe characteristics of professionals, 
leading to the proposition that, far from exhibiting the value-neufrality associated 
with the objectivity of rationality, they had their own set of values vs^ch migjit or 
might not conflict witii pubhc interest values. While acknowledging a definition of 
professionalism as characterised by, "systematic theory, authority, community 
sanction, ethical codes and culture," Ham and Hill beheved that attempts at 
definition have tended to suffer from a lack of differentiation between occupational 
'^  Meynaud, op. cit, p.210. 
'^  Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Boston: Little Brown, 1967; Gordon Tullock, The Politics 
ofBureaucracy, Washington, D. C: Public Affairs Press, 1965, p.21, quoted in critical responses 
by Rigby, op. cit, pp.9-10, and Self, op. cit, pp.234-35; Ham and Hill, op. cit., p.55. 
'" C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, as appraised by Ham 
and Hill, op.cit, pp.54-55. 
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characteristics and the societal status of professions." From the viewpoint that 
professionalism, apphed to the entry of professional groups into govemment service, 
tiireatened to overwhelm the cenfral departmental stiiictiire of tiie United States' 
adminisfrative system, Mosher presented a representative characterisation of 
professionals in pubhc organisations. Reflecting the frend in research away from 
prescriptive to descriptive modelling, he stated: 
Each profession brings to an organisation its own particularized view ofthe 
world and ofthe agency's role and mission in it. The perspective and 
motivation of each professional are shaped, at least to some extent, by the 
lens provided by professional education, prior professional experience, and 
professional colleagues. These distinctive views are further moulded and 
sfrengthened through fraining and experience in the agency itself ... ^ 
He rejected Tullock's stance that career conformity and orthodoxy are significant in 
determining elite status and values, sfressing that the critical factor is the 
identification of professional knowledge and skills with the primary purpose and 
activities ofthe organisation. Where this occurs, he sees the professional elite group 
becoming the "core" ofthe organisation, achieving confrol ofthe hierarchy of 
authority and providing its leadership.'^  
There is a broad consensus that education and organisational socialisation maintain a 
professional/technocratic elite and reinforce its particular values. The social and 
economic rewards associated with professional status intensify the competition for, 
and thus restrict access to, professional ranks. The outcome is a process of pre-
selection and pre-socialisation, although it may be overstating the case to conclude 
" /W4 pp. 143-44. 
'* Mosher, op. cit, p. 132; For a similar view of France's Grands Corps, which include the two 
technical corps of Mines and Fonts et Chaussees, see Marie Kessler, Le Conseil d'Etat, Paris: A. 
Colin, 1968, p. 16. 
'^  Tullock, op. cit, p.41; Mosher, op. cit, p.l23; see also D. C. Corbett, "The Politics ofBureaucracy 
in the United State of America", Public Administration, March 1973, pp. 35-36. 
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tiiat tiie "professional minorities who control a field" receive "a super-filtered, 
superclassified, specialised and hierarchical cohort" '* As access to professional 
education is a function of class, on this basis, professionalisation is seen to enfrench 
inequahties m the distribution of power and contribute to tiie formation and 
maintenance of a professional elite." Whether or not this process supports the case 
for homogeneity among professional elites is an issue for debate. According to the 
education/socialisation approach, France's technocratic elite demonsfrates the 
characteristics usually associated with homogeneity and tiiis is evident in the notable 
sohdarity among members ofthe two technical corps of Mines and Fonts et 
Chaussees which have dominated tiie adminisfration of France's public works and 
nationalised industries. The corps are also part of an informal network across tiie 
Grands Corps adminisfrative elites which are said to share a common ideology, 
reflecting professional values, of behef in the cenfrality ofthe State and the 
importance of State intervention to France's economic and social development. The 
particular character of tiie role ofthe State and the adminisfrator's concept of it 
appears to influence the value base ofthe adminisfrative elite vMie reinforcing its 
cohesion. In Britain, generalist adminisfrators form an ehte corps with common 
career-oriented behefs, values and ethics, yet the view ofthe role ofthe State to 
which they relate, differs markedly from tiiat ofthe French adminisfrative elite.*" 
'* Larson, op. cit, p.204; see also Armstrong, op. cit, pp.213-14. 
" Meynaud, op. cit, p. 121. 
^ Page, op. cit, p.l47; Self, op. cit, p.l85, who quotes the view of F. F. Ridley, "French 
Technocracy and Comparative GaweimasxA", Political Studies, February 1966, pp.44-45; ibid, 
pp. 163-64. 
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Common social and educational backgrounds leading to shared adminisfrative values 
do not guarantee uniformity of adminisfrative behaviour and, it is argued, to use them 
to confirm a relatively homogeneous technocratic elite, is to oversimplify a multi-
faceted set of interactions.*' Nor is the possibility of shared project goals promoting 
co-operative relationships enough to sway a general preference for a model of 
conflict and negotiated compromise. Bureaucratic/professional conflict is well 
recognised and conflict among professional elites is seen to occur in certain 
circumstances; when each group has a different type of professional expertise, they 
will compete to be tiie dominant influence on the basis of superior expertise, and 
when they dominate agencies with similar functional expertise, they will compete to 
protect their particular agency's position from encroachment by otiier agencies and to 
reinforce its dominant status.*^ At the same time, numerous organisational, decision-
making and external variables, some of which have been previously identified, can 
effectively challenge any dogmatic apphcation of conflict theory to issues of 
professional elites and their adminisfrative power status. 
The political-adminisfrative relationship provides tiie overall framework for 
assessing the nature and extent of professional/technocratic influence, with the 
cenfral issue being the proper roles of politicians and officials in govemment 
adminisfration. It has been the subject of numerous studies v^ch, if nothing else, 
have demonsttated the difficulties of developing a prescriptive model for a pohtics-
administtation dichotomy that can be convincingly apphed in practice, and to the 
particular as well as to the general. Moreover, the issue is made more complex by tiie 
*' Page, ibid., Meynaud, op. cit, p. 183. 
*^  Ibid, p. 132. See also Gordon Clapp, The Tennessee Valley Authority: An Approach to the 
Development of a Region, University of Chicago Press, 1955, p.5; Corbett, 1973, op. cit, pp.36-
40; Rourke, op. cit, pp. 175-76. 
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preference, sometimes ideologically-driven, for stmcturing debate around the use of 
values as a determining principle. Most ofthe studies are concerned with defining 
the con^onents of apolitical-bureaucratic relationship and often take the Weberian 
"ideal-type" model of bureaucracy as the orientation point for their analysis. What 
they highlight is that there are clear differences over time and across different 
systems in the perceived importance of prescribing the limits of administtative power 
and that, in many instances, the differences reflect particular socio-pohtical situations 
and the prevailing political ethos. 
Protecting ofiBcials and their areas of administration from pohtical interference and 
pattonage proved to be a major impetus for estabhshing a dividing line between 
pohtics and adminisfration. In France, the segregation of an elite of frained engineers 
in the Fonts et Chaussees Corps was intended as protection against an administration 
"still somewhat attached to aristocratic methods" *^  In the United States, the overt 
pohtical corraption at all levels and in early government-supported development 
projects such as the Trans-continental railway provoked popular agitation for the 
reform of govemment administration, as was demonsttated by the history ofthe 
Progressive and Populist movements ofthe late 1800s and early 1900s.*" "Politicians 
decide, officials carry out", the often-quoted statement of President Woodrow 
Wilson, himself an engineer, defining the separate roles of politics and 
administtation was made in this reform context. As with the ttaditional politics-
adminisfration model, its usefuhiess is limited, since it was a response to particular 
events and issues of admirusfration ui tiie United States. It was primarily associated 
*^  Armstrong, op. d/., p. 187. 
*" See, for example, Ambrose, op. cit (The Union Pacific railway was a govemment corporation, the 
second to be estabhshed in the United States). James Edward Wright, The Politics of Populism: 
Dissent in Colorado, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974, especially p.260. 
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witii tiie much broader aims of marking a distinction between career service and 
pohtically appointed officials, as well as sfrengthening the powers ofthe executive 
and extending tiieir scope to include administration.*' 
The expanded interventionist role of governments throughout the Depression and 
Worid War Two focused attention on policy-making as a source of official power 
and as a pohtical process in \\4iich ofiBcials had a participatory role.** The concept of 
bureaucratic politics and the methodological problems associated with prescriptive 
modelling encouraged a behavioural ^proach which assessed the pohtical-official 
relationship as a series of interactions. Efforts to define the differences between the 
two roles in the pohcy process were not abandoned. Rather they were charted in 
terms of goal orientation, area of competence and scope of responsibilities, as a 
division of labour or as ends versus means. Simon's revival of "decision-sciaice" 
theory, in which he proposed ascribing facts to officials and values to politicians, 
proved to be unexpectedly durable in that a 1991 survey of administrative elites 
foimd empirical support for a "facts/interests" model ofthe political-adminisfrative 
relationship.*' Evidence of officials disguising values as facts and the failure of botii 
politicians and officials to disclose their guiding values imdermined Simon's 
argument, and the consequent critical debate identified the significant issue of 
*' This section draws on Mosher, op. cit, pp.84-89, A\iio refers to the 1937 report by President 
Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management, (the Brownlow Committee), and Dunsire, 
op. cit., pp. 98-99. See also, C. Campbell and J. Halligan, Political Leadership in an Age of 
Constraint: Bureaucratic Politics under Hawke and Keating, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992, p. 95. 
** See Mosher's overview, op. cit., pp.88-89; and E. N Sulieman, (ed.) Bureaucrats and Policy 
Making, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984, p. 4; Corbett, 1973, op. cit.,p.32. 
*' Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision-making Processes in 
Administrative Organization, Second Edition, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957; Joel D. 
Aberbach, Daniel B. Mezger & Bert A. Rockman, "Bureaucrats and Politicians: A Report on the 
Administrative Elites project",/4yP/l, 50, 2, June 1991, p.207. 
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political mistmst ofthe values of incumbent officials v^ dienever governments witii 
different ideologies and pohcy programmes were elected to power.** Some 
commentators argued that doubt about public service neufrality derived from the 
stereotyping of officials' values as the outcome of conservative conditioning and that 
the Machiavellian view of bureaucratic politics was exaggerated.*' Nevertheless, 
recommendations for pubhc service restmcturing made by successive committees 
and commissions were shaped by the assumption of value bias and self-interest on 
the part of officials. The threat of dominance by officials was seen to be an outcome 
of bureaucratic characteristics rather than a failure of political mechanisms of 
confrol. 
In the conceptuahsation of bureaucratic politics, conflict was identified as a 
determining characteristic ofthe political-administrative relationship, with senior 
officials conpeting against other officials, organisations and ministers for the prize 
of controlling the decision-makmg process and its outcomes. Anotiier sustainable 
view was that mirusters and senior officials held competing or ambivalent goals yet 
worked in partnership to deliver govemment policy. Conflict was accepted as a 
normal interaction aimed at securing the best choice from a range of policy or 
program options, negotiation and compromise to accommodate political needs and 
technical preferences or realities were infrinsic to the pohcy process, and there was a 
tendency towards cooperative interaction to minimise the influence of external 
interests.™ The concept of mutual tmst is not generally associated with the debate on 
** Hyslop, op. cit, p.3, quoting David Marquand, in R. D. Putnam, "The Political Attitudes of Senior 
Civil Servants in Westem Europe: A Preliminary Report", British Journal of Political Science, 
1973, p.289; see also. Self, op. cit, p.43. 
*' See Ham and Hill, op. cit, pp.56-59 for an overview of this view; and Mosher, op. cit, pp.. 89-90. 
™ Self, op cit, pp.149-52; Corbett, 1973, op. cit, pp.32-33. 
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political-adminisfrative interactions but Self, for example, believes its importance to 
tiie process of democratic govemment cannot be oversfressed.^ ' A heightened 
mistrust ofthe role of pohticians in decision-making is one characteristic presented 
as distinguishing senior technical professionals from their bureaucratic counterparts. 
Thus, the rationality of professionalism provides the correct way of solving problems 
whereas; 
Politics is seen as being engaged in the fuzzy areas of negotiation, elections, 
votes, compromise - all carried on by subject-matter amateurs. Politics is to 
the professionals as ambiguity to tmth, expediency to rightness, heresy to tme 
behef ^^ 
The sense of mistrust is fuelled by the perception that pohtical expediency is 
foremost in decision-making. Lack of expertise does not inhibit politicians from 
encroaching on areas of technical expertise for their own ends nor from ttansferring 
responsibility for unpopular decisions or failed policies to officials who have no 
formal means of pubhc redress. Acknowledging that decision-making takes place in 
conditions of complexity and uncertainty, Meynaud describes the political approach 
to the process in terms ofthe concepts of "bounded rationality" and "satisficing" 
usually associated with bureaucratic decision-making." According to this view, 
pohticians might, for example, endorse tiie majority opinion of competing experts, 
opt for the least dangerous method which, in the event of failure, will cause the least 
damage, or go with the opinion of a tmsted adviser. The process will also be 
influenced by the sttong commitment of individual politicians to particular 
" For a summary of views on political-official interactions, see Page, op. cit, p. 133; Self, op.cit, 
pp. 184-86, pp.298-99. 
'^  Mosher, op. cit, p. 119. 
" See Davis, et al., op. cit, pp. 109-10. 
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technology-dominated organisations for status or goal achievement purposes.^ " It is 
suggested that pohticians have the means to conttol technocrats, particularly by 
taking a more decisive, responsible role in the pohtical-official relationship. 
According to this view, the potential threat to the democratic process lies not so 
much in the potential for technocratic expansion as in the shift in confrol over 
govemment decision-making from tiie legislature to the executive branch, with the 
latter exerting direct authority over senior officials." 
It is in the area of adminisfrative discretion that the reality of demonsfrating political 
confrol finds its greatest challenge. Beyond the formal delegation of tasks vv^ch is 
essential to carrying out the business of govemment, there is an often open-ended or 
undefined fransfer of discretionary decision-making power. Although the fraditional 
model of restricting officials to implementing decisions made else\diere was 
intended to remove tiiem from policy-making, the implementation process became 
recognised as a source of bureaucratic power. It called for discretionary decision-
making that was often not subject to pubhc accountability and was therefore outside 
public control.^ * 
The importance of confrolling policy implementation was underlined by the 
instances of officials commanding the means to block the process and Allison's 
example ofthe lead-up in the United States to the Korean War where decisions were 
made but there was a lack of agreement over v^ iio was responsible for implementing 
them." The problem of confrolling the level of discretionary authority delegated to 
technocrats on tiie basis of their particular expertise was exacerbated by the 
'" Meynaud, op. cit., pp. 134-35; Self, op. cit, p.251. 
" Meynaud, ibid, pp. 110-12; Self, ibid, p. 161. 
'* See, among others, Rourke, op. cit, p.28, p.37; Robbins, op. cit., p.llA; Davis, et al., op. cit, p.71. 
" Allison, op. cit, p. 153. 
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propensity by governments to adopt the principles of business corporations to 
implement mdustrial development pohcy. Engineers predominated among the 
technocrats appointed as operational heads of public corporations, being granted a 
range of corporate powers and a high level of operational autonomy specifically to 
distance them from political confrol and associated intimations of political 
cormption.™ They were removed from direct ministerial confrol, so that ministers 
were answerable but not formally responsible to parliament for operational decisions, 
enabling tiie fransfer of operational responsibility from the amateur, as represented 
by the minister, to the technical expert. Nationalised industries and govemment 
investment in major public works and regional development schemes were used 
increasingly in many countries from tiie 1930s as instruments of economic 
development pohcy. 
This frend was epitomised by President Roosevelt's declaration that the legislation 
estabhshing the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 was intended to create a new 
form of adminisfration, "a corporation clothed with the power of govemment but 
possessed ofthe flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise" " It promoted an 
exhaustive debate on the pubhc corporation in terms of balancing autonomy, 
efficiency and accountabihty, while achieving policy objectives. The principal 
concems were, that there was a fine line between discretionary decision-making and 
rule-breaking, that the decision-making freedom allocated to professionals-
technocrats enhanced their power and that they possessed authority without 
accountability.^ " Some strikmg examples of vviiat were perceived to be independent 
corporate decision-making tended to provoke periodic moves to bring semi-
™ Larson, op. cit, pp. 136-37. 
' ' Quoted in, among others, Clapp, op. cit, p.8. 
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govemment bodies back under tiie cenfralised, hierarchical authority ofthe 
departmental stmcture. At tiie same time, detailed arguments were presented to 
demonsttate that, in practice, there was effective political conttol over public 
corporations through a range of often informal mechanisms and through recourse to 
the law as defence against "tiie arbifrary exercise of power" *' 
The relationship between administtative discretion and political confrol may, in 
practice, be determined on tiie basis of bargaining and negotiating, usually described 
as "partisan mutual adjustment", within the decision-making process, or, "allowing 
professional groups to do their own thing, or administrators to roll their own logs and 
push tiieir own barrows" ^ Some aspects of this argument are associated with the 
widely-held view that effective political leadership holds the key to confrolhng 
govemment administration and its officials. Reference is made to particular eras in 
both France and the United States when weak leadership resulted in the expansion of 
professional-technical influence on govemment policy, v^ile Weber's search for a 
viable power relationship between politicians and officials is seen as a response to 
tiie "mle by officials" that characterised Pmssian adminisfration in the era of 
Bismarck.^ ^ Numerous studies have attempted to identify tiie essential characteristics 
for effective organisational leadership, whether political or bureaucratic. They have 
*° Ham and HiU, op. cit, pp. 154-55. 
*' Ibid., p. 159; W. A. Robson, Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership, Second Edition, 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1962, pp.40-41; John Greenwood and David Wilson, PMWJC 
Administration in Britain Today, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, Chapter 11. There are numerous 
other reference works on the public corporation, including, W. Friedmaim, (ed) The Public 
Corporation, Toronto: Carswell, 1954; Herbert Morrison, Socialisation and Transport, London: 
Constable, 1933; J. Thurston, Govemment Proprietary Corporations in the English-Speaking 
Countries, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937. See also Leon Peres, "The Resurrection of 
Autonomy: Organisation Theory and the Statutory Corporation" in Spaim and Curnow, op. cit 
^ Corbett, 1973, op. cit, p.37. 
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tended to run into problems such as confuming the portability of characteristics 
among different areas of responsibility, identifying the particular leadership qualities 
needed to command authority in different situations and accounting for the variations 
in effectiveness of individual leadership styles.^ " In his study of leadership, Selznick 
refers to empirical tests A\4iich, while recording a wide variation in individual 
characteristics, confirm organisational leadership as "situation specific" and patterns 
of leadership behaviour as "persistent and relatively stable" ^ ' Along with other 
analysts in this field, Selznick finds it easiest to discuss leadership in relation to the 
relatively confrolled environment of military situations and personnel. Where he 
refers to govemment administtation, it is political administtation, so that proof of 
leadership is found in the achievement of statesmanship. This concept of leadership, 
with its overtones of beneficial motivation and assumption of clear public benefit 
goals, has been difificult to translate into the world of practitioners. 
A more realistic approach to the issue of conttol has been to focus more on 
leadership as the exercise of authority and to acknowledge the operation of 
constraints on the effective exercise of political and bureaucratic authority.** The 
policy process may occur in a centripetal system, that is, through the interaction of 
politicians and senior officials, but is more likely to occur in a centrifugal system, 
where politicians have to manage the competing influences not only of specialist 
advisers but also of various extemal interests.*' Extending this argument, Rourke 
refers to what is essentially a "corporatist" idea of competition among ehtes to sttess 
*^  Page, op. c/f., p. 135. 
*" See Ham and Hill, op. cit, pp. 127-28; Selznick, op. cit, pp.2-3. 
*' Ibid, pp.22-23. 
** For an overview of studies of political authority, see Page, op. cit., pp. 168-70. 
*' Page, ibid., p. 145, quoting J. D. Aberbach, J. D. Putnam, and B. A. Rockman, Bureaucrats and 
Politicians in Westem Democracies, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
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tiiat business interests represait a further consfraint on any perceived political or 
adminisfrative hegemony in pohcy areas. He also notes the sometimes overlooked 
influence of media representatives in constraining or promoting political or 
admirusfrative agency objectives.** 
Even if the debate on politicians and the imposition of effective confrols has been 
inconclusive, there is sfrong endorsement for the pluralist approach that the pohcy 
process and the influences on govemment decision-making are multi-dimensional 
and too complex to concede officials the dominant role. Accordingly, as officials 
"win some and lose some just like any other sector"*', the threat of technocratic 
govemment can be discounted. As Armsfrong expresses it: 
It is indeed questionable whether "technocracy" can ever be more than a 
synonym for a special kind of elite administration underwritten by a distinct 
potent political authority.'" 
There may be too many consttaints operating to allow technocrats to take over 
govemment pohcy-making or to constitute any long-term threat to a democratic 
distribution of power, but they do exercise influence in the policy process. While the 
constmction of a typology is not attempted," it is possible to identify the conditions 
which foster an expansion of technocratic influence, largely as a sub-set ofthe 
expansion of bureaucratic influence. They are: professional socialisation and 
identification; membership of a bureaucratic organisation in which technological 
goals equate with organisational goals and technical specialists comprise the 
dominant professional and administtative group; political emphasis on centtalist, 
pro-development pohcies allied witii effective ministerial sponsorship; a high level 
** Rourke, op. cit, pp. 170-71. 
*' Campbell and Halligan, op. cit, p.200; see also. Page, op. cit, p. 170 
'" Armstrong, op. cit, p. 191. 
" See Dunsire, op. cit, pp.209-11. 
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of administrative autonomy; coercive authority over otiier technical and 
administtative elites; power to co-ordinate the work of govemment agencies with 
similar functions; supportive client and media relationships; and the authority 
conferred by proven competence, professional status and social respect. 
When it is a matter of assessing tiie level of influence associated with the individual 
technocrat, there is the immediate problem of isolating and proving it in vviiat is 
generally agreed to be a multi-dimensional and far from linear process, shaped at 
arbittaiy points by an indeterminate range of participants. The cenfral question 
becomes why, given a broadly similar professional socialisation and occupational 
status, one technical specialist will have a discemibly higher level of administrative 
power than another. One approach is to acknowledge scientific rationality as the 
basis of technocratic influence and ^ply the classical or rational actor model of 
decision-making to the process of decision-making. It personifies the actors in the 
process and focuses on their acts and choices. As Allison explains: 
It focuses exphcitly on an individual leader or leadership clique as the actor 
where preference function is maximised and whose personal or group 
characteristics are allowed to modify the basic concepts ofthe paradigm, 
and a more complex version "attempts to explain or predict an occurrence by 
reconstmcting the calculations ofthe victorious actor.'"^ The latter goes some way 
towards addressing the problem of ^e post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, that is, to 
determine after a decision is made whether or not the influence of a particular person 
was the critical factor," the problem being compounded by the secrecy that usually 
surrounds bureaucratic participation in decision-making. Another approach has 
professionals using the idea ofthe indiA^dual and "the uniqueness of individual 
'^  Allison, op. cit, p.37. 
'^  Corbett, 1973, op. crt.,p.32. 
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cq)abilities" to explain their claim to autonomy wiiich, in turn, consolidates their 
ideological position of disinterest in serving the pubhc interest.'" 
Overall, the power of an individual is widely held to be explicable only in an 
organisational context, so that an individual derives his power from his orgaiusation 
and organisational position and, less conclusively, from the status ofthe organisation 
in the adminisfrative system As Rourke siunmaries this view: 
... while an institution is often described as the lengthened shadow of man, it 
m ^ be equally correct to say that an executive is the lengthened shadow of 
an institution, since his own prestige may largely reflect the appeal ofthe 
organisation he commands.'* 
Inevitably, individual power at the higjiest levels of organisation tends to be 
correlated with leadership skills. Studies of U. S. govemment administtation in 
particular, put forward examples to support this premise but it suffers in the same 
way as the debate on pohtical leadership from evidence that the exercise of these 
skills is dependent on extemal factors and the effectiveness of such elusive qualities 
as confidence, honesty and trast. One such study found, for example, that Congress 
was more hkely to qjprove agency funding when it had confidence in the head ofthe 
agency.** In discussions on the reasons for technocratic influence, considerable 
emphasis is placed on the technocrats' command of indispensable knowledge and 
expertise but it should also remembered that their management capabilities made it 
possible for them to acquire bureaucratic power. It is interesting to note that whereas 
leadership is usually assumed to depend on an arbittary combination of 
'" Larson, op. cit, p.206. 
'* Rourke, op. cit, p. 96. 
96 Rourke, ibid, pp.97-99, nominates U. S. Secretaries of State Jesse Jones, Robert McNamara and 
Sargent Shriver as examples, and svmmiarizes the views of various U. S. writers, including Richard 
F. Fenno, The Power ofthe Purse, Boston: Little Brown, 1966; Victor Thompson, Modem 
Organisation, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961; and Simon, 1957, op. cit. 
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organisational and personal factors, some management courses are developed on the 
basis tiiat leadership skills can be taught and that they are tiie tools of managerial 
success." 
A high degree of similarity in tiie language used and the variable factors identified 
can be discemed among the analytical approaches to the acquisition and exercising 
of individual adminisfrative power, ranging from management theory and the various 
theories of decision-making to technocratic theory. Witii the aim of estabhshing a 
causal relationship, all are concerned with substantiating possible sources of power 
and advocating techniques and sfrategies for wirming the competition for power, or 
preventing others from doing so. In the final analysis, they are all exploring how the 
individual adminisfrator acquires authority over others and thus has the edacity to 
manage people and processes and to influence decisions and actions in line with 
his/her own priorities and those of his/her supporting organisation. 
The very nature of personal attributes has made it difficuh to determine or predict 
which of them, separately or in combination, contributes to the power exercised by 
one individual rather than another. The concept of personality is too diffuse and 
involves the coordination of too many influencing variables to allow any clear 
apphcation. A more rewarding approach is to refer back to the process of 
professional socialisation. Taking Larson's view that "subjectively, career is a 
pattem of organisation ofthe self','* it is proposed that the attributes of technical 
professionals, evident in their self-selection, career expectations and occupational 
socialisation, predispose them to achieving adminisfrative power. Technocrats are 
frequently characterised as single-minded, decisive and energetic, witii the inference 
'^  See, for example, Sayles, op. cit 
'* Larson, op. cit, p.229. 
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of a causal relationship between these attiibutes and personal power. Personal 
ambition is rarely mentioned, probably because it runs counter to the professional 
ideology of disinterested public service, while Rourke argues that the personalities of 
bureaucrats provide the ultimate resfraint against abuse ofthe power they exercise on 
behalf of otiiers." To test this approach, a review of one hundred short biogr^hies of 
the engineers ofthe Corps des Fonts et Chaussees was consulted. The consistent 
tiieme tiirougjiout was that they achieved their positions of power by means of 
outstanding technical and managerial skills. Issues of excessive influence and abuse 
of power are already assumed to be negated by the professional fraining and 
socialisation process associated with the ENPC and its guiding principle of 
continuing, progressive reforms which enable it to dismiss all challenges to the 
competence and integrity of its members."" 
Given the uncertainty evident in attempts to prescribe tiie personal, occupational and 
organisational factors that secure individual administrative power or, alternatively, 
that an individual must conttol to rise above other administtators, the cliche that 
some men are bom to be leaders should not be dismissed as simplistic. Rather it 
encapsulates the particular combination of personal attributes v^ch may be 
intangible but vviiich are associated with leadership. Moreover, chance or fortune 
cannot be discounted as having a significant effect on the opportunities for individual 
power which may well be the outcome of an qjpropriately quahfied individual being 
in the right place at the right time. As no less an authority than Machiavelli noted; 
"men are successful while they are in close harmony with Fortune, and when they are 
" Rourke, op. cit, p. 177. 
"'° Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees, 260 ans de TEcole desponts en cent portraits, Paris: 
ENPC, 1997 (no page numbers); See also, Michel, op. cit., p. 19. 
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out of harmony, they are unsuccessful"."" Numerous personal and environmental 
factors have been identified as having tiie potential to enhance or confrol the 
effective power of a senior govemment adminisfrator, but it seems that no amount of 
determinism can offset the random effect of chance as the fmal arbiter of mdividual 
power. 
The elevation of civil engineers to a position of pubhc power ki Ausfraha followed a 
similar pattem to the United States, Britain and countries of Westem Europe. The 
issues identified and the range of theories, opinions and explanations debated in the 
body of literature produced in relation to these countries was also generally 
apphcable to Austtaha. The catalyst for their achieving, collectively, a position of 
importance in govemment policy-making was the recognition by business and 
govemment that large-scale infrastmcture works to develop natural resources were 
essential for economic growth and the fact that men with engineering skills and 
experience had a monopoly on the expertise necessary for their reahsation. One of 
the most important aspects ofthe Austtalian experience of economic development 
was the high level of govemment intervention dating from tiie estabhshment of each 
ofthe Australian colonies. Distance, sparse population and a harsh environment are 
the reasons commonly cited'"^ but, more broadly, Austtalia's wealth was in the land 
and what it could produce, not only for its citizens but also for colonial governments, 
as both depended for survival on its exploitation. Moreover, while there was a long 
"" Rourke, op. cit, p. 96, quoting Allan Parsons (trans). The Prince in Machiavelli, The Chief Works 
and Others, Durham, N. C ; Duke University Press, 1965,1: 92. 
'°^ There are numerous historical sources for variations of this view. See, for example, the works of 
historians Geoffrey Blainey and Russel Ward, and W. Hancock, Australia, Ernest Benn: London, 
1930. For the public administration viewpoint, see Roger Wettenhall, 'T*ublic Ownership in 
Australia", m Public Enterprise and National Development: Selected Essays, Canberra: Royal 
Ausfralian Institute of Public Administration (ACT Division), 1987, pp. 1-2. 
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history of private investment along these lines, there were comparatively few success 
stories of their provision of large-scale permanent infrastmcture. 
The operation of these factors was said to account for the widespread view ofthe 
institution ofthe State in Austtalia as "a vast pubhc utihty",""^ needing to be serviced 
by an ever-expanding bureaucracy. As already noted in relation to other Westem 
democracies, an expanding interventionist role increased tiie corrplexity of 
govemment, and favored the advancement ofthe specialist over the generalist 
administtator, while the emphasis on resources development advantaged technical 
specialists, particularly engineers. Apparently regarded "witii appreciation and even 
awe",'"" they were routinely appointed to senior administtative positions, usually 
with responsibility for planning and implementing a range of pubhc works and 
infrastmcture programmes. 
Two distinguishing features of Austtalian administration which derived from the 
priority given to economic development were firstly, the status associated with a 
professional pubhc service classification, and secondly, the early and widespread use 
ofthe pubhc corporation. It is generally acknowledged that the Austtahan colonies 
adopted the principles and the institutions ofthe British "Westminster" system of 
govemment but ad^ted aspects of them to local conditions. One of these adaptations 
related to public (civil) service classifications. By the 1860s, Queensland had 
followed Victoria's initiative in inttoducing separate professional and adminisfrative 
(clerical or ordinary) divisions but, unlike the British system on which it was based, 
being in the professional division was no barrier to senior q)pointments and the 
'"^  Hancock, op. cit, p.30. 
'"" V. Subramanium, "The Relative Status of Speciahsts and Generalists: An attempt at a comparative 
historical explanation". Public Administration (London) 46, 1968, p.337; See also, E. A. Lyall, op. 
cit, p. 107. 
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adminisfrative influence associated with tiiem. Indeed, William Tully, Queensland's 
Surveyor-General and Commissioner of Public Lands in tiie 1870s, was classified 
concurrently in botii divisions.'"' The number of professional officers in the 
Queensland Public Service did not significantly increase until the early 1950s and, 
under Pubhc Service classification provisions, were generally obliged to change to 
an adminisfrative classification to be eligible for senior appointments. Recognition of 
professionals as senior adminisfrators was then largely absent from the 
Commonwealth Public Service, witii national governments preferring to follow 
Britain in favouring generalist adminisfrators. Speaking in 1964, Sir Frederick 
Wheeler, then Chairman ofthe Commonwealth Pubhc Service Board, confirmed: 
We do not deny that there may be a place for a highly paid expert, with a 
relatively narrow advisory role, within the senior ranks ofthe Commonwealth 
Service. Such a specialist would not have administrative or management 
responsibilities, but would act as a technical advisor to the administrators 
concemed with the formulation and management of pohcies.'"* 
Wheeler allowed specialists to be accepted into the highest levels of administration if 
they renounced then particular, narrow code of professional conduct for the more 
appropriate, generalist code.'"^ This was the generalist-dominated stance tiiat so 
frusfrated skilled engineers in public service. As Lloyd argued: 
Why is it that non-engineers do not understand that the management of 
engineering functions cannot be effective in other hands. It is difficult for 
engineers to explain the obvious to technologically illiterate managers ... 
Any explanation is difficult to accept by people (including some engineers) 
'"' Kay Cohen "Lands Administration", in Kay Cohen and Kenneth Wiltshire (eds.). People, Places 
and Policies: Aspects of Queensland Govemment Administration 1859-1920, St. Lucia: UQP, 
1995, p. 141. 
'°* F. H. Wheeler, C. B. E., "The Responsibilities ofthe Administrator in the Pubhc Service", Public 
Administi-ation (Sydney), 23, 4,1964, p.296. 
"" Ibid 
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witii 'generalist' mind-sets, simply because such people do not comprehend 
tiie engineering ethos and function.'"* 
As for the public corporation, Ausfralia was belatedly credited with its invention as a 
mechanism of pubhc ownership which was clearly dissociated from the socialist 
overtones of state interventionist action. The vesting of corporate powers and levels 
of operational autonomy in adminisfrative agencies responsible for pubhc utilities, 
public enterprises and infrastmcture development programmes took many different 
forms. Whether the result was a departmental corporation or an independent statutory 
body, the intention was, as in other countries, to minimise the potential for political 
cormption and to maximise efficiency in the achievement of pohcy goals."" At the 
same time, public works and infrastmcture programmes were carried out by line 
departments identified with functional specialities. 
The system of engineer fraining, inherited from Britain, also supphed Ausfralia with 
numbers of experienced practitioners and a prestigious professional body in the 
Institution of Civil Engineers (London),"" which was replaced by an Ausfralian 
equivalent in 1919. Although, historically, the majority of civil engineers in Australia 
were employed by governments, Lloyd's account ofthe straggle towards 
professional recognition conveys no sense of Larson's view that it was assisted by 
membership of a govemment bureaucracy. Writing in the early 1990s, Lloyd argued 
that the historic contribution of engineering technology to economic growth and 
society's well-being had remained largely unrecognised. Engineers were not 
'"* Brian E. Lloyd, Engineers in Australia: Engineers in Transition, South Melboume: Macmillan, 
1991, p.l2. 
'"' Roger Wettenhall, "The Snowy Scheme" in Wettenhall, 1987, op. cit, p.74; See also, Wettenhall, 
1973, op. cit, pp.240-44; Friedmann, op. cit, 1954; J. D. Tucker et al.. Local Govemment in 
Queensland, 1, Australian Institute of Urban Studies, 1981,pp.41-47. 
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accorded the status and respect due to members of such an important profession and, 
to make the case for industrial action, he equated low status with low salaries. One of 
many over the years to accuse senior engineer-adminisfrators of failing to take action 
to improve the pay and conditions of junior engineers, he also believed they had 
failed to use their position to raise professional standards.'" On the other hand, 
leading consultant engineers, one of whom was John Monash,"^ believed that tiie 
solution lay in the formation of a national professional body to institute and confrol a 
national accreditation process. 
Nevertheless, from colonial times authoritarian heads of departments and statutory 
authorities consohdated their empires based on organisations v^ch effectively 
monopohsed the various areas of technical expertise. Through their command of 
vital technical and organisational skills, and with the relative inecperience of most 
politicians in planning and executing development programmes making a high level 
of administrative autonomy inevitable, they exerted considerable influence on 
govemment development pohcy. At different periods during tiie twentieth century, 
spokespeople for a range of vested interests mounted efforts to reassert public control 
through the mechanism of ministerial responsibility by bringing agencies back under 
the central departmental umbrella. However, even with vigorous debate on the 
reasons for the failure of many agencies to achieve the goals for which they were 
created, continued recognition of tiie political benefits of semi-independent 
authorities or statutory corporations in the area of development pohcy guaranteed 
"" Brian Carroll, The Engineers: 200 Years at Work for Australia, Barton, A. C. T.: The Institution of 
Engineers, 1988, pp.73-74. 
' " Lloyd, op cit, pp.11-12, p.l38. 
"^ Serle, op. c/t, p. 188. 
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counter-movement for their re-estabhshment."^ As in the United States, France and 
other European countries, the industrial expansion of tiie 1920s and the large-scale 
regional development programmes ofthe 1930s in Ausfralia increased the demand 
for skilled engineers, with the need to create more constmction authorities 
reinforcing the adminisfrative status of senior technical specialists. When this pattem 
was repeated in the post-war reconstmction period and from the late 1960s in the 
resource-rich states of Queensland and Westem Ausfralia, the same issues of pubhc 
confrol, the value of efficiency, and the threat of technocratic dominance were again 
debated. The link between engineers and the principles of scientific planning was 
acknowledged, with economist J. B. Brigden declaring that, confraiy to accepted 
thinking, the scientific approach set the benchmark for social planning: 
The scientific approach is different. It is less exciting and may even seem to 
be pretentious. But that is nonsense. We can have tiie spirit ofthe competent 
engineer who sets out to make a prehminary survey. He will not deceive 
himself by hopes and fears and his personal likes and dislikes. He will 
carefully measure all of his materials. He will test his foundations very 
thoroughly. He will know the breaking-sfrain of his steel. He will check up on 
the rehability of his power-supply. So must the rehable social planner 
behave."" 
The identification of professional characteristics, the issues associated with the rise 
of professionalisation and the relationship between professionals and bureaucrats 
followed the general frends previously outlined. Engineers were members of a 
"^ See, for example, Jean Holmes, The Govemment cf Victoria, St. Lucia: UQP, 1975, pp.40-43; 
Eggleston, 1932, op. cit, pp.2-3; T. H. Kewley, "The Statutory Corporation", inR. N. Spann (ed.). 
Public Administration in Australia, Second Edition, Sydney: Govemment Printer, 1960, pp. 102-
125. Among the numerous reports submitted to the Royal Commission on Australian Govemment 
Administration, 1974-75, see especially, Enid Campbell, "Ministers and Permanent Heads", 
Research paper, 30.7.1975, quoted in Hyslop, op. cit, p. 109, and Dr. R. L. Wettenhall, "Report on 
Statutory Authorities", Royal Commission cm Australian Govemment Administration, Appendices 
to the Report, Vol. 1., Canberra: AGPS, 1976. 
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professional elite and, in claiming superiority over other professions on the basis of 
their importance in creating Ausfraha's wealth,"^ they articulated the precepts of a 
technocratic ideology. 
Determining tiie sources of power of individual engineer-adminisfrators, \viiile 
isolating their effective influence on pohcy decisions and then implementation, is as 
problematic in Ausfralia as elsev\4iere, despite their numbers and the political 
environment in which they operated both being comparatively small. Patronage or 
sponsorship is one source of potential technocratic power not adequately dealt with 
in studies of administtative power. Rigby, for example, has a useful commentaty on 
sponsorship in the context ofthe superior-subordinate relationship in an 
hierarchically-ordered organisation,"* but references to pattonage are usually 
negative and associated with issues of pohtical corraption and bureaucratic self-
interest. There are two aspects of pattonage to be examined, the first being the 
conttol the head of an organisation exerts over staff appointments and promotions. 
Various cenfralised confrols over these functions have been instituted for line 
departments but the staffing powers delegated to heads of statutory agencies are 
often specifically excluded from tiiem In agencies engaged in public works, confrol 
over workers' employment has been exercised by unions and govemment 
mechanisms such as labour exchanges but decisions on the qjpointment of skilled 
technical staff tended to remain the province ofthe executive head. In fiercely-
contested areas of development policy, such as the provision of transport, irrigation 
and water conservation facilities, the capacity to select and nurture staff of high 
"" J. B. Brigden, "The Devil a Saint would be". Radio talk, 4QG, 16.10.1933, typescript, J. B. 
Brigden Papers, MS 730, Item 34, National Library of Australia (NLA). 
"^ Lloyd,op. czf., p.ll. 
"* Rigby, op. cit, pp.6-9. 
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quality allowed him to build an empire of technological superiority which would 
compete successfully against otiier agencies in the same field, ensure the future of his 
agency and expand his influence in the development policy process. 
The corollary ofthe staffing power vested in an agency head was his influence over 
career prospects. Issues of merit and seniority aside, tiie sponsorship of certain staff 
members instead of others has been a source of power for the agency head and a 
source of future power for tiie subordinate individual. In the early twentieth century, 
the New South Wales Department of Public Works, tiie Victorian State Rivers and 
Water Supply Commission, and the Victorian Country Roads Board, were cases in 
point.'" Moreover, they were early examples ofthe formation of a technocratic elite 
which consohdated its authority within a bureaucratic stracture. The sttength of tiieir 
monopoly position was such that th^ were able to reject any political encroachment 
on their operations and, within the direction of overall govemment pohcy, maintain 
their operational independence. The same could be said for the Queensland Co-
Ordinator-General in the post-war period. Li conttast, the administtation of main 
roads in New South Wales and railways in tiie various states was too important to a 
wide range of public and political interests to allow the conditions for empire-
building and the autonomy of technical expertise, the lesson having been leamt from 
the adverse reaction to Victoria's early experiment in independent railway 
admirusttation.'" 
' " See Richard Raxworthy, The Unreasonable Man: The life and works of J. J. C. Bradfteld, Sydney: 
Hale & Iremonger, 1989, pp.42-50; E. Sugden & F. W. Eggleston, George Swinbume, Sydney: 
Angus & Robertson, 1931, p.259; Eggleston, op. cit, p.l59;D. H. Trollope, "Engineering: The 
Makings of Man", The Inaugural Hawken Address, presented before The Queensland Division, 
Institution of Engineers, Austraha, on October 19"', 1973, typescript, pp.2-6. 
"* See Wettenhall, R. Railway Management and Politics in Victoria, 1856-1906, Canberra: Royal 
Institute of Public Administration, ACT Group, 1961. 
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tiie adverse reaction to Victoria's early ©iperiment in independent railway 
adminisfration."* 
The second aspect of pafronage is the relationship between the technocrat and his 
political superior. Several studies examining the role played by senior officials in 
state development have noted its relevance to explanations of individual 
adminisfrative power. It is particularly so in view of tiie widespread preference for 
the direct line of responsibility established by the appointment of a single 
commissioner or chairman as agency head, the associated use ofthe corporation sole, 
and the vesting of tiiese appointments and removals in tiie executive rather than in 
parhament. A striking example is that of C. Y. O'Connor, the engineer famous for 
his association with the constmction ofthe Coolgardie water pipehne and its tragic 
aftermath. In 1891, amidst sfrong local objection, John Forrest, Premier of Westem 
Ausfralia, appointed O'Cormor the colony's Engineer-in-Chief with responsibihty for 
implementing Forrest's ambitiously comprehensive infrastmcture development 
program. As O'Connor's biographer described their relationship: 
For nearly ten years, until Forrest decided to enter federal pohtics, these two 
men were to work closely together in the pursuit of a common end: the better 
equipping ofthe colony with 'Railways, harbours, everything' '" 
The trae measure of Forrest's support and protection became evident after it was 
withdrawn. For years, unsuccessfiil attempts had been made in parliament and 
through numerous committees of inquiry to discredit O'Cormor's professional 
competence but, early in 1902, a fresh assault, formalised in the appointment of a 
"* See Wettoihall, R. Railway Management and Politics in Victoria, 1856-1906, Caribeira: Royal 
histitute of Pubhc Administration, ACT Group, 1961. 
' " Merab Tauman, The Chief: C. Y. O'Cormor, Nedlands: University of Westem Australia Press, 
1978,p.53. 
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select committee of inquiry into tiie Coolgardie Water Scheme and enthusiastically 
promoted by the local press, questioned his personal mtegrity. With Forrest in 
Federal Parliament and the new Premier, Leake, indifferent to O'Connor's position, 
there was no sttong Ministerial presence to defend him. Deeply affected by tiie 
sttengtii and direction of tiie attacks, he committed suicide six months later.'^ '' 
Another example from Westem Ausfralia m the late 1940s and early 1950s, was the 
relationship between R J. Dumas and David Brand, his Minister and later Premier, 
whom Layman describes as Dumas' "admirer" '^ ' Layman gives Dumas, v^o was 
Chief Engineer ofthe Public Works Department, first Chairman ofthe State 
Electricity Commission (SEC) and later Co-Ordinator of Works and Industrial 
Development, sole credit for initiating the talks with private enterprise which 
resulted in a new direction for the state's industrial development. She goes on to 
acknowledge that, in a general climate of indifference. Brand's support was essential 
to securing Executive agreement for Dumas' plan.'^ ^ In Tasmania, Alan Knight, 
Chief Engineer ofthe Public Works Department and sole Hydro-Electricity 
Commissioner from 1946, worked closely with Premiers Cosgrove and Reece to 
achieve economic growth through the development ofthe State's hydro-electricity 
resources'^ ^ and, in Queensland, a successful resources development program from 
the 1970s owed much to the relationship between the Premier, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, 
and successive Co-Ordinators-General, Charles Barton and Syd Schubert. 
'^ ° /6i4 pp.212-27. 
'^' See Layman, op. cit, pp.245-46. 
'^ ^ Ibid 
'^ ^ See Lowe, op. cit; see also, Peter Thompsrai, Power in Tasmania, Melboume: Austrahan 
Conservation Foundation, 1981, Introduction. 
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technocratic influence. As engineer John Monash found during his confroversial time 
as Chairman and General Manager of Victoria's State Electricity Commission, the 
problems associated with its adminisfration were compounded when his initially 
supportive Minister, F. W. Eggleston, not only withdrew his support but actively 
sought Monash's dismissal. Eggleston was joined by Electricity Commissioner, 
George Swinbume, who, during his term as Victorian Premier, was among the chief 
proponents of "State Socialism" and the benefits of adminisfrative autonomy. Their 
stance, that Monash was acting independently of govemment directives, epitomised 
the general concem over the issue of confrolling developmental pohcy.'^ ^ From the 
distance of two decades, former Tasmanian Premier Eric Reece dismissed 
environmental activist Bob Brown's view that, as Hydro-Electricity Commissioner, 
Allan Knight was "the power behind the throne at a time of weak-kneed politicians" 
and that "the drive for hydro-industrialisation came from Knight himself, asserting 
that Knight's role was never more than "an adviser to government" '^ * And while 
Layman tempers her case for Dumas' dominant influence on Westem Austtalia's 
development pohcy by waming against overestimating it. Walker's analysis ofthe 
process over those years gives Dumas only a minor role. In the context of federal-
state relations, he emphasises the instmmental role ofthe many senior specialist 
officials involved and the clear responsibility of politicians for making the actual 
decisions in concluding: "We have seen quite clearly that tiie range and complexity 
ofthe issues raised by the problems of 'development' are not amenable to decision 
by adminisfrators or specialists" '^ * 
'^ '' Serle, op. cjf.,pp.447-51. 
' " Bruce Montgomery, "Sir Allan Knight, Obituary", The Austi-alian, 29.5.1999. 
'^ ^ Layman, op. cit, p.235; K. J. Walker, "The Politics of National Development", AJPA, March 
1973, p.l 13. 
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The image of "weak-kneed politicians" was one aspect ofthe debate on political 
confrol of technocrats that has been exploited by academics and other pubhc 
commentators to criticise governments on a partisan basis. Engineer-adminisfrators 
were said to dictate the planning and selection of developmental projects on their 
own terms and for their own professional self-interest or, more generally, to take 
advantage ofthe awe with which unqualified politicians regarded their undoubted 
technical expertise.'" Moreover, tiie threat of adminisfrative dominance perceived in 
the fostering of a professionally-based, organisational esprit de corps over the life of 
a development project was often enough to warrant the subsequent disbanding ofthe 
organisation.'^ ^ As was the case vvath the Snowy Mountains Autiiority, the Victorian 
SEC and other statutory authorities established for developmental purposes, 
executive control, if not parliamentary confrol was imposed through the numerous 
statutory financial and regulatory checks, as well as a conventional retention of final 
Ministerial approval over a range of decisions. Recourse could also be had to other 
confrol mechanisms; naming and blaming senior govemment officials vmder 
parliamentary privilege, various modes of official parhamentaiy inquiries, with the 
publication of selected evidence to the inquiries, and the scratiny of annual estimates 
and use of parliamentary standing and/or select committees. Technocratic dominance 
to the extent portrayed in development politics was more political propaganda than 
actuality. 
' " R. H. Robinson, For My Country, Brisbane, 1957, p.375; Power, op. cit., p.23; Lyall, op. cit., 
p.144. 
'^' D. J. Hardman, Snowy Scheme Management & Administi-ation, Sydney: West Publishing Corp., 
1970, p. 159, p. 165; Tully, 1965, op. cit 
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The examples cited also comphcate the proposition put forward by Rourke and 
others tiiat individual administtative power exists only as a function of organisation. 
Monash with the SEC, William Calder witii tiie Victorian Country Roads Board and 
William Hudson with the Snowy Mountains Authority were just some ofthe 
engineers appointed on the basis of already estabhshed technocratic reputations, that 
is, they had reputational power, to set up and administer entirely new organisations. 
Thus, their organisations were potentially more a reflection of themselves than 
otherwise, although it cannot be disputed that, over time and if they were perceived 
to fulfil their purpose, the organisations did serve to enhance their chief 
adminisfrator's individual power. Overall, however, it appears that the technocrat's 
role follows the conventional path of advising, negotiating and bargaining in the 
highly competitive environment ofthe decision-making process and that individual 
influence has a direct correlation with bargaining skills and some ofthe managerial 
skills also identified as characteristics of leadership. In terms of competing for pohcy 
influence with other specialist elites, it seems that, in the period under review, 
engineers found the greatest competition from economists. The influence of 
academic economists such as L. F. Giblin and D. Copland predominated in national 
economic pohcy during the Depression era and most commentators on Queensland 
politics during the late 1930s and 1940s ascribe a similar level of influence to Colin 
Clark.'^' 
At the same time, the capacity for specialist adminisfrators to influence political 
choices in developmental policy was most effective when they formed an alliance 
'^' For a general reference, see C. B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression: A Study of 
Economic Development and Policy in the 1920s and 1930s, Sydney: Sydney University Press, in 
association with Oxford University Press, 1988; ChiUa Bulbeck, op. cit 
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with economists or heads of Treasury and particularly vviien then minister had the 
dual portfolios of Premier and Treasurer. It was said that HEC chief, Allan Kni^t, 
and Under-Treasurer, Ken Binns, "an unbeatable team", buih up useful insights into 
the strengths and weakness of Reece, at that time holding the two portfolios, and his 
deputy, Roy Fagan. Having consolidated an harmonious working relationship with 
them, engineer and economist exerted the influence on the Tasmanian Cabinet'^ " that 
elevated the HEC and Knight to what is widely acknowledged as an unprecedented 
level of adminisfrative power. During the years from 1983 to 1987 v/hen Queensland 
Premier, Joh Bjelke-Petersen was Treasurer, the working partnership of Under-
Treasurer, Leo Hielscher, and Syd Schubert, then head ofthe Premier's Department 
and Co-Orduiator-General, also had an identifiable mfluence on the direction of 
developmental policy. However, it has been the role of Hielscher rather than of 
Schubert that has been equated with that of Dumas in Westem Ausfralia and 
Wainwright in South Ausfralia in Queensland's re-orientation from primary to 
resources-based industrial development.'^ ' 
A. F. Davies' discussion ofthe concept of administrative style offers some indicators 
of individual administrative influence. Instancing the "dramatic enlargements of 
talent" which occurred in wartime in Britain, he asks if some men have "a 
generalised gift for management and adminisfration" '^ ^ In keepmg with the frend 
elsewhere he endorses the usefulness of laboratory studies aimed at identifying 
leadership characteristics, but the conclusion to be drawn from his discussion is that 
'^ ° Lowe, op. cit, p. 16, p.23. 
'^' Humphrey McQueen, Gone Tomorrow. Australia in the 80s, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1982, 
p. 125, quoted in Bulbeck, op. cit, pp.26-27. 
'^ ^ A. F. Davies, Skills, Outlooks and Passions, A psychoanalytic contribution to the study of politics, 
Melboume: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p.51. 
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there are too many unmeasurable and situation-specific variables to allow any 
definitive outcome. His application of role theory, that is, the official's pubhc self, or 
presentation of self, has some merit, as does the linkuig of characteristics such as 
"autonomy and dominance", and "a hunger for power" with "early socialisation" '^ ^ 
When he delves into psycho-analytic tiieory for explanations of individual 
adminisfrative power, however, he makes little distinction between pohticians and 
officials and his argument suffers from its dependence on subjective information 
which is not universally acceptable and a range of interpretative theories.'^" Self 
observed that when administrative style was attributed to an official, it was usually 
indicative of adminisfrative influence,'^' and Davies follows the same pafli in 
agreeing with the popular idea of individual power as a function of organisational 
position and possibly reputation. But generally, the deconstraction of individual 
adminisfrative behaviour in terms of adminisfrative style fails to give sufficient 
weight to professional, occupational socialisation to provide explanations for the 
adminisfrative power that accrues to the individual technocrat. 
Another approach is to refer to the biographies of leading engineer-adminisfrators in 
Ausfralia with a view to determining whether or not these technocrats, already 
identified as influential in some aspect of govemment developmental policy, had 
personal and professional attributes ui common. There is little doubt that they 
displayed the professionally conditioned behef in scientific rationality as the correct 
basis for decision-making, and the benefits to society of applied engineering 
outcomes. Most of them had established reputations as skilled engineers and 
organisational managers which, together with a pronoimced self-belief, not 
'^ ^ A. F. Davies, "The Concept of Administrative Style", AJPA, 12, May-Nov. 1966, pp.51-53. 
'^ ^ Davies, 1980, op. cit, Introduction. 
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infrequently interpreted as arrogance or "mtiiless egotism'"^ in Monash's case, gave 
tiiem an unmistakable authority, so that it was said of Allan Knight: 
His personality and judgment had played a role more significant than ahnost 
any other person in post-war economic development... As an engineer and 
designer, he was exceptional, as an adminisfrator, he was inspirational; and as 
a man he personified imcompromising strength.'" 
Although attempts to draw out the elusive concept of personality may blur the 
difference between occupational and personal characteristics, they deliver a high 
degree of consistency in identifying tiiose that distinguish influential technocrats. 
Work was their hfe, tiiey were "natural leaders of men'"^ *, with the ability to make 
incisive decisions and, when it came to influencing decisions, to excel at negotiating 
and bargaining. As Raxworthy, for example, portrayed J. J. Bradfield; 
... (he) was able to play a cracial part in events at a vital moment, for he 
leamt to wait patientiy for that moment and then act swiftly and decisively. 
He leamt to become "the unreasonable man" '^ ' 
Engineer-adminisfrators appointed to implement m^or infrastmcture projects won 
the trast ofthe pubhc as being above the taint of political corraption but were 
nevertheless routinely attacked by opposing interests for both promoting excessive 
technocratic influence and enhancing their personal power. Overall, however, the 
issue of personal ambition or Davies' "hunger for power" is not addressed in the 
biographies cited. Isolating its function in the acquisition of individual technocratic 
power might have proved to be too difficult, but a more important consideration may 
'^ ^ Self,op. C7/., p.l52. 
'^ * Serle, op. cit, p.509. 
' " Lowe, op. cit p. 70. 
'^ ^ Tauman, op.cit,p.52. 
'^' Raxworthy, op. cit, p. 52. 
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have been the effect ofthe negative connotation of self-uiterest on the 
characterisation of a professionally socialised official working in the public interest. 
Although it is far from conclusive, individual prominence appears to result from a 
particular occupational environment, together with professional and personal 
characteristics which, separately, may be relatively inconsequential but when 
combined, make the effective difference. The best articulation of this proposal is 
found in Serle's interpretative assessment of Monash's claim to greatness: 
If Monash was a genius, it was his 'infmite capacity for taking pains' which 
made him so. ... He achieved greatness, essentially as an administrator, by 
cultivating to a super-pitch of excellence the ordinary talents and virtues; a 
tentative memory, energy and capacity for hard work, concenttation, 
orderliness, common sense, power of logical analysis, attention to detail, fine 
judgment - and a temperament and constitution wdiich enabled him always to 
work harmoniously with colleagues and to stand heavy sfrain ... Almost his 
greatest gift was to be a teacher. His clarity of mind and of exposition was his 
sfrength above all others. To define the heart of a problem and reduce it to the 
simplest terms was his centtal quality of leadership."" 
Serle then records what Monash believed were the contributing factors to his 
success: 
It was a matter primarily of concenttation, of study and hard work, not 
genius. One must be thorough master of one's self, know one's own mind and 
be courageous enough to formulate what one wants. Character, personality 
and the capacity to inspire were necessary; pick the right men and impress 
your views on them Be indifferent to praise or blame, admit it when you are 
wrong; yet be confident enough to carry on independently of criticism."" 
Although, not surprisingly, they raise Monash to the status of an administtative 
paragon, these assessments provide a useful base of occupational influences, 
professional values and personal characteristics from which to develop an 
explanation for the administtative power of a particular engineer-administtator. 
""' Serle, op cit, p.507. 
"" Ibid pp.507-08. 
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2. 
A FOUNDATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: J. R. KEMP AND 
QUEENSLAND'S FIRST MAIN ROADS AUTHORITY 
In 1920, the Main Roads Board, Queensland first centtal roads authority, was 
constituted and John Robert Kemp, formerly a senior engineer with the Country 
Roads Board in Victoria, was appointed its Chairman. These decisions by 
Queensland's Labor Govemment under Premier E. G. Theodore marked the 
beginning of, and provided the means for, Kemp's rise to a position of administtative 
power. They were levers of change insofar as they marked the inttoduction of a new 
element in govemment developmental policy, but tiiey were more a matter of 
political pragmatism in the face of sustained pubhc pressure than considered policy 
initiatives acknowledging the economic importance of roads. The main roads 
authority (Main Roads) was established witii a modest set of aims but went on to 
fulfil largely unforeseen, often cracial aims and functions, wiiile successive 
govemments came to rely for the co-orduiation ofthe State's entire infrastmcture 
development programme on a man first appointed for his experience as a roads and 
bridges engineer. 
State confrol of roads was a long-standing item in the pohcy platforms of both Labor 
and non-Labor Parties in Queensland. Nationalisation of roads was a plank in 
Labor's fighting platform amended for the 1920 Labor-in-Politics Convention, which 
confirmed Premier T. J. Ryan's earlier statement on its desirability. Conventional 
analysis of Labor's first decade of govemment in Queensland focuses on its 
reformist "socialist" ideology and the extent to which these ideals were achieved. 
Many have commented on Labor's failure to implement a European style of 
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socialism with its emphasis on new stractures of shared power. They point to the 
watering down, and ultimate failure of, the nationalisation objective and Labor's 
increasingly ambivalent attitude to reforming worker conditions. Preferring 
legislation to direct action to achieve Labor's ideological goals, T. J. Ryan was 
typified as a liberal radical reformer rather than a hardline socialist, espousing a 
pragmatic brand of socialism tailored to his Queensland constituency and its 
particular geographic, economic and social circumstances.^ That the union movement 
and the Labor Party in Queensland developed, not from urban-based tmions but from 
the 'bush' worker unions in the aftermath ofthe 1890s shearers' strikes, was unique, 
both nationally and intemationally, and Labor's support base remained 
predominantly rural. Ryan was accepted by the union movement despite having a 
non-union background. He worked to foster an alliance with worker, small land 
holder and businessman to achieve improvements to living and working conditions. 
An enduring emphasis on rural constituencies and agricultural development earned 
Labor's policy orientation the label of "agrarian socialism" 
Giving the interests of small farmers priority over those of workers implied a tuming 
away by Labor leaders from their ttaditional labour movement constituency,^ 
although Ryan s 'small man' was already a significant component of Queensland's 
population and Labor's electoral support base. As numerous published local histories 
demonsttate, in class terminology, many of them were workers; teamsters, station 
employees, miners, seasonal meatworkers and cane cutters, w^ose goal was the long-
' See, for example, D. J. Murphy, T. J. Ryan: A Political Biography, St. Lucia: UQP, 1990, 
especially pp.517-19; D. J. Murphy, "Thomas Joseph Ryan" in Denis Murphy, Roger Joyce and 
Margaret Cribb, (eds.). The Premiers of Queensland, St. Lucia: UQP, 1990, pp.272-73. 
^ Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton, Labor in Queensland: From the 1880s to 1988, St. Lucia: 
UQP, 1989, p. 89. 
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term economic security they believed agriculture and land ownership offered. Thus, 
the agricultural settlement pohcy initiated in the late 1860s was accelerated under 
Labor. Govemment pohcy was oriented to support small producers and land holders 
through market protection and the development of decenttahsed infrastracture. Labor 
also continued tiie aggressive railway constraction policy of previous govemments 
appreciating, as they had, that railways were essential to maintaining an economy 
dependent on primary production. Railways represented a substantial avenue of 
employment and hence a ready reservoir of electoral support, v^Me routinely 
contributing more than a third ofthe state's armual revenue.^  
Transport had long been acknowledged as a critical factor in state development. 
When Labor came to power in 1915, fransport policies were concemed principally 
with railways and shipping, despite many raral areas being dependent on road 
ttansport vMch usually provided the sole access to the nearest railway. Yet, apart 
from the provision of access roads to new settlements, roads were not a State pohcy 
concem. Railways were considered to be the enabling agents of agricultural 
settiement. Through its substantial rural constituency. Labor was sufficiently aware 
of rural transport problems to include State conttol and management of roads in its 
original platform but remained overwhelmingly committed to railways' expansion. 
Centtal conttol of roads first appeared on the Caucus agenda on 23 October 1919 
when Secretary for Agriculture, William Gillies, submitted an interim report on 
proposed legislation to establish a State main roads authority. A Caucus resolution 
that '*the Minister give notice to inttoduce that afternoon", was not acted on at the 
See Kenneth Wiltshire, "Public Finance", in Murphy, et al., 1980, op. cit, pp.168-69. 
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time. A week later, the submission of a further report was followed by a successful 
motion that "tiie Minister be allowed to proceed with the Bill, with amendments as 
proposed by the Committee",'* although no record has as yet been discovered of 
either these amendments or ofthe committee proposing them. Caucus was already 
subject to the final decision-making powers of Labor's Centtal Political Executive 
(CPE) in matters relating to any plank in tiie Party's platform on v^ch it was unable 
to reach a decision. CPE minutes for this period do not record any discussion on the 
Main Roads Bill and a further twelve months elapsed before Gillies presented tiie 
Bill to Parliament. In the meantime, the premiership had passed to Theodore, wdiile 
tiie London loans embargo severely conqjromised Labor's State Enterprises and 
infrastracture development programme.* In October 1918, after Theodore, as 
Treasurer, had outiined the railways' financial position. Cabinet recommended either 
closing down or restricting future railway projects which mostiy related to the 
constraction of branch hnes to link small farmer settlements witii main line railways. 
In a letter to the Govemment in 1918, Thomgs Stopford, who had replaced Gillies as 
Chairman ofthe Pubhc Works Commission responsible for ^proving branch 
railway line constraction, declared his support for roads: 
... many ofthe branch lines that were asked for by the people should not be 
branch railways but branch roads ... good sohd motor roads as feeders to the 
lines.' 
" Caucus meeting, 29.10.1919, Australian Labor Party, Queensland Branch, Caucus Minutes, 1, 
24.7.1917 - 23.2.1920, TR 1893, John Oxley Library. 
^ W. J. Gall, Diary Notes, 29.8.1918 43/D/30, WiUiam James GaU W. J Collection, MS 43, 
University of Queensland Fryer Library. 
* See Tom Cochrane, Blockade.- the Queensland Loans Affair 1920 to 1924, St. Lucia: UQP, 1989, 
Chapter One; C. B. Schedvin, "Theodore and the London Pastoral Lobhy" Politics 6, May 1971, 
pp.26-41. 
' Quoted by Gillies, Main Roads Bill, Second Reading, QPD 1919-20,133,p.l811. 
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Railways Miruster in the Ryan Govemment, James Fihelly, was a surprising 
advocate for roads. An often fiery opponent of Ryan and Theodore, he had ambitions 
to become Premier and apparently would have preferred the Agriculture portfoho as 
the least troublesome for him.^  Early in 1920, he and Railways Commissioner 
Davidson spent three months in the United States assessing tiie relative merits of rail 
and road constraction. Davidson was unpressed witii the eflBciency of road 
constraction and fransport but nothing he saw on tiie inspection tour changed his 
view that light railroads cost less to constract than good roads.^  It became apparent 
that the Main Roads Bill's infroduction had been delayed until more mformation was 
gatiiered and assessed as, at the same time. Gillies and two other (unnamed) 
ministers were sent to Victoria to examine the operations of its Country Roads 
Board. 
Based on the model developed in New York State, the Board, established in 1913, 
was Ausfralia's first state road authority. Since Separation, Queaisland had adopted 
Victorian models in several areas of govemment adminisfration, and the legislation 
to provide for a main roads authority followed the principles and much ofthe 
practice ofthe Countiy Roads Board. Essentially tiie Victorian Board was a semi-
independent authority with at least one Board member a qualified engineer. It was 
funded by Treasury loans and motor vehicle taxes and, although designated a cenfral 
authority with all the implications for cenfralised road planning, its purpose was to 
ensure co-operation and cost sharing with local authorities. By this time, the New 
South Wales Govemment had failed in several attempts to estabhsh a similar road 
autiiority and a proposal was under discussion to constitute the New South Wales 
^ Gall, Diary Notes, 2.9.1918,43/D/32, op. cit 
' See also Gillies' reference to Davidson, Main Roads Bill, 1920, op. c/f. p. 1817. 
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Minister for Local Govemment the Main Roads Board. Gilhes rejected rumours of 
his appointment to the Queensland Board, branding the New Soutii Wales proposal a 
blatant attempt at political conttol. ^ ° 
The form ofthe Main Roads Bill was not discussed in Caucus before GWlies 
presented it to Parhament in November 1920, but the second reading speeches shed 
some light on the decision-making process leading up to its inttoduction. Although 
there are no Cabinet minutes for these years. Ministers were generally in favour of 
the measure, partly because of the minimal ^propriation needed for its 
estabhshment but also because the Victorian Board's operations had demonsttated 
the benefits of such an initiative. Ministerial support was also influenced by sfrong 
lobbying from the Automobile Association, carriers' associations, farmer groups, 
progress associations and some local autiiorities. 
The Bill passed through Parliament with little dissention. All speakers who 
participated in debating its provisions confirmed their awareness ofthe positive 
aspects of centtahsed planning and funding directed towards the provision of rural 
roads to assist rural settlers. The legislation provided for the Main Roads Board, to 
declare a road a main road, subject to the Govemor-in-Covmcil's approval and after 
consultation with the local authority to apportion fairly the local authority's financial 
liability. Despite tiie intention, (inherent in its designation as a semi-independent 
authority) to remove the Board and its operations from political influence, the 
possibilities for political pattonage were immediately recognised. ^ ^ It was an issue 
that continued to permeate debate on main roads legislation throughout subsequent 
'° The Roadmakers, Department of Nfain Roads, N. S. W., 1976, pp.11-19; Brisbane Courier, 
9.3.1920; Main Roads BiU 1920, op. cit, p.l810, p.l827. 
" /Wrf, p. 1823, p. 1827. 
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decades. It also remained directly relevant to Kerrq)'s position as administtative head 
ofthe authority. 
Under the Act, the Board became the only main roads authority in Austtalia to be 
delegated tiie collection of motor vehicle regisfration fees, previously a pohce 
function. Of particular concem to representatives of rural electorates was the 
consequent regulation, once the Board's operations commenced, making vehicle 
regisfration con^ulsory. This was seen as taxation without any guarantee of road 
services, with the prospect for local autiiorities of an inequitable distribution of 
vehicle tax revenue. The issue of confrol of vehicle hcenses became an effective 
govemment tool in the battle between roads and railways for freight haulage, a 
dispute that was not resolved in Queensland until the late 1970s. 
The Board comprised three members ^pointed for a five-year term. At least one was 
required to be an engineer qualified "by experience and examination" Kemp, 
previously an engineer with the Victorian Countiy Roads Board, was appointed 
Chairman in October 1920 at a salary of £1,000 per armum J. A. Fraser, Deputy 
Chief Engineer for Railways, was appointed in January 1921, and D. A. Crawford, 
Engineer in Charge ofthe Pubhc Estate Improvement (PEI) Branch, was appomted 
in March 1921, both at a salary of £800. It is speculated that, on Gillies' visit to tiie 
Country Roads Board early in 1920, the position of Chairman was first offered to the 
Board's Chief Engineer, A. E. Callaway. Callaway, with the ^proval of Board 
Chairman, William Calder, apparently recommended Kemp v^o accepted the offer 
and arrived in Queensland in October 1920. Kemp's role in drafting the legislation 
was confirmed in the preamble to the Board's first official meeting in which 
78 
members referred to tiie Govemment's confidence in Kemp in accepting his 
recommendations concerning the Board's estabhshment.^ ^ 
John Robert Kemp, tiie only son of a schoolteacher fatiier, was bom in Yeldon, 
Victoria, in 1883 and educated privately and at local State schools. His school years 
coincided witii the era of Monash, Swinbume and Watts, v^en statutory corporations 
were estabhshed to undertake the major public works programmes deemed necessary 
for Victoria's development. As the importance of technical professionals to the 
successful completion of these programmes was widely acknowledged, the 
engineering profession was in the ascendant. Unlike Monash, Kemp's family 
circumstances did not allow him to study engineering full-time at university. In 1902, 
from a temporary position as draftsman he was accepted as a cadet-engineer in the 
"pupillage" system, working under William Davidson and Carlo Catini in the 
Department of Public Works. Studying part-time at Melboume University, he 
completed the first year ofthe engineering course and passed some second year 
subjects. Possibly because ofthe resistance among senior departmental staff to 
university-based ttaining for engineers he was not allowed time off" to attend lectures, 
and it became increasingly difficult for him to keep up with his studies. Melboume 
Uruversity's engineering faculty was then small in numbers and low in status, while 
most working engineers still received their ttaining under tiie apprenticeship system 
In the event, Kemp withdrew from the course and did not complete the degree. In 
1910, after three years at the Commonwealth Patents Office, he was ^pointed Shire 
Engineer for Karkarooc shire, one of hundreds of small local govemment areas 
established following the passage ofthe 1874 Local Govemment Act. 
'^  Preamble to Main Roads Board, Record of Agenda for Board Meetings (Record of Agenda), 
Department of Main Roads (DMR) 78, 1.2.1921. 
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Road Districts witii local Road Boards, established under the 1854 Act, provided the 
initial infrastracture for the development of local govemment in Victoria. Road 
Boards were later replaced by small local boroughs administered by ratepayer-
elected councils. Their local responsibilities, including roads and pubhc works, were 
defined, witii a mechanism established for the receipt of grants from the colonial 
govemment. ^ ^ Gazetted as a borough in the 1890s, K^karooc was located in the 
marginal v^eat growing Mallee region of north westem Victoria, where the survival 
of local farmers depended on a viable rail link to Melboume and a network of 
irrigation channels to maintain a reliable water supply. ^ ^ Karkarooc was a small shire 
in terms of ratepayer numbers, and plans for improvements in local public works 
were always framed within, and subject to, the shire's rating base. At the time of 
Kemp's ^pointment, the council's approach to its pubhc works responsibilities was 
amateurish and inefficient. According to Council Minutes, Kemp began work 
immediately with an enthusiasm made even more impressive by the results he 
achieved within a short time. Delivering long detailed engineer's reports to monthly 
covmcil meetings, he always took the opportunity to offer constmctive 
recommendations for the shire's works programme,'^ and imparted an attitude of 
professionalism which raised the standards that councillors employed in dealing with 
" J. R Power, R. Wettenhall & J. Halhgan Local Govemment in Australia. Canberra: AGPS, 1989, 
pp.238-44, pp.248-49, p.251. 
'" T. G. Taylor, "The Problem of Closer Settlement in Victoiia" Economic Record, 1936,12, pp.57-
70. 
'^  A. Hilton, (Karkarooc) "Historical Notes re J. R. Kemp," prepared May 1967, handwritten, no 
page numbers, Evan Richard, Papers, Box 2 of 2, Folder 9, Heritage Panel, Institution of 
Engineers Australia, (Qld Division); see, for example, J. R. Kemp. Engineer's Report, appended to 
Minutes of the Karkarooc Shire Council, 11.9.1911, pp.462-44. (A typed copy has been made of 
the handwritten Shire Council Minutes for this period. With few exceptions, no page nimibers 
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tiieir responsibilities. It may also be speculated that pattonage and preferential 
freatment in public works schedules were much reduced, if not abandoned, under his 
dedicated assault on the shire's works problems. He instituted strict surveying and 
costing metiiods to the tendering and confracting for the multitude of small jobs, 
usually involving road and bridge constmction, urigation and drainage works. Close 
supervision ofthe work carried out by local confractors was maintained, and Kemp 
was not averse to requesting Council's approval for the termination of confracts 
when work was unsatisfactory. ^ ^ 
In addition to roads, the railway link to Melboume and the maintenance and 
expansion of irrigation channels were high on the shire's priorities for pubhc works. 
To resolve problems or obtain govemment support in these areas, Kemp, with the 
shire president, organised visits to Melboume. There he consulted with appropriate 
departmental officials but, if a satisfactoty response was not forthcoming, did not 
hesitate to enlist the support ofthe local Member of Parliament to bring the matter 
before the relevant Minister. ^ ^ Kemp speared to be well-prepared for these meetings 
and employing such direct action was usually successful. Problems arising from low 
rates' revenue prompted Kemp to undertake the valuation ofthe entire shire, which 
he completed in 1912.^ ^ For this purpose, he studied for, and was awarded, a valuer's 
and surveyor's certificate. Throu^out 1910 and 1911, Kemp developed and 
maintained an achievable programme of public works across a large range of areas. 
He ensured that the Council obtained full benefit from the State Govemment's 
were transferred from the original journals. - Brian Decker, Warracknabeal Shire Council, April 
1997.) 
'* See, for example. Engineer's Report, ibid, 21.2.1911. 
" General Business, ibid, 17.5.1910; 18.10.1911; Engineer's Report, ibid, 8.10.1912. 
'^  See, for example, J. R. Kemp, Valuer's Report, ibid, 14.11.1911; General Business, ibid, 
29.10.1912. 
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annual Mallee Roads Grants. He initiated plans for the installation of electric lighting 
in Hopetoim and Beulah, the shire's two main towns, consulting former colleagues in 
the Patents Office on the respective merits of gas and electricity and asking a friend 
to draw up the first plans and specifications. He also played a major role in the 
selection of consulting and electrical engineers for the project. 
By 1912, a council sub-committee was estabhshed to deal with tendering for all 
public works conttacts. While Kemp continued to propose, cost and supervise every 
conttact job, his dominance ui public works matters appeared to be waning, possibly 
because his efforts to institute efficient practices had been too successful. Following 
his campaign to compel the Victorian Water Supply and Irrigation Commission to 
accept greater responsibility for its functional area,^ ^ the Commission took over all 
water supply and irrigation matters from Karkarooc Council. A consulting engineer 
was ^pointed to the shire and Kemp responded to this ^parent slight by asking 
permission to take up a part-time appointment as consulting engineer for a 
neighbouring shire. The installation of electric lighting was taken out of his hands 
when electtical engineers were appointed to the project and tiie tendering sub-
committee made all tiie decisions on works confracts. Kemp was left with the still 
important, but routine, duties associated with the constraction and maintenance of 
roads, bridges and various small works projects. 
This situation was clearly not challenging enough for an energetic, ambitious man, 
now possessed of proven engineering and administrative skills. In 1912 he attended a 
Municipal Association conference convened to discuss the response of local 
" J. R. Kemp, Engineer's Report, op. cit, 22.11.1910,17.1.1911. 
^^  Minutes ofthe Karkarooc Shire Council, op. cit, 27.8.1912 and J. R. Kemp, Engineer's Report, 
ibid 
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authorities to the Country Roads Bill then before the Victorian Parliament. ^ ^ It is 
possible that he was approached informally there about a position with the proposed 
Country Roads Board as, shortly afterwards, he offered his resignation to Karkarooc 
Council. Aware of his value to the shire, the councillors offered him an increase in 
salary^ v^ i^ich Kemp accepted but, in November 1913, he again tendered his 
resignation. This time it was to take up an appointment as assistant engineer with the 
newly-formed Country Roads Board. There were generous tributes from councillors 
and local residents, acknowledging his substantial contribution to the development of 
the shire under very difficult circumstances. While tiiey regretted losing his services, 
they were proud that their engineer had secured such a prestigious appointment.^ 
Kemp had demonsttated his capacity to "get on" with people, to achieve results when 
resources were scarce, and to liaise successfully with other local authorities and state 
govemment officials. Altiiough he may have been judged a hard but fair man, his 
generally effective dealings with small, local confractors gave him valuable 
experience in assessing the respective merits of confract and day-labour employment 
for local works. There is also little doubt that, during his time with Karkarooc 
council, his engineering fraining advanced rapidly. He kept himself informed of new 
developments in engineering techniques and ^phed them wdiere possible to 
resolving the broad range of technical problems he constantly faced. 
Kemp's fraining and experience shaped a reputation which helps to explain why a 
shire engineer, particularly from a remote, marginal shire such as Karkarooc, was 
selected for appointment to the Country Roads Board. As much as the Board needed 
'^ President's Report, ibid, 11.11.1913. 
^^  Minutes of a Special Meeting, Karkarooc Shire Council, ibid, 1.1.1913; Minutes of the Karkarooc 
Shire Coxmcil, op. c/f, 21.1.1913. 
^^  76/^,11.11.1913. 
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experienced roads and bridges engineers wiio understood the local autiiority 
environment, the conditions under vMch its staff was obhged to work required 
energetic, young men accustomed to remote, rural areas. Kemp's demonsfrated 
competence while working in the Mallee's difficult and variable conditions was to his 
advantage in the selection process. Other contributing factors may have been his 
public service contacts in Melboume and his standing in the Victorian Municipal 
Association. On a personal level, one reason for his taking every opportunity to visit 
Melboume became q)parent when he married Iva Lilley of Melboume, soon after the 
confirmation of his appointment to the Country Roads Board. 
One ofthe first tasks ofthe Countiy Roads Board was to conduct a survey of road 
conditions in all shires and to hear submissions on road requirements from local 
councillors and residents. It entailed Board staff fravelling twenty-one thousand 
miles in the first year, some ofthe time on horseback, and resulted in the proposed 
declaration of just over two thousand miles of main roads. The survey showed that 
closer settlement, agricultural development and marketing had all been severely 
retarded by the absence, particularly in rural areas, of ttafficable roads.^ '* By 1916, 
with the increasingly adverse effect ofthe war on manpower and materials, the 
Board was obliged to curtail both its planned programme of roads and bridges 
constraction and the extension of categories of roads to be brought under its 
provisions. As the end ofthe war marked the Board's fifth year of operations, 
William Calder, its highly respected Chairman, took the opportunity to praise the 
dedication and self-sacrifice ofthe small number of staff, including Ken^, during the 
'^* B. F. L., (Bridge Sub-Branch), "Country Roads Board", Roadlines, June 1970, pp.8-10. 
84 
war years.^' The increased responsibilities gave Kemp an extta degree of maturity 
and professional self-confidence, >\4iile the reduction in staff allowed him more 
direct experience with planning and adminisfrative activities, tiie benefit of which 
became ^ parent in the way Main Roads adminisfration in Queensland evolved. He 
was rewarded with a promotion to senior engineer early in 1920 but, within six 
months, had accepted the offer of employment in Queensland. 
When Kemp was appointed Chairman of tiie Main Roads Board, he came to a State 
exhibiting many signs of economic stagnation. The London market's embargo on 
coital loans to Queensland, vsdiich had been the goal of pastoral and business 
interests, proved an effective obstacle to progress on Theodore's expansive promises 
for the provision of development infrastracture. Unemployment had risen sharply, 
economic growth had slowed and the financial demands generated by the state's vast 
size and decentralised settlement pattem were exhausting available funding avenues. 
According to more than one analysis, the Govemment failed to address the serious 
problems in its public fmances, which included bigger Consolidated Revenue 
deficits, increasingly high taxation levels, and lack of access to the cheap loan funds 
required for any substantial developmental works programme.^ ^ Development funds 
had long been committed to railway expansion and, to a lesser extent, to ports and 
harbours. The concept of a fransport network to serve primary industiy was 
expressed in the constraction of east-west trunk railways linking ports along the 
coast with the hinterland. 
^^  Fifth Annual Report ofthe Country Roads Board, December 1918, p.7. Main Roads Library 
(MRL), no classification number. 
*^ Gough, et al, pp.9-10; Kenneth Wiltshire, "Public Finance", in Murphy, et al., 1980, op. cit, 
pp. 162-64. 
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Queensland had no roads pohcy, despite the increasing popularity of motor vehicles 
for private and commercial use. The Roads and Survey Branch, later the PEI Branch, 
ofthe Lands Department constracted some roads in conjunction with closer 
settlement schemes but overall responsibility for the provision of roads rested with 
local authorities. As elsewiiere in Austtalia in the late nineteentii century. Road 
Trasts were formed to advise the Govemment "on the effective expenditure of road 
and bridge money" Roads became tiie responsibility of local area Divisional 
Boards estabhshed in 1879 which in tum were replaced by the separate municipal 
and shire councils created under the Local Authority Act 1902. The extent of road 
constraction was largely tied to the local rate base, although Treasury made some 
funding available througji long-term loan subsidies. Larger towns had formed roads 
but in sparsely settled districts Avith few ratepayers and w^ere disputes arose about 
apportioning financial liability, arterial or through roads and those adjacent to shire 
boundaries often remained no more than bush fracks.^^ 
Kemp's summary ofthe road situation, as it stood in 1920, emphasized the high cost 
of boundary disputes, tiie inefficient allocation of resources caused by the overall 
lack of infrastracture planning, and the failure to ^preciate the scientific basis of 
road constraction.^^ Some local authorities in Queensland, in supporting the 
estabhshment of a main roads authority, recogrused that it could deliver, in addition 
to roads and bridges, financial and en^loymait benefits far beyond their own limited 
27 Kerr, op. cit., p.251; Joan Carmichael Neal, Beyond the Burdekin: Pioneers, Prospectors, 
Pastoralists: A History ofthe Dalrymple Shire 1879-1979, Charters Towers: Mimosa Press, 1984, 
p.251. 
*^ See, for example, Kerr, op. cit., pp.251-253: Dorothy Jones, Trinity Phoenix: A History cf Cairns, 
Cairns Post, 1976, p.446. 
" J. R. Kemp, "Address to Ipswich Rotary", 17.10.1934, J. R Kemp, Papers. OM 79 - 58/1, John 
Oxley Library. 
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means. By confrast, the Board also had to contend witii the view tiiat this was yet 
another move to curtail the independence of local govemment and to fransfer more 
decision-making power over local responsibilities to Brisbane.^" At that time, local 
authorities were formed by and operated under the provisions of 1he Local 
Authorities Act of 1902. Their powers to make by-laws in respect of specified local 
responsibilities were subject to final approval by the Govemor-in-Council. Although 
rates conq)rised their principal source of finance, revenue was often inadequate to 
meet basic requirements. They relied heavily on state govemment subsidies to carry 
out pubhc works programs, with tiie inevitable consequence of increased interference 
in determining local priorities.^ ^ 
Convincing local representatives that co-operating with the Main Roads Board was 
to their benefit was one ofthe major challenges Kemp faced in having the Board 
accepted as essential for local area 
development. Years later, Kemp was able to joke that: 
The initial movements ofthe Main Roads Board were viewed with suspicion 
by the Local Authorities as some sort of political joke and Board members as 
highwaymen ofthe Dick Turpin or Ned Kelly variety, rather than as 
constractors having the development ofthe countty at heart.^ ^ 
Another important issue for Kemp, as a newly appointed official, was the 
relationship between Labor Ministers and senior public servants, particularly tiiose 
accorded delegated decision-making power as heads of non-departmental bodies. 
^ Robinson, op. cit, p.324. 
'^ For a comprehensive discussion on local authorities' powers, the reality ofthe 'general competence 
power' and the threat of loss of independence, see Colin A Hughes, The Govemment of 
Queensland, Chapter 7; J. D. Tucker, op. cit, 1981, pp.2-4, and Tucker et al, in Power, Wettenhall 
& Halligan, op. cit, 1989, Vol. 1., Chapter 1. 
^^  Kemp, op. cit 
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Unlike future Main Roads amending legislation, tiie debate on the 1920 Bill did not 
touch on Kemp's ^pointment or on the adoption ofthe Board as an adminisfrative 
instrument. Main Roads fell within the responsibility ofthe Minister for Lands, but 
v^^le Gilhes, as Minister for Agriculture, was its chief sponsor, it was a semi-
independent authority created by statute and standing outside the department's 
financial and staffing stractures. Such boards were already widely accepted 
throughout the Austtalian States as the appropriate administtative form for carrying 
out development projects, with the need for independence from direct pohtical 
confrol frequently cited in support. 
This did not inhibit the Opposition from making political mileage out of questioning 
the extent of mirusterial confrol over their decisions and actions. Section 19 ofthe 
Main Roads Bill provided that Board recommendations or decisions were subject to 
the ^proval ofthe Minister and the Govemor-in-Council. Debate on this provision 
covered conventional points such as ensuring parliamentary confrol, the dangers of 
political confrol through the exercise of ministerial responsibility, and the need for 
freedom from political confrol to achieve non-partisan, cost efficient results. 
However, as too little was seen to be at stake in the configuration and operation of a 
Main Roads Board, there was no attempt on this occasion to press the Govemment to 
any serious extent on these issues. 
It is not known whether or not Gillies discussed with Kemp, before his appointment 
was confirmed, the extent to which the Govemment was willing to concede decision-
making powers to him as head of Main Roads. In other words, was ministerial 
approval of Board decisions to be simjdy a formality or would the Govemment 
exercise close ministerial, and indeed Cabinet, confrol, over the Board's operations? 
From title outset. Labor's relationship with its seruor public servants was 
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characterised by mistrast. Arising from tiie conviction that the latter were intent on 
preserving the anti-Labor pohcies ofthe previous administtation, it resulted in a high 
degree of ministerial conttol ofthe administtative process.^ ^ As a Minister, 
McCormack was said to be unswerving in his view that "sabotage" by senior 
officials was the cause of many of Labor's administtative problems. According to 
Murphy, there was "a fundamental disagreement betweai Ryan and McCormack -
and also Theodore to a degree - on the public service. Ryan looked to a pubhc 
servant's competence and loyalty where McCormack looked to his pohtics".^ '* Some 
Ministers attempted to foster pubhc service co-operation by initiating a process of 
consultation at a Cabinet meeting in September 1917 to which departmental heads 
had been invited to discuss the then critical budget deficit. After Ryan had asked for 
their assistance in keeping expenditure within the budget estimates, J. D. Story, who 
had been the well-respected Under-Secretary ofthe Department of Education for 
more than a decade, offered his opinion that much ofthe deficit problem derived 
from the propensity of Ministers to make promises "which were difficult of 
fiilfihnent"^^ 
Such issues in relations between ministers and adminisfrators under a reformist 
Labor Govemment were particularly relevant for Kemp. At the very least, they raised 
questions about the effective extent of his own adminisfrative independence, the 
Board's insulation from political interference and its capacity to deliver efficient 
results. The Board's estabhshment as a semi-independent roads authority was 
^^  A. A. Morrison, "The Govemment of Queensland", in S. R. Davis, The Govemment ofthe 
Australian States, Melbourne: Longmans, 1960, pp.313-14. 
^ Murphy, 1990, op cit, p.260. 
*^ Gall, Memo describing meeting of Under-Secretaries with the Premier and the Treasury, where 
Gall noted "Ryan was roused to fiiry" by Story's response, 19.9.1917, 43/A/la, op. cit 
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possibly little more than a demonsttation of govemment action in response to 
constituents' demands and its failure may well have been anticipated. It was a view 
expanded on in a newspaper editorial which observed that, with a first-year budget of 
£5,000 to cover the salaries of a staff of experts, their ttavelling expenses and any 
other outlays, it would be a long time before the Board was in any position to begin 
constmcting roads. In a public address some years later, Kemp noted rather wtyly 
that Parhament had proceeded 'Very cautiously" in respect ofthe new main roads 
authority. The initial Treasury allocation was a modest £60,000, and funding levels 
were raised only after the Govemment "re-assured itself of tiie good results arising 
from the works being carried out" ^ ^ There appeared to be some reluctance to 
endorse the expenditure of funds on roads if they duphcated established railways. 
Others believed that, as road constraction on the scale envisaged in Queensland was 
an immensely difficult task, there was no basis for comparison with the operations of 
Victoria's Countiy Roads Board. 
Against this background during 1921, Kemp worked with Gillies, and Forgan Smith 
vs^ o was then Minister without Portfolio assisting the Premier, to formulate Board 
pohcy. In September, administtation ofthe Act was ttansferred from Pubhc Works to 
Public Lands, officially to promote coordination between the work ofthe Board and 
that ofthe department's Survey and Roads Branch. Despite the hmited resources at 
its disposal, tiie Board needed to demonsttate its relevance to the Govemment's rural 
development pohcy and, to do this, Kemp adopted the approach he knew well from 
his years with the Country Roads Board. This was to imdertake a prehminary survey 
^ Brisbane Courier, 3.1.1921. 
'^ Kemp, Address to Ipswich Rotary, op. cit 
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of roads to be recommended for gazettal and for future road constraction and 
reconstraction. On his ^pointment, Kemp had sait all local authorities a 
questionnaire requesting information on their road systems, population area, road-
making plant, number of horse-drawn and motor vehicles, and staff numbers and 
qualifications. His intention of compilmg "a p^er picture" of local conditions m 
preparation for flie Board's survey trips^* was frusfrated by the limited response he 
received, but he could not have anticipated that several shires had never kept such 
records. 
During the year, the three Board members fravelled throughout Queensland, 
gratefully accepting the concession tickets the Railway Commissioner offered them, 
and completing other stages by boat or on horseback. Kemp met scores of local 
govemment, small business and settlers' representatives in the northem, centtal and 
southem divisions into vdiich the Govemment had divided the state for Main Roads 
purposes. Although many rejected Kemp's attempts to persuade them ofthe benefits 
of coming under the main roads scheme, they ^predated the visit by a Brisbane-
based official and his genuine interest in their problems. The tenor of their meetings 
on these and later tours laid the foundation for the respect local authorities accorded 
him and for his reputation as "a fair-minded man of action" ^ ' 
While not set out in the legislation, pohcy was determined as the development of 
roads wiiich would provide "continuity of communication" and assist the ttansport of 
local products to a centte of population or to a railhead. Whereas one indicator of 
autonomy was ministerial approval ofthe main roads gazettals it recommended on 
rational-technical groimds, it was soon tested in respect of Board recommendations 
^ J. E. England, former Secretary, Main Roads. Interview with Harold Lowe, typescript, 3.11.1970, 
Evan Richard, Papers, Heritage Panel, Institution of Engineers Austraha (IE Aust), (Qld. 
Division). 
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for roads perceived to be ui competition with railways. One highly conttoversial 
example was the Brisbane to Ipswich highway. In the early 1920s Kemp successfully 
defended plans for its constraction against concerted attacks by politicians and 
officials determined to protect the railway monopoly. At its first official meeting in 
Febmary 1921, tiie Board made its first recommendations for the declaration of main 
roads under Section 15 of the Act. They were in Beaudesert Shire and included the 
recommendation of a road from the border at Mt Lindsay towards Rathdowney. 
Altiiough, as Kemp reported, tiie road would serve more than two hundred families 
and open up the area for further settlement, the route was in competition witii tiie 
newly-opened ttamway constracted by the Beaudesert Shire Council and the 
proposed standard gauge interstate railway via Rathdowney to Kyogle. 
Conttary to the provisions ofthe Act, the Board recommended these roads without 
fnst consulting the shire council. It may well have been a declaration by Kemp that 
he would conttol the roads gazettal agenda from the outset, recommending roads on 
the agreed pohcy basis of providing ttansport access for closer settlement. To 
representatives ofthe Queensland Farmers' Union who considered it a waste of 
money to duplicate ttansport facilities in one area when other areas had neither roads 
nor railways, Kemp explained that a right of ^peal to the Minister was available if a 
shire council did not agree with the Board's proposal.'*" Anotiier view put forward by 
a Main Roads engineer \ ^o rose through the ranks to become Mains Roads 
Commissioner supported such decisions in terms of their rationality: 
The Board found in its early enquiries that certain existing trunk routes of 
intercommunication between cities and towns did in fact pass through 
covmtry already sufficiently served by railways. In some such cases 
abandonment of existing routes was considered and attempts were made to 
'^ Wheeler, op. cit, p.l. 
"" Record of Agenda, 15.11.1921, Item 18. 
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choose acceptable altemative routes located in country not served by the 
railway system. Some routes through country already served by railway had 
to be adopted to provide continuity.'*^ 
For the Board to have any guarantee of an effective future was clearly dependent on 
the expansion of its operations. To borrow from decision-making theory, the Board 
was a participant in a zero-sum game where such expansion was bound to encroach 
on the operations of both the Railway Department and the Department of Pubhc 
Lands. The view quoted above also supports the contention that, from the outset, the 
Board was aware ofthe need to ^pear to be conforming with an established 
govemment pohcy while pursuing its own goals. 
The first annual report ofthe Main Roads Board was finalised in July 1922. Work 
was commenced on fifteen declared main roads and Kemp's mission to supply tiie 
Board and local authorities with essential plant and equipment was signalled by the 
expenditure of fifty per cent of available funds for this purpose. Above all, the report 
was a testimony to the Board's operational efficiency under difficuh conditions. 
Apart from local roads, it had completed the classification of roads to be 
recommended for gazettal in all three divisions ofthe state, and provided provisional 
estimates of costs and the cost-sharing arrangements with local authorities. A perasal 
ofthe minutes ofthe first year's meetings gives some idea ofthe straggle to form a 
viable organisation, the scope of tiie Board's powers and operations, and Kemp's 
interaction with pohtical, commercial and farmer interests. 
The first Board meeting in Febmary 1921 confirmed Kemp's priorities as Chairman 
and also the constraints under wiiich the Board commenced operations. His first task 
had been to prepare a report suggesting amendments to the Act, including 
•" H. Lowe, "The Challenge and Achievement ofthe Queensland Main Roads System", typescript, 
Main Roads Department, 1970, Evan Richard, Papers, Heritage Panel, Institution of 
Engineers Australia (IE Aust), (Qld. Division). 
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amendments to the financial provisions. Against the time wiien the Board began tiie 
work of road constraction, he instituted the gathering of material on survey 
instruments, road-making plant and equipment, technical books and information on 
road constraction programmes and methods, obtained mainly from state road 
autiiorities in the United States. Although the Act exempted Main Roads staff" from 
the Public Service Act, ministerial and public service approval was required for all 
staff appointments and salary levels nominated by tiie Board. In Febmary 1921, for 
example, ministerial approval was given for the appointment of secretary, J. E. 
England, while the Pubhc Service Commissioner s approval was needed for the 
appointment of a temporary typist. Later that year, Stoty notified the Board that staff 
eaming over £300 per annum were exempt from the provisions ofthe Industrial 
Arbitration Act 1916 and these exemptions were later extended. As the Board did not 
have tiie fimds to employ technical staff, much ofthe preliminary work on an early 
project, tiie constraction ofthe Caims Range Road, was undertaken by W. Reinhold, 
an engineer with the Pubhc Lands' PEI Branch. 
At the end of Febmary, the Board ^proved a "Notice of Intention" to be sent to 
Beaudesert and other councils in relation to m^or recommendations such as the 
Brisbane to Warwick road and the Brisbane to Ipswich road. By then, Kemp and 
Fraser had completed tours of inspection in Cambooya, Esk and Moreton shires, 
meeting with council representatives to explain the "general financial provisions of 
the Act and general policy ofthe Board".'*^ At each meeting, requests for inspections 
of roads received from shire and municipal councils were recorded, as were similar 
"^  Record of Agenda, 28.2.1921, Report of Interviews, Item 6. 
94 
requests from local progress and farmers' associations, and from members of 
parhament. To demonsttate impartiality in responding to these requests, a protocol 
was developed under which they were first referred to the relevant local council and 
then a schedule of inspection visits was drawn up. Gillies' support clearly derived 
from his interest in expanding agricultural settlement in his Cauns and Atherton 
Tableland electorate and providing settlers with road access to the coast. His 
recommendation of a number of roads in his electorate for declaration as main roads 
was responsible for the Board's extensive northem tour in the middle ofthe year, 
although each of them was subjected to the Board's protocol for recommending road 
gazettals. It may be surmised that the ease with which the Board opened a regional 
office in 1922 and the fact that it was located at Yungaburra on the Atherton 
Tableland was a measure of his effective support. There was early evidence of 
Kemp's preference, usually met with a public outcry, for declaring roads that gave 
access to mountain settlements. Among them were the Caims Range road (at a time 
when the Caims Range railway was being extended to Tolga and Millaa Millaa), the 
Hervey's Range road, the Townsville to Mount Spec road, the Tamborine Mountain 
road, and a road to O'Reilly's on the Lamington Plateau. Taking his lead from the 
Victorian Country Roads Board and state road autiiorities in the United States, Kemp 
investigated ways of providing for roads to new or previously inaccessible 
setflements, such as at Springbrook and Beatrice River, and areas of low ratepayer 
mmibers, ultimately succeeding in having them included in the categories eligible for 
Main Roads' subsidies. 
Other issues raised during 1921 required the Board's role and powers to be defined. 
The Board was enpowered to make regulations for the regisfration of all motor 
vehicles and tiie collection of a wheel tax, directed at commercial vehicles. As tiiey 
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superseded those operating under the Traffic Act and a hostile reaction to the 
proposed new tax was already evident, Kemp gathered information from interstate 
and overseas sources and from local authorities in preparation for formulating them. 
They addressed the issue of varying tiie tax according to tyre type and weight of 
loads, since narrow, sohd tyres and heavy, commercial loads were detrimental to the 
condition of roads and added considerably to road maintenance costs. The Board also 
refused requests for licensing fee exemptions from community services such as fire 
and ambulance brigades, as well as ministers of religion, and all three levels of 
govemment. 
When local autiiorities exercised their right of appeal against a main road being 
declared, Kemp usually attempted to resolve the impasse by personally conferring 
with representatives and extending the period for notification of objection until the 
shire was in possession of all information that would persuade them ofthe value of a 
main road. The problem often arose when the lack of Board staff made delays in the 
initial investigative survey inevitable, which then delayed the process of supplying 
estimates of costs and determining tiie extent ofthe authority's liability. The situation 
was eased after Kemp obtained ministerial approval for shire engineers and 
surveyors to undertake these surveys although, as many of tiiem were inadequately 
qualified, the results often fell short ofthe required standard."*^  The fact that 
objections by local autiiorities to main roads' declarations rarely went as far as 
invoking ministerial intervention owed much to Kemp's personal approach to 
resolving tiiie matter. Where a council objected to a proposed route or wanted an 
altemative route for local reasons, Kemp discussed the matter with coimcillors and 
tended to accommodate their requests unless there was some compelling technical 
''^  England, interview, op. cit, p.5. 
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reason to retain the original decision. A satisfactory outcome was often achieved as, 
for example, when Cleveland Shire Coimcil objected to the proposed Cleveland -
Redland Bay Road because it wanted the terminus extended to West Cleveland.'*^ A 
similar situation arose regarding the planned constraction of roads across shire 
boundaries to complete a principal (main) connector road. Kemp arranged to bring 
together representatives of neighbouring shires but, in some instances, had to defuse 
enfrenched local differences before the road proposals and allocation of costs could 
be negotiated."*^  The results were not always positive and it seemed that the threat of 
the coercive power vested in the Minister by section 19 of the Act was sometimes tiie 
only effective way to ensure a planned cormector road was built. 
By mid-1921, the methods of dealing with the administration ofthe Act had been 
estabhshed. Kemp and one other Board member together undertook extensive tours 
organised around the invitations from various shire councils, although Kerrq) 
delegated routine inspections to Fraser and Crawford. Reflecting the early 
estabhshment of a functional hierarchy, Crawford compiled and dispatched 
instractions for surveys, supervised the plant and equipment the Board purchased 
when more money became available, and was in charge ofthe Board's road 
constraction operations. Fraser compiled descriptions ofthe roads recommended for 
main roads status for the information ofthe local authority and for the Govemor-m-
Council's approval. The Board secretary was responsible for the day-to-day 
adminisfrative work, but referred to the Board all disputed decisions, ministerial 
requests, hcensing fees inquiries and petitions for changes to proposed routes. Later, 
this process was made more efficient by the establishment of a Main Roads 
•" Record of Agenda, 15.12.1921, Item 3. 
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adminisfrative committee v^ch determined the matters to be referred to the 
Commissioner for decision. Cabinet approval was given for the appomtment of three 
clerical staff, largely in recognition ofthe additional work involved in administering 
the vehicle registration regulations. Then followed an assistant secretary (who later 
became Main Roads Commissioner), and seven engineers, tiiree of v\^om were 
appointed the first District engineers. By 1923, tiie foundation had been laid for an 
adminisfrative and professional organisation which became noted for "devotion to its 
work, loyalty to its Chief and untiring efforts in the public interest" ^ 
Between 1922 and 1926, Main Roads changed its status from a fledgling institution, 
scarcely acknowledged as part ofthe mainsfream of state development, to a powerful 
player, and moved from the periphery towards the cenfre of developmental policy 
considerations. During these years, budget, staffing and operational facilities 
expanded steadily, new categories of roads were brought under Main Roads' 
provisions, its dependability and efficiency were more widely acknowledged, and a 
higher degree of adminisfrative and operational autonomy was in evidence. With a 
growing reputation as an effective adminisfrator, Kemp was ^pointed sole 
commissioner in place ofthe Board. The importance of Main Roads as an instrament 
of govemment policy was enhanced by the infroduction of Commonwealth road 
funding subsidies, which propelled Kerrq) into the role of a leading advisor in this 
area of Commonwealth-State negotiations. It was also tiie period during v^ch Kerrq) 
claimed a place in state and national professional associations, developed his interest 
in the science of road-making and pursued the raising of professional engineering 
standards. 
^^  See, for example, ibid, 4.1.1922 - description of reconmiended road, Sarina-Hampden; Kerr, op. 
cit, re similar disputes between Burdekin and Ayr shires. 
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One of Premier and Treasurer, E. G. Theodore's pubhc commitments in 1922 was to 
make loan funds available for a public works programme to relieve unemployment. 
His speech at Laidley on 21 Febraary 1922 confirmed the formation of co-operative 
and representative producer bodies, together with govemment intervention to support 
to the agriculture industry and provide protection for "the man who tills the soil". He 
listed eight "tangible and reahsable objectives", one of vsiiich was "Main Roads" "^^ 
Togeflier with Coyne, the Minister for Pubhc Lands, Theodore had met with Board 
members in January that year. He asked them to prepare, as a matter of urgency, a 
road plan for the next financial year, intimating that if it received Cabinet approval, 
£200,000 of loan funds would be available by September.'** Although Board minutes 
do not record any further discussion on the loan, by June Kerrq) had notified tiie 
councils involved in two major road projects, the Tinaroo road on the Atherton 
Tableland and the Killamey to New South Wales Border road, of loan funding being 
available to the end ofthe financial year, with the promise of more to come. The day 
after his Laidley speech, Theodore was arguing forcefully, if unsuccessfully, at the 
Premiers' Conference for Commonwealth funding to assist in developing north 
Queensland.'*^ 
hi November 1919, shortly after Labor elected him Premier and Treasurer to replace 
T. J. Ryan, he had responded to aggrieved shire councillors seeking Treasury loans to 
finance long-neglected works programmes by announcing a Commonwealth 
proposal to advance funds to the States. They were to finance local authority works 
"* England, Interview, op, cit, p.l 1. 
"' Brisbane Courier 22 February 1922; The Worker, 2 March 1922. 
^ Record of Agenda, 11.1.1922, Item 39. 
"' Ross Fitzgerald, "Red Ted": The Ufe ofE. G. Theodore, St. Lucia: UQP, 1994, p. 162, p. 164; 
Dorothy Jones, Cardwell Shire Story, Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1961, p.329, p.332. 
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as an unemployment rehef scheme witii preference to retumed servicemen, with 
roads hsted first on the Commonwealth schedule of works regarded as "creators of 
labour"^" His aimouncement foreshadowed by over two years, the Brace-Page 
Govemment's decision to implement its Federal election promise of a "national" 
roads subsidy initiative. He appears to have banked on its being reahsed and 
therefore determined the instramental role roads development in general, and Kemp 
and the Main Roads Board in particular, could play in realising his vision for 
Queensland's economic development. In his tours of tiie northem electorates, where 
Labor's popularity was being undermined by high unemployment and a perceived 
neglect by the Brisbane-based Govemment, Theodore capitalised on Kemp's good 
relations with local representatives and did not hesitate to divert complaints about the 
lack of pubhc works to him. His pubhc support for a roads pohcy gave Kemp an 
influential ally in Cabinet at a time when responsibility for Main Roads was 
ttansferred to an indifferent McCormack as Minister for Public Lands. 
Federal subsidies for state roads' constraction effectively commenced with an 
announcement, immediately prior to the State Treasurers' Conference in August 
1922, ofthe Commonwealth's intention to grant the states up to £250,000 for the 
constraction of national highways to reheve unemployment. Funds were to be 
allocated on aper capita basis, required matching state funds and could be used on 
existing or new road constraction, subject to Commonwealth approval. Newspaper 
reports speculating that Queensland's expected £35,000 share would be apphed to 
one or two major highway projects, provoked heated public debate on the rightful 
beneficiaries of such govemment largesse, with Redchffe council and the proposed 
^ Brisbane Courier, 13.U.1919. 
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Redchffe highway being nominated as the favourite. It was reported that, prior to the 
August conference, Main Roads had submitted to Theodore a list of recommended 
works which he forwarded to "the Melboume authorities" for assessment and 
approval. Eventually, Kemp received ministerial approval for allocations to thirteen 
road projects, with preference clearly being given to those on v^ch the surveys and 
local authority agreements had already been finahsed.^^ 
Debates in Parliament on both the 1922 and 1923 Main Roads Amendment Bills 
provide a further insight into the relationship between Board members, ministers and 
parhamentary representatives, and tiie often frusfrating process of implementing a 
main roads pohcy. Most accounts of Kemp's years as Chairman tend to convey a 
personal and professional success story, but the reality of those early years was more 
complex. In establishing the organisation, witii all the tedious work of defining 
effective administtative and operational procedures, and protecting its place in the 
pohcy environment, he had as many failures as successes and considerably more 
public and political criticism than is usually depicted. 
The 1922 legislation was noteworthy for the criticism ofthe Board during debate on 
v^at were presented as simple changes to the Board's financial provisions. 
Alongside claims that main roads were being buih for Automobile Club members 
rather than for farmers, was the accusation of a dehberate "go-slow" pohcy being 
adopted on main roads jobs.^ ^ No examples were given but it appears to have arisen 
from local autiiority complaints about the effect ofthe Industrial Court granting a 
new award earlier in the year. The Board had worked under the terms ofthe Local 
Authorities Award until the Austtalian Workers Union applied for a new award to 
' ' Northem Herald, 30.8.1922; Brisbane Courier, 26.9.1922. 
'^  Main Roads Act Amendment Bill 1922, Second Reading, QPD, 1922,142, p, 2123, p.2125. 
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cover a range of new classifications relating to main roads constraction work. 
Secretary J. E. England represented the Board during the two-day hearing, the 
outcome of which was a combined "Local Autiiorities and Main Roads Award" 
setting a basic wage and various on-the-job allowances." The changes m financial 
provisions, based on Board recommendations ^proved by the Minister, allowed 
annual funding to be increased using tiie existing stracture, thus allowing greater 
operational planning flexibility. Whereas all Main Roads Fund money remaining 
unspent at the end of title financial year was previously retumed to the Treasury, it 
would now 'Remain the property ofthe Board" and be carried over to the following 
financial year. In addition, the process of determining and apportioning annual 
expenditure in local autiiority areas was adjusted, with local authority liability for 
maintenance to be repaid annually instead of over tiiirty years. 
In these early years, inadequate funding hindered Kemp's attempts to implement the 
Board's goal of an effective road network throughout Queensland. The Board's 
operations were expected to be largely self-funding, and depended on an aimual 
parhamentary ^propriation deemed to be a repayable loan, local authority 
repayments and revenue from the newly-imposed motor vehicle regisfration fees. 
Although Section 22 of the 1920 legislation provided for them to be paid into the 
Main Roads Fund, there was a considerable lead time for regisfration and collection 
of these fees. As compulsory regisfration was proving difficult to enforce, in 
December 1921 the Board successfully sought ministerial approval to institute 
proceedings against defaulters.^ '* While the pubhc image of its operations focused on 
road constraction, the regulations accompanying the Act delegated to the Board 
*^  England, Interview, op. cit, p.6. 
^ Record of Agenda, 15.12.1921, Item 46. 
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powers over commercial vehicle movements and loads. What was to prove a long-
term battle began when representatives, mainly from rural electorates, challenged 
Board decisions restricting commercial vehicle movement on declared main roads. 
Kemp's response was invariably courteous but unwavering: the regulations apphed 
to vehicles using main roads and then only by proclamation in certain areas under 
certain conditions.'^  
The 1922 legislation represented a small, but encouraging victory for Kemp. The 
provisions of anotiier amendment Bill debated in Parliament during August 1923 
showed the results of Cabinet's increasing confidence in his professional judgment. 
Having monitored its successful operation by the Countty Roads Board, he argued 
successfully for main roads funding for anew categoty of developmental roads, 
aimed at providing fransport access to railheads for sparsely settled or newly opened 
areas. ^ ^ A continuing source of dissatisfaction for many local authorities was the high 
cost of main roads, requiring a commitment to repaying fifty per cent of interest, 
redemption and maintenance over thirty years, when they incurred no coital costs in 
respect of railway constraction. One example was the proposal examined by the 
Pubhc Works Committee which, in April 1921, was assessing proposed railway 
extensions, to link the Port Douglas rail terminus with the terminus at the mining 
centte of Mount MoUoy. Despite its initial enthusiasm and an extended consultation 
period. Port Douglas Shire Council lodged an objection to the declaration of tiie 
Caims-Port Douglas road as a main road on the groimds of lack of finance, leaving 
the Main Roads Board no option but to express its regret and let the matter lapse." 
Many councils were also ofthe opinion that, in particular instances, the standard of 
'^  Ibid, 21.3.1922, Item 4. 
^ Main Roads Act Amendment BiU, 1923, Second Reading, QPD, 1923, 141, p.778. 
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road specified by Main Roads was in^propriately higji for its predicted use. Less 
exacting, and therefore cheaper, specifications were envisaged for developmental 
roads. The amendments provided for tiie establishment of a Main Roads 
Developmental Fund, into wiiich were paid vehicle hcensing fees and money 
appropriated by parliament based on estimates submitted by the Main Roads Board. 
The Board would fund tiie cost of constraction from the Fund, the hability ofthe 
benefiting local authorities being to repay half the interest on constraction costs over 
twenty years, and all maintenance costs. 
Overall, the legislation demonsttated Cabinet's agreement with the general thrust of 
Kemp's suggestions for change. However, the debate on amendments proposed by 
the Opposition indicated that, at least in theoty, the Board's operations remained 
frnnly under ministerial conttol. McCormack ridiculed Countiy Party deputy-leader, 
A. E. Moore's call for parliament to have the opportunity to scratinise Main Roads 
expenditure proposals,^ ^ but reacted angrily to the objection raised by King, the 
Member for Logan, against the deletion from the Bill of section 15 of the principal 
Act giving local autiiorities the right to ^peal against Board decisions, declaring: "I 
take power to compel them even if they do not agree, if I consider it necessary" ^' 
Having sought advice on the issue, McCormack subsequently agreed to an 
amendment reinserting section 15. He blamed the Main Roads Board on v^^ose 
advice it had been intentionally omitted, the Board's view being that, as the State 
was paying the total cost of constraction, local authorities would have little interest 
in developmental roads. While he again emphasised his power to have any road built, 
he mended some political fences by declaring his personal support for consultation 
' ' Record of Agenda, 27.3.1922, Item 18. 
^ Main Roads Act Amendment Bill, 1923, Second Reading, op. cit, p.785. 
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witii local authorities in all circumstances.^" In debates on the Bill and the Mam 
Roads estimates, numerous speakers used the occasion to criticise or support Kemp 
and tiie Board's work, but it was often no more than an opportunity for them to 
publicise the need for a low-cost road in tiieir electorates. 
The Main Roads Acts Amendment Act 1925 marked the end of v^at was effectively a 
probation period for Kemp and the beginning of his recognition as an influential 
admirusttator. It provided for tiie replacement ofthe Board with the Main Roads 
Commission and his appointment as sole commissioner with a range of corporate 
powers and choice of, and control over, commission staff. As McCormack described 
it, Kemp was appointed "in the executive capacity of confroUer of main roads 
constraction" ^ ^ D. A. Crawford, who succeeded Kemp as commissioner in 1949, 
was appointed Chief Engineer, while Fraser occupied the position of his assistant for 
the few years before his retirement. The Act reduced local authorities' repayment 
commitments on main roads and, Queensland having secured permission to ^ply 
part ofthe Commonwealth grant for the purpose, extended the provisions for fiinding 
developmental roads. By presenting the Bill to Parliament as mostly a "machinery 
measure" McCormack tried unsuccessfully to avoid discussion on the issues of a sole 
commissioner versus a Board, the edacity ofthe commissioner to deliver a 
comprehensive and equitable road constraction programme, and political interference 
versus parliamentaty conttol. With the Commonwealth's entry into state roads 
funding, politicians were becoming more appreciative ofthe electoral importance of 
roads and, as was to occur in debates on any legislation with which Kemp was 
'^ Ibid V-7S6. 
^ Ibid; ibid p.793. 
" Main Roads Acts Amendment Bill, 1925, Second Reading, QPD 1925,145, p.605. 
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associated, speakers made a clear distinction between almost universally 
complunenting the person and questioning the powers delegated to him. 
According to Cotterell, the appointment of a sole commissioner was not the outcome 
of pohcy considerations or a preference for the sole commissioner in place ofthe 
Board form of administtation, but the result of Kemp applying for the position of 
presidait ofthe newly-established New South Wales Main Roads Board. Kemp must 
have proved his administtative value to the Queensland Govemment, as McCormack 
received Cabinet approval for the appointment, together witii a salary of £1750 
which placed Kemp on the same level as the New South Wales Board President and 
the Queensland Railway Commissioner.^ ^ There were fifteen q)phcations for the 
president's position and eighty-seven apphcations for the two member positions. The 
Board appointed in January 1925 con^irised two engineers, each with over thirty 
years experience, and the President, J. Garhck, who had been Under-Secretaty ofthe 
Department of Local Govemment for twenty years. Garhck was said to have assisted 
in drafting the Bill during 1924 and, after the proposal to appoint tiie Minister for 
Local Govemment as Chairman was rejected, he was the preferred candidate. If 
Garhck was certain to be appointed President, especially to appease the sfrong local 
govemment lobby, Kenqj's ^plication had no chance of success. His success in 
exfracting a higher salary from Karkarooc council in 1912 by threatening to resign 
may have decided him to tiy the same tactic with the Queensland Govemment. 
Whether or not he was offered the presidency of tiie New South Wales Board was, in 
the end, not at issue since merely the idea of losing his services was enough for the 
*^  Cotterell, op. cit, p.82. 
" Department of Main Roads, New South Wales, op. dt, p.83. 
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Govemment to agree to Kemp's proposals for greater status and power, both for 
himself and tiie Main Roads authority. 
As significant in these respects was the Commonwealtii's entty into state roads' 
funding which commenced in 1922 and was expanded, firstly through the 
Commonwealth Mfl/« Roads Development Act 1923 authorising "the first systematic 
road grants" to the States,^ '* and amendments in 1924 and 1925, the latter providing a 
£250,00 unmatched grant for the reconstraction of existing main roads. Under the 
Federal Aid Roads Act 1926, the first specific purpose, or section 96, grants were 
made to the States on the basis of a co-operative agreement between Commonwealth 
and participating States. The 1923 legislation provided for close ministerial confrol 
ofthe scheme, witii ministerial approval required for works' proposals which were to 
be con^)iled by "a competent state authority", and include plans, specifications and 
completion date. The Board submitted a list of appropriate road projects but, owing 
to the stringent supervisory conditions imposed and the on-going lack of operational 
funding which impinged on the availability of technical staff, skilled workers, plant 
and materials, the first two years' grants were not fully expended. Between 1923 and 
1926, there was vigorous debate in the national Parliament on the constitutional 
legality ofthe Commonwealth's action, wWle the States declared their reluctance to 
allow the imposition of national priorities and national conttol on an important State 
responsibility. 
Early in 1925, Kemp and England had accompanied the Minister for Public Works to 
a conference ofthe newly-estabhshed Federal Aid Roads Board and state road 
authorities wdiere, after a series of acrimonious exchanges, tiie Commonwealth 
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acceded to state demands to modify the original grant conditions. The conference 
(COSRA) gained the status of a permanent intergovernmental committee, providing 
an effective avenue for improving federal-state relations in matters of roads policy, 
and giving Kemp membership of an influential, national technocratic network. As 
Saunders outiines, the Agreement under the 1926 legislation provided for an annual 
Commonwealth payment of up to two milhon pounds for ten years, the amount 
payable to each state to be determined on the basis of three-fifths population and 
two-fifths area, and used for the constraction and reconstraction of defined "federal 
aid roads" ^ ^ The new formula netted Queensland one million poimds more than 
under the previous/?er capita scheme, with Kemp taking part in all the Federal-State 
negotiations preceding that decision, and "the hard fight" to gain agreement from 
New South Wales and Victoria.^ ^ The more stringent ministerial conttol of evety 
aspect of roads programmes, together with the requirement for tiie States to submit a 
five year plan broken down into proposals for each financial year, and payment only 
on satisfactoty completion of each project, placed a premium on a professional, 
administtatively efficient state roads authority. The 1925 rail strike notwithstanding, 
McCormack also went so far as to declare the Govemment's intention of framing a 
State roads policy in recognition ofthe growing importance of roads to Queensland's 
economic development.^ ^ 
In the debate on the 1925 legislation, disquiet was expressed over who confrolled the 
process of allocating the Federal Aid grant funds. It was an important issue to local 
*^  C. A Saunders, "The Development ofthe Commonwealth Spending Power", Melboume 
University Law Review, 11. June 1978, p. 384. Saunders analyses the arguments relating to the 
constitutional basis for these initial Commonwealth road grants. 
*^  Saunders, op. cit, p.386. 
^ Kemp, "Address to Ipswich Rotary", op. cit, p.4. 
*' Main Roads Acts Amendment Bill, 1925, op. cit, p.604. 
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authorities as these fimds reduced their long-term financial commitment while 
contributing to the provision of new or upgraded roads. As numerous Opposition 
speakers were to do in the future, A. E. Moore invoked the spectre of an official 
being placed above Parhament when he quoted the Minister as stating: 
It was absolutely undesirable that any pohtical mterference should be used 
with regard to the allocation ofthe Commonwealth grant, and that the idea of 
the Bill was to provide that the money should be paid to the Main Roads 
Commissioner, to give him absolute discretion in the allocation ofthe funds 
according to the conditions attached to the grant. ^ * 
McCormack was obliged to clarify the Govemmait's position by asserting that, 
while botii Federal and State ministers retained a veto power, there had been no 
pohtical interference in respect ofthe allocations recommended by Commonwealth 
and State engineers.^ ^ The first challenge to Kemp's autonomy in this regard came 
from the Brisbane City Coimcil's request, on the basis of its higher vehicle 
registtation revenue, for £100,000 to be allocated from the Main Roads Fund, which 
included Federal Aid roads funds, specifically for tiie development of mettopolitan 
roads. As he was to do on numerous otiier occasions, Kenqj offered a rationally-
based explanation for the Premier's refusal ofthe request, observing that it would 
have meant applying tiie principle to all other local authorities and thus desttoying "a 
progressive state-wide main roads constraction policy" °^ 
Moreover, the benefits from Federal Aid roads funding were not as great as 
anticipated due to changes in the financial situation at botii Federal and State levels. 
Although Main Roads was receiving increased annual funds from registtation fees 
and state loan allocations, the State's overall fiscal projections were affected by the 
Commonwealth decision in 1926 to discontinue per capita payments to the states 
^ Ibid,p.605. 
*' Ibid, p.606. 
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vnderihe Surplus Revenue Act 1910 and inttoduce provisions for state grants. 
Among the factors influencing these changes to the roads funding base were; lower 
than anticipated fuel excise receipts which reduced the total amount of Federal Aid 
roads grants available to tiie states; the exclusion ofthe States, on constitutional 
grounds, from levying this type of taxation; and inability or unwillingness on the part 
ofthe Queensland Govemment to provide the necessary matching funds.^ ^ Overall, 
however, the provision of Federal subsidies for state roads supported the concept of 
forward planning for pubhc works and helped obviate some ofthe political backlash 
resulting from the declaration of more main roads than tiiere were funds available for 
their constraction. It is not clear whether the latter was part of Labor's sttategy to 
increase electoral support or a successful outcome of Kemp's campaign to force an 
expansion in the scope of Main Roads' operations. Whatever the background, it 
created a reservoir of works which, having been confirmed by the ministerial 
approval process, could be rqjidly activated to reheve unemployment in specific 
locations. As a result, it contributed to raising the status of roads as a valuable 
instrument of Queensland economic development pohcy^^ and highlighted the 
growing dependence on Kemp and the Main Roads Commission for its efficient, and 
thus politically effective, application. 
During these years, Kemp also took a leading role in civil engineering's professional 
association. Having been a foundation member ofthe Institution of Engineers, 
Austtalia, (lEAust.) he was elected a member ofthe Institution's coimcil from 1924 
™ Seventh Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1928, p.2. 
" See, for example, "Minister's Address" Minutes ofthe Annual Conference ofthe Local 
Authorities' Association of Queensland, 1927, p. 9, Local Govemment Association of Queensland 
Library. 
" See, for example, "President's Address", 1924, op. cit., p. 18. 
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to 1927, Vice-chairman of tiie Brisbane division in 1925 and 1926, and Chairman in 
1927. Although he had become more of an adminisfrator than a designing engineer, 
he was a respected authority on the scientific approach to tiie use of road 
constraction materials and assisted in winning government consent for the 
estabhshment in 1929 ofthe Professional Board of Engineers, the first civil 
engineering accreditation body in Ausfralia. ^ ^ The citation that accompanied his 
nomination by the Queensland division in 1928 for tiie position of lEAust. Vice-
President, confirmed McCormack's earlier description of his role as "executive 
confroUer" of all state and local authority main and developmental road works. 
Moreover, he had "orgarused a major department and built a road system from 
nothing",^ '* atfracted sound technical staff wdiom he moulded into an efficient, loyal 
professional corps and laid down adminisfrative and operational protocols \diich 
proved equal to future, changing circumstances. Despite worsening economic 
conditions exacerbated by successive years of drougjit. Main Roads' annual 
expenditure had risen to over £850,000, of which more than half derived from 
Commonwealth roads subsidies wiiich had been extended in 1927 for a fiirther ten 
years. The completion or partial completion of main roads in ninety four local 
autiiorities and maintenance work in one hundred and thirteen of them demonsttated 
the acceptance ofthe concept of a central roads autiiority, even among Darhng 
Downs' stalwarts who had campaigned vigorously against the Brisbane-Ipswich-
Toowoomba highway and the Curmingham's Gap road to Warwick.^ ^ As outhned in 
" See Cohen, 2000, op. cit, p. 1. 
'" Nomination summary, "Eminent Queensland Engineers" Box 2 of 2, Folder 9, Evan Richard 
Papers, op. cit; E. L. Richard, "Sir John Kemp" op., cit, p.2. 
" Opening of the Toowoomba Range highway, 5mfca«e Cour/er, 30.1.1940; Daj(y Ma/7, 10.6.1927, 
13.6.1927. 
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Main Roads' annual report for 1928 , Kemp planned to issue a bulletin containing 
statistical information collected by staff on topics ranging from trends in motor 
vehicle regisfration to soil sampling. ^ ^ Together with his long, detailed annual reports 
with photographs comparing the condition of roads before and after Main Roads 
works, coverage of Federal-State roads fiinding arrangements and a separate Chief 
Engineer's report, it demonsfrated his appreciation ofthe sfrategic value of 
publicising the work ofthe organisation he administered. 
By 1930 Kemp had developed Main Roads into an efficient, responsive organisation 
which delivered important, if basic developmental infrastracture to regional 
Queensland. Moreover, both through his personal standing and the contribution of 
Main Roads to local development programmes, he helped State Govemment 
representatives to maintain a viable working relationship with local authorities and 
tiieir representatives. Still replicating the Victorian Countiy Roads Board model, 
successive amendments to Main Roads legislation had extended the categories of 
roads coming under Main Roads provisions to include tiie free constraction of 
declared state highways, and subsidies for the constraction of mining and rural 
access roads, and tourist development roads. To encourage political support and co-
operation with Main Roads on the part of local authorities, more flexibility was 
infroduced in the apportioning of road constraction and maintenance costs. In 
addition, local authorities benefited from amendments to Federal Aid Roads grants' 
provisions, all of which were in place by July 1931. Rather tiian direct grants-in-aid, 
roads subsidies were tied to a percentage of fuel excise receipts. The previous grant 
conditions were abolished, allowing States a discretionaty capacity to extend the 
*^ Seventh Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1928, p.7. 
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allocation of Federal Aid funds from new constraction to repair and maintenance 
work.''' 
From its onset in 1929, the Ausfraha-wide economic depression represented a new 
set of challenges for Kemp and for Main Roads which, over the following decade, 
proved to be an effective mechanism for the dehvety of unemployment relief 
measures. Enfrenched unerr^loymait was not a new problem for Queensland. Unlike 
New South Wales and Victoria, its economic base was almost entirely dependent on 
primaty and related industries. Successive years of drought had already been 
experienced by 1929 but, even witii good seasons and stable market prices, seasonal 
unenq)loyment was always sufficiently high to warrant on-going provision for 
designated unemployment relief works. Queensland was already suffering the effects 
of a depressed economy before the 1929 State election. Among otiier election 
promises. Labor emphasised its commitment to an extensive regional roadworks 
programme to combat increasing unemployment but, with the McCormack-led 
Govemment unable to overcome voters' perception of economic mismanagement, it 
was defeated by the Moore Countiy-Nationalist Coalition. 
At the national level, the threat of "national default" resulted in a Commonwealth-
States Agreement, signed at the June 1930 Premiers' Conference, to implement what 
was known as the Premiers' Plan.'^ Formulated by leading economists, the Plan was 
a severe deflationaty measure aimed at reducing tiie national debt and moving 
" The Federal Aid Roads Agreement Approval (Variation of Agreement) Approval Act 1930: The 
Federal Aid Roads Amendment Act 1931; Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 
1932, p.5; See also, C. M. T. Berbudeau, "Federalism and Local Govemment in Queensland", M 
A. thesis. University of Queensland, 1971. 
'* For a comprehensive coverage of Commonwealth-State relations in the Depression and an analysis 
ofthe Premiers' Plan, see C. B. Schedvin, 1970, op. cit 
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towards a balanced budget. It called for increases in Commonwealth income and 
sales tax and primage duties, the reduction of private and public interest rates, and a 
twenty per cent reduction in adjustable Govemment expenditure.^ ^ At the Loan 
Council meeting held at the same time. Federal Treasurer and Loan Council 
Chairman, E. G. Theodore, reported that, despite the well-publicised tightening of 
the overseas loan market on vMch Ausfraha depended for the m^ority of its 
borrowings, tiie States' requests for loan funds had increased. To encourage a 
reduction in debt levels, he announced that loan expenditure for Commonwealth and 
State capital works programmes for 1930-31 would be reduced by fifty per cent on 
the previous year.^ ° It was not until September 1931, when the effects ofthe 
Premiers' Plan on national employment levels were acknowledged to be too severe, 
that Theodore's more moderate ideas for dealing with the economic crisis were again 
considered. Following the report of a specially convened Loan Council sub-
committee, the Premiers' Conference supported its recommendations for an increase 
in loan expenditure.*^ This change marked the beginning of general political support, 
sustained throughout the 1930s, for the view that increased pubhc works' loan 
expenditure was critically important for economic revival. 
However, until its defeat by Labor in the June 1932 election, the Moore Govemment 
maintained a pohcy of total support for the Premiers' Plan. The Treasurer, W. H. 
Barnes, declared after the June 1930 Loan Council meeting, that Queensland should 
live within its means. He signalled his Govemment's determination to reduce loan 
™ Ibid, p.249. 
^ Brisbane Courier, 12.6.1930. 
*' Report of the Proceedings of the Conference of Commonwealth and State Mnisters, 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers (CPP), 1929-31,2, pp. 392-3. Quoted in Schedvin, 1970, 
op. cit, p.275. 
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expenditure and maintain a balanced budget in order to remove the stigma of 
financial irresponsibility.*"^ Queensland was the only state to implement the full 
recommended twenty per cent reduction in govemment spending. Pubhc Service 
staff numbers were cut and wages and salaries initially reduced by ten per cent, 
while, in July, the Pubhc Service Commissioner, J. D. Stoty, successfully argued the 
Govemment's case for a reduction in the basic wage.*^ Even as tiie Loan Council 
was miplementing the agreed restrictions on expenditure approvals, Theodore 
announced Loan Council approval for a Commonwealth loan often milhon pounds 
to be floated on the Austtalian market. Queensland did not participate in this loan 
since, it was claimed, unlike the other States which intended to use tiie loan to pay 
off outstanding overdrafts, it retained cash balances. As the cash balances were 
subsequently found to have been overstated, more likely reasons were the difficulty 
in meeting interest and redemption payments after the sharp drop in revenue receipts 
for the year, and tiie fact that Queensland's heavy loan commitments were at the 
limit of Loan Council approval. 
While loan funding for state works programmes and general revenue funding for 
govemment wages and services were severely reduced, the political backlash over 
the high unemployment levels produced Federal and State fimding for 
unenq)loyment rehef projects. The Moore Govemment made an effort to redirect part 
of its normal loan-funded public works programme to unemployment rehef work 
and, in niid-1930, two further funding sources were added. The first was a Federal 
Govemment grant of one million pounds made available from unexpended balances 
under a six montii extension ofthe Federal Aid Roads Agreement to December 1930. 
^ Brisbane Courier, \6.6.\930. 
^ Ibid 16.7.1930. 
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Queensland's share was £130,000, allocated on a tiiree-fifths population and two-
fifths area basis, according to the provisions of tiie Agreement. The second was the 
Income(Unemployment Reliej) Tax Act pa&seA by tiie Queensland Parliament in July. 
The responsibility ofthe Minister for Labour and Industiy, its purpose was to 
provide essential rehef works for unemployed workers by co-ordinating the activities 
of all relevant departments and co-operating with Main Roads and local autiiorities in 
making works projects available. The rehef works were funded by a flat rate levy, 
initially of one and one quarter per cent on annual income above £105, but rising to 
five per cent on incomes above £499 in August 1932.*^  The levy was to be paid into 
an Unemployment Relief Fund, from v i^iich reduced wages were paid to relief 
workers and rations provided for those men for wiiom there was no work. 
Queensland's approach to unemployment relief works as a factor in economic revival 
was similar to, if not directly derived from, measures initiated in other countries in 
this period. In the United States, legislation infroduced under Roosevelt's "New 
Deal" made provision for tiie revival of activity through massive pubhc works 
programmes, an increase in unemployment relief and a reduction in indebtedness. As 
later developed in Queensland, the major emphasis was on forestty programmes, 
such as the afforestation of lands, soil erosion, fire prevention and the constraction of 
tourist fracks. $3,3000 million was allocated by Congress for tiie purpose but, as 
Kemp was also to find, the "often comphcated negotiations with State and municipal 
authorities" delayed the planning and implementation ofthe programmes.*^ New 
Zealand's unemployment relief measures were almost identical in form and 
^ ibid; see also, Wiltshire, "Pubhc Finance", op. cit, pp. 166-68. 
** Ibid,p.\69. 
^ E. W. Easton. 'Tublic Works in Relation to Employment. With Particular Reference to 
Queensland", M. A. thesis. University of Queensland, 1947, p. 10. 
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objectives to tiiose infroduced in Queensland in 1930. Legislation made provision for 
an Unemployment Fund and an Unemployment Board which, in co-operation with 
local authorities, allocated funds to ^proved rehef works projects. Local Authorities 
provided tools and supervision, \diile wages were paid out ofthe Unemployment 
Fund. In order to protect estabhshed employment, projects had to be additional to the 
ordinaty local authority works and at lower wage rates. They were to be reproductive 
in nature and, in tiie event, consisted almost entirely of unskilled work, such as road-
making and land clearance.*^ 
As the Main Roads Commission under Kemp already had a consistent role in the 
dehvery of unemployment rehef works, it was invaluable to the Moore Govemment 
in addressing what was a rapidly growing problem. Both the Minister for Labour and 
Industiy, H. E. Sizer, and the Minister for Railways and Roads, Godfrey Morgan, 
exploited Main Roads' capacity to respond quickly and reliably to demands for rehef 
projects and to deliver them to numerous local authority areas in a demonsfrably non-
partisan process. The publication in mefropolitan and regional newspapers ofthe 
Commissioner's monthly report to the Miruster for Railways and Roads, giving 
details of numbers employed, projects in hand and the geogrq)liical distribution of 
new and ongoing projects, became an on-going vehicle for political point scoring. 
Kemp also took steps to emphasise the Commission's worth in his reports to Cabinet 
and to Parhament, in speeches at the opening of roads and bridges, during inspection 
visits to local authorities, and to local govemment conferences. In April 1930, as 
Loan Council expenditure approvals were being reduced to fifty per cent ofthe 
previous year, Sizer armounced a £100,000 advance on the "proposed unemployment 
levy" for the immediate start of rehef works. Kemp made a point of recording that. 
^ Ibid, pp.U-\2. 
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by the end ofthe month, Govemment-approved road works projects across the State 
had commenced "at the shortest possible notice and practically without a hitch" ** He 
also used unemployment rehef funding to enable a start to be made on several of his 
preferred developmental projects for which fluids had previously been unavailable. 
Some of these were tourist roads, such as the Townsville to Mount Spec, Enoggera 
Waterworks to Mount Nebo, and the Tambourine Mountain roads, while others, 
including the Halifax to Lucinda Point road, were intended to assist development of 
local facilities.*^ In most cases, as Kemp had previously been unable to obtain the 
necessaty financial commitment from the local authorities, tiie works had 
subsequently Iqjsed. The Department of Labour and Industiy also acknowledged the 
essential role Main Roads played in tiie Department's edacity to dehver on 
Govemment promises, publishing in 1931, for example, a comprehensive list ofthe 
results of Main Roads relief works.^ ° However, few of these works were completed 
within one fmancial year. Year after year, the same projects were referred to by the 
Government, and in Main Roads' Annual Reports, as examples of relief work 
schemes employing significant numbers of men. 
At the commencement ofthe State Unemployment Relief Scheme, Kemp made Main 
Roads' organisational resources available to the Department of Labour and Industiy. 
Main Roads thus subsidised the preparation of works plans, the cost of plant hire and 
the provision of materials for tiie scheme. After 1931, when the relief scheme was 
extended to include local authorities. Main Roads staff also confrolled and inspected 
unemployment rehef works on other than main roads. This confrol function was later 
extended to other types of rehef schemes under the direction ofthe Minister for 
^ Annual Report ofthe Commissioner cfMain Roads, 1930, p.7. 
^' Ibid, p.l4. 
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Labour and Industiy. Main Roads unemployment relief projects eventually 
involved eighty-seven main roads m fifty-seven local authorities. They were selected 
from proposals submitted for inclusion in the state-wide road development plan but 
v^ch, normally, would not have been commenced for some time. Consequently, in 
making a positive contribution to infrastracture development, they convincingly 
demonsfrated the much-vaunted benefits of state-sponsored, reproductive works. 
By the end of 1930, the Moore Govemment had resolved the issues of imposing and 
collecting the levy provided for in its amended Income(Unemployment Relief) Tax 
legislation. The £800,000 to £900,000 expected from the levy was to be paid into an 
Unemployment Development Fund and, in Febraaty 1931, an Unemployment Relief 
Adminisfration Board was constituted. The Board was subsequently known as the 
State Unemployment Council or the State Employment Council. Kemp was 
appointed Chairman, the other members being the Surveyor-General, the Under-
Secretaty, Department of Labour and Industiy, and the Private Secretaty to the 
Labour and Industiy Minister. The Board's role was to recommend rehef work 
projects within the available resources ofthe Unemployment Fund. Confirming 
Kemp's previous comments on the opportunity the relief projects afforded Main 
Roads for a co-operative relationship with the Department of Labour and Industiy 
and local authorities, the Board was directed to secure some measure of efficiency by 
co-ordinating the activities ofthe various departments and govemment authorities 
involved. It was also to co-opt the services of any govemment official "v^o by 
experience and fraining might be found useful in furthering Unemployment Relief 
90 
Annual Report, Department of Labour & Industry, 1931 p. 17, p.23. 
"' Ibid,p.l2. 
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Schemes" The Govemment's action had, in part, been pronq)ted by tiie direct 
Commonwealth grant payment of £73,000 the previous year to local authorities for 
Christinas unemploymait rehef works. The grant was opposed by Ken^ who 
beheved it encouraged an inefficient use of funds for local works programmes, and 
by the Director of Labour because of his department's exclusion from the labour 
hiring process. In the event, the grant money was used inefficiently and some of it 
remained unexpended. 
As Chairman, Kemp's position enabled him to maintain the Main Roads 
Commission's cenfral role in unemployment relief measures while opening up 
opportunities for extending his influence to areas outside Main Roads. The range of 
schemes submitted to the Board for further investigation included subsidies to 
mining prospectors, advances to cotton growers, and support for experimental 
tobacco growing on the Atherton Tableland. Also included was a confroversial 
provision for loans to private landholders. Labor Opposition leader Forgan Smith 
labelled it a means of securing cheap labour, but Sizer contended that the money, to 
be used for ringbarking, scrab clearing and water facilities, would develop the land in 
addition to generating employment. 
In Januaty 1931, the Moore Govemment's adherence to the dictates ofthe Premiers' 
Plan resulted in a sfrengthening of tihie role of railways as an instrament of economic 
development and a potential setback to Kemp's influence in this pohcy area. A new 
Cabinet position of Minister for Transport was created to oversee the co-ordmation 
of state transport, with responsibility for Main Roads being fransferred to hun from 
Public Lands, and a State Transport Board was constituted under provisions ofthe 
'^  Ibid, pp.29-30. 
'^  Brisbane Courier, 18.7.1930. 
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State Transport Co-Ordination Act 1931. Its first meeting convened on 26 Januaty 
by the Chairman, Railway Commissioner Davidson, was held in the Railway 
Department's conference room. Kenq) was one of four other Board members, with 
support for Main Roads' interests being bolstered by the appointment of Main Roads 
clerk, Leo Feenaghty, as secretaty, and the retention of barrister, G. M. Calder, who 
was also a Main Roads engineer, as legal counsel.'^ One ofthe first resolutions 
passed at the meeting, which certainly sfrengthened Davidson's position but may 
also have been a recognition of Kemp's facility in using the press to advance his own 
views, was that all pubhc statements were to be made by the Chairman on behalf of 
the Board. Moreover, it was agreed that, in any subsequent discussions, decisions 
would be presented as decisions ofthe Board and not attributed to any one member. 
The Board's principal responsibihty under section 15 ofthe enabling legislation was 
to investigate the state's transportation problems, the issue ofthe overlapping of 
services, and tiie respective capacities of road and rail transport prior to making 
recommendations in a report for Cabinet consideration. Kemp exercised an indirect 
influence on the report's contents when his absence from early meetings caused 
decision on some recommendations to be deferred and then abandoned. More 
directly, he had J. E. England, the Main Roads Commission secretaty, draft a 
succession of alterations and amendments which were accepted in the final report. 
As the Moore Govemment continued to support the Premiers' Plan in campaigning 
for the June 1932 Queensland election, the Commonwealtii Govemment used tiie 
'" Minutes of meeting of State Transport Board, 26.1.1932, R.M.O. 300, Queensland Transport 
Archives (QTA). 
'^  Ibid, 29.2.1932, 8.3.1932, 30.3.1932. 
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April Premiers' Conference to announce a Commonwealth-State Winter Relief Loan. 
Queensland's share was £310,000, with a fifty per cent matching requirement. In 
March and April, the State Employment Council had received a range of works 
proposals from govemment departments, local autiiorities, private companies and 
individuals.^ ^ An overall unemployment rehef works programme assembled from 
these proposals was presented by Moore to the Premiers' Conference in anticipation 
of Commonwealth Govemment and Loan Council approval. As the loan was being 
raised on debentures issued by the Commonwealth Bank, the bank attempted to exert 
conttol over the loan allocations by requiring the Bank Board's approval for all 
proposals. Prime Minister ScuUin was quoted as advising Queensland "to make 
application to the Bank for the money" but as Barnes, the Queensland Treasurer, 
insisted, "it had definitely been agreed" that ^proval for loan-fimded unemployment 
relief works rested with the State Employment Council soon to be formed in 
Queensland. The Council was to include Commonwealth representatives among its 
members and, if the Council's decisions were unanimous, the only further step 
required was their ratification by State Cabinet. 
The formation of tiie new Council was announced on 5th May 1932. As Labour and 
Industiy Minister, Sizer was the Council's Chairman. Other members were; Kemp; J. 
D. Stoty; the administrative heads ofthe Treasiuy and the Department of Labour and 
Industiy; the Manager of tiie Agricultural Bank; two private sector representatives 
and W. L. Payne, Chairman ofthe Land Administtation Board (LAB) vy*tich had 
been permanently established under 1931 amendments to the Lands Acts. Altiiougji 
^ See, for example. Conference of Local Progress Associations' deputation to Minister for Labour 
and Industry re the plight of cotton growers in Callide, Dawson and Burnett districts, 2.5.1932. 
246/2/5, R.M.O. 300, QTA. 
" Brisbane Courier, 20.5.1932. 
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tiiere was no local govemment representative, the Council membership was intended 
to combine representation ofthe major groups having a direct interest in economic 
revival and employment creation witii the "special knowledge" of experienced 
govemment administrators. There were also two Commonwealtii Govemment 
representatives. At the Council's first meeting on 11 M ^ 1932, Kemp was appointed 
Chairman ofthe Industiy, Mining and Works Committee and a member ofthe Rural 
Development Committee, the Council's two sub-committees. As he had aheady 
gathered information on, or personally inspected, most ofthe proposals in hand, the 
report he presented at the first meeting made recommendations as to their viability 
and whether or not they met the criteria of reproductive works laid down by the 
Commonwealth. At the same time, the state component ofthe loan allowed the State 
Govemment to retain some autonomy in the selection of relief works schemes. The 
Commonwealth-approved programme listed certain general categories of works, but 
it was the State Employment Council's responsibility to draw up a detailed schedule 
of qjproved works according to funding allocations. The schemes the Council was 
asked to investigate and recommend to the Commonwealth differed little from those 
in the previous schedule, except for tiie provision for loan assistance to private 
industty. The latter referred directly to two proposals submitted to the 
Unemployment Council earlier in the year. The first proposal, which was later 
approved, was from the directors of Mount Morgan for funding to revive its defimct 
gold mining operations. The second was an unsuccessful request from timber 
merchant Romeo Lahey for funds to constract a road from Cardwell to access timber 
reserves in the hinterland. Lahey proposed to float a public company to finance the 
cutting and milling ofthe timber and ship it south from a jetty he proposed builduig 
123 
at Cardwell. Kemp recommended the proposal should not be approved since, in his 
opinion, it lacked the most basic operations' planning.^ * 
The Council's meetings during May to finalise the schedule were influenced by the 
campaign promises for the imminent State election, the competing claims ofthe 
works departments and the Brisbane City Council's demands for State Govemment 
support. Witii Commonwealth approval for the Employment Council's programme 
secured, Moore immediately announced the employment of one thousand men 
"within the week", to be increased to three times tiiat number "when the programme 
is in full swing" Almost £100,000 was ttansferred from the Main Roads Trast Fund 
for the purposes of road constraction in North Queensland to boost tiie available 
relief funds.^ ^ Sizer's announcements over the following two days dealt with the 
details of these programmes. Presented as decisions of theEnqjloyment Council's 
two sub-committees, they were intended to address the high unemployment rates in 
the mettopohtan area and to provide assistance in rural development. As the Rural 
Development Committee's Chairman, Payne, the Land Administtation Board 
Chairman, was now in a position to advance some ofthe important land settlement 
projects previously affected by the cutbacks in loan works approvals. On 28 May, he 
made his own public armouncement that landholders should make their loan 
apphcations to the LAB. He also armounced that the PEI Branch would be 
responsible for road works in respect ofthe closer settlements recently opened in the 
Millmerran, Chinchilla, Wondai and Mundubbera districts. His action exacerbated 
the tension between Kemp and Payne over issues of responsibility for road planning 
'* Memo. W. H. Austin to Minister for Labour & Industry, re Premiers' Conference, 11.4.1932, 
26.4.1932.246/2/4, R.MO. 300, QTA; Memo. Kemp to Industry, Mining and Works Committee 
19.5.1932.246/2/3, op .czf. 
^ Brisbane Courier, 27.5.1932. 
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and constmction in Queensland. Kemp had been unimpressed by the PEI Branch's 
failure to complete promised access roads to new settlements, particularly in North 
Queensland, and moved to confrol this new situation. As Chairman ofthe Industty, 
Mining and Works Committee, he secured Sizer's approval for an agreement with 
the Land Settiement Committee for the PEI Branch's works to be restricted to the 
Millmerran area. Main Roads took over the remaining projects and arranged for them 
to be carried out by the respective shires under Main Roads supervision. ^ °° 
Long-standing North Queensland examples ofthe problems arising from this divided 
responsibility included the Palmerston lands and the Beattice River settlement. Since 
1922, local settlers and their pohtical representatives had lobbied Main Roads for an 
access road and bridge^°^ but, as the proposed road was not designated a main road, 
its constraction had remained the responsibility ofthe PEI Branch. In May, during a 
campaign speech in Bowen, the Premier had promised £10,000 for the constraction 
ofthe long-awaited access road from Millaa Millaa to the Palmerston lands. The 
money was to be provided through the Forestty Board ofthe Land Administration 
Board ratiier than the unemployment rehef loan, and the road constracted by the PEI 
Branch. ^ °^  Kemp first exerted pressure on the Rural Development Committee to 
agree to the money being provided from the Unemployment Fund, then had the 
project ttansferred to the Main Roads' unemployment works programme. He 
intended to ensure the constraction of an all-weather road ratiier than the suggested 
forestty ttack so as to provide the settlers with essential year-round access to 
markets. By the end ofthe year, he had negotiated a £10,000 additional grant from 
'°° Brisbane Courier, 27.5.1932; 23.5.1932; 28.5.1932,246/2/5, R.MO. 300. QTA. 
'"' Record of Agenda, 6.2.1922, Item 10,48/1/1; ibid Item 34,48/3/1. 
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tiie Commonwealth-State loan funds free of interest and redemption p^ments, as "a 
sttaight out subsidy to the Main Roads Fund for building this road for the purpose of 
land settlement and forestty development" °^^  The McHugh Bridge across the 
Beatrice River was completed in September 1932, allowmg road access to the 
Beatrice River settlement for the first time. It was constracted largely under a Main 
Roads relief works scheme on a site chosen several years previously by Kemp and 
Crawford. 
Forgan Smith's Labor Govemment was retumed to power in June 1932 on a platform 
of measures for unemployment rehef At the national Labor Party Conference before 
the election and at the Premiers' Conference later that year, the incoming Premier 
affirmed his rejection ofthe Premiers' Plan and his commitment to a retum to full 
employment for Queenslanders. *°^  His policy proposals aimed to provide dfrect 
employment, but also to target indirect opportunities for enployment by committing 
resources to an infrastracture development programme. This would enable more 
extensive land settlement, with the associated relocation of many unemployed 
workers to the agricultural sector, and the potential for increased agricultural 
production and the fostering of industries serving the primaty sector. ^ °^  In a radio 
broadcast a week after Labor was formally retumed to govemment, the Premier 
disclosed the outcome of a special Cabinet meeting on Labor's policy "to combat tiie 
depression" Although he foreshadowed the inttoduction of full award rates and 
conditions for rehef workers, the creation of a "representative" Bureau of Industiy to 
'"^  Brisbane Courier, 20.5.1932. 
'"^  .Memo, Deputy Chief Engineer, Main Roads Commission (MRC), to Accountant, 1.8.1932, W. H. 
Austin to Secretary, Forestry Board, 2.8.1932,246/2/3, op. cit; Kemp, Report on Proposals -
Forestry Department, State Employment Coimcil, 19.11.1932, op. cit 
""* See Costar, "Labor and the Depression," in Murphy et al, 1980, op. cit, p.419. 
">' Ibid 
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promote full employment, and the prospect of economic revival, tiiere was little of 
substance in the speech. The only employment-gaierating scheme to be confirmed 
was "tiie immediate commencement of an extensive programme of road works", ^ "^  
although no details ofthe programme were disclosed. 
One commentator in the daily press declared the Minister for Transport tiie most 
important Cabinet position behind the Premier. Li his view, it was the Minister's 
responsibility to prevent the railways administration from re-creating its "State 
within a State" which, tiirough its management pohcies and "scandalous over-
staffing", had compromised tiie orderly administtation ofthe State. ^ °^  Influencing 
this view were tiie events ofthe previous November when tiie Moore Govemment 
instituted draconian legislative measures in what was considered a ill-advised 
attempt to break a railway strike that began at the Mt Oxide and Dobbyn copper 
mines. Also not forgotten was the disraption that resulted from tiie 1927 South 
Johnstone sugar mill and railway strike and the ensuing battle for dominance 
108 
between tiie Ausfralian Railways Union (ARU) and the Ausfralian Workers Union. 
Allied to the enthusiasm with which the newsp^ers greeted tiie prospect ofthe 
roadworks' programme providing jobs for large numbers of unemployed workers 
was an implication that sfrengthening the position of roads as a significant 
employment provider would weaken enfrenched union dominance of transport 
services. In the Brisbane Telegraph a few days later, another commentator took the 
new Premier to task for claiming that, as "geniuses have replaced fools in the pubhc 
adminisfration" under his regime, unemployment relief works pohcy would 
'°* Brisbane Courier, 23.6.1932. 
'"' Da/ZyMa/7,20.6.1932. 
'"^  Lack, op. cit, pp.117-18; For details ofthe 1927 strike and its aftermath, see Fitzgerald and 
Thornton, op. cit., pp.44-47. 
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henceforth be rationally and efficiently implemented. Expanding on the merits of tiie 
estabhshed Main Roads adminisfration, he asserted: 
The Maui Roads Commissioner has been carefiilly employing all the fimds 
available in this vety class of work, and it is a fact that under the wise 
adminisfration ofthe Commissioner a remarkably high percentage of 
efficiency, in all the circumstances has been shown for the expenditure of 
money specifically according to the conditions of tiie Moore Government's 
rehef scheme. ^ °^  
The writer aligned himself with the promotion of roads over railways wiien he 
attacked the Premier again in December. On this occasion, he criticised the Premier 
for urging the public to go back to supporting the railways when the benefits of road 
ttansport were now so widely appreciated.^ ^" Altiiou^ motor vehicle registtation in 
Queensland had quadrapled between 1924 and 1931, Forgan Smith found himself 
obliged to comply with the nationally-determined pohcy on fransport. The outcome 
ofthe Conference of Ausfralian Railways and Transport Authorities Kemp and 
Davidson had attended in Febraaty 1932 was fiirther endorsement of measures to 
remove the perceived unfair competition road ttansport represented for railways. 
The Premier acknowledged the realities ofthe State situation where railways 
represented a virtually unserviceable debt while accounting for around forty percent 
of loan expenditure, but retumed nearly forty-five per cent ofthe State's armual 
revenue"^ and was an important contributor to Labor's support base. Displaying his 
customaty capacity for positive tiiinking, Kemp noted that the conference report 
confirmed continuing Federal support for developmental feeder roads giving access 
109 Brisbane Telegraph, 23.6.1932. 
'"• Ibid, 13.12.1932. 
' " Brigden, Questions put to the Conference, Report on Conference of Railways and Transport 
Authorities, 15-23 February, 1932, J. B. Brigden, Papers, MS 730, Series 1, Item 22, NLA. 
"^ Wiltshire, "Public Finance", op. cit, pp.166-67. 
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to railheads, as they embodied the original concept of road networks 
complementing but secondaty to railway development. 
Under provisions of The State Transport Act 1932 which repealed the 1931 
legislation, the Transport Board was replaced by tiie State Transport Commission, 
the members of v^ich were the Commissioner for Railways v^o was ^pointed 
Chairman, the Commissioner of Main Roads, and the Commissioner of Pohce. The 
Commission's principal duties involved administering the registtation and movement 
of heavy vehicles. Kemp balanced the conttols unplicit in the ttansport co-ordination 
arrangements with the increase in regisfration fees' revenue paid into tiie Main Roads 
Fund and the reduction in road maintenance costs to result from the restrictions 
imposed on heavy vehicles. His conviction ofthe cenfrality of roads, and the 
engineers v^o designed and constracted them, to Ausfraha's economic development, 
was the dominant tiieme of his pubhc speeches as President ofthe Ausfralian 
Institution of Engineers from 1931 to 1932^ "^^  and to community and business groups 
around the State. It was a visionaty stance and in the best fradition of professional 
ideals. That he attached some sense of a noble calling to his profession was 
illusfrated by his highly unusual inclusion of a quotation from an unknown author in 
the 1933 Main Roads report to Parliament: 
Roads rule the world - not kings, nor courts, nor constables; not ships, nor 
soldiers. The road is the only royal line in a democracy, the only legislature 
that never changes, the only court that never sleeps, the only army that never 
quits, the first aid to tiie redemption of any nation, tiie exodus from stagnation 
in any society,... The road is umpire in evety way and when the new map is 
made it simply pushes on its great campaign of help, hope, brotherhood, 
efficiency, and peace. "^ 
' " Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1932, p.l2. 
"" J. R. Kemp, Presidential Address to a meeting ofthe Institution of Engineers (Australia), 8.3.1932, 
typescript, Canberra: lEAust., 1932. 
" ' Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1933, p.6. 
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Under tihie Labor Government, tiie State Employment Council was retained, virtually 
unchanged, to contionue its role of investigating and recommending suitable 
unemployment works proposals under the Commonwealth-State loan arrangements. 
The "revival loan" Forgan Smitii referred to after tiie election was probably tiie same 
Commonwealtii-State loan ^proved in M ^ 1932. However, Cabinet had apparently 
decided to raise the state component ofthe loan, since the full £620,000 was once 
again available to the Council for allocation to suitable works projects. At meetings 
ofthe Council's two sub-committees throughout June, the original list of proposals 
was again brou^t forward for consideration. As many ofthe proposals as possible 
were referred back to the relevant departments for funding under their annual works 
appropriations or, as with a range of Main Roads works, ttansferred to the State 
Unemployment Relief Scheme funded from the unemployment tax. 
The previous allocations and arrangements for road works schemes associated with 
new settlements, as well as advances to cotton growers, were retained and funded 
from the Rural Development Committee's loan allocation. The Industty, Mining and 
Works Committee was allocated £293,000 and Kemp's recommendations on a 
number of proposals for funding allocations received Council approval. These 
included the revival of gold mining operations at Mount Morgan, the constraction of 
wheat silos by the Pubhc Works Department, and £25,000 for coke ovens at Bowen. 
Supported by the Premier, this latter proposal was intended to revive part ofthe 
Ryan/Theodore plan for a State-owned iron and steel works at Bowen. Kemp 
hesitated to recommend funding as the viability ofthe works depended entirely on 
Mount Isa Mines honouring long-term purchasing confracts and, following a Cabinet 
decision to hold it in abeyance, the project did not proceed. 
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Kemp was able to provide tiie Council with a hst of aerodrome improvement projects 
in Brisbane and eight regional towns after the Commonwealth representatives 
insisted that some ofthe Commonwealth loan fimding be directed to Commonwealth 
works priorities. Most of his time, however, was taken up with assessing local 
authority proposals for public works that covered not only road constraction but also 
the provision of water, drainage, sewerage and electricity systems. The Main Roads 
Commission had been allocated £200,000 from the Industiy, Mining and Works 
Committee funds to carty out road works "in specially selected areas to aid 
development ofthe State and assist in opening up new lands, marketing of produce 
and fransport generally" ^^^ While Kemp may have exerted some influence over this 
wording, the absence of a detailed programme speared to have been contingent on 
political considerations, as weU as the outcome ofthe Land Administtation Board's 
continual attempts to influence land settlement funding decisions. 
On 22 July, at a meeting ofthe Industty, Mining and Works Committee, Kemp 
moved to reassert his influence over road works allocations by stating that he had 
£290,000 worth of road work "ready for immediate dispatch". He thought it would 
be useful in view ofthe Council's difficulty in finding suitable schemes to fund. 
Committee member, J. D. Stoty, supported Kemp's proposal, commenting tiiat it was 
"the best scheme on which money could be expended" as it fiilfiUed all the formal 
requfrements of unemployment relief schemes. ^ ^^  In Ken:q)'s view, road works were 
particularly valuable in times of high unemployment. Road were che^er to build 
than spur (branch) railways and; "It can safely be said that no other occupation finds 
"* Works Approved. Conmionwealth-State Winter Rehef Loan. State Employment Council, July 
1932, R.M.O. 300, QTA. 
" ' Meeting ofthe hidustry. Mining and Works Committee, 22.7.1932. R.MO. 300, QTA. 
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more employment per £1,000 expended than road constraction" ^^ * Following its 
approval by the Council and Cabinet sub-committee, the programme provided a fiill 
year's employment for 640 men. 
On 4 August, the Under-Secretaty, Department of Labour and Industiy, W. H. 
Austin, wrote to Kemp, advising him ofthe strict conditions goveming the 
employment of rehef workers. Labour was to be drawn from the local labour 
exchanges, the selection being made by the Dnector of Labour or his agent. As large 
a proportion as possible should be selected from the ranks of Intermittent Rehef 
workers, bearing ui mind tiie need to organise efficient gangs of men. Kemp had 
previously referred to the problem of maintaining road constraction standards and 
achieving efficient results, given that large numbers ofthe unemployed were 
unaccustomed to eitiier physical exercise or the living conditions in road can^s. As a 
result. Main Roads was conceded the right to retain gang foremen from its staff and 
employ sufficient skilled men to ensure projects were completed. Another concession 
was that workers could be held over for periods of two weeks after the normal 
rotations to ensure continuity of work, while a later agreement between the 
Commission and the Director of Labour settled the proportion of relief workers to 
Main Roads workers for each gang. In a reflection of tiie change of govemment and 
the implementation of Forgan Smith's promise, it was a condition of employmait of 
labour tihiat relief workers would be paid full award rates and the rotational periods 
for married and single men strictly observed. ^ '^ These conditions for the employment 
of relief workers on pubhc works projects were retained and applied to all the m^or 
"^ Annual Report of the Commissioner ofMainRoads, 1932, p.lO; ibid, 1933, p.5. 
' " Austin to Kemp, 4.8.1932, State Employment Council, R.MO. 300, QTA. 
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pubhc works subsequently administered by the Bureau of Industiy through its Works 
Committee of v^ diich Kemp was Chairman. 
The problem arising from the Treasurer s decision to remove local authority access 
to loan funding was addressed by a suggestion from Austin. Where loan allocations 
would have been made to local autiiorities, they would be allocated to the 
Commissioner of Main Roads and "in his way, wtolst still doing good work, expedite 
the expenditure ofthe Winter Rehef Loan up to the full amount granted" Moreover, 
any unallocated Rural Development Committee funds could be allocated to the 
Commissioner for the same purpose.^ ^° The Council's endorsement of Austin's 
suggestion recognised Kemp's special knowledge of local authority conditions and 
his capacity to secure agreement with them in planning and financing works 
programmes. It also gave Kemp effective confrol over Payne and the Land 
Adminisfration Board in determining road works schemes associated with the 
opening up of a number of land settlements. Although in subsequent Employment 
Council meetings Payne attempted to re-establish some independence in this 
1*71 
matter, most ofthe schemes continued to be subject to an agreement between the 
Main Roads Commission and the PEI Branch on tiieir respective responsibilities. A 
meeting ofthe State Employment Council with the Cabmet sub-committee on 9 
March 1933 made further small allocations from the remaining expended loan fimds 
to subsidise mining prospectors and a banana growing project at Nerang. It was 
'^ ° Austin to Payne, 23.7.1932. R.M.O. 300, QTA. 
'^' See, for example. Secretary, Lands Administration Board, to Under-Secretary, Department of 
Labour and Industry, re funding for road to Eungella lands, Mackay 2.5.1933.246/2/12, R.M.O. 
300, QTA. 
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Kemp's last meeting as he did not attend the meeting on 17 July when the Council, 
having no furtiier purpose, was adjourned "sine die"^^^ 
On 5 December 1932, the Bureau of Industiy was established under tiie Bureau of 
Industry Act. Kemp's appointments as Chairman ofthe Roads, Mining and General 
Works Committee and the Bureau's Works Boards, have been considered the first 
significant stage in his rise to the position of unrivalled administtative power which 
derived from his appointment in 1938 as Co-ordmator General of Pubhc Works. ^ ^ 
However, it has been argued here that the foundation for his later pre-eminent 
position was laid in his development of Main Roads from a concept that appeared to 
be programmed for failure to an efficient, politically important organisation. In tiie 
process, he exhibited effective organisation and management skills, estabhshed 
cordial relations with pubhc representatives throughout the state and with Federal 
and State departmental officials and, particularly through his handling of 
unenq)loyment works programmes, won the confidence of those with political 
power. Moreover, his responsibilities as a member of the State Employment Council 
alerted him to the possibility of a plarmed, co-ordinated ^proach to the delivety of 
govemment public works programmes. In 1937, when the Govemment began to 
explore pubhcly the concept of administtative co-ordination, Stoty commented: 
.... In respect of works v^ diich are intended specifically to reheve 
unen^loyment, a form of Intta-state co-operation and co-ordination would be 
advantageous. ... Orderly planning of works-projects for unemployment 
relief purposes involves a careful marshalling of schemes and a local analysis 
of them with a view to the selecting ofthe schemes which will employ most 
'^ ^ Minutes ofthe Meetings ofthe State Employment Council and tiie Cabinet sub-committee, 
9.3.1933, 17.7.1933, R.M.O. 300, QTA. 
'^ ^ Wheeler, op. cit, p.6. 
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man-power as the first objective, and will contain the greatest possibilities of 
becoming reproductive. Experience has demonsfrated ... that when special 
funds have been made available somev^at unexpectedly, for rehef work 
projects, there has been a much hurried searching for suitable works ... This 
unpreparedness too has retarded tiie restoring of men to fiill-tmie employment 
vdien funds have been made available for full-time work. 
The idea (of orderly planning and coordination) is not new; rather it is a 
suggestion for the continued application ofthe principles ofthe old 
Employment Council and the extension of some ofthe features ofthe present 
Bureau of Industiy. ^ ^ 
^^* Annual Reports ofthe Pubhc Service Commissioner, 1931-37, Queensland Parliamentary Papers 
(QPP),\93S,2,p.\9. 
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3. 
'BOARDS OF EXPERTS': KEMP AND THE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY 
Kent's membership ofthe Bureau of Industty during the 1930s represented an 
important stage in his rise to a position of significant administrative power. In 
broadening his range of responsibilities, it gave him the opportunity to gain experience 
in the administration of functional authorities beyond Main Roads, to inq)rove his 
understanding of pubhc finance issues, and to consohdate his professional status. 
Kenp's appointment acknowledged his standing as one of a group of senior 
administrators on wiiich the Forgan Smith Govemment depended to inclement the 
"economic revival" promises generally credited' with returning Labor to office in June 
1932. His pivotal role in the commencement ofthe major works projects underpinning 
these promises and the long process of their realisation, honed Kenqj's skills in 
managing the effects of political pragmatism, scarce resources and conpeting 
departmental ambitions. Overall, his work with the Bureau laid the foundation for his 
subsequent appointment as Co-Ordinator-General of Pubhc Works (Co-Ordinator-
General) and contributed to his influence on the drafting of Forgan Smith's landmark 
State Development and Fublic Works Co-ordination Act 1938. 
The Bureau of Industry Act, assented to on 5 December 1932, provided for the 
Bureau's establishment within Forgan Smith's Treasuty portfoho. Infroducing the 
enabling Bill to Parhament, the Premier noted that, although the Bureau of Economics 
and Statistics established by the Moore government was dissolved, many of its 
functions were transferred to the new bureau. Similarly, the position of Director, to 
1 See, for example. Lack, op. cit, pp. 124-128. 
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vdiich J. B. Brigden was re-appointed, retained many of its former powers. Forgan 
Smith defined the Bureau's function as: 
... the preparation and elaboration of schemes for unenployment rehef, and 
promotion of enployment and generally to act in an advisoty capacity under 
legislative authority in respect to many matters vs^ch have assumed national 
importance as a natural result ofthe rationalisation of industty under modem 
methods of production 
and its establishment as central to Labor's plan "to provide a method of organised 
planning in the intemal economy ofthe State"^ Forgan Smith, as Treasurer, was 
President ofthe Bureau. Kemp, as Main Roads Commissioner, was one of seven ex 
officio members, the others being Brigden, the Pubhc Service Commissioner, the 
Chairman ofthe Land Administration Board (LAB), and the Under-Secretaries ofthe 
Departments of Labour and Industty, and Pubhc Works. There was provision for up 
to eight otiier members to represent "primaty production, commercial and frade 
union" interests.^  Three sub-committees were estabhshed, the Rural Development 
Committee, the Adminisfrative, Finance and Industrial Committee, and the Roads, 
Mining and General Works Committee to which Kenp was appointed Chairman. 
One ofthe Bureau's statutoty responsibihties, the co-ordination ofthe state's loan 
works programme and its funding, was to assume increasing importance during the 
1930s. However, beginning with the first meeting in Febraaty 1933, members were 
principally occupied with selecting works proposals that had the c^adty to create 
employment, much as the State Enployment Council had done the previous year. 
Having a extensive knowledge of local conditions, Kemp inspected many of these 
proposals while consulting with representatives ofthe govemment departmaits and 
^ Bureau of Industry Bill, 1932, Second Reading,, QPD, 1932, 162, p.l621. 
^ Ibid 
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local authorities which normally sponsored them On the Bureau's recommendation. 
Cabinet approved three major capital works projects: 
the Kangaroo Point (Stoty) Bridge, which included river works associated with the 
bridge's constraction, river mq)rovements to facihtate shippmg, and the reclamation of 
riverside land at Hamilton; the Stanley River (Somerset) Dam; and, the relocation of 
the University of Queensland to St. Lucia. 
To administer the projects, the Bridge Board, the Stanley River Works Board and the 
University Works Board were created under the Roads, Mining and General Works 
Committee, with Kemp appointed Chairman of all three boards. Successive 
amendments to the 1932 legislation delegated "the powers and authorities" ofthe 
Bureau to the Works Boards, allowing each board to be constituted a constracting 
authority, to raise its own fluids and to have powers of land resumption, but reserving 
to the Bureau the ownership ofthe facility constracted. The Works Boards were 
responsible, through the Bureau of Industty, to the Govemor-in-Council. In 
Parhament, Opposition attacks on the scope ofthe Bureau's powers and their 
delegation to the Works Boards were particularly strong in relation to the Bridge 
Board, wtoch was constituted by Orders-in-Council of December 1933 and 
September 1934. The absence of validating legislation was condemned as a further 
example ofthe Govemment ignoring the democratic parhamentaty process in favour 
of executive decision-making. Although, as a result, the Stanley River Works Board 
and the River In:q)rovement Works Board were constituted under amendments to the 
Bureau of Industry Act m 1933 and 1934, the Opposition identified a further cause 
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dissatisfaction in Parhament's exclusion from decisions on the capital expenditure 
associated with these m^or infrastracture projects." 
As Chairman ofthe Bureau's Roads, Mining and Works Committee, Kenp's 
responsibihties were concemed with roads, through the road development plan for the 
state drawn up by the Main Roads Commission (Main Roads), and general works, 
through his chairmanship ofthe Works Boards. However, in pursuing an active role in 
the Bureau's investigative function, he became involved in the assessment of a much 
wider range of potential development projects, including irrigation and electricity 
supply schemes, the provision of harbour facihties and agricultural production 
experiments. This investigative role, much of it involving the evaluation of local 
authority works priorities and associated financial obhgations, expanded the 
experience he had already gained with Main Roads in compihng and recommending 
pohtically acceptable pubhc works budgets. Since the Bureau of Industty had been 
given responsibihty for co-ordinating loan fimding for Queensland's pubhc works 
program, Kemp's position as Chairman ofthe Bureau's Roads, Mining and Works 
Committee meant that he was responsible for shaping many ofthe prehminaty 
recommendations. His ^pointment as Chairman ofthe three Works Boards brought 
him face-to-face with the diflBculties of balancing the allocation of loan funding for all 
approved projects. The Brisbane City Council was a case in point. The Council had 
been obhged to make a financial commitment to two ofthe Works Board projects on 
the basis of their benefit to ratepayers, even though it was having diflBculty funding 
essential works in the metropohtan area. His experience in producing a pohtically 
approved, workable outcome from these complex negotiations enhanced Kemp's 
status locally, confirmed his reputation for rehabihty and impartiality, and gave him 
Bureau oflndustry Amendment Bill, 1934, QPD, 1934, 166, pp. 1640-41. 
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standing in the national decision-making agencies dealing with loan funding for state 
pubhc works programs. This was to prove of assistance in discharging his 
responsibihties as Queensland's Co-Ordinator-General, as Deputy-Director ofthe 
Alhed Works Council during World War Two, and in negotiations on post-war 
reconstraction programs.' 
With his appointment to the Works Boards, Kemp was obhged to address the logistics 
of undertaking a considerably expanded range of duties. In addition to investigations 
on behalf of the Bureau of Industty and the increased scope of Main Roads' fimctions, 
both of which entailed regular inspection tours and personal haison with local 
authority representatives, in December 1935 he was appointed Chairman ofthe Royal 
Commission on Electricity. The Commission was appointed following allegations of 
exploitative, monopohstic and unsafe practices on the part of electricity supply 
companies throughout Queensland. Reflecting Labor's ideological goals of pubhc 
ownership of utihties, its prime purpose was to inquire into the feasibihty of a co-
ordinated, pubhcly-owned electricity supply system for the state. According to 
Thomis, this encompassed a sub-set of aims, including ehminating waste and 
duphcation, the economic development ofthe state, planning for rural electrification, 
and the early implementation of "a cheap, eflBcient service", especially for 
Queensland's south-east.* Ken5)'s estabhshed relationship with local authority 
representatives proved invaluable. After visiting towns "from Coolangatta to Caims" 
and hearing evidence from dozens of witnesses, the Commissioners demonstrated an 
enviable eflBciency in presenting a comprehensive report within twelve months.' 
^ Wheeler, op. cit 
* Thomis, op.crt., pp.168-69. 
' Royal Commission on Electricity: Report ofthe Royal Commission on Electricity (Chairman, J. 
R Kemp), November, 1936, QPP, 1936,2., p. 1255; Thomis, op cit.. Chapters 6 & 7. 
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Except for a secretaty appomted to each Board, the Works Boards had none ofthe 
usual departmental support stracture. Kemp's solution to this problem was to conduct 
the business ofthe Boards, and the Royal Commission in its initial phase, using Main 
Roads as the administrative base and holding the Works Boards' meetings, one after 
the other, on Friday mornings in his Main Roads oflBce. This regime was extended to 
the early years of his duties as Co-Ordinator-General v^ e^n that organisation also 
lacked a separate adminisfrative stracture. While it was common for correspondence 
on a particular matter to be addressed, for example, to Kemp as Main Roads 
Commissioner from Kemp as University Works Board Chairman, the meticulous 
record-keepmg process wiiich he had earher initiated for Main Roads, and vviiich was 
carried over into each ofthe other oflBces he held, ensured that unambiguous lines of 
responsibihty were maintained. 
Of undoubted value to Kemp in effectively discharging his Works Boards' 
responsibihties was the support \\4iich derived from the harmonious working 
relationship he enjoyed with both Brigden and Stoty. As Director ofthe Bureau of 
Industty, Brigden was appointed to all three Boards, as was Stoty, the Bureau's Vice-
President. There did not appear to be an attempt by any one member to dominate 
proceedings and, with all matters subject to the formal reporting and decision-making 
processes of Board meetings, Ken^' role as Chairman and oflBcial spokesman for the 
Boards was never undermined. Each respected the others' particular fields of 
expertise and consulted in confidence before proceeding on a course of action. 
Brigden respected Kemp's opinion, not only on technical matters but also on the 
complex aspects of project fimding, as was demonsfrated in the negotiations over the 
Austrahan Mutual Provident Society (AMP) loan to finance constraction ofthe Stoty 
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Bridge.* Whether or not Kemp considered Brigden a personal fiiend is uncertain but, 
for Brigden, there was certainly a personal element in their relationship, as shown by 
the concem he expressed in private correspondence about Kent's heavy work 
schedule and the state of his health.' The relationship between Kemp and Cohn Clark, 
Brigden's replacement as Director, was never one of fiiendship and, on occasions, the 
normally diplomatic Kemp did not hide his hostiUty to Clark. 
During the 1930s, Stoty's mfluence on Queensland govemment administration was at 
its height. In July 1940, at the oflficial opening ofthe Kangaroo Point Bridge, renamed 
in Stoty's honour, Forgan Smith described him as "one ofthe greatest statesmen and 
pubhc servants in the British Enpire" '° Stoty had a presence in areas of 
adminisfration far beyond his official duties as Pubhc Service Commissioner and he 
had become acquainted with Kemp when both became members in 1932 ofthe State 
Employment Council. Clearly inpressed with Kenp's practical approach to the 
Council's problem of selecting effective unemployment relief projects from among the 
many proposed, Stoty had unequivocally supported Kerry's plan for providing an 
immediate, and productive, enployment programme through Main Roads' projects. 
As a member ofthe Works Boards, Stoty assisted with report writing for, and made 
representations to Cabinet on behalf of the Boards. Standing in as Chairman when 
* See correspondence between Brigden and Kemp, September 1935, Records Management Ofl&ce 
(R.M.O.) 303, Queensland Transport Archives, (QTA). It should be noted that Main Roads' 
material relating to Main Roads, Co-Ordinator-General, Works Boards and Allied Works 
Council activities has been copied, often on a seemingly random selection basis, on a total of 320 
film reels v\4iich were held in the Queensland Transport Archives, Fortitude Valley. A hard-copy 
index to the files represented on each fihn reel was available initially for my research but later 
disappeared . File numbers have been included in citations where they were retained on the 
photographed pages. 
' See, for example, Brigden to Kemp, handwritten letter 10.9.1935, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
"' Courier-Mail, 6.1.1940. 
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Kemp was absent overseas in 1938, he did not attenpt to irr^ose his own priorities on 
the Boards' agendas. Rather he continued to maintain his role as part of their 
management "team" and to pursue the agreed goals. Stoty was particularly helpful in 
the painfully petty negotiations that characterised the St. Lucia University project but 
his most substantial contribution was as the Boards' industrial relations expert. 
Kemp's priorities in this area were unambiguous in that his chief concems were to 
have projects conpleted within the estimated budget and as quickly and efficiently as 
possible. While he maintained generally cordial relations with union ofiBcials, he 
created some difificult situations by agreeuig, often during his on-site inspection tours, 
to workers' requests for better pay and conditions, without reference to the Industrial 
Court process. In 1937, he petitioned the Premier to allow work gangs on the 
Somerset Dam to be employed on a five-day week basis. Although in contravention of 
the conditions laid down for the Intermittent Rehef system, Kemp argued, 
unsuccessfully, that this was the most cost-efficient method of utihsing the available 
labour. 
Ofthe public works projects developed in the 1930s under the authority ofthe Bureau 
of Industty, the constraction ofthe Stoty Bridge and the Somerset Dam held a 
particular appeal for Kemp. They were an engineering challenge that, if met, 
represented an opportunity to raise the standard of engineering practice in Queensland 
and to give Queensland a national, if not international, reputation in the field. 
Queensland a national, if not intemational, reputation in the field. The report ofthe 
Bureau of Industty's 'Special Committee on Water Supply and Flood Prevention', 
which recommended constraction of Somerset Dam, provided Kenp with tangible 
proof of Queensland's capabihties in this field. He had 250 copies printed for 
distribution, personally forwarding some to appreciative colleagues at the Melboume 
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Harbour Trust and the Institution of Engineers. An approadi to A. G. Gutteridge, the 
Melboume engineer who had prepared a report to the 1928 River Commission, 
backfired when, in an exchange of letters with Kemp, Gutteridge refused to be 
sw^ed from his preference for the Middle Creek dam site." 
One ofthe initial problems Kemp faced in maintaining the momentum of pohtical 
support for the major projects arose from the enthusiasm with wiiich Forgan Smith 
and other Labor spokesmen embraced the projects as the centrepiece of a pubhcity 
campaign to reassure Queenslanders of their economic rationale. Armouncements of 
the high levels of job creation, the boost to allied industries and even completion dates 
were premature as, at the time, the projects were still at the concept stage. Designs 
and related costings were not finahsed, fimding had not been secured, and legal 
difficulties with land resunptions had not been resolved. With regard to the St. Lucia 
University, for example, some months before the first formal meeting ofthe 
University Works Board was convened, Forgan Smith, having initially refused to 
allocate any state government funds, without informing either Brigden or Kemp then 
obtained Cabinet approval for the appointment of his preferred architect and the 
building plans and fee schedule submitted by hun.'^  Moreover, Kemp had to contend 
with influences that estabhshed an order of priority wiiich, in turn, affected the rate of 
progress on the project. In the 1930s, such inqjortant influences were the level of 
pohtical support and the degree to vviiich each project was perceived to give effect to 
govemment pohcy. In these terms, the Stoty Bridge was accorded the highest 
priority, leading to its conpletion in the shortest time of all the projects. Progress on 
" Kemp to Gutteridge 3.5.1935, Gutteridge to Kemp, 11.5.1935, 28.5.1935,/&/</; See Royal 
Commission of enquiry (on) Brisbane water supply, report, together with appendices, (A. G. 
Gutteridge) QPP, 1928, Vol. 2, pp. 775-854. 
'^  Brigden to Kemp, Confidential Letter. 28.4.1937, File 247/6/2, R.MO. 310, QTA. 
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constraction was visible on a daily basis, the project employed large numbers of both 
skilled and unskilled rehef workers, the unions won inq)ortant award variations for 
several categories of workers, the consulting engineer, J. J. Bradfield, was the much 
acclaimed designer ofthe Sydney Harbour Bridge, vAule the bridge itself was an 
important transport hnk for commercial and defence purposes. Moreover, its cost was 
entirely recouped from the motor vehicle toll unposed between 1940 and 1948. By 
contrast, although it was readily regarded as an engineering marvel, and the benefits in 
terms of water supply and flood mitigation acknowledged, the Somerset Dam did not 
appear to have a high level of pubhc or pohtical support. Disputes over the design, the 
project's low employment rate and continuing industrial problems contributed to an 
image of a vety costly scheme, progress on which was too slow to be of use to the 
Govemment's pubhcity canpaign. Forgan Smith showed httle interest in the Dam's 
constraction, possibly because he saw it as more the concem ofthe engineering 
specialists and the two local authorities involved. 
Although work did not begin until late 1937, progress on the St. Lucia University was 
equally delayed by labour disputes, a scarcity of skilled workers and difficulty in 
obtaining essential plant and materials. Ofthe two, the University fared better, as the 
project had the unequivocal support of both Forgan Smith and Cohn Clark, and 
benefited from the not inconsiderable influence of Stoty, by then the University's 
Vice-Chancellor. Overall, there was httle evidence ofthe energetic ^proach Kemp 
usually took towards his responsibihties, for which a number of reasons could be 
cited. Among them were the often petty disputes arising from the academic staffs 
desire to influence almost evety aspect ofthe project, which even Forgan Smith, who 
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frequaitly made his own demands, found obstractive.'^ In addition, the sfrong 
relationship between Forgan Smith and the architects, and Cohn Clark's attempts to 
circumvent the Board's authority, threatened to undermine Kemp's position. Much of 
the time, Kenp's role was confined to mediating between the University staff, the 
Senate and Cabinet on their respective expectations, and ensuring that, despite on-
going industrial action, work on the project fulfilled its employment-generating 
function. 
However, he was enthusiastic about planning the extensive landscaping envisaged for 
the University grounds. As with the Somerset Dam, it was indicative of Kemp's 
commitment to free-planting programs to enhance the immediate environment. In 
1938, he organised the estabhshment of a plant nursety on the grounds, utilising the 
skills of E. W Bick, the Brisbane City Council Parks superintendent'", and the 
Govemment Botanist, Dr D. A. Herbert. To avoid wasting more time at inconclusive 
meetings, Kemp, as Co-Ordinator-General, formed a committee with Board member, 
D. A. Crawford, to dhect the tree-planting when constraction commenced again after 
the war. He then delegated overall responsibility for the program to J. A. Holt, the 
Bridge Board's Chief Engineer and also the University project's Supervising 
Engineer.'^  
Kenp's energies were directed most obviously towards advancing the constraction of 
the West End to St. Lucia Bridge, one ofthe options rejected by the 1926 Cross 
River Commission, although tentatively ^proved by Cabinet as a short route to the 
new university. J. J. Bradfield had submitted a prehminaty design for a steel bridge. 
" Courier-Mail, 23.10.1941. 
'" E. W. Bick to Chairman, University Works Board, 16.10.1941, R.M.O. 310, QTA. 
" Minutes of Board Meeting, 28.2.1946, File 247/7/1, R.M.O. 310, QTA; Holt to MRC Engineer, 
21.4.1949, FUe 247/7/16, R.M.O. 310, QTA. 
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estimated to cost approximately £200,000, to be constracted in conjunction with the 
University buildings. FoUowing Cabinet's approval of a cost-sharing arrangement 
negotiated by Kenp and Stoty with the Brisbane City Council, work on the West End 
approaches had commenced by December 1939. Given the restrictions the Premier 
had imposed on funding for the entire project, financing the bridge was always going 
to be difficult. Although Kemp re-allocated funds from the Somerset Dam works in an 
attempt to keep the project going, by 1943, it became a casualty ofthe priority given 
to defence over civil works and was closed down. It was this change in national 
works pohcy, and the associated diversion of funds, materials and manpower to the 
war effort, that also proved to be the determining factor in delaying the conqiletion of 
both the Somerset Dam and the University. '* 
With the national defence plan finally in place by 1941, Commonwealth and State 
representatives to the Loan Council agreed to abide by the agreement under which 
State co-ordinators haised with the Loan Council-appointed Co-Ordinator of Works 
in compihng a list of approved works of defence value for loan funding. While Kemp 
had no hesitation in making the decision to close down the University works and hand 
over the existing buildings for Army occupation, his behef m the importance ofthe 
Somerset Dam led hun to make a personal appeal to Su" Harty Brown, the National 
Works Co-Ordinator, to approve further funding as a defence project. After Brown 
tumed him down, Kemp, assisted by Stoty and the Board's Chief Engmeer, W. H. 
Nimmo, but opposed by Cohn Clark, secured Cabinet approval for an extension of 
funding." This enabled constraction to progress to a stage where the Dam provided a 
'* See, for example. State Loan Fund, Reduction in Allocations, 22.4.1941, 247/6/13, R.M.O. 307, 
QTA. 
" Note of Telephone conversation, Kemp to Board Secretary, 28.5.1942,Under-Secretary, Treasury 
to Chairman, Stanley River Works Board, 10.9.1942. R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
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secure water supply for Ipswich and Brisbane, before plant and work teams were 
transferted to the high priority Caimcross Dock project. 
Exerting a further, distinctive influence was Kemp's own approach to Queensland's 
overall pubhc works planning. While records ofthe various Works Boards' meetings 
in the 1930s confirm his on-going responsibihty to the management of these projects, 
his sights were set on achieving a much broader goal. Even prior to his appointment 
as Queensland's Co-Ordmator-General in Januaty 1939, he had a decisive role in the 
negotiations with local authorities, Queensland Treasuty and the Loan Council to 
finalise the annual funding allocations for the state-wide works programme. While it 
remains difificult to assess the part played by personal ambition, Kenp's actions 
demonsfrated a complete dedication to advancing as many m^or developmental 
works projects as available resources and his capacity for satisfactorily addressing 
govemment pohcy concems permitted. It will be seen from his champiomng, against 
sustained opposition at both state and national levels, of plans for a new Fitzxoy River 
Bridge, the Tully hydro-electric scheme and the Burdekin Dam and Bridge '^ that his 
preference was for engineering projects on a grand scale. It is proposed that this 
particular preference was a function of being a 'technical speciahst', an engmeer with 
not only a comprehensive knowledge ofthe development needs of local areas but also 
a firm behef in the superiority of technocratic solutions to infrastracture development 
problems. 
See pp.292-293, and pp.325-326 for a detailed discussion of his efforts to secure these projects. 
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THE WORKS BOARDS 
The manner in vvdiich Kenq) carried out his responsibihties as Chairman ofthe Works 
Boards, 'wdiere he was, in effect, the overseer ofthe three projects until the earfy 
1950s, demonsttated many ofthe professional and personal attributes that contributed 
to his achieving a position of extraordinaty power in the govemment adminisfration of 
the period. 
The Story Bridge 
In the mid-1920s, the problem of confrolling the Brisbane River to alleviate annual 
disasfrous flooding in the Brisbane area and also ensure a rehable water supply during 
frequent periods of drought had led to investigations and reports on the feasibility of 
siting a dam in the upper catchment areas ofthe Brisbane Valley. Investigations and 
reports were also conpleted during this period on, a) Brisbane River inprovements to 
upgrade facilities for the port of Brisbane, and, b) the constraction of a cross-river 
bridge to link the north-south road access. Although these proposals were presented 
largely in terms of employment creation schemes, they were also a response to private 
industty pressure for transport infrastracture to promote business opportunities. In 
1930, Kemp convened a committee to re-examine the 1926 Cross River Commission 
report on a "cross river facility" for Brisbane. The committee recommended the 
constraction of a high-level bridge at the Kangaroo Point site although Kemp had 
argued unsuccessfully for a lower-level bridge to Boundaty Stteet and the consequent 
closing to large ships ofthe City and South Brisbane wharves. Under his plan, 
shipping facihties would be relocated to a new site for the port of Brisbane along the 
reclaimed Hamilton lands and close to the major processing and storage plants 
149 
associated with Brisbane's export frade. This would achieve lower bridge 
constraction costs and ehminate the necessity for the expensive annual dredging 
required to keep the river channels open above Kangaroo Point.'' Nearly fifty years 
was to elapse before commercial shipping was finally removed from the city reaches 
and large-scale dredging ofthe river channels ceased. 
In 1931, with httle prospect of public funding for the bridge, the Moore Govemment 
considered a proposal to award, as payment for constraction, a private toll franchise 
to the firm of Dorman Long v^ch had constracted the Sydney Harbour Bridge on the 
same terms. In October that year. Parliament passed the Tolls on Frivately 
Constructed Road Facilities Act delegating the Commissioner of Main Roads to act 
on behalf of the Govemor-in-Council in assessing proposals, determining costs and 
setting toll rates. The Commissioner had the final decision on the constraction and 
maintenance aspects of any proposed road fadhty (Section 10) and, with the approval 
ofthe Govemor-in-Council, had the power to terminate the franchise owner's right to 
levy and collect tolls. (Section 19) Although the Dorman Long proposal did not 
proceed, it ehcited strong public opposition to the notion of a private undertaking 
confrolling access to an important road facility. On its retum to power in 1932, Labor 
did not repeal the 1931 toll legislation, thereby retaining the safeguard embodied in 
the Commissioner's control over the granting and operations of toll franchises. Main 
Roads was asked to prepare a cost estimate for the bridge's constraction as a pubhc 
utihty franchise, paving the way for the 1933 amendments to the Bureau of Industty 
Act, under v^ iiich the Bureau was granted a franchise until all interest and redemption 
" Report ofthe Cross River Commission 1926, (Chairman Professor R Ha\^ *;en), Brisbane: 
Brisbane City Council, 11.1.1926, pp.70-71. 
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payments were met.^ ° Through the authority thus delegated to hun as Commissioner 
for Main Roads, Kemp remained in a position to influence the Government's final 
decision on the means adopted to recoup the cost ofthe bridge. 
Throughout Januaty 1934, J. J. Bradfield, as consulting engineer to the project, had 
several meetings with Board members to reach agreement in principle on height, 
width, and clearance levels. Probably because he was the only engineer on the Board, 
Kenp dominated the negotiations leading to its final recommendations on bridge 
design and the terms of Bradfield's contract. His insistence on a clear defibnition of 
areas of responsibihty resulted in Bradfield's being answerable to the Board in all 
matters except for the right to select his own specialist staff '^ Bradfield recommended 
the appointment of J. A. Holt as design and supervising engineer and, as his assistant, 
J. E. Kindler, an engineer with the Main Roads' Bridge Branch vvdio had worked with 
Bradfield on the Sydney Harbour Bridge. Amendments to the Bureau of Industty 
legislation in 1946, under which matters previously administered by the Works Boards 
were transferred to the Co-Ordmator-General, Kenp had Holt and Kindler, as well as 
other Bridge Board engineers, transferred to the Co-Ordinator-General, where they 
formed the nucleus ofthe team of technical speciahsts which he directed in the 
planning and unplementation of m^or works projects. Kindler was appointed Chief 
Engineer in 1954 after HoU succeeded Kemp as Co-Ordinator-General. Other 
engineers, whose requests to be transferred from the Main Roads' Bridge Branch to 
the bridge works were approved by Kemp, included (Sir) Charles Barton, who was 
appointed Co-Ordinator-General after Holt. This hne of succession from Main Roads 
^° Co-Ordinator-General, Report to the Premier, "Story Bridge, Revenue: Finance: Toll Rates", 
27.10.1939,41 A/220, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
'^ Forgan Smith to Bradfield, 27.11.1933, J. J. C. Bradfield, Papers, NLA MS 4712, Box 6, Folder 
37 
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Commissioner to Co-Ordinator-General, first instituted with Kemp's appointment in 
1939, endured until the 1980s, tiie last such appointment being (Sir) Sydney Schubert. 
On 29 June 1934, after several weeks of pubhc debate on height and width provisions. 
Cabinet adopted the Bridge Board's recommendations. A short but intensive pubhc 
campaign by central Brisbane shipping interests^^ led to the adoption of one hundred 
feet for the bridge height, wtole Kemp's recommendation for a much wider roadway 
of sixty feet, based on projected future traffic growth, was approved. It was expected 
that Bradfield and the Bridge Board's design staff would finalise the detailed plans 
and specifications in time for tenders for constraction to be called in November." 
Despite some pohtical and union pressure for the work to be carried out by day 
labour. Cabinet agreed to the confract system the Board had recommended on the 
grounds of greater efficiency, with day labour to be employed by the contractor under 
conditions to be agreed between the Board and the Director of Labour. The 
constraction contract was subsequently awarded to Evans Deakin-Homibrook, with 
the bridge's steel conponents being fabricated in the Evans Deakin factoty at Rocklea. 
On 9 May, 1935, an Order-in-Coundl constituted a committee ofthe Bureau of 
Industty, to be called the Works Board The Board's first meeting on 7 June, 1935, 
at vsiiich Kenp was elected Chairman, incorporated in its minutes the operations' 
report ofthe Bridge Board. ^ '' With the same delegated authority and the same 
membership for both boards, the two names were often used interchangeably. 
^^  R. E. Nixon-Smith, Chairman, Up-River Shipping Interests Committee, Courier-Mail, 2.4.1934, 
15.5.1934. 
" Bureau oflndustry, "The Bridge Board", Summary, 26.9.1934, R.M.O. 306, QTA. 
" Report of Operations under the Bridge Board, 7.6.1935, 247/6/14, R.M.O. 306, QTA. 
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However, the Works Board's responsibihties ©ctended to carrying out the 
recommended flood prevention and river improvement works and the re-building of 
the Petrie Bight wharves necessitated by the bridge's constraction. In July, Brigden 
and Treasuty officials had lengthy discussions on financing the bridge and river works 
and, specifically, the "loan mon^ requirements" The initial scheme was to raise the 
required two million pounds in loan money locally, the period ofthe loan to be 
twenty-five years. By September, the pubhc loan option, although approved by the 
Loan Council, had been discarded and Brigden was assessing a loan offer from the 
AMP. On 10 September, Brigden wrote, ui confidence, to Kemp seeking his advice 
on the proposal he had put to AMP representatives. Assuming Kenp had already left 
Brisbane on a main roads inspection tour, he had proceeded with the proposal but, as 
he wrote, if he had known Kenq) was still in Brisbane, they could have gone to the 
AMP meeting together. He apologised for his calculations which, since "both the 
Premier and the AMP wanted immediate attention" were "absurdly hurried" " In his 
confidential reply, Kemp reassured Brigden that the proposals were as satisfactoty as 
could be hoped for under the circumstances and, more inportantly, "will save the 
Govemment any serious embarrassment in any particular year'" ^ * Brigden and Kenp 
conferred almost daily during September to discuss and refine the AMP offer to a 
point where it would satisfy the Bureau's requirements, the AMP, the State 
Govemment and the Loan Council. The most pressing issue to be resolved was the 
funding of loan interest payments and expenditure on the river inq)rovenient works, 
neither of which was covered by the terms ofthe AMP loan, in a way that did not 
compromise funding allocations for other works projects. 
" Brigden to Kemp, 10.9.1935, 11.9.1935, RM.O.306, QTA. 
*^ Kemp to Brigden, letter, 11.9.1935, ibid. 
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The Bureau of Industry Act 1935 vahdated the Order-in-Coundl of 14 October 1935 
v^ i^ch had authorised the AMP loan. The Bridge Board then arranged for repayments 
of Treasuty advances for work already commenced to be made from the AMP loan. 
To cover interest payments and other commitments, the Premier agreed to approve 
the ttansfer of £40,000 from the Unenq)loyment Rehef Fund to the Bridge Board." 
Brigden again conferred with Kemp to finahse the agenda for a special meeting ofthe 
Bureau held mid-December in Forgan Smith's office. As the borrowing authority 
under the amended Act, the Bureau formally approved the AMP loan at the meeting 
and resolved to delegate its borrowing powers either to the Bridge Board or the 
Works Board, thus avoiding the need to obtain the Bureau's approval for any 
variations to the loan agreement.^ * 
In December, another inqiortant issue to be decided was the nomination of a minimum 
rate for the toll to be inposed under the AMP loan agreement, which required the 
AMP's consent for any reductions in the initial rate. Brigden accepted Kent's figure 
of 6d as the minimum rate per private motor vehicle and varied rates for pubhc 
transport and commercial vehicles. It was not until M ^ 1939, when Kemp stressed 
the urgency ofthe situation, since the bridge was nearing conq)letion and a start on 
building the toll houses had to be made, that Cabinet considered approving these 
rates. However, the issue was by no means resolved, with a range of opponents from 
the business and govemment sectors arguing for the bridge to be a user-free fraffic 
facihty. By this time, Kemp had been appointed Co-Ordinator-General and, in any 
" Minutes, Bridge Board meeting, 29.11.1935, R.M.O. 306, QTA. 
^^  Brigden to Kemp, 14.12.1935, R.M.O. 303. QTA. 
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recommendation he made to Cabinet, his principal aim was to balance immediate 
pohcy and funding considerations against maintaining the progress of as many ofthe 
m^or projects as possible. Since, under the 1931 legislation. Main Roads had 
responsibihty for granting toU franchises. Main Roads engineer, D. Garland, prepared 
a report for Kemp on the many factors to be assessed in deciding the issue. The 
report's conclusion supported Kemp's view that toU revenue represented the only 
viable means of paying for the bridge. It was akeady clear that Consohdated Revenue 
would not be used to fund the bridge, while the Brisbane City Council as the relevant 
local authority had barely sustainable debt commitments in relation to the Stanley 
River Dam and the St. Lucia Bridge. 
In his customaty, meticulous fashion, and utihsing the resources and backing ofthe 
Main Roads Commission, the Co-Ordinator-General and the Bridge Board, Kenp 
initiated a more detailed investigation. His conclusions m support of a government-
administered toll on the bridge were presented to the Premier in a confidential memo 
of 5 May,^ ' followed in October by a lengthy report suitable for Cabinet discussion. 
The October report in particular illustrated Kerry's capacity to dehver an inpeccably 
researched, logically developed and pohtically aware document to the Premier and 
Cabmet. It set out recommendations that addressed the relevant issues, were in 
keepmg with Kemp's preferred outcomes, and against which it was difficult to mount 
any sustained opposition. To deal with the problem of ownership ofthe bridge and the 
Premier's promise that the franchise would be determined by referendum, Kenp 
clarified two pomts; firstly, that, under the Bureau of Industry Acts 1932-34, the 
Bureau was the owner ofthe bridge and had been granted a pubhc utility franchise 
under the 1931 toll legislation and, secondly, that the final period ofthe franchise 
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would be determined by an Act of Parhament. However, the franchise would remain 
in force until all repayments were completed, and the Act would be ratified at an 
election rather than by referendum^" Against a background of reduced loan funding 
allocations, he set out the arguments for and against a toll system He detailed the 
long-term debt obhgations associated with a toll-free bridge and the consequent 
penalties in the form of higher taxation and curtaihnent ofthe State's employment-
generating public works programme. With an eye to material the Premier might use in 
pubhc announcements, Kemp observed that; 'Tromthe pubhc relations point of view, 
it may be noted that the toll proposed would be akin to a framway or a bus fare" and, 
returning to his central theme, emphasised that the price of a toll-free bridge was a 
severe reduction in future works programs. '^ 
There was further evidence in the report of Kenqj's capacity to look beyond the 
immediate situation in order to calculate future benefits, vMch was to become more 
noticeable in his efforts to secure wartime defence works for Queensland. Expanding 
his argument in favour of a toll system, he foresaw that, on the debt being fully 
discharged in 1963, the Govemment would be in a position to re-assess traffic 
requirements and proceed with the constraction of another cross-river bridge or 
tunnel, if warranted.^ ^ This type of pronouncement did not sit well with the Bureau's 
Director, Cohn Clark. His particular economist orientation was not conducive to 
acknowledging benefits, the economic value of which was not immediately calculable. 
Thus, it was inevitable that, at the vety least, he and Kenp would hold dififering 
" Kemp to Chief Secretary 4.5.39, File 247/6/ - , R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
^^  Kemp (as Co-Ordinator-General) "Report on the Story Bridge; Revenue: Finance: Toll Rates" 
27.10.1939. (41 A) 220, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
'' Ibid 
32 Ibid 
156 
viewpoints. This was home out by Clark's opposition in 1941 to Kemp's attenpts to 
continue the work on the Somerset Dam, and his repeated efforts in the immediate 
post-war period to dismiss Kenp's enthusiasm for the Burdekin Irrigation scheme as 
ill-founded, lacking an appreciation ofthe relationship between pubhc fioiance and 
Labor pohcy goals." Both men had put their respective points of view on the tolls 
issue to numerous pubhc forums during this period and, on one occasion, Clark 
queried calculations Kemp had submitted for determining recommended minimum toU 
rate. Ken^ responded by sending him a copy ofthe 1933 edition ofthe "Proceedings 
ofthe American Toll Bridge Association" but Clark was able to have the last word. In 
writing to thank Kemp for the pubhcation, he noted that the Association's calculations 
supported his own.^ " Addressing the question of meeting the deficit on the bridge, 
Kenvp rejected suggestions that Brisbane be declared a betterment area for the 
purpose of levying special rates, or that the Brisbane City Council be required to 
make the specified local authority repayments. The Council's debt position was so 
desperate that no repayment on the existing £100,000 Treasmy loan was hkely in the 
current financial year, while the Lord Mayor was seeking further Treasmy assistance 
to complete urgent maintenance work. As any additional Treasuty funding would cut 
departmental allocations, the only other course of action was for Kemp, as Co-
Ordmator-General, to agree to re-allocate unexpended money from the State 
Development tax funds. ^ ^ 
" See, for example, Diane Shogren. "Agriculture 1932-57' in Murphy et al., 1980, op. cit, pp.214-
215. 
^'^ Clark to Kemp, 14.7.1939, 247/6/13, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
^' Memo. Under-Secretary, Treasury, to Co-Ordinator-General. 25.10.1939, RMO. 303, QTA. 
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Kenp's preferred method of financing tiie current year deficit of £54,000 was for the 
amount to be advanced from the State Insurance Commissioner's funds at current 
rates of interest. He suggested that compensatoty revenue to continue local authority 
works funding could be raised by allowing the Insurance Commissioner a monopoly 
on third-party insurance. While this proposition had httle chance of being adopted at 
the time, Kenp beheved the proposal, originally developed by Main Roads and the 
"ex-Auditor General", warranted a thorough investigation as it would be well-
received by most motor car owners, even if the insurance companies reacted 
unfavourably.^ ^ In the meantime, he recommended a scheme under wiiich pending 
amendments to the Main Roads Acts 1920 -1934 tighten vehicle registration 
conditions, thereby yielding an extta £30,000 per annum, wMe authorisation for the 
State Transport Commission to inpose a uniform flat rate for drivers hcence fees 
would add another £16,000. By this process, any drop in employment from the 
curtailment ofthe Insurance Commissioner's loans for local authority works would be 
avoided, while interest would be earned on the Insurance Commissioner's advances." 
Discussions on the deficit financing proposals continued through 1940. At meetmgs 
between Treasmy and the Co-Ordinator-General on the Bureau of Industty's 1940-41 
works program, Kenq), as Co-Ordinator-General, recommended that the Bridge 
Board take up the Co-Ordinator-General's oflfer of £80,000 from State Development 
tax funds as the govemment's contribution to total interest payments on the AMP 
loan. This action had first been proposed by Brigden in 1932 during prehminaty 
discussions on funding for the bridge works. The final recommendation of Kemp's 
^ Ibid, p.l 
" Ibid,p.U. 
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October report, that Cabinet approve the immediate constraction of toll houses on the 
bridge at a total cost of £2,000, emphasised one means by wiiich the Govemment 
retained confrol over pubhc works expenditure. The requirement for Cabinet ^proval 
of evety item of expenditure over £500^ * was a continuing source of fiiistration for 
Kenp and the various Works Boards, as each request for Cabinet approval had to be 
acconqjanied by a report justifying the expenditure and confirming the funding source. 
Although, as Kemp's range of responsibilities increased, he was increasmgly inchned 
to anticipate Cabinet ^proval of his actions and furnish a report later, this type of 
control mechanism illustrated Morrison's description ofthe Labor govemment's 
preoccupation with the details of administration. '^ Initially derived from Labor's 
distrust of pubhc officials appointed by a non-Labor govemmait, this became a 
routine aspect ofthe government-administration relationship and, as Hughes later 
remarked: "over the years. Ministers came to trust theu- pubhc servants but still 
continued to exercise direct control over their department's work and the Cabinet 
considered remarkably trivial matters"'"' During the 1930s, Cabmet was obsessed with 
the smallest details of departmental spending in order to achieve an armual revenue 
surplus, the maintenance of high cash balances in the various Trust funds, and the 
maximum exploitation of federal govemment loan allocations. Kent's carefully 
detailed recommendations to both the Premier and Cabmet were rarely rejected, even 
if persistence, through repeated, more forcefully and technically couched 
presentations, was sometimes required to achieve a commitment. The toll issue was a 
case in point, as there was a further month of communication with associated 
^^  See, for example. Chief Secretary's OflBce to Works Board, Minutes ,Works Board meeting, 
11.10.1935,247/6/13, RM.O. 306, QTA. 
^' Morrison, op. cit, pp. 313-14. 
'"' Hughes, 1980, op, cit, pp. 165-166. 
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departments, Cabinet and the acting Premier, before Cabinet approval was obtained 
for the toll system and for the constraction ofthe toll collection houses on the bridge. 
However, it was not until April 1940 that the Premier, in a cable from Fiji, signalled 
his approval ofthe nominated schedule of toll rates."' 
The in^ortance the Labor Govemment attached to the bridge's completion was 
confirmed by the elaborate official opening ceremony held on 6 June. In his speech, 
the Premier referred to the project as one ofthe first "rehabilitative" works it 
authorised foUowing its retum to power in 1932. Its value to evetyone in the 
community was unquestionable, reinforcing his conviction that; "Sound econorny did 
not consist in freezing credit or hiding money in the ground".'*^ In naming the bridge 
after J. D. Stoty, he made much of Stoty's contribution to govemment adminisfration, 
and added his endorsement ofthe praise given to the work of Dr Bradfield, the 
supervising engineer, J. A. Hoh, the contractors, Evans Deakin, and the members of 
the Bridge Board. At the end of his list was Kemp, "another official who had done 
work of inestimable value" "^  Kent's low ranking may have been inadvertent or was 
redolent of other matters. Perhaps Kenp was not so inportant an official as he 
appeared to others, or, in the Premier's view, it may have been that Kemp's standing 
was already sufficiently secure as to allow other ofificials to occupy the limehght on 
this occasion. Alternatively, there is the possibihty that the Premier saw Ken^ m the 
"' Assistant Under-Sea-etary, Chief Secretary's Office to Kemp, Co-Ordinator-General, 29.11.1939; 
R.M.O. 303, QTA.; Forgan Smith to Acting Premier, P. Pease, 4.4.1940, R.M.O. 303, QTA 
*^ Courier-Mail, 7.6.1940. 
« Ibid 
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"instrumental role" ofthe traditional, albeit speciahst bureaucrat, having previously 
depicted Ken^ as one v^ o^ saw the worid "as one big engineering workshop""" 
The Stanley River (Somerset) Dam 
Among the many schemes rejected by the State Employment Council in May 1932 
was the constraction of a dam, in the Brisbane River catchment area for both flood 
mitigation and water supply purposes. At the time, it seemed unhkely that the project 
would be approved owing to its massive cost, the long lead time before actual 
constraction work commenced, and its questionable value as an Unenployment Relief 
Scheme. 
In May 1934, a special committee ofthe Bureau was appointed to investigate the 
proposal to constract a major dam to provide a secure water supply for Brisbane and 
to control flooding in the Brisbane Valley."^  Apart from Brigden, the committee 
Chairman, all the members, W. H. Nimmo, Main Roads Commission design engmeer; 
D. Fison, chief engineer. Department of Harbours and Marine; and L. C. Morris, 
superintendent. Technical Education, Department of Public Instraction, were 
engineers. The most controversial issues were the selection ofthe dam site, the type 
of dam, and a proposal for hydro-electric power generation, with Morris delivered a 
dissenting report which criticised the majority recommendations and put forward a 
case for Middle Creek as the dam site. Kemp was obviously determined to exert as 
much influence as possible on the final decision as, three months later, he sent a report 
to the Premier on Morris's report and the Committee's recommendations, making it 
^* W. Forgan Smith. Foreword to, J. R. Kemp, Report on Visit of Inspection to Europe and North 
America: April 1938-January 1939, Brisbane: Govenmient Printer, 1939. 
*^ Brigden to Acting Premier, "Brisbane Water Supply and Flood Prevention: Report ofthe Special 
Committee", op. cit. 
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clear he was committed to ensuring Cabinet approved his preferred site on the Stanley 
River. Stating that he had felt it his duty to be a member ofthe Committee "in order, 
if necessaty, to discuss its recommendations to the Bureau and yourself, with a proper 
knovdedge thereof, he went on to comment that he had delayed writing it so as to 
study the recommendations and, as was his practice, to secure further speciahst 
advice."* Afthough he declared himself to be a member ofthe Committee, his actual 
status appeared to be somewhat different. According to Brigden's infroductoty 
remarks, Kenp had a watching brief as Chairman ofthe Bureau's Roads, Mining and 
General Works Committee, but his participation was restricted to attending the more 
important meetings."' 
Kent's actions were partly explained by the pubhc campaign initiated by Inigo Jones, 
Govemment Meteorological Officer and founder ofthe Crohamhurst weather 
observatoty, in support of Morris's recommendation for Middle Creek. Making 
frequent reference to the experience of dam builders in other Austrahan states, Europe 
and the U. S. A to demonstrate the technical basis for the Committee's 
recommendations, he proceeded to dismiss Morris's objections to the proposed 
gravity-type dam, its unsuitabihty for hydro-electric power generation, and the 
questionable effectiveness ofthe Stanley River site for flood prevention."^ Cabmet 
approved the Committee's recommendations but preferred that the final 
implementation decisions should await the outcome of a conference convened on 3 
October 1934 by the Bureau of Science and Industty. Chaired by the Home Secretaty, 
E. M. Hanlon, it was attended by members of Cabinet, the Bureau of Industty, and 
"* Kemp to Chief Secretary, "Report on Bureau oflndustry Special Committee Report", 17.8.1934, 
RM.O. 303, QTA. 
"' Ibid 
"^ Ibid; Memo, Brigden to Premier, 29.8.1934, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
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Brisbane and Ipswich City Councils."^ Having outhned the recommendations 
submitted for Cabinet approval, Brigden led the ensuing discussion towards 
agreement on the key issues, with Kemp, attending as Chairman ofthe Bureau's 
Works Committee, taking the relativefy minor role of providing fiirther information as 
required. The main purpose ofthe conference was to secure the two Councils' 
commitment to the project and their support for the Stanley River site. Their 
agreement paved the way for the 1934 and 1935 amendments to the Bureau of 
Industty legislation, which provided for the constitution ofthe Stanley River Works 
Board, under the Bureau of Industiy, as constracting authority for the dam At the 
conference, Hanlon pledged government funding for more than fifty per cent ofthe 
cost. Since Brisbane and Ipswich ratepayers were to bear the remaining costs, their 
representatives sought places on the Board. Hanlon rejected this demand, declaring 
that the Board would not make pohcy and, as with the Kangaroo Point Bridge Board, 
would not have pohtical representation. It was to be, he asserted, "a Board of 
experts" *" As a con^)roniise measure, F. F. Gilchrist and F. A. Griffiths, engineers to 
the respective councils, were appointed as their "expert" representatives, joinmg 
Stoty, Brigden and Kenq), as Chairman, on the Board. 
As with the StOty Bridge project, no time was lost in assembhng a speciahst 
engineering team for the design and constraction ofthe dam Cutbacks in pubhc 
works across Austraha had resulted in high unemployment among engineers, so that 
Kenp had no difficulty securing men with substantial experience in this field. W. H 
Nimmo, appointed Design Engineer and later the Board's Chief Engineer, speciahsed 
"' Report of the Conference convened by the Bureau of Science and Industry to consider the 
recommendations ofthe Bureau in respect to the proposed dam fOT the purposes of Water Si^ jply 
and Flood Mitigation,, 3 October 1934, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
"> Ibid 
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in hydrauhc engineering in Victoria and Tasmania, and had completed the prehminaty 
hydrological survey for Tasmania's Great Lake hydro-electric scheme. After moving 
to Queensland, he was with Brisbane's Mefropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage 
Board before being appointed design engineer with Main Roads m 1927. From the 
outset, Nimmo demonsfrated his total dedication to the success ofthe project. His 
technically competent, detailed reports on evety aspect ofthe complex undertakings 
provided essential support for Kent's determination to have the dam completed on 
schedule, notwithstanding on-going engineering and operational problems, and the 
spoiling tactics consistently employed by the project's detractors. Appointing Nunmo 
as Design Engineer forestalled a move by the Brisbane City Council to gain more 
control over the project by havmg the Council's Works Department develop the 
design. To defuse the situation, Kenp arranged for C. B. Mott, the Council's Design 
Engineer, to assist Nimmo while, in a similarly motivated arrangement, B. E. Shaw 
was fransferred from the Department of Irrigation and Water Supply as a second 
design engineer. Glenister Shell, who had also worked on Tasmanian dam projects, 
was appointed Resident Engineer at the site, a position he held until October 1941. To 
complete the team, Kemp personally recommended to the Premier the appointment of 
the intemationally respected civil engineer, H. H. Dare, having gone to considerable 
lengths to secure Dare's agreement. A member ofthe New South Wales Conservation 
and Irrigation Commission and the Murray River Commission smce 1917, Dare had 
been closely associated with the design and construction ofthe massive Burrinjuck 
Dam and also the Wyangala and Hume Dams.^ ' Until 1943 when the project was 
closed down for the duration ofthe war and his contract terminated. Dare made short 
' ' Bureau oflndustry. Draft for Aimouncement by the Premier. "Stanley Dam Design: Appointment 
of Engineers," 27.12.1934, RM.O. 304, QTA. 
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visits from his Melboume base to Brisbane and the dam site to confer with Nimmo 
and approve the technical decisions made in the interim 
It seemed that an wapoTtarA aspect of Dare's appointment was the legitunacy his 
intemational standing conferred on the Board's decision to constract a gravity-type 
dam Early in December 1934, Lars Jorgensen, an American engineer with world-
wide experience in hydro-electric dams, had submitted througji Nunmo, his Ausfrahan 
agent, a design for a constant arch dam at Silverton, one ofthe options rejected in 
favour ofthe Stanley River site.^ ^ After this latter site was confirmed, Jorgensen 
presented a revised design and lobbied the Premier, Bureau of Industty and Board 
members, as well as Ken^, to ^point him project consultant, with Nimmo attesting 
to his vast superior expertise in dam constraction.^ ^ Kemp moved quickly to reinforce 
the Board's control, instracting Nimmo to cease acting as Jorgensen's agent and 
arranging for the latest technical information on both arch and gravity dams available 
from North America and Europe to be assembled and analysed. However, the 
outcome was afait accompli, the deciding factor bemg Dare's intemational reputation 
as a gravity dam expert. The Board was thus able to demonstrate the rational-
technical basis for its decision to reject Jorgensen's proposal in favour of Dare's 
recommendation 
Jorgensen was equally clear about what had occurred. Obviously angty, he wrote to 
Ken^, through the Board, implying a lack of impartiahty in the Board's decision: 
... you are apparently satisfied with a one man decision on such a rather 
important piece of work. I am not Ordinarily such decisions are left to 
two or three engineers appointed for the purpose, v^o are not themselves 
involved in the particular work.^ " 
5^  Jorgensen to Kemp. 5.12.1934, 11.12.1934, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
^^  Nimmo to Kemp. 25.3.1935, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
'" Jorgensen to Works Board, 11.7.1935, p.3,.R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
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Jorgensen's dfrect appeal to Forgan Smith led the Premier to demand the Board's 
reassurance on this matter. Sensitive to the threat to the Board's independence, 
Brigden confirmed Dare's undoubted "professional conq)etence" and the rational 
basis for deciding on a gravity dam He went on to clarify that he and StOty, rather 
than the engmeers on the Board, took responsibility for the decision wiiich drew 
heavily on the experience ofthe Bureau of Reclamation and the Federal Roads 
Authority, "the two largest pubhc works authorities in the U. S. concemed with 
concrete works" Along with others experienced in this field, their engineers had 
already discredited the theoretical principles on which Jorgensen had developed his 
argument in favour of an arch dam" Brigden's report was effective in havmg 
dismissed as unfounded Jorgensen's claim that the Board or, more particularly, Kemp, 
as an engineer and the Board's Chairman had wrongly influenced the final decision on 
the design. The issue might have hngered on as one ofthe reasons behind the 
Premier's decision, in October 1936, to commission an Inquity into the costing and 
constraction methods ofthe Stanley River Dam project. Although the Inquity's 
Report, delivered in June 1937, was critical ofthe project's overall management, no 
fault was found with the dam's design or the constraction methods.** 
Once the prehminaty work began on land clearing and constracting access roads, the 
g ^ between the concept ofthe dam and the reahty of its constraction became 
apparent. Although Kemp was in regular contact with dam-building authorities in 
New South Wales and Victoria, and had the benefit of theu- collective experience, 
local conditions tended to produce unique problems. The notion of achieving 
" Brigden, Report to the Premier, 20.8.1935, RM.O. 303, QTA. 
** Amos & Parkinson, Report of the Committee of Inquiry, 4.6.1937, p.45, R.M.O. 304, QTA. 
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efficiency through forward planning was often compromised, requiring the Board to 
make the on-site, ad hoc decisions that were singled out for criticism in the Inquity's 
Report." While the Premier made considerable pohtical coital out of announcing the 
dam project as a m^or unemployment rehef measure, he failed to clarify that the 
figure of £1.750 million supplied by the Board was an estimated, rather than an actual 
cost. Cabinet had given no guarantees as to its funding and, in 1937 for example, 
previously approved allocations were reduced wiien other works projects claimed 
funding priority. In addition, the provision of electricity to the site and arrangements 
for the sale of electricity generated by the dam became enmeshed in the larger issue of 
rationalising Queensland's electricity supply industty. 
Before planning ofthe project's major components had been finahsed. Cabinet asked 
Kenq} to organise work under the Intermittent Rehef Scheme so as to justify its 
allocation of Unenq)loyment Rehef Funds. It was a relatively simple matter to set in 
ttain local Main Roads works, but the Board's decision to contract out the land 
clearing and quany operations opened the way for the industrial relations' disputes 
that seriously disrupted progress on constraction. From the time the work 
commenced, the Board was in constant negotiation with union representatives and the 
Director of Labour over hiring conditions under the Unemployment Rehef Scheme. 
Although it may have been a case ofthe Austrahan Workers' Union (AWU) being the 
symbol of Queensland unionism in this period,'^  the widely varying types of work 
involved in the major works projects resulted in industrial action being taken by 
several other unions, including the Transport Workers Union, the Society of 
" Ibid; Brigden, Report to the Under-Secretary, Chief Secretary's Office, 22.6.1937, R.M.O. 304, 
QTA. 
'^  See, for example, Brian Carroll, "William Forgan Smith", in Murphy, et al., 1990, op. cit, p.414. 
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Carpenters and Joiners, the Federated Engine Drivers Association and the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union. It is debatable whether the on-going industrial 
action, which generally achieved its aims, resulted from the failure of awards to cover 
the existing job classifications and conditions, or v^ether the unions perceived the 
projects as an opportunity to demonstrate theh power. 
Throughout 1935, as attenpts were made to resolve the crisis, Kenq)'s principal aim 
was continuity in the workforce so as to maintain an efficient rate of progress and 
acceptable work standards. Although hampered by the unions' depiction ofthe Bureau 
of Industty as contmuing its predecessor's opposition to unionism, Brigden tried to 
secure the agreement ofthe Minister for Labour and Industiy to changes that would 
have achieved this. Not surprismgly, pohtical support for such a radical departure 
from the spuit ofthe Unemployment Rehef Scheme was not forthcoming,*' with the 
result that, instead of having any control over worker employment, the Board was 
forced into an endless process of reaction to, and compromise with, uruon claims. 
Kemp was already experienced in dealing with Main Roads industrial relations where 
the situation was often comphcated by the need to resolve single-instance claims, and 
had maintained a cordial, if formal relationship with senior union ofificials. Initially, on 
notification of worker claims and the possibihty of strike action, he and Brigden met 
with officials to negotiate a resolution but, as the unions successfiilly pursued a 
growing log of claims through the Industrial Court, Ken^ largely withdrew from an 
active role. All armouncements relatmg to industrial issues were made by the Board as 
the controlling authority, rather than by the Chairman or the Bureau of Industiy. The 
estabhshmait of an Industrial Relations branch, modelled on the one Kemp instituted 
*' Brigden to Under-Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry, 2.9.1935, Under-Secretary, 
Department of Labour and Industry to Brigden, 12.9.1935, RM.O. 303, QTA. 
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at Main Roads, brought a degree of professionalism to the situation, with the Board 
being represented by its industrial officers at Industrial Court hearings. Stoty's 
standing and experience in this field proved invaluable. He was able to clarify the 
options available to the Board on particular claims and, on the few occasions wiien 
the award variations the unions sought were actively opposed, he was delegated to 
argue the Board's case in the Industrial Court. 
Industrial relations' issues were among the reasons for the serious challenge to the 
Board's authority in 1936. The Premier's decision in October to commission an 
Inquity into the project's management was partly a response to con:q)laints by union 
ofificials over labour practices instituted both by the Board's contractors and by Main 
Roads in relation to work on access roads. Other reasons for the Inquity were 
allegations of unfair dismissal of workers on the grounds of their union activity, the 
resident engineer's pecuniaty interest in the haulage contract for the quany, and 
irregularities m the cost accounting and stores' purchasmg system The latter was 
discussed, apparently to the Board's satisfaction, with the Deputy Auditor-General in 
March 1936 but, taken with the other conq)laints, it raised concems in Cabinet about 
the Board's overall management c^abihties. In a decision that both astonished and 
angered Kemp, the Premier initially nominated a Mr Forbes of Concrete 
Constractions Pty. Ltd., Sydney, to conduct the Inquity. Having established through 
his colleague, H. H. Newell, the New South Wales Main Roads Commissioner, that 
Forbes was not a qualified engineer and was therefore unhkely to be accepted as an 
authority, Kemp succeeded in blocking his appointment. However, if Board members 
had hoped to divert the Premier from the idea of an Inquity, they were disappointed. 
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hi December 1936, Forgan Smith announced a new Inquity, this time to be conducted 
by more appropriately qualified investigators, N. J. Amos, the Railway Department's 
Chief Engineer, and C. E. Parkinson, Engineer in Chiei^  Department of Irrigation and 
Water Supply. Their appointment did nothing to ^pease Board members v^o, after 
Jorgensen's allegations, still reacted strongly to any criticism of its operations. Having 
invited Forgan Smith to make a personal inspection of work in progress, Brigden 
remonsttated with him: 
The Board is not aware ofthe reasons for this action The iraphcation is that 
some criticisms or allegations have been made reflecting on the efficiency or 
thoroughness ofthe Board's control. If any such charges have been made the 
Board would qjpreciate your confidence to the extent of acquainting it ofthe 
circumstances.*" 
The Inquity was far more comprehensive than the Board anticipated. Amos and 
Parkinson investigated evety aspect ofthe project's organisation and operations, 
including the controversial issue ofthe dam township. Nunmo prepared a detailed 
report setting out the information they requested and, while mstracting staff to give 
their fiill co-operation, the Board continued to object to the secrecy surrounding the 
Premier's action. The Inquity's findings, reported in June 1937, might have endorsed 
the Board's "most important decisions and policies"*' but, according to Brigden's 
official response, the pohtical interference in its supposedly independent authority was 
resented. Brigden errqihasised the unique technical character of operational decisions 
in rejecting the report's "minor" criticisms ofthe costing system Recommended by 
the Main Roads Commission and the Brisbane City Council, the system dehvered the 
d^-to-day, practical information engineers required. Minor discrepancies did not 
*" Brigden to Forgan Smith, 5.12.1936, R.M.O. 304, QTA. 
*' Amos and Parkinson, Report of Committee of Inquiry, 4.6.1937, R.M.O. 304, QTA. 
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mean, as the report suggested, that costings were inaccurate. Rather, he said, they 
represented; 
difference of opinion such as may be expected among technical men and do 
not call for the lengthy statements that would be necessaty to explain the 
actual choice made by the Board or its engineers when decisions had to be 
made.*^  
The report endorsed the township concept as an efficient means of providing on-site 
workers' accommodation, v^le not wholly accepting it as a proper expenditure of 
unenq)loyment rehef tax funds. Although such townships later became an 
unremarkable adjunct to development projects, Somerset Dam, as it was officially 
named in October 1935, was Queensland's first purpose-built project town." For 
Kenp, it was essential to maintaining a viable workforce. Under the conditions ofthe 
Unemployment Rehef scheme, the Board was required to hire local labour but, from 
the outset, numbers had to be supplemented from Labour Exchanges as far away as 
Brisbane. Many of these workers had no experience of constraction camp hving m a 
relatively inaccessible area, vvMe married men were unwilling, and could not afford, 
to hve apart from their famihes on the long-term basis the project necessitated.*" With 
Kenq}'s enthusiastic backing, the township concept which began as an exercise in 
corporate patemahsm evolved into a practical demonstration ofthe ideals of 
community co-operatives. 
As with other aspects ofthe project, the main criticism ofthe township arose from its 
cost, more specifically the unwarranted cost of building v^^ at was widely perceived to 
be a "model" town, with a level of services and facihties not provided in other towns. 
" Brigden to Under-Secretary, Chief Secretary's Office,. 22.6.1937, RM.O. 304, QTA 
" Brigden to Kemp, 7.10.1935, R.M.O. 304, QTA. 
*" Memo re visit of Dugdale, industrial correspondent. Telegraph newspaper to site, 16.9.1935, 
RM.O. 303, QTA. 
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Board members rejected this criticism, while acknowledging that, at first sight, the 
facihties might appear generous for w*iat was to be a tenqioraty settlement. At the 
same time, they were obviously proud ofthe generally co-operative relationship 
between management and workers that the town represented, and its usefuhiess both 
in reducing the turnover of workers and the potential for industrial action. Always 
mindful ofthe value of pubhcity, Kemp arranged for tours ofthe dam works, which 
he hosted as often as his work schedule aUowed, to include a visit to the town That 
he enjoyed the success ofthe township concept was evident in his relationship with 
the Residents' Committee. In September 1937, Kemp stood in for Forgan Smith who 
had dechned the Committee's mvitation to open the Somerset Dam Golf Course. 
Accorrq)anied by Mrs Kemp, Professor and Mrs Brigden, and Mr and Mrs Nimmo, he 
"drove ofiFthe first ball" to mark the oflficial opening, afterwards being presented with 
the golf ball as a memento ofthe occasion." 
In mid-193 8, constraction commenced on the dam proper. Anticipating an expansion 
ofthe on-site workforce, the Board made further allocations to unprove town services 
and recreational facihties. After 1941, the defence priorities imposed on works 
projects and manpower by the declaration of war in the Pacific slowed the rate of 
progress and, in 1943, forced a total shut-down for the duration ofthe war. At the 
Post-War Reconstraction Conference held in November 1943 to formulate the Bureau 
of Industty's post-war program, Kenp, as Co-Ordmator-General, succeeded in 
placing the dam on the first hst to be submitted to the National Works Council for 
approval." In 1946, when work resumed on a hmited scale, Cohn Clark found an 
" Brigden to Kemp, 7.9.1937 and 13.9.1937, 247/7/1, R.MO. 304, QTA. 
** Notes of Post-War Reconstruction Conference No. 9, Bureau of Industry in connection with 
formulation ofthe Bureau's post-war programme for submission to the National Works Council 
held on 17 11.1943, 22.11.1943, pp. 1-2, R.M.O. 303, QTA. 
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economicalfy rational basis for the continuation of a permanent town at Somerset 
Dam, thus reversing his long-standing opposition to the project." Another reason for 
Clark's changed approach to the town's future was his recognition of its value as an 
already estabhshed accommodation and recreation centre for the tourist resort that 
had long been suggested for the area In Januaty 1940, Clark had attempted to give 
the dam project a measure of popular ^peal by declaring that the lake formed behind 
the dam wall would be developed as "a pleasure resort" for the pubhc.**^  In outhning 
plans for boating, fishing, camping and hiking facihties, he was secure in the 
knowledge that they involved httle cost to the Board and, given the funding 
constraints m operation, were unlikely to be approved in the near future. 
Even in the prehminaty planning, Kenp sought to make provision for preserving and 
enhancing the site's natural environment. In this, he demonsttated once again his 
appreciation of tourism as a viable industty for Queensland and the benefit of utilising 
infi-astracture works projects to assist its development. He arranged for Main Roads 
to plant jacaranda trees along the access roads to the dam and, in 1939, having 
acquired thousands of "Queensland Nut" trees, obtained the Board's approval to use 
them as the foundation for an extensive landscaping program around the town and 
lake.*' Another proposed scheme, to stock the lake with fish and set up a fish-
breeding program, had undoubted public ^peal, judging by the coverage it received 
in the daily newspapers. Kemp took the matter seriously, consuhing with Fisheries' 
officials and investigating sunilar schemes associated with major dams in the southem 
states. Pubhc interest gathered momentum and, after receiving equally enthusiastic 
*' Clark to Board. "Rents at Somerset Dam", 3.6.1946, p.l, RM.O. 305, QTA. 
*^  Clark Interview, Courier-Mail, 4.1.1940. 
*' Kemp to Nimmo, 23.2.1939, Sect., MRC, to Board Sect., 23.3.1939, RM.O. 305, QTA. 
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support in Parhament, the proposal looked set to tum into a m^or, high-cost project. 
Having to extricate the Board from any immediate obhgation, Ken^ put an end to the 
matter by advising that lack of funds prevented hun commissioning the professional 
assistance the scheme needed to become estabhshed.^ " The tree-planting projects, 
together with intermittent clearing and fencing work, were made possible by Kemp 
arranging for them to be financed from the unemployment rehef fimds allocated to 
Main Roads and the Forestty Department The projects were also useful as a source of 
jobs for dam workers who might otherwise have been stood down during ten^oraty 
works closures. 
The shortage of materials and skilled workers delayed the resumption of constraction 
work until 1948. Although he authorised plant to be retumed from Caimcross Dock, 
Kenp was not prepared to transfer prematurely the engineering staff v^ o^ were 
working on other important projects for the Co-Ordinator-General, including 
designing the Fitzroy Bridge and a range of private sector commitments. The 
specialist engineering team he had built up within the Co-Ordinator-General had 
become a major factor in his can^aign to control the planning and constraction of 
m^or infrastracture works. He was intent on extending the use of theu professional 
experience to areas previously the responsibihty of other constraction authorities, 
wtole also remaining alert for any proposals that might threaten to disperse the team 
Somerset Dam was completed in 1954, in tune to prove its effectiveness in flood 
mitigation during the major flood the following year. Responsibihty for the township 
™ Minutes of Board meeting, 1.11.1945, RM.O. 303, QTA; Kemp to Board Secretary, 14.11.1946, 
R.M.O. 305, QTA. 
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was ttansferred to the Esk Shke Council, the Stanl^r River Works Board was 
dissolved and the Dam's operations were handed over to the Brisbane City Council.^ ' 
University Works Board 
On 6th March 1937, Forgan Smith laid the foundation stone for the University of 
Queensland's buildings on the new St. Lucia site. His determination to see the 
buildings conpleted and occupied as soon as possible was not backed by either the 
necessaty finance or any fiaial agreement on design plans. Prior to the first fiill meeting 
ofthe University Works Board on 30 April 1937, Brigden had written to Kemp 
outhning the unsatisfactoty basis ofthe Premier's enthusiasm Although the Bureau 
had responsibihty for the project, Brigden was unaware of any written directions 
being issued until he discovered that, the previous August, Cabinet had confirmed F. 
Hennessey as architect and approved his design plans and suggested scale of fees. 
However, apart from £10,000 in the current loan estimates, no funding had been 
allocated to the project. To counter pressure from Forgan Smith for the Bureau to 
borrow the money reqiured, Brigden hoped to utihse the University's funds and have 
the Department of Pubhc Works appointed as constracting agent for the Bureau. 
While the unenployment rehef component ofthe project was easily accommodated by 
an extensive roadworks and landscaping program, it was another matter to achieve 
consensus among the various interests as to the form, size and functions ofthe 
proposed buildings. Hennessey had won the Premier's approval and a qualified 
acceptance by the University Senate with a model of a university m the grand, neo-
classical style, designed for fifty years in the future. To overcome a foreseeable 
' ' See also, Powell., op. cit., p.97. Powell describes further extensions to the dam completed in 
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inqjasse, with the Bureau ranged against the architect, the Senate, and the Premier, 
Brigden suggested that the Pubhc Works Department conduct negotiations with 
Hennessey and the Senate on final planning dedsions.^ ^ 
. It tiius fell to Kemp, Stoty and Brigden, as the University Works Board, to devise the 
means of tenq)ering the grand vision to a more reahstic scale while drawing up a 
realistic constraction schedule acceptable to all interests. For Kenq), the project was 
not so much an issue of technical expertise as one of managing the expectations ofthe 
Premier and the widely vatying groups involved. This was home out in Brigden's 
notes, forwarded for Kemp's comments, on a Senate deputation to the Premier on 6 
October, and Brigden's subsequent request for Kemp's advice on the 
recommendations he should make to the Premier on the Bureau's behalf" In 
Brigden's view, the Senate's plan to allocate £500,000 over twelve years was 
unworkable. The architect's plans were unsuitable for staged constraction, and 
demands by the University departments for five times the space they currently 
occupied, required a far greater expenditure than envisaged. Offering in the meantune 
a scaled-down plan prepared by Works Board staff, Brigden recommended an in-
depth investigation ofthe project, sunilar to those the Board had carried out for its 
other major projects. Professor A. C. V Melboume, the University staff spokesman, 
was highly critical of Brigden's remarks, while Forgan Smith defended his own 
position in claiming that "he could change his mind if necessaty"'" Refusing to amend 
the ceihng of £500,000 over ten years for constraction ofthe buildings and the St. 
1959. 
" Brigden to Kemp. Confidential Report to Chairman, Works Board, 28.4.1937, 247/6/2., R.M.O. 
308, QTA. 
" Brigden to Kemp. 7.10.1937, 13.10.1937,247/7/1, RMO. 308, QTA. 
'" Ibid 
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Lucia Bridge, the Premier produced a new Pubhc Works Department plan vsiiich 
varied Hennessy's design by reducing the length ofthe main building, omitting the 
Great Hall, but retaining the original "semi-circle" principle for the location of 
departmental buildings. Demanding to know v^ a^t was wrong with his suggestion of a 
brick building with stone facmgs instead of sandstone as a means of redudng costs, he 
added that, if the architect objected, he would cancel the entire contract. After the 
Premier agreed to consider altemative plans, Brigden asked Kemp, in his capacity as 
Main Roads Commissioner, to provide them by the end ofthe month when the 
Premier retumed from his northem tour." The plan eventually approved by Forgan 
Smith allowed for staged constraction, in sandstone, ofthe centtal building, libraty, 
student union and departmental buildings, but omitted the Great Hall. Ground works, 
to include access roads, sport facihties and landscapmg, were to be carried out by 
intermittent rehef labour paid out ofthe Unemployment Rehef Fund. 
The St. Lucia Bridge was one of twelve options considered by the Cross River 
Commission in 1926. Although it was conceded that a bridge from West End to the 
St. Lucia Road would reheve traffic congestion on the River Road (Coronation 
Drive), the proposal was not given serious consideration as the area had a low 
population density and there was then no plan to relocate the University to St. Lucia. 
Having obtained the Premier's approval for the bridge, Kenp chaired a meeting, on 
12 November 1937, of a special Bureau of Industty Committee on access and 
ttansport to St. Lucia Other members were Dr. Bradfield, who had already submitted 
a prehminaty design for a steel bridge, G. R. Steer, head ofthe Brisbane City 
Council's Transport Department, vviio required a decision on the projected fransport 
usage in order to assess the extent ofthe Council's commitment, and C. B. Mott, the 
" Ibid 
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Council's Engineer. In a joint report to the Premier the following April, Stoty and 
Kenp submitted their recommendations on the bridge, the most important of wiiich 
were the estimated cost of £160,000 and the options for ^portioning payment 
between the State Govemment and the Council, v^ Wch ranged from the Government 
meeting the total cost to the Council making annual repayments according to the 
estabhshed local authority works scale. Two years later, the Premier accepted Kenq)'s 
recommendation that the Council's liabihty be limited to £2600 a year. Although the 
reason cited was the small area to benefit directly from the bridge,'* Kemp was 
concemed that any higher figure would be meaningless, given the difficulty the 
Council was already having in meeting existing debt obhgations. In an attempt to 
overcome the threat lack of finance posed to the bridge, Kemp and Clark had 
Bradfield design a tunber bridge at half the cost ofthe steel bridge, but tests by Hoh 
showed the substitution was not cost effective.'^  
In the early months of 1938, prior to Kemp's departure to attend the Intemational 
Road conference at The Hague, almost evety aspect ofthe University project was the 
subject of prolonged disputes. In March, intermittent rehef workers stopped work 
until it was determined if excavating building foundations came within the meaning of 
builders labourers' work and should be done on full time and at award rates.'^  
Reiterating his concem for maintaining efficiency in pubhc works, whether or not they 
were carried out under the Intermittent Rehef Scheme, Kemp asked the Minister for 
Labour and Industty to grant the men a five day week at award rates. This was 
'* Rogers, Co-Ordinator-General's Office, Memo "St. Lucia Bridge Approaches", 30.1.1940, 
247/7/14, RM.O. 310, QTA. 
" J. J. Bradfield, "Brisbane River Bridge: Timber Bridge at St. Lucia", typescript, 29.11.1940, J. J. 
C. Bradfield, Popera Box 7, Folder 39, MS 4712, ISILA. 
'* Brisbane Telegraph, 22.3.1938. 
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refiised on the grounds that it would estabhsh an expensive precedent for all 
intermittent rehef projects." Six months later, the Govemment introduced the State 
Development and Pubhc Works Organisation Bill which established the Co-ordinator-
General. The BiU also provided for the Intermittent Rehef Scheme to be abolished. 
Rehef workers were to be transferred gradually to full-tune errq)loyment, at award 
rates, on the proposed accelerated pubhc works programme to be co-ordinated by 
Kemp in his role as Co-Ordinator-General. University staff members actively 
participated in discussions on evety aspect ofthe University's planning and 
constraction. That each head of department wanted his exact requirements met 
without fully appreciating the difificufties the overall lack of finance for the project 
created was understandable, but it also meant a long, tedious process of consultation 
on the smallest matters. Even the landscape design and choice of trees for the grounds 
were subject to this process, with each staff member submittuig a hst of preferred 
specimens. While Kemp encouraged the development of an extensive tree planting 
scheme, he was impatient with the associated staff disputes and was relieved to be 
able to act on Brigden's suggestion to hand over these intemal planning concems to 
dedicated University staff committees.*" 
During Kemp's absence overseas at the end of 1938, Cohn Clark replaced Brigden as 
Director ofthe Bureau of Industty and J. D. Stoty was appointed the University's 
Vice-chancellor. Stoty was acting Chahman of all the Works Boards for this period 
and, on securing the appomtment he had long desired, was determmed to achieve 
" F. Walsh, Under-Secretary, Department Labour & Industry, to Secretary MRC, 
2.3.1938.,247/7/17, RM.O. 310, QTA. 
*" Minutes of meeting of special tree planting committee. Members were MRC engineer, G. Calder, 
Govemment Botanist Dr. D. A. Herbert, and staff representative Professor A. C. V. Melboume, 
10.9.1938, 247/7/16, R.M.O. 310, QTA. 
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some progress on the University's constraction. Whether or not he was instrumental 
in the decision being made is unclear but, in September 1938, the University Works 
Board was made a constracting authority, as with the other Works Boards, and took 
over constraction from the Department of Pubhc Works. Early in 1939, after Kemp 
had retumed to Queensland and accepted the appomtment as Co-Ordinator-General, 
he was again obhged to intervene dkectly in operational matters after the Master 
Builders Association registered a complaint concerning the tender process for the 
supply of stone. As there were potentially serious pohtical ramifications, Kemp feh it 
necessaty to authorise an mvestigation through the Board. In his subsequent report to 
the Premier, he was able to redirect responsibihty from the Board back to architects, 
Hennessey and Hermessey, for whom, it seemed, he had httle time.*' Despite the 
restracturing Stoty had organised, and Kemp's increased standing as Co-Ordinator-
General, the management ofthe University project remained troublesome. Unhke 
other Works projects where he had successfully delegated the day-to-day 
responsibihties, he found he was still having to resolve problems associated with road 
layouts, soil analysis, drainage, electrical plant and the location of sports facihties. 
However, he took a special interest in all technical matters relating to the constraction 
ofthe buildings. Although his responsibihties had greatly increased, especially with the 
commencement of national defence works' planning, Kemp was not prepared to 
accept the interference that had characterised most other aspects ofthe project. 
His stance led to a direct confrontation with Clark early in 1940. StOty had written 
Kenp a private letter reporting on "the rather dehcate situation" which had arisen 
when Clark independently sought the advice ofthe Govemment Analyst on non-porite 
'^ Kemp to Forgan Smith, 11.4.1939, 247/7/20, RM.O. 310, QTA. 
180 
waterproofing for the buildings. Clark had then ordered the architects to discontinue 
its use, even after Hennessey and Hennessey reported in its favour. In a letter to Stoty 
on 5 March, Clark claimed that, having discussed the matter with Kemp, they had 
agreed to defer any decision until later. Acting for the Co-Ordinator-General, Stoty 
then vutually warned Clark against interfering in technical matters by informing him 
that any action regarding the use of non-porite "is the function ofthe Co-Ordinator-
General as Chairman ofthe Board". ^^  The matter did not end there. In August, Clark 
wrote to the Auditor-General, with a copy to Kemp, stating that purchases of non-
porite in July were "a clear, and possibly dishonest, waste of pubhc money" He added 
that he had recommended its use be discontinued but was overruled by the Board on 
the advice ofthe architects." Having received advice on the matter from Nimmo and 
from Cummings, the project's consulting architect, Kemp made a personal inspection 
ofthe University buildings before corrpiling a detailed reply to the Auditor-General. 
Uncharacteristically, he attacked Clark's allegations, making no attempt at diplomacy: 
The Director is setting himself up as the Authority to decide v^ether a 
specified material is or is not worthless ... The concluding remarks of Mr 
Clark in his letter to you ... are unwarranted and highly objectionable. No 
member ofthe Board is entitled to interfere with the constraction under 
approved plans and specifications except under the authority ofthe Board." 
On Kemp's instractions, the matter was brought up for discussion at the next 
University Works Board meeting. The Board endorsed his report to the Auditor-
General and authorised the continued use of non-porite. Having expressed his regret 
that the phrases he used "might be liable to misinterpretation" and proposing to advise 
the Auditor-General accordingly, Clark wrote separately to Kemp to clarify; "that no 
^^  Neil Smith, Memo "University Works, St Lucia", 6.3.1940.,247/6/l, RM.O. 310, QTA. 
" Clark to J. D. Ross, Auditor-General, 23.8.1940, R.M.O. 310, QTA. 
84 Kemp to Ross, 28.8.1940,247/7/19, R.M.O. 310, QTA. 
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in^utation was intended against the Board or any Member thereof Ken^ 
acknowledged the letter but made no comment on Clark s apology,*^ reinforcing his 
stated view that Clark did not have the right to interfere in matters outside his field of 
professional conqietence. 
Work resumed on the University buildmgs in 1946. By this tune, an unprecedented 
level of eruohnents, together with ongoing fimding and materials shortages, 
precipitated an accommodation crisis. This necessitated the provision of temporaty 
buildings, even though, as Kenp noted at the time, the main adminisfrative and arts 
building was not in use, owing principally to "ttansport problems" ** It was a 
reference to his unsuccessful attempts to have the West End to St. Lucia Bridge re-
instated on the post-war works programme. His subsequent reports on progress at St. 
Lucia included the bridge, constraction of wiiich he continued to assert was delayed 
by the steel and cement shortages. However, neither the State Govemment nor the 
Brisbane City Council saw sufficient benefits accruing from its constraction to divert 
the necessaty funds from more urgent works. 
In 1946, under the provisions ofthe Labour and Industty Act repealing certain 
sections ofthe Bureau of Industry Acts 1932 to 1943, the University Works Board 
ceased to exist and conttol of all matters previously administered by the Board was 
transferred to the Co-Ordmator-General.*^ Following the transfer, Hoh, the enable 
Chief Engineer ofthe Bridge Branch, was appointed supervising engineer, and with 
further funding guaranteed, relatively rapid progress was made on the faculty 
buildings. Under these circumstances, Ken^ regained his enthusiasm for the project 
** Minutes of Board meeting, 29.8.1940; Clark to Kemp, 30.8.1940, Kemp to Clark, 2.9.1940, 
247/7/19, RM.O. 310, QTA. 
** Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1946, pp. 9-10. 
" Ibid, 1947, p. 15. 
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and, as each new building was completed, it was given extensive coverage in the Co-
Ordinator-General's annual reports. Kenp was pleased to refer to the University as a 
sound example of both the govemment's pohcy of economic developmait through 
pubhc works and its attention to the future of higher education in Queensland. The 
new University also provided an opportunity for the Govemment to demonstrate the 
boieficial apphcation of funds derived from the State Development Tax. Although 
Forgan Smith's relationship with the University Senate had deteriorated, Kenp took 
an increasingly active role m the development ofthe Engineering faculty. His 
relationship with Roger Hawken, Professor of Engineering, went back to the early 
years of Main Roads wiien Hawken was retained to cany out soil analyses on a 
number of roadworks projects. Hawken consulted Kemp on a range of matters, from 
the design ofthe new Engineering building at St. Lucia, to the appointment process 
for faculty members and job placements for graduates. Moreover, in Hawken, Kemp 
found acknowledgement of his strong views on engineering training, shaped by his 
own experience and his often expressed support for in:5)roved professional 
engineering standards m Queensland.** His mterest in the progress ofthe University's 
constraction program contmued after he retked as Co-Ordmator-General. A week 
before his death m Febraaty 1955, he attended the opening of two University 
residential colleges, for which he had helped to arrange funding subsidies some years 
previously.*' 
During the 1930s, dommated as it was by Depression economics, Kemp extended the 
scope of his statutoty responsibihties and gained much ofthe administtative 
experience that equipped hun "to be the right man in the right place at the right time" 
** See, for example, Kemp to Hawken, 18.6.1946, R.M.O. 310, QTA. 
*' Courier-Mail, 1.3.1955. 
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The examination of Kemp' activities during this period, particularly in relation to his 
role in the Bureau of Industty, helps to illusttate much about his working methods. It 
also reveals aspects of his personal and professional value orientation, vdiich may 
assist in assessing vsiiy the govemment ofthe day, as well as many associated 
authorities and agencies, were comfortable with such an extraordmaty range of 
powers and responsibilities being delegated to him It m ^ be said that Kenp was the 
administrative centrepiece around which the m^ority ofthe Queensland 
Govemment's development plans after 1938 revolved. 
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4. 
THE CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL OF PUBLIC WORKS: ISSUES OF ROLE 
AND INFLUENCE 
In the years from 1938 to the immediate post-war period, Kemp achieved the 
position in vsiiich he was later described as "Chief Advisor to tiie Govemment with 
more power than anyone else m Queensland except for tiie Premier"' The principal 
factors contributing to the consohdation of Kemp's position were the changes in the 
Govemment's approach to unemployment, a renewed emphasis on state 
development, and the adoption ofthe concept of co-ordmation of public works, all of 
which combined to locate pubhc works as tiie centtepiece of govemment economic 
revival pohcy. Equally unportant was Queensland's forward defence role for the 
Allied Forces after 1941, the consequent effect of this on Federal-State relations, and 
the priority given to public works in national post-war reconstraction planning. In all 
of these events, Kemp had the enabling, administtative role. 
Changes to the Govemment's unemployment relief pohcy during 1938 were of direct 
consequence to Kemp. Unemployment had been the cenfral issue ofthe election 
campaign preceding Labor again winning govemment that year and, with the 
prospect of much reduced unemployment tax receipts, the Govemment had mdicated 
its inability to continue supporting the Intermittent Relief Scheme. The scheme had 
proved to be inefficient in meeting pubhc works goals, wiiile local authorities had 
soon leamt the advantages of substituting relief works for regular works 
' Richard, 1988, op. cit 
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programmes.^  In presenting the Goverrunent's decision for its abolition, T. A. Foley, 
Minister for Labour and Industiy, stated that it was never more than a stop-g^ 
measure as the Govemment always mtended to replace it with "some form of fiill-
time employment vMch could be used satisfactorily for tiie development of this 
State.'" 
The expanded public works programme put mto effect m the United States under 
Roosevelt's "Second New Deal" provided a useful model for this mitiative but, in 
Queensland, the Labor Govemment found it difficult to gain the ^proval of even its 
fraditional supporters. The Labor Party and the frade unions endorsed the change" as 
advancing the principle of universal access to full award wages, but remained 
unconvinced ofthe Govemment's capacity to gaierate sufficient fiill-tune jobs. Even 
the proposal to effect the fransfer over a period of twelve months, m conjunction with 
a special accelerated pubhc works programme, speared to set unachievable 
employment goals. A survey of workers registered under the relief scheme carried 
out in July by Colm Clark, Director ofthe Bureau of Industiy, gave some mtimation 
ofthe huge increase m pubhc works required.^  With over seventeen thousand 
workers to be fransferred from the scheme, the proven capacity ofthe Main Roads 
Commission under Kemp's direction to have approved works available for 
immediate commencement became of critical importance in maintaining the 
credibility of tiie Government's plans. 
^ W. Forgan Smith, Income (State Development) Tax Bill. 1938, Second Reading, QPD, 1938,173, 
p. 1600. 
^ Ninth Annual Report ofthe Under-Secretary, Department cf Labour and Industry, 1938-39, p.8. 
" Carroll, 1990, op. cit., p.411. 
' Courier-Mail, 22.1.193%; Annual Report, Department of Labour and Industiy, 1938-39, p.30. 
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The legislative measures proposed by the Govemment in August began the process 
v^ toch resulted in Kemp's elevation to a position of administrative confrol over the 
State's public works programme. At tiie opening ofthe new session of Parhament on 
10 August, tiie Governor outlined the Govemment's mtention to abohsh intermittent 
relief and to mtroduce what was described at the time as "the most ambitious step the 
Premier ... and his party have taken since they assumed office in 1932" * This was a 
pohcy of orderly, forward plarming and a co-ordinated approach to public works to 
deliver efficiency m employment generation and state development. During the 
session, the Govemment presented three enabling measures which were passed by 
Parliament after lengthy and often aggressive debate. The Income (State 
Development) Tax Act, passed m November, provided for the continuation ofthe 
Income (Unemployment Relief) Tax at the reduced rate and a higher exemption 
threshold promised during the State election but with the name changed to reflect the 
emphasis on state development. The Rural Development Co-ordination of Advances 
Act, passed ui September, abohshed the Agricultural Bank, created a Bureau of Rural 
Development to co-ordmate the allocation of loans and grants to assist primaty 
production, and gave the Bureau power to raise loans m the private sector. The State 
Development and Fublic Works Organisation Act, passed early m September, set out 
tiie provisions for the co-ordmation of pubhc works, through a newly-created non-
departinental autiiority, the Co-ordmator-General of Pubhc Works By ^pomting 
him Co-Ordinator-General, the Govemment placed Kemp m a dommant 
adminisfrative role and effectively delegated to him responsibility for implementing 
its pubhc works-led plans for economic revival. 
Courier-Mail, 11.8.1938. 
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There are a number of views on the genesis of tiie office of Co-ordmator-General. 
The generally accepted view, put forward by Cotterell, that it "pioneered, in 
Ausfralia at least, tiie principles adopted at the 1937 Intemational Labour 
Organisation Conference at Geneva",' carries an unphcation, sometimes adopted as 
fact, that Queensland's mitiative took its form from these principles. The resolution 
passed at the Conference stated: 
In the absence of advanced planning, expenditure on pubhc works tends to 
inaease with prosperity and dimmish during depression, thus aggravating the 
effect on the labour market of fluctuations in private employment. Hence it is 
desirable to time public works to reduce as far as possible industrial 
fluctuations, and this mvolves co-ordination ofthe methods ^phed by 
various authorities.* 
As such, its influence on the co-ordmation stracture introduced m Queensland was 
limited. It was more hkely to have had a political use in bestowing an ideological 
legitimacy on tiie change in pohcy direction. The need to organise works 
programmes to allow for seasonal employment fluctuations, particularly in North 
Queensland, was already recognised well before the Geneva Conference, so that the 
various references made to the Co-Ordinator-General's responsibility m this area 
during the debate on the 1938 legislation simply reinforced the long-standmg 
provisions made under the Main Roads works programme. Moreover, examples of 
co-ordinating mechanisms in Queensland govemment adminisfration had been 
evident for over a decade. The Premier himself referred to an interdepartmental 
committee he convened in the late 1920s as Secretaty for Agriculture and Stock, the 
members of which were the Main Roads Commissioner, the Railway Commissioner, 
the Under-Secretaty, Department of Agriculture and Stock, and the Under-Secretaty, 
' Cotterell, in Murphy et al., 1980, op. cit., p.89. 
* Annual Report ofthe Co-ordinator-General, 1940, p. 1, quoted in Miimery, "Coordination and the 
Coordinator-General", op. cit, pp.70-71. 
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Department of Pubhc Lands. The Committee's work m preparing developmental 
projects for progressive implementation showed the benefits of co-ordination as, he 
reported, "seven-tenths of them had been given effect to over the years, with vety 
material advantage to the State.'" 
Subsequently, the Moore Govemment's State Employment Council appointed in 
1930 co-ordinated the assessment of unemployment rehef projects for fimding 
allocation, v i^iile the State Transport Co-ordination Act 1931 mitiated an on-gomg 
series of govemment efforts to conttol competition between railways and main roads. 
In tiie period between its retum to power in 1932 and the 1938 co-ordmation 
legislation. Labor infroduced four major changes in the machmety of adminisfration, 
identified as "uivolving co-ordination", with the aim of creating employment and 
advancmg state development.'" Moreover, since 1931, when he advocated an 
increase in loan works expenditure rather than the reductions demanded under the 
Premiers' Plan, Forgan Smith's support for achieving efficiency m public works 
adminisfration through co-ordinated planning was well-known." 
The State Development and Fublic Works Organisation Act provided for the 
estabhshment ofthe Co-ordinator-General as a cenfral authority to co-ordinate the 
works programmes of local authorities and govemment authorities engaged in 
constraction work. The provision for the Co-Ordinator-General to gather information 
on actual and proposed works projects throughout tiie State, assess their suitability in 
terms of employment and state development goals and, accordingly, recommend a 
co-ordinated works programme for govemment funding allocations was, according 
' state Development and Pubhc Works Organisation Amendment Bill, (S. D. R W. O.) 1940, 
Second Reading, QPD, 1940, 176, p.267. 
"' Cotterell, op. cit, p.87. 
" Carroll, 1990, op. cit., pp.404-05. 
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to later analysts, the principal overt purpose for its creation.'^  The recommendations 
were subject to the qjproval ofthe Govemor-in-Council through the relevant 
Minister. The Co-Ordinator-General had comprehensive powers to co-opt officials 
from govemment departments and semi-govemment or local authorities, and to 
initiate mvestigations himself, or at the minister's request, "into any Act, matter or 
thing, mcluding any projected works vviiich may be deemed necessaty or desirable 
for the purposes ofthe Act."" The Act was to operate for seven years in the first 
instance, while the Co-Ordinator-General was appointed by tiie Govemor-in-Council 
but could only be removed from office by a vote of Parliament. 
Opposition to the provisions ofthe Bill was notable for the level of hostility 
displayed in the ensuing debate. There were two main aspects on which it was 
focused. The first was the overall threat to the sovereignty of parliament posed by the 
creation of a public works co-ordinating authority responsible to the Govemor-in-
Council rather than to the Parhament. This was a long-standing, legitimate concem 
in the face ofthe propensity of governments to use semi-govemment authorities 
outside the confrol of Parhament for particular purposes, and the debate foUowed the 
fraditional course. In this instance, non-government members objecting to the 
Premier's insistence that it was not intended, nor was it possible, "to estabhsh a 
tyranny through tibe Executive Council","' supported their argument with several 
examples, includmg the lack of Parhamentaty fundmg approval for the Stoty Bridge 
project. In their view, the Bill affirmed the Labor Govermnent's continuing 
preference for Executive over Parhamentaty govemment, carrying with it the 
implication that Labor's decisions, particularly in the area of works funding 
'^  See Minnery, "Coordination and the Coordinator-General", op. cit, p.68. 
" Section 16, S. D. R W. O. Bill, 1938, QPD. 172, p.252. 
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allocations, would not stand up to parhamentaty scratiuiy. Recent commentators have 
given some weight to the suggestion that the Co-Ordinator-General was to be used to 
reduce the corraption underlying decisions regardmg the allocation of works 
projects." Although competition remauied inevitable, the apphcation of objective 
criteria assodated in this case with the appointment of a technical specialist, was a 
recognised mechanism for containmg political mfluence in the distribution of local 
autiiority works grants.'* However, as both the Premier and Opposition ML As had, 
for different reasons, afready established, the executive council retamed the power of 
fmal approval. Moreover, the effectiveness of tiie measure rested on the edacity of 
the Co-Ordinator-General to influence the process to the extent of having his 
recommendations adopted. 
The potential power ofthe Co-Ordinator-General to influence decisions was 
recogrused m the second aspect on wiiich debate focused, the scope of powers 
delegated to tiie Co-Ordinator-General. The ramifications of tiie Co-Ordinator-
General's potential confrol of employment distribution were not addressed. Despite 
Kemp's representations on tiie inefficiencies ofthe Labour Exchange system, the 
Director of Labour, supported by an effective union bloc, had already won the battle 
with Kemp for confrol of rehef work at Main Roads and major works sites, so that 
political intervention to change the system was unlikely. A half-hearted attempt was 
made to have the entire Bill discarded on the grounds that existing legislation already 
provided for works co-ordmating mechanisms, but the principal point of attack was 
the detrimental effect ofthe Co-Ordinator-General's powers on local govemment. 
Opposing arguments presented in terms ofthe destraction of local govemment 
'" Ibid, p.\94. 
'^  Minnoy, op. cit., p.69. 
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independence did not obscure the prime concem of all members of Parhament. This 
was to protect the mutually dependent relationship with their constituents A\toch 
relied for success on the economic benefits of works projects. They had no wish to 
relinquish such an important lever of local influence or to suffer the electoral 
consequences of works allocation decisions over wiiich tiiey had no confrol. 
R H Robmson, previously the Auditor-General, who had then followed Charles 
Chuter as Under-Secretaty ofthe Department of Health and Home Affairs, and 
whose responsibility extended to the sub-department of Local Govemment during 
this period, summed up tiiese concems in his scathing commentaty on the co-
ordination measures: 
This new form of cenfral govemment confrol ofthe local govemments 
virtually desfroyed the initiative and drive ofthe representatives ofthe people 
in the local authorities. In the cenfral govemments of both tiers the result was 
much the same, even tiie Executive Govemments losing tiieir grip on pubhc 
works pohcy and leaving their hob to the logroUers much like in previous 
generations ...." 
Two provisions ofthe Bill were identified as threatening the existing disfribution of 
power in these areas. The first was section 16, tiie so-called "dragnet clause", which, 
in providing for the Co-Ordinator-General to investigate any works defined by tiie 
Co-Ordinator-General as "works for the purposes ofthe Act", failed to define any 
limits to the exercise ofthe Co-Ordinator-Generals powers.'* The second was section 
20, whereby the Co-Ordinator-General had power to recommend to the Minister that 
a local authority be ordered to undertake certain works. If the local authority refused 
to do so, the Co-Ordinator-General as directed by the Mmister had the power to cany 
'* See, Self, op. cit, pp.160-61. 
" Robinson, op. cit, pp.323-24. 
'* S. D. R W. O. BiU, 1938, Committee, p.235. 
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out the works, the costs of which would be borne under the usual conditions by the 
local autiiority. The Premier was sufficiently annoyed at the Opposition's dehberate 
triviahsation of what he saw as constmctive mitiatives to declare: "there is no 
intention on the part ofthe Govemment to interfere under this Bill in a pettifogging, 
opticus or querulous way with any local authority" " He went on to repeat his 
conviction tiiat the use of section 20 would be necessaty only when one local 
authority refused to participate in a major jouit developmental project.^ " Despite his 
assurances, the two provisions together were interpreted as conferring coercive, 
absolute powers on the Co-Ordinator-General. They precipitated tiie widely-
publicised attacks in which the Govemment was accused of adopting "principles of 
Fascism" and employing the "autocratic" metiiods of Nazi Germany. It was a popular 
ploy at a time when Europe stood on tiie brink of war. It also played on tiie rather 
dubious assertion, since it related, among other tilings, to a govemment minister 
rather than an official, tiiat Germany had in Herman Goering the first known Co-
ordinator of Pubhc Works. '^ The epithets of "czar" and "dictator" which were 
applied with considerable effect, if confusingly, to both the Minister and the Co-
ordmator-General, were not new to parhamentaty debate. They were used in other 
instances where appointments were perceived to concenfrate excessive power m a 
single official, as with the appomtment in 1916 ofthe State Insurance Commissioner, 
in 1920 when J. D. Stoty was appomted sole Pubhc Service Commissioner m place 
ofthe Public Service Board, and similarly in 1947 when A. J. Anderson was 
appointed State Transport Commissioner. 
" S. D. P. W. O. Bill, 1938, Second Reading, p.239. 
°^ Ibid, p.259. 
19^ 
Kemp's name first entered the debate on 30tii August when the Premier announced 
tiiat he had been ofifered the ^pointment of Co-Ordinator-General. Explainmg 
Kemp's selection, he said that Queensland was "fortunate" to have available for the 
position; 
... not only a man with a vety complete engineering knowledge, but one v^o 
has adminisfrative capacity, an understandmg of finance, and all the other 
qualities necessaty for such an ^ pointment.^^ 
While non-govemment members continued to oppose the concept of a co-ordinator 
general armed with "dictatorial " powers, Kemp's nomination was generally well-
received. The q)parently confradictoty stance, which continued unchanged until well 
into the post-war period, stemmed from a recognition ofthe position and its 
incumbent as distinct entities. Most Parhamentaty representatives were already 
acquainted with Kemp and had no difficulty endorsmg the qualities the Premier 
identified. Over tiie years. Ministers had found it politically beneficial to acconpany 
him on regional inspection tours, v^ile backbenchers regularly visited his office to 
present delegations and to confer with him on local works projects. They were 
agreed on the fairness of his decisions, his record, only limited by the fluids 
available, of "getting things done", and an almost obsessive dedication to his 
responsibilities. He was also known to local authority representatives, farmers and 
businessmen throughout the state as a result of his frequait tours, not only as Main 
Roads Commissioner but also as a member ofthe State Employment Council, tiie 
Bureau of Industiy, tiie State Transport Board and several Commissions of Inquity. 
There was little doubt about Kemp's political value, both as the Brisbane-based 
Govemment's principal link with its regional constituaits and as a buffer against 
'^ Ibid, p.281; Courier-Mail, 31.8.1938. 
^^  S. D. P. W. O. Bill, 1938, p. 155. 
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their continual demands for increased works allocations. Kemp had a long 
experience of bemg cast in this role. In tiie first years ofthe Main Roads Board, 
Premier E. G. Theodore met with numerous deputations of local representatives, 
disgruntied over the Govemment's failure to build tiie promised access railways for 
new settiements. It was his practice to refer tiiem to Kemp to provide a roads-based 
solution to the problem, although he knew that the tight confrols over the Board's 
operations, instituted to protect the railways, precluded any such outcome.^ ^ 
As Leader ofthe Opposition, J. Maher, conceded: 
Mr. Kemp has been dealmg witii local authorities ever since he assumed the 
important responsibilities of his present office. Lookmg round the wide range 
ofthe pubhc service, I suppose tiiere is no one wiio would have the same 
measure of confidence amongst local goveming bodies in the discharge of 
this important office as Mr. Kemp.^ " 
The Local Authorities Association welcomed Kemp's qjpointment. The 
Association s executive did not anticipate any abuse ofthe Co-Ordinator-General's 
powers and assured him of members' co-operation. However, it regretted that the 
Govemment felt the need to use tiie threat of compulsion when local authorities had 
always been willing to co-operate on all "legitimate" unemployment relief schemes.^ * 
To make the best of a losing argument, Maher then raised the issue of Kemp being 
overworked. As the Co-Ordinator-General was so unportant to the Govemment's 
economic revival plans, he wanted Kemp to be reheved of all other responsibilities to 
enable him "to bring his splendid powers of mind and directive energy to bear upon 
^ See, for example, Eacham Shire delegation. Daily Mail, 16.5.1922; South Coast local authorities 
delegation. Daily Mail, 3.6.1922. 
^^  S. D. P. W. O. Bill, 1938, Second Reading, p.236. 
" President D. Annand, Report on The Local Authorities Association Conference 1939, pp. 34-35. 
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tills paramount problem of State development" ^ Maher was probably bemg ironic 
on this occasion but the issue received serious support from otiier speakers, mcluding 
W. L. Dart, a member ofthe newly formed Uruted Austtalia Party, who coined tiie 
often-quoted phrase, '^e will have to be a superman"^ ^ in reference to Kenp's work 
load. Before the end of tiie year, Kemp was reheved of one ofthe responsibilities 
they had targeted. Implementing the recommendations ofthe Royal Commission on 
Transport, of which Kemp had been a member, the State Transport Act 1938 
replaced tiiie Board appointed by tiie Moore govemment in 1932 witii a three-
member State Transport Commission. Main Roads Commission secretaty, J. E. 
England, who had been Regisfrar of Vehicles since 1932 and had deputised for 
Kemp on tiie Board during 1938, was appointed Chairman ofthe Commission. ^^ 
With England taking the place of Kemp under the new arrangement. Main Roads 
continued to have an influential position in fransport pohcy deliberations, allowing 
Kemp to maintain a presence while relinquishing the formal responsibility. It was 
still insignificant when weighed against his other areas of responsibihty, so that the 
Opposition continued to raise the issue whenever the opportunity presented itself 
Planting the seed of doubt about one man's competence to discharge so many 
adminisfrative responsibilities was tiie only way the Opposition found to attack 
Kemp personally, and it finally bore fruit m the post-war period. 
In his criticism of public works co-ordination, R. H Robinson also argued that the 
pohcy compounded the State's loss of independence in its relations with the Federal 
Government.^ ' However, Forgan Smith's stance at Premiers' Conferences and Loan 
*^ S. D. P. W. O. BiU, 1938, p.237. 
" /Wrf, pp.252-53. 
^^  Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1939, p. 12. 
'^ Robinson, op. cit, p.324 
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Council meetings had already demonsfrated his refusal to concede State confrol in 
exchange for increased Federal funding. During the debate on the State Development 
and Public Works Organisation Bill, tiie Premier arranged to have published two 
emotionally charged newsp^er articles ostensibly reinforcing his arguments in 
favour of pubhc works co-ordination. Their real intent was to leave no doubt that 
effective state action agamst unemployment depended on a Federal Government 
commitment to increased fimding support for tiiis mitiative, but on a "partnership" 
basis that did not compromise state independence.^ Kemp was an important weapon 
in Queensland's on-gouig quest for increased Federal subsidies and Loan Council 
allocations for state pubhc works. This was especially pertinent to expansionist plans 
for linkuig employment to major mfrastracture development projects in water, 
sewerage and electricity supply and m the mcreasingly popular areas of water 
conservation and irrigation. The experiences of both Forgan Smith and Kemp 
showed that convmcing the Loan Council to ^prove borrowings for state works 
programmes on the scale envisaged required soundly conceived and costed projects. 
Also, as demonsfrated with the grants made principally for road works under the 
Federal Aid Roads Agreement and for unemployment relief, the Commonwealth had 
to be satisfied about the State's cq)acity to complete approved projects. 
Against this background, the creation of a co-ordinating works authority was 
intended to bring a greater level of efficiency to the loan works ^phcation process, 
but the success ofthe sttategy was still aitirely dependent on the c^abilities ofthe 
person appointed as co-ordinator. Kemp's appointment took advantage of his already 
established reputation in the Federal sphere. Federal authorities held him in higji 
regard on the basis of his comprehensive grasp of public works at local and state 
30 Courier-Mail, 26 and 27 August 1938 
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levels, his national standing as an acknowledged road works specialist, and his 
proven rehability in completing Commonwealth-subsidised projects to the set 
standards and within budget limits. For fifteen years, he had been the Govemment's 
adviser at national roads pohcy conferences and, in coUaboration with engmeer 
coUeagues who headed other state road authorities, was mfluential in securing 
beneficial changes to the Federal Aid Roads Agreement.^ ' Moreover, as Chairman of 
the Bureau of Industty's Roads, Mining and Works Committee and subsidiaty 
Works' Boards, Kenq)'s part m the process of accommodating competing demands 
for works' allocations extended weU beyond road works considerations. 
Due in no small part to the assistance of J. B. Brigden, Kemp developed an expertise 
in public finance which assured him of a consultative role m dehberations on the 
State's overall works programme and the means of its fundmg. His position gave him 
a legitimate base for expanding the scope of his dealuigs with Federal authorities and 
exposed him to a much wider range of mfluaitial contacts m Federal Govemment 
circles. That he made full use of these contacts was demonstrated by his tireless 
lobbying for national recognition as a lever to gain Federal funding for works 
projects such as the Somerset Dam and the Burdekin River development scheme. It 
was therefore evident that, over a number of years prior to his appointment as Co-
Ordinator-General, Kemp had been assuming more of a cenfral, co-ordinating role in 
tiie decisions associated with the annual state works programme. During this period, 
the Govemment also developed a greater reliance on his advice, in step with the 
increasing importance of state-wide capital works projects in the implementation of 
'^ For example; in 1929, the Prime Minister convened a conference of Premiers and Ministers 
responsible for roads. Kemp and J. H. Stanley, Under-Secretary, Treasiuy, accompanied the 
Treasurer, W. H. Barnes, and the Minister for Railways and Main Roads, Godfrey Morgan. Annual 
Report (fthe Commissioner ofMainRoads, 1930, pp.2-3; Ibid, 1934, p.9. 
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economic development pohcy. The Govemment's reliance on Kemp in the area of 
Federal-State financial relations was confirmed wiien, two years later, Forgan Smitii 
referted to pubhc works co-ordination under Kemp's direction as maximising 
Queensland's bid for Loan Council defence works allocations.^ ^ 
There is little documentaty evidence to confirm that the legislation was drafted with 
Kemp in mind or that he was directly involved in its drafting. Robmson claimed that 
Kemp "had no particular desire for such a position. "^ ^ Rather, it was "tiie prince of 
bureaucrats" v^o influenced Forgan Smith "to set up a new form of approval and 
confrol of cenfral and local govemment loan expaiditure by the ^pointment of a Co-
ordinator-General."^ The two possible candidates for the titie at that tune were Colm 
Clark and J. D. Stoty. As a newcomer, appointed for his expertise as a statistician, 
Clark is unlikely to have exerted a determining influence on the legislation. It was 
not until the post-war period that he reached the height of his influence as Labor's 
chief economic adAdser. In confrast to that period, his preference in 1938 was for 
govemment assistance to secondaty industries to boost economic growth in general 
and enployment in particular. Heedmg Brigden's advice that "Industries Assistance 
m ^ have some problems",^ ^ he put his energies into the Industries Assistance Board 
which had been revived in July with the passing ofthe Industries Assistance Act and 
tiie fransfer of its administration from the Premier's Department to Treasmy. 
Although he was publicly critical of any Federal decision to reduce overaU loan 
works funding because ofthe detrimental effect on employment,^ Clark did not 
32 S. D. P. W O. Act Amendment Bill, 1940, p.268; see also Minnery, op. cit, p.68. 
'^  Robinson, op. cit, p.324. 
^ Ibid 
^^ Brigden to Clark, 8.4.1938, Cohn Clark Papers UQFL 87, Box 21 A, University of Queensland. 
36 D. B. Copland to Clark, 12.7.1940, Colin Clark Papers, op. cit 
199 
endorse Forgan Smith's high level of rehance on the major public works projects 
Kemp supported. 
The Premier may have become as concemed as the Opposition about the 
ramifications ofthe loose legislative defmition of tiie Co-Ordinator-General's 
investigative powers. Stirred by the suggestion that section 16, tiie "dragnet" clause, 
allowed the Co-Ordinator-General to investigate state taxation issues, he nevertheless 
rejected Maher's proposed amendment seekmg to limit its scope to employment-
related areas. The amendment raised the possibility of competing jurisdictions and 
even ofthe Co-Ordinator-General's dominance ofthe Bureau of Industiy, as it had 
the capacity to fransfer to the Co-Ordinator-General "the supreme authority" granted 
to the Bureau's Dnector under the Bureau of Industry Act 1932. In movmg to protect 
the Bureau's authority, and, consequently, Clark's interests, Forgan Smith was 
adamant that, "The director of this Bureau will not be an officer ofthe Co-Ordinator-
General and not subject m any way to the confrol of tiiis (the Co-Ordinator-
General's) department" " The issue of competing jurisdictions remained unsolved. 
There was already tension m the relationship between Clark and Kemp over the 
adminisfration ofthe Bureau's Works Boards. Ignoring Brigden's implicit waming 
not to interfere,^ he immediately began applying his own, economist approach to 
technical specialist matters while challenging the balancing act Kemp had carefully 
developed to maintain funding coverage for all the works projects. Under legislative 
amendments in 1940, the Co-Ordinator-General became a constracting authority and 
a "corporation sole", largely for Commonwealth defence works requirements. These 
changes enabled Kemp to move works' constraction plannmg out from under the 
^^  S. D. P. W. O. BiU, 1938, Second Reading, p.252. 
^ Brigden to Clark, op. cit 
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Bureau's legal umbrella, minimise Clark s formal confrol and proceed towards 
finally achieving a long-desired goal. In 1946, when the Works Boards were 
abohshed and their responsibilities fransferred to the Co-Ordinator-General, Kemp, 
as Co-Ordinator-General, gained formal adminisfrative confrol over tiie planning and 
implementation of tiie state's mfrastracture development and pubhc work 
programmes. 
"The prince of bureaucrats" almost certainly referred to Stoty whose intervention, 
over the years, in departmental matters outside his formal responsibilities had not 
endeared him to many departmental heads. As a member ofthe Moore Govemment's 
State Employment Council, Vice-President ofthe Bureau of Industiy and member of 
the Bureau's Works Boards, he had first-hand experience ofthe inefficiencies in the 
existing works allocations process. He was probably a member ofthe "cabal of 
reformist professionals in Brisbane witii cormections to Forgan Smith and the 
Cabinet" referred to by Mirmety,^ ' whose views on tiie need for plarming in 
govemment works' programmes were articulated m the Bureau of Industty's 1934 
armual report. In the 1937 Public Service Commissioner's armual report, Stoty 
disclosed his support for 'Tnfra-state co-operation and co-ordination", and outlined 
the benefits of orderly, forward planning of works projects for unemployment relief 
Li his view, co-ordmation in public works was simply a continuation of "the 
principles ofthe old State Employment Council and an extension of some ofthe 
features ofthe present Bureau of Industiy" ^  Not surprismgly, he nominated the 
Bureau of Industiy as the ^propriate authority to undertake mvestigations and to 
analyse the potential employment capacity of major works. Given the date the report 
'^ Mirmery, op. cit, p.lO. 
"" Annual Reports <fthe Public Service Commissioner, 1931 -1937, p. 19. 
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was published, it tends to confirm Stoty as tiie person who mfluenced Forgan Smitii 
to set up a co-ordinating autiiority, vAule suggesting that Stoty's plan was to locate it 
witiiin the Bureau' existing stracture. This arrangement would have provided a direct 
line of confrol over public works through the Bureau to Treasuty, leaving 
undisturbed Treasiuy's loan subsidy scheme for local works, that had proved so 
popular with local authorities and their Parhamentaty representatives. In line with 
Stoty's preference for tiie departmental mode of adminisfration, tiie end result would 
have been to keep the decisive role in shqjuig a co-ordmated public works 
programme within the financial, generalist arm of adnunisfration. The technical, 
professional specialists, while essential to the integrity ofthe programme, would 
have been relegated to a peripheral, consultative role. 
Stoty's views clearly influenced Cotterell's assertion that the Co-Ordinator-General, 
far from being "the most radical change" in Queensland's administtative histoty, was 
littie more than an extension ofthe Bureau's Roads, Minmg and Works Committee.'" 
This would have been sustainable if Stoty's proposal had been adopted. However, 
two factors militated against it. Following Labor's win in the April 1938 State 
election, Treasuty was detached from the chief secretaty's portfolio and Frank 
Cooper, as the new Treasurer, took over responsibility for the Bureau of Industiy. 
However, as the political architect ofthe co-ordinated works plan,''^  Forgan Smith 
had no intention of ceding its confrol to Treasvuy. By choosing the option of 
establishmg a new co-ordinating authority responsible to him as Premier, he 
guaranteed for himself, the approval safeguards notwithstanding, a dnect luie of 
confrol over the pubhc works' pohcy he had worked so determmedly to initiate. The 
"' Cotterell, op. cit, p.89. 
"^  See Carroll, in Murphy et al., 1990, op. cit, pp.412-13. 
9.07. 
legislative provisions enabhng the Co-Ordmator-General to co-opt departmaital 
ofificials and to conduct investigations into any potential areas for developmaital 
works, indicated that the Premier envisaged a much more extensive range of 
operations for the Co-Ordinator-General than would have apphed under the 
committee stracture. 
Once the Bureau of Industty option had been rejected, tiiere was evety indication that 
StOty was in favour of Kemp's appointment. Smce they had first worked together on 
the State Employment Council, Stoty had openly supported Kemp's attempt to 
inttoduce efficiency into the admirusfration of unemployment rehef works. As a 
member ofthe Bureau of Industty's Works Boards, he had made representations to 
Cabinet to assist Kemp' plans and had actively opposed Colin Clark's interference in 
Kemp's sphere of adnunisfration at the University of Queensland. Moreover, Stoty's 
time as Queensland's most mfluential bureaucrat was gradually coming to an end. He 
was due to retire as Public Service Commissioner, after several extensions to his 
term of office, altiiough he remained a member ofthe Bureau of Industty and the 
Works Boards, hi August, during the debate on the State Development and Pubhc 
Works Organisation Bill, he was appointed the University of Queensland's Vice-
Chancellor, a position which promised the opportunity to pursue his vision for 
tertiaty education in Queensland. 
As to the choice of Kemp as Co-Ordinator-General, in the confined circles of 
Queensland Govemment and administtation, Kemp's professional relationship with 
the Premier and the Cabinet was inevitably close and of long standmg. Forgan Smith 
did not hesitate to confirm this, claiming it had been his responsibility, as Secretaty 
for Public Works in 1920, to appoint the Main Roads Board and to determine the 
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Board's operational policy."^ Later, he told Parliament: "The Co-Ordinator-General 
and I get on vety well: we listen to each otiier with a great deal of interest" '^  Kenp 
m ^ not have had tiie unanimous support of Cabmet, but his political usefuhiess and 
sound record in pubhc works' adminisfration were not disputed. There would have 
been few, if any, candidates with a similar breadth of experience m the relevant areas 
of administration. However, as writers analysing Weberian constracts ofthe 
political-adminisfrative relationship have identified,"^ the most important 
consideration influencing the choice of Kemp as Co-Ordinator-General was the 
affiruty between his views and tiiose ofthe Premier on the primacy of state 
development. Throughout the 1930s, Kemp had taken an increasmgly promment role 
in the works planning that formed the basis of Forgan Smith's determined push for 
an escalation in major development projects. While Ministerial supportCTS may have 
been impressed by the mystique of specialist engineering expertise that he embodied, 
Kemp's views on plarming for tiie State's future had a much broader orientation. As 
his reports, public speeches and radio talks during the 1930s demonsttated, a 
comprehensive understandmg of tiie needs of people living in regional Queaisland 
State and engaged in a range of occupations informed his conviction tiiat continuing 
infrastracture development would dehver both economic growth and social 
stability.'^  While Kemp's later actions lent support to tiie view that he saw m the Co-
Ordinator-General the opportunity to retain and build on the engineering expertise 
developed through the various Works Boards, it is a hmited view. More to the point 
"^  S. D. P. W. O. Act Amendmait Bill, 1940, Second Reading, p.267. 
'^ Ibid, p.269. 
"^  See, for example. Page, op. cit, p.30, p. 133. 
"* For a selection of Kemp's speeches and radio talks, see J. R. Kemp Papers., OM 79 - 58/1, John 
Oxley Library. 
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were the different contexts in v^ch Forgan Smith and Kemp operated. Even as their 
affinity was estabhshed, Forgan Smith would have assigned Kemp the fraditional, 
instrumental role of a govemment official in achieving his aims. It was a measure of 
Kemp's capacity for working with the prevailmg political will that he succeeded m 
achieving the majority of his own aims. 
Robinson's claim, also shared by some MLAs at the time, that Kemp did not want 
the position as Co-Ordinator-General, was almost certainly based on Kent 's 
typically modest pubhc persona. It is difficult to credit tiiat he did not welcome tiie 
appointment, with its potentially open-ended powers and higher admirusfrative 
status, as the means of takuig charge of pubhc works planning, v t^ole elevating 
Queensland engineering projects to national, if not mtemational standing. As it 
hqjpened, the critically important role of defence works in World War Two, togetiier 
with the responsibility of delivering a massive works programme in what was 
considered to be an impossibly short time, tested botii the effectiveness of co-
ordination and Kemp's capabilities. His success in the complex field of public works 
under wartime conditions enhanced his reputation as an administtator and ensured 
what was a virtually unchallenged confrol over the planning and co-ordination ofthe 
State's public works. 
If Kemp had a decisive influence on the concept ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, the 
question remains whether or not his influence extended to framing the legislative 
provisions. The answer hes in the evidence that particular powers granted to tiie Co-
Ordinator-General reflected long-standmg fhistrations Kemp had experienced, and 
went some way towards resolving them. In some instances, the legislative provisions 
opened the way for Kemp to press successfully for further changes or extensions to 
the scope ofthe Co-Ordinator-General's powers. The "coercive" powers of section 
9.05 
20 were intended to address a situation Kemp had faced since the early years of Main 
Roads. The refusal of local authorities, usually concemed about the cost of proposed 
works, to co-operate in approvuig a main road for gazettal and constraction, resulted 
in long delays while the Main Roads Board negotiated a compromise. If negotiations 
were unsuccessful, work did not proceed."' Althougji tiie Minister had tiie power 
under the Main Roads Act to order works to be carried out, it was rarely invoked and 
even more rarely exercised. Througji tiie co-ordmated programme, the aim was to 
begin planning for anew phase of developmental works to cover irrigation, water 
supply and electricity schemes, many of which required the co-operation of several 
local authorities. The lesson learned from Kemp's experience ofthe narrow focus of 
local authority concems, dominated as they were by financial considerations, was 
articulated by Forgan Smith in his reference to the need to prevent "internecine 
strife" interfering with works plarmmg."* 
Another reason for establishing a process of plarming and co-ordmation among 
works departments and authorities was the evidence of duphcation in works projects 
which, as was widely known, was particularly evident in road works. Forgan Smith 
later claimed that an mvestigation he had ordered in 1937 disclosed tiiat the PEI 
Branch ofthe LAB was "undertakmg a class of road it was not my intention, at least, 
that it should undertake vviien the Main Roads Commission was established" "^  
Whatever his recollection of past evaits, it had been clear at the time that the PEI 
was the dominant participant in any clash between the LAB and Main Roads over the 
"' For example, objection to proposed route hinisfail to MUaa MiUaa, Main Roads Board, Record of 
Agenda, 12.5.1922, Item 24 (48/1/1); Opposition to road, Warwick to Killamey, Main Roads Board, 
Record of Agenda, 13.6.1922, Item 8, (56/7/1/). 
^ S. D. P. W. O. BiU, 1938, p.259. 
"' S. D. P. W. O. Act Amendment BiU, 1940, p.268. 
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provision of access roads to new settlements. Responding to delegations from the 
settlements, Kemp campaigned to bring access roads under Main Roads provisions 
but, in 1927, tiie LAB's dominance was confirmed when tiie five departments 
involved in land settlement were placed under the Secretaty for Public Lands. The 
intention was, among other thuigs, to co-ordinate roads constraction for the 
settlements. Again, protection for railway expansion plans, in conjunction with the 
LAB's confrol over all closer settlement issues, dictated restrictions on Main Roads 
operations in this area, with the resuh that Kemp lost out to the LAB Chairman, 
William Labbat Payne. In 1938, Payne retired from the LAB to take up an 
appointment on the Land Court. The removal of his main opponent at a time wiien 
settlers' complaints about the Board's failure to constract access roads were 
receiving considerable publicity, placed Kenp ui an advantageous position. 
In 1939, following Cabinet qjproval of his recommendation on tiie matter,*" an 
amendment to the Mam Roads legislation brought tiie constraction of access roads, 
under certain conditions, under the Main Roads Act. Apphcations from local 
authorities for access roads required the approval ofthe Co-Ordinator-General who 
could then recommoid tiiat road constraction be carried out, either by the local 
authority, the PEI Branch, or Mam Roads. Subsequently, the 1940 amendment to the 
State Development and Fublic Works Organisation Act added the Co-Ordinator-
General to the hst of state constraction authorities. Under the barmer of co-
^ Main Roads Acts Amendment BiU, QPD, 1939, 175, p. 1564; Under the 1939 amendments. 
Section 19 of theMain Roads Acts, 1920-1935, was repealed and replaced. The new section 
provided that "local authorities or Crown instrumentalities may apply to the Minister for the 
construction of access roads to new settlements to be opened up for development or of subsidiary 
roads in settlements still being developed. Such applications wiU be referred to the Co-ordinator-
General of Pubhc Works..." Hon H. A. Bruce, Secretary for Public Lands, Second Reading 
Speech, op. cit, 1939, p. 1552. 
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ordination, Kenqi gained confrol of all State road works plannmg and constraction 
As he reported with obvious satisfaction, "This will bring about the co-ordination of 
State road poh(ty on sound lines, financial and otherwise, and will prevent 
overlapping". Hinting at the dubious basis for past decisions concemuig access 
roads, he added that, "It will also ensure that funds are used upon works in the 
relative order of importance" *' 
Another area m wiiich legislative provisions addressed difficulties Kemp had 
previously experienced was the resumption of land for public works. Particularly 
with the rebuilding ofthe Petrie Bight v>4iarves and tihie resumptions requued for tihie 
StOty Bridge approaches, lengthy disputes over compmsation had compromised 
budget provisions and interfered with constiuction schedules. The 1940 amendments 
made the Co-Ordinator-General a "corporation sole" with power to buy, seU and hold 
land, while alterations to the existing conditions gave tiie Co-Ordinator-General 
"enormously increased" powers over resumptions. The steady sfream of disputed 
Main Roads compensation decisions still being referred to the Land Court, and the 
perceived threat the new provisions posed to land owners' rights, provoked sfrenuous 
protest against the amendment. However, as far as Kemp was concemed, it resolved 
another ofthe long-standing frusfrations of works' admirusfration. The new 
resumption conditions brought improved efficiency and security to public works 
planning while reducing tiie risk of compensation disputes jeopardising constraction 
schedules as they had done in the past. 
Despite Cabinet endorsement ofthe frequent recommendations he made on tiie 
subject, Kemp had less success in ttying to influence the process of Treasmy loan-
subsidies to local authorities. It had been a source of continual fiiisfration for him as. 
' ' Annual Report ofthe Commissicmer of Main Roads, 1939, p. 12. 
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for years, his efforts to convince local autiiorities to mvest m soundly-constracted 
roads under the Main Roads provisions had been thwarted by the councils' ready 
access to Treasmy fundmg. The availability of cash subsidies for unemployment 
relief works infroduced in 1932, together with long-term loans for infrastracture 
works, enabled them to follow their own programmes. At a time when lack of funds 
often meant Kemp had to refuse local autiiority requests for main roads works, he 
found it galling to see money wasted on non-reproductive or uncompleted works. 
Treasuty loans were over thirty years at low interest rates and, with little pressure for 
eventual repayment, provided a cheap and politically popular altemative to the costs 
involved in Main Roads compliance. As, under these circumstances, it was difficult 
to cany out the staged constraction of main roads, Ken^ tried unsuccessfully to have 
Treasuty notify him of any loan fimds granted for road works. 
Speaking on the State Development and Public Works Orgarusation Bill m 1938, the 
Premier acknowdedged the unsatisfactoty aspects of tiie scheme as a prelude to 
making the Co-Ordinator-General responsible for ensuring a maximum retum on the 
govemment's outlay.*^ He confirmed that section 15 ofthe Bill, embodying the spirit 
of co-ordination which the Co-Ordinator-General represented, was based on Kemp's 
recommendations. It enabled the Co-Ordinator-General to request all local 
autiiorities to provide con^rehensive information, including all financial 
fransactions, on their works programmes. The information was essential to the 
preparation of a State-wide, co-ordinated works programme but its disclosure 
threatened to reveal specific shortcomings and abuses ofthe loan-subsidy scheme. 
Several speakers had little hesitation in recounting to Parhament mstances known to 
them of local authority manipulation ofthe scheme. However, they were careful to 
52 S. D. P. W. O. BiU, 1938, p.l25, p.239. 
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present the Co-Ordinator-General's power as anotiier uitrasion on local autiiority 
independence, smce tiie ease with which Treasuty loans for local works could be 
obtained, remained an effective means of ensuring constituency support. The 
principal opposition came from a few Brisbane-based representatives. On behalf of 
tiie Brisbane City Council, tiiey objected to the Co-Ordinator-General's interference 
in areas of Council responsibility wiien the Council's charter of independent was 
clearly set out in the Greater Brisbane legislation. 
The Council's poor record of administtation was a sensitive issue. In 1938, following 
a "highly critical" report from the inquiry undertaken by John McCracken and E. H 
George, R H. Robmson, then the Auditor-General, was seconded to tiie Council to 
re-organise its affairs, as an altemative to dissolution and the appointment of an 
administtator.^ ^ There were the inevitable political consequences and those with a 
vested interest m stabilising tiie Council's administration to protect it from State 
Govemment intervention. They believed the Co-Ordinator-General's power to 
compel information, taken with the power to compel the undertakmg of works, gave 
him the means of intervention. Kemp had no sympathy with the Council's position. 
Its over-ambitious works programme, coupled witii general financial 
mismanagement, had affected fundmg provisions for the Stoty Bridge and 
prehminaty work on tiie West End to St. Lucia Bridge, obligmg hun to compromise 
on funding for other Works Boards' projects. 
It was as much to close off the more obvious opporturuties for abuse as the stated 
reason of reducing cash outlays on unemployment relief that, in November 1938, 
cash subsidies for local authority works were converted to subsidies on loan interest 
and redenption rates. By March 1939, v^ e^n Kemp was m tiie process of preparing 
53 J. R. Laverty, "Greater Brisbane and Local Govemment" in Murphy etal., 1980, pp.131-32. 
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his first co-ordinated works programme, Treasuty loans for local authority works 
were still being granted without reference to hun. Despite legislative authority and an 
extensive publicity campaign sfressing the benefits of co-operation,^ he was still a 
long way from obtaining the comprehensive information he required for a soundly-
based co-ordmated programme. During 1939, talks between Kemp and Treasuty 
ofificials resulted in Treasiuy agreeing to consult with the Co-Ordinator-General on 
loan approvals, although specific information on each approval remained elusive.'^  
The Commonwealth's decision, early in 1940, to amalgamate State and Defence 
Loan Works programmes for loan works approval purposes, lent some urgency to the 
need for Queensland to present a comprehensive, rationally-developed co-ordinated 
works plan. Amendments to the State Development and Fublic Works Organisation 
Act in September 1940, mfroduced increased powers for the Co-Ordinator-General as 
necessaty for defence purposes. Kemp's repeated representations to the Premier were 
finally rewarded in spite ofthe Opposition's argument that the proposed provisions 
would make the Co-Ordinator-General more powerful than Treasiuy.^ Under the 
amendments, Treasmy was required not only to advise the Co-Ordinator-General of 
loan approvals but also to submit any fiuther loan proposals for approval by the Co-
Ordmator-General before he recommended tiieir mclusion in the co-ordmated plan. 
Addressing the need for local authority co-operation to maximise access to 
Commonwealth loan fimding, H A. Brace, Minister for Pubhc Works, and one of 
Kemp's foremost supporters, attempted a conciliatoty approach to opponents ofthe 
Co-Ordinator-General's power to supervise and approve all local authority works. He 
''' See, for example, Courier-Mail, 8.3.1939. 
^^  For a comprehensive coverage of Treasury loan-subsidies, see Wheeler, op. cit, pp.37-42. 
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said that, as Queensland was now moving to the stage of providing major 
infrastracture works m rural areas, many of tiie projects, such as tiie Barron Falls 
hydro-electricity scheme, had proved to be beyond local engmeering expertise and 
funding capacity.*' Abandonmg conciliation, Forgan Smith demanded local authority 
compliance in providing uiformation on works programmes and their full co-
operation with the Co-Ordinator-General in preparing the co-ordmated plan. He 
made no bones about the Co-Ordinator-General's supervisoty role being intended to 
rectify the mistakes ofthe past and, by dehvering a more cost-efficient result, 
unprove Queensland's standing in Loan Council deliberations.^ 
His forcefulness may be fraced back to the embarrassment the Premier experienced 
at the Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers m mid-193 8. The 
Conference was convened by the Commonwealth to seek state support for a 
Commonwealth-State co-operative fimding plan for "defence and public 
development" A unanimous vote of q)proval opened the way for the plan to 
proceed, but Forgan Smith found that Queensland had "no scheme of co-operation 
available to put before the ... conference."*' Kemp had assisted Forgan Smith in 
putting together a works programme built around m^or road and railway 
constraction projects, but the bulk of it was rejected on the grounds that it failed to 
provide a reliably comprehensive overview of state pubhc works. Proposals for 
Conunonwealth defence works allocations in 1938 which initially all but by-passed 
Queensland, convinced him ofthe need to confrol local authority programmes m 
order to achieve tiie efficiency required m works submissions. This experience 
** S. D. p. W. O. Act Amendment BiU, 1940, p.279. 
" Ibid, p.2S%. 
^ Ibid p.266. 
59 Income (State Development) Tax Bill, 1938, p. 1600. 
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reinforced the Premier's determination to impose co-ordination on the adminisfration 
of pubhc works and to give the responsibility to the official with proven technical 
and administrative skills, whose aims were in step with his own. 
By 1940, most ofthe changes Kemp advocated had Ministerial and legislative 
endorsement. Even if he had not wanted to take on a position that had become the 
focus of such intense public debate, it nevertheless consolidated his adminisfrative 
standing and his capacity to influence the political process towards his professional 
public works' orientation. The suggestion that the Co-Ordinator-General's powers 
allowed Kemp to make pohcy decisions, usually the prerogative ofthe Executive, 
was as easy to confirm as was its mevitability. The Premier had stated early in the 
debate on the Co-Ordinator-General's powers that the Govemment had absolute trast 
m the official appointed to implement the pohcy of public works co-ordmation.*° If 
tiie imphcation was that, by changing the conditions for local authority works and 
Treasuty loan ^provals," Kemp had become "political" or had politicised the 
process, this was to misread Cabinet's mtention. The policy direction towards 
infrastracture development works and the means of its implementation had already 
been ^proved by Cabinet. In Parliament, Forgan Smith conveyed the inpression 
tiiat, while m some instances it might "modify or even ertiarge upon" specific 
proposals,^ ^ the Govemment usually accepted Kemp's advice. H A. Brace was more 
forthcoming about Kemp's status, hi November 1939, he disclosed that Kemp had 
recommended the proposed amendment to the Main Roads legislation regardmg 
obstractions on roads. As Minister, he then felt it wiser to mclude the requirement for 
the Govemor-m-Council's approval so as to avoid any accusation that Kemp as 
*° S. D. P. W. O. BiU, 1938, p. 195. 
" See Wheeler, op. cit, p. 15. 
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Commissioner of Main Roads would arbifrarily use these powers." In a sense, tiie 
Govemmait had little choice but to concur in the expansion of Kent 's mfluence. 
The situation was inevitably exacerbated by wartune conditions, but the end resuh 
for Kemp was a confrol of Queensland's public works that went far beyond any 
passive reading ofthe adminisfrative role of Government officials. 
The likelihood tiiat the concept ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, the extent of his powers 
and his appointment to the position had, at least in principle, been agreed early in 
1938, was supported by Kemp's departure in April on an extended overseas tour. As 
he did not retum to Brisbane until December that year, he was effectively 
quarantined from the confroversy over the extensive powers delegated to the Co-
Ordmator-General and the change they signalled in Kemp's relations with State and 
local authority representatives. The principal reason for Kemp's trip was his 
selection as the Commonwealth's official representative to the Eighth Congress of 
the Permanent Intemational Association of Road Congresses held in June at The 
Hague. His selection confirmed the esteem in which he was held by his Ausfralian 
road engineering colleagues and, although it was his first overseas visit, he was far 
from being overawed by the splendour ofthe conference setting and the prestigious 
assembly of intemational delegates.*^ Fmdmg his right to a seat on the oflficial 
platform taken over by the head of tiie British delegation, who had decided that he 
represented Britain's "Dommions and Colonies", Ken^ rallied support for a 
challenge. In their report, the British engineers paid little heed to "Empne-wide 
problems", in particular the relationship between laboratoty testing of subsoil 
foundations and tiie design of pavement thickness. As Kemp pointed out, errors ui 
*^  S. D. p. W. O. Act Amendment BiU, 1940, p.293. 
*^  Main Roads Acts Amendment Bill, 1939, p. 1564. 
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testing had proved expensive for Ausfralia in planrung road constraction and, to 
address the problem, one of his first actions as Main Roads Board Chairman was to 
estabhsh testing facilities m conjunction with the University of Queensland.*^ After 
consultation with Indian and other Empire representatives, he drew up a motion 
recommending further investigation of soil testing facilities that, through 
improvements in road design and selection of materials, would dehver major cost 
savings for road constraction authorities. Kemp's stance obviously strack a chord 
with an influential group of delegates. The motion made its way up through the 
various sections ofthe Congress, was then supported by several European delegates, 
and finally presented to the general session, where its adoption was carried 
unanimously.** The success ofthe motion gave the British delegates cause to rethink 
their assumptions about the Empire countries, while Kemp had left his own, and 
Austtalia's imprint on the congress. Kemp fully appreciated the opportunity to 
discuss advances and experiences in road constraction techniques with other road 
authority professionals. He found he was not at a disadvantage in the discussions as, 
he later reported, he leamt that practices in Ausfralia, and Queensland in particular, 
measured up well to other, so-called, more advanced countries. 
At the invitation of colleagues representing various national roads autiiorities, many 
of v^om were attending the Congress, he visited Britain, Scandinavia, Germany, 
Canada and the United States. In relation to some aspects of roads and ttansport 
management m Britain, he decided he had nothing to leam, as Queensland already 
had ^propriate provisions in place. He enjoyed the incomparable scenety ofthe 
famous Skyline Drive in Kentucky's Blue Ridge Mountains but, not missing an 
^ Kemp, 1939, op cit 
** See, far example. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Main Roads, 1939, p.l3. 
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opportiinity to canvass support for the froubled Mount Spec road to the west of 
Townsville, reported that; "except for the autumn colouring we have equally 
beautiful drives in our own State. Mount Spec is equal to any" *' Otiier financial and 
road constraction initiatives impressed him so much tiiat he determined to inttoduce 
them in Queensland. Some of tiiem formed the basis of projects he was able to have 
commenced but did not live to see completed. The constraction design and operating 
systems that made Rotterdam the premier port of Europe shaped his 
recommendations for tiie development of Brisbane's new port facilities on the 
reclaimed Hamilton lands. He also found confirmation in England's green landscape 
for his plans for municipal and Main Roads free-planting projects, which were 
incorporated in subsequent Main Roads legislation. The beauty ofthe Lakes District 
reinforced his intention to develop a tourist resort at Somerset Dam wiiere, he 
beheved, "the scenety will equal any ofthe Lake scenety..." ^ 
However, his mspection ofthe giant engineering projects in Scandinavia and North 
America represented tiie high point of his tour. He was able to see, at first-hand, vy a^t 
it was possible to achieve by pursuing a grand vision for engineering, to provide 
social and economic benefits for the commimity as much as to raise professional 
standards. New York's Tri-borough Bridge and the Golden Gate Bridge in San 
Francisco captured Kemp's interest, not only for the bold qjproach they represented 
to fraffic management problems, but also for their irmovative bridge design which 
demonsfrated, for tiieir time, the peak of engineering expertise. The effective 
alleviation of fraffic problems also provided by the Mersey, Rotterdam and Hamburg 
timnels in Europe, and the Lincoln and Holland turmels in New York, led him to 
** Ibid, pp.lO-ll. 
*' Kemp, 1939, op. cit, p. 196. 
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recommend an under-river tunnel as an altemative to a bridge for an additional river 
crossing. In one ofthe few examples where Kemp failed to have his 
recommendations adopted, the proposal was rejected. The concept was too 
revolutionaty for Brisbane in the 1940s and, despite his argument that it was a sound 
investment for the future, the cost was considered to be too high. 
The most memorable part of his American visit came with his visits to the United 
States' massive irrigation and hydro-elechicity schemes, notably the Bonneville Dam 
in Oregon, the Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River, and the Boulder Dam on 
the Colorado River. Based as he was m a small, conservative pubhc works 
environment, Kemp found their size, and their impact on the region's industiy, 
community and environment, almost beyond comprehension. The Grand Coulee 
Dam, for example, was to provide irrigation for one and a quarter million acres and 
from 20,000 to 40,000 farming families, while generating cheap electricity for towns 
and industries over the vast catchment area The project was expected to be "self-
liquidating" on the basis of power sales and payments by farmers for their water 
supply".® Its popularity as a national tourist attraction was a welcome confirmation 
of Kemp's often criticised advocacy of public works plannmg to assist Queensland's 
tourism industiy. Even if on a different scale, the parallels between the United States 
and Queensland, in the conditions under which an expanded public works 
programme came into being, were not lost on Kemp. There were similarities in the 
decision to undertake major works to counter high unemployment, in the political 
support for small-scale, reproductive works in roads, soil conservation and irrigation, 
but opposition to proposals for expensive major projects located m a few selected 
** Ibid.p.65. 
® Ibid„ pp.231-252. 
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regions. In the United States, enabling legislation passed in 1933 provided for an 
independent adminisfrative authority headed by an engineer, charged with 
implementing a range of works to be allocated across all regions. Moreover, the 
adminisfration ofthe higji level of ^propriations tiie programme required, togetiier 
with decisions on project approvals and locations, were marked by political and 
bureaucratic m-fighting. Local authorities were not unanimous in their support for 
the programme. Some of them, as with the City of New York over the Tri-borough 
Bridge, and tiie local authorities affected by the siting ofthe Boulder Dam works, 
were hostile to the idea of national intervention in their statutoty areas of 
responsibility.™ 
hi his inaugural lecture in 1935 as head ofthe Engineering faculty at the University 
of Queensland, Roger Hawken had criticised Ausfralian engineers in govemment 
service for bemg ground down into mediocrity." The Stoty Bridge and the Somerset 
Dam had been a response to that criticism and had succeeded m raising the status of 
Queensland engineering. However, their approval had been hard-won. The decision 
to tie up scarce funding resources in expensive capital works, the benefits of which 
were confined to the mefropolitan area, had caused a bitter political debate which 
was still raging in the early 1940s. Against this background, and with the uncertainty 
attached to Commonwealth loan fimduig approvals, the Govemment's commitment 
to an ambitious programme of development works, giving priority to major hydro-
elecfricity and irrigation schemes, remained tentative." In Tasmaiua, the partnership 
™ Arthur Schlesinger Jnr. The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming ofthe New Deal, 2, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1958, pp.340-368. 
" Professor R. J. H. Hawken, The University and the Professions: The John Thomson Lecture for 
1935, Brisbane: UQP, 1935. 
" See, for example, Courier-Mail 8.3.1939: "Premier has asked the Co-Ordinator-General to explore 
the possibilities of minor water conservation and irrigation schemes in Queensland." 
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of tiie Premier, Eric Reece, and head ofthe Hydro-Electricity Commission, Alan 
Knight, had successfully implemented plans for economic revival tiirough hydro-
elechicity generation schemes. In Queensland, the sheer size ofthe state, its 
population spread, enfrenched primaty mdustty base and related economic 
difficulties, militated against any whole-hearted political support for capital works 
investment on a similar scale. The frend was to address the problem of water 
conservation by approving small schemes, such as tiie successful, staged constraction 
ofthe Lockyer River weirs, the Border Rivers project, which Kemp had long 
supported, together with the revival of tiie Upper Burnett and Callide irrigation 
settiements vdiich had proved to be an expensive failure under the Irrigation and 
Water Supply sub-department ofthe LAB. 
The achievements in public works Kemp had seen in the United States motivated 
him to renew even more determinedly his efforts to initiated world-class engineering 
projects for Queensland's development. Their effect on him influenced the course of 
Kemp's pubhc life and, consequently, the course of Queensland's infrastracture 
development. When tiie Commonwealth Government launched its plans in 1943 for a 
national programme of post-war reconstraction with the promise of substantial 
funding for Nortii Queensland development, projects similar in concept to those that 
had so impressed Kemp became the cenfre-piece ofthe States' pubhc works 
projections. In the post-war period, Kemp came to devote all his energies to 
overcoming the many obstacles, political and otherwise, to the realisation of what 
appeared to many to be his obsession with grand engineering works. On the one 
hand, he was recognised as the most powerful official in the state, but on the other 
hand, the desk-thumping, overbearing sense of rightness and manipulation of 
govemment policy that characterised his behaviour during this period, earned him 
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tiie enmity of other senior officials and many of his former political supporters, hi a 
scarcely disguised attack on Kemp, Robinson later referred to "tiie exfraordmaty 
growth and influence, even dictation to tiie cenfral govemments, ofthe engineering 
profession" resulting in individual requirements being "subject to the vMms and 
fancies ofthe engineer and his glorification ..." " It was a reflection ofthe enduring 
view that Kemp's judgment became clouded by the desire to erect monuments to 
engineering that had more to do with his own personal and professional goals than 
tiieir contribution to state development. 
During the September debate on the State Development and Pubhc Works 
Orgarusation Bill, the Opposition had the opportunity for some fun at the Premier's 
expense. Having talked at length about Kemp's suitability for the position of Co-
Ordinator-General, he was then obhged to admit that Kemp, still m Britain, had not 
yet accepted the offer. ^ ^ Soon after his retum to Brisbane in December, Kemp 
formally accepted the ^pointment as Co-Ordinator-General for five years from 1 
Januaty, 1939. Any dehght he might have feh m achieving tiiis career milestone was 
concealed in tiie ^ propriately modest comment: "I desire again to express to the 
Govemment my ^preciation of this expression of confidence"." His combined 
salaty as Main Roads Commissioner and Co-Ordinator-General placed him at the 
highest level ofthe pubhc service. As Kemp lacked any interest in accumulating 
personal wealth, the salaty level represented for him an important confirmation of his 
status vis-d-vis otiier senior adminisfrators. It also confirmed that, in negotiating the 
" Robinson, op. cit, p.375. 
'" S. D. P. W. O. BiU, 1938, p.244. 
" Ninth Annual Report ofthe Under-Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry, 1939, p.49; 
Armual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1939, p.5 
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terms and conditions of his ^pointment, tiie Govemment was willing to put a high 
value on securing his skills. 
Kemp returned from his overseas tour to find the Main Roads Commission in the 
middle ofthe busiest year it had ever experienced. The accelerated works 
programme, of which Main Roads projects were the cornerstone, involved staff in 
the added responsibilities of fraining inexperienced, former rehef workers and 
supervismg a markedly increased number of local autiiority works.'* Main Roads 
now provided the adminisfrative base for the Co-Ordinator-General, as well as for 
Kemp's duties as Chairman ofthe Bureau of Industty's Works Boards. Changes to 
the method of ^proving local authority works for mclusion in the co-ordinated 
works plan meant a much heavier workload for Main Roads engmeers, smce the Co-
Ordinator-General had only a small adminisfrative staff There was an immediate 
need to sfreamline and co-ordinate adminisfrative processes across the three main 
areas of Kemp's responsibilities. W. L. Rogers, Kemp's private secretaty in Main 
Roads, was given a second appointment as Secretaty to the Co-Ordinator-General 
and, v^ e^n Kemp was ^pointed Deputy-Director ofthe Allied Works Council 
(AWC) in March 1942, Rogers' third concurrent appomtment was as his secretaty 
and also Adminisfrative Liaison Office to tiie AWC. Neil Smith, as assistant 
secretaty to the Co-Ordinator-General, had the job of liaismg witii local authorities 
over the works apphcations and approvals process, while E. Coulter continued as 
secretaty to each ofthe Works Boards. Most notably m Rogers' case, their 
unwavering personal loyalty and dedication to their responsibilities constituted a 
critical factor in Kemp's edacity to manage the increasmgly complex fimctions 
under his confrol. Through the system of close and often informal communication 
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Kemp developed witii tiiem, tiiey helped him keep abreast ofthe daunting list of 
matters tiiat daily required his attention. He was still able to maintain his schedule of 
receiving deputations from politicians and their constituents, monitoring 
developments m other govemment departments, and responding quickly and 
effectively when his opinion was sought, or when it was advantageous for him to 
oflfer it. 
Kemp's involvement with the administtation of Main Roads' operations was largely 
confined to making decisions on matters tiiat were unclear or were in dispute. The 
Administtative Committee convened by Main Roads Secretaty, J. E. England, v^ich 
Kemp had established in the mid-1920s, attended to routine adminisfrative matters, 
with much ofthe communication with divisional offices, other departments and local 
authorities handled by England. David Crawford, Main Roads' Chief Engineer, 
proved to be a competent deputy during Kemp's absence overseas at a critical time 
for Main Roads operations. As with many ofthe engineers on the Main Roads and 
Works Boards' staff, Crawford did not have Kemp's adminisfrative flair or ambition 
to move beyond the professional engineering sphere. As Kemp's time was 
increasingly taken up with other responsibilities, Crawford's adminisfrative role 
expanded to the extent that, during the war years, he was effectively the 
Commissioner of Main Roads. 
Main Roads' divisional offices headed by experienced engineers functioned within 
an hierarchical, career-oriented stracture closely confroUed by the Brisbane office. 
Over years of supervising local road works programmes, staff had built up a detailed 
knowledge of their particular locality, while operating procedures were standardised 
and worked as efficiently as distance and scarce resources allowed. As such. Main 
Roads was an estabhshed presence m regional Queensland and, for local authorities. 
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a comfortable, often personal link with the cenfral govemmait's works 
adminisfration. Kemp had done much to foster this informal relationship by his 
approachability and his fairness in dealuig with road works' problems during his 
frequait tours of inspection around the State. As a result, it was a relatively simple 
matter for Main Roads procedures for works' applications and approvals to be 
extended to cover the requirements ofthe co-ordinated programme. The obhgation 
on local authorities to submit all works' plans for the Co-Ordinator-General's 
approval enabled Kemp to promote one of his favourite causes, the ^pouitment of 
qualified aigineers, preferably Mam Roads' frained, to improve local authority 
engineering standards. It was possible to see his influence at work wdien members of 
parhament needed no urging to detail the expensive failures ofthe consultant 
engineers employed by local councils." For once, there was no opposition to an 
expansion ofthe Co-Ordinator-General's powers if, as was proposed, the outcome 
was more cost-efficient works of a higher standard at the local level.'* The 
combination ofthe Main Roads organisation and the network of supportive 
adminisfrative and professional staff he had fostered, helped Kemp to deliver the 
results expected of him. Together with his almost legendaty capacity for work,™ it 
provided an effective response to critics who doubted his abihty to do justice to such 
a heavy load of responsibilities. 
In the months leading up to the complete abohtion of unemployment relief by 30 
June 1939, to be followed by the presentation of Kemp's first co-ordinated plan of 
public works, consistently high unemployment figures reflected the Govemment's 
" S. D. P. W. O. Act Amendment Bill, 1940, p.286. 
'* Ibid, p.2%2. 
" Geoffrey Cossins, engineer, who worked on the Somerset Dam and Caimcross Dock projects 
during World War Two. Personal communication, April 1999. 
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failure to honour the promises it made the previous year regarding full-time 
employment. Meeting the staled target of offering employment to one-third of the 
eighteen thousand registered relief workers fell far short ofthe concerted action tiie 
situation demanded," Labor was now faced with convincing ils constituents and the 
electorate at large ofthe efficacy of a pohcy of employment generation and raral 
development to be dehvered by the co-ordination of public works. Responsibility for 
tiie success of its appeal was quite openly placed in Kemp's hands and, once again, 
he w-as casi as the buffer between politicians' promises and tiie obligation to 
implement them. In the lead-up to tiie finalisation of tiie plan, the Premier, together 
with ministers with works-relaled portfolios, made a succession of public 
declarations about projects the Co-Ordinator-General was investigating for possible 
inclusion In tiie plan. The major projects highlighted in this way covered the essence 
ofthe repr^entations made in Parliament over tiie years for local infrastructure 
works. They included an expanded road works programme for towns and isolated 
districts, the promotion of cotton growing, the provision of electricity and water 
supply systems to regional towns, water conservation and irrigation schemes, and 
measures to combat soil erosion. Opportunin'es for "pork-bairelltng" were 
enthusiastically exploited, even with minor works. Minister for Labour and Industry, 
T. A Folev, when approached by members ofthe Spring Hill Playground and 
Recreation Association about the continuation of \\=ork on their pl^grounds, referred 
them to Kemp whom, he said, "might have tiie woriv completed on a full-time 
basis."" In tiiis context, the Co-Ordinator-General's power of investigation became a 
useful pohtical tool. While it was the means by which Kemp eclaided his influence 
^ Ninth Annual Report tfthe Under-Secretary, Department cf Labour and Industry, 1939. p. 51 
*' Courier-Maii24.6.J939. 
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beyond his primaty responsibilities, it was now used as a process behind whidh tiie 
Govemmait could hide fi-om the consequences of heightened expectations. 
Announcing the Govemment's support for tiie long-discussed Border Rivers water 
conservation scheme, Forgan Smith confirmed that the Govemment had accepted 
Kemp's recommendations for an investigation, but wamed that "actual 
developmental and constmction work would depend mainly upon the results of 
investigations and the availability of funds. "^ The political considerations 
influencing the selection of water supply schemes from the hundreds hopefiilly 
submitted for inclusion in the programme threatened to undermine the perception of 
Kemp's impartiality. To protect himseif, he made his own pubhc armouncements in 
which he emphasised his limited role in decisions affecting the programme. That this 
attempt was less than successful was apparent in his announcement, tiiree months 
before its formal presentation, that water supply schemes for Townsville and the 
South Coast were "definitely included" in the programme.^ ^ The South Coast 
scheme, proposed by tiie three shire councils located in a fraditionally non-Labor 
area, was clearly of political importance as, a week later, Kenq} was delegated to 
represent the Govemment at a conference convened by the Councils. While he was 
sympathetic to their situation, to ensure his position was not compromised, he 
adopted the Ministerial tactic of using tiie investigative process to delay making any 
binding commitment.^ " 
In relation to otiier components ofthe co-ordinated plan, the normal armual votes for 
departments engaged in building constmction remained largely unaffected. Railways 
presented no problem as there had been no new constmction approvals since the 
^ Ibid, 4.1.1939. 
'' Ibid 
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early 1930s, v^ile maintenance costs were held to previous levels.** The Brisbane 
City Council was another matter, as a number of urgent works had been discontinued 
owmg to the Council's difficuh financial position. Treasuty promised "to see the 
council through" by granting a "sttaight" loan, even though tiiere was no prospect of 
repaying another recent loan in the current financial year. During these months, the 
pubhcity given to the employment value of Main Roads' expanded works schedule 
helped to deflect criticism ofthe Govemment's performance. However, tiie 
readjustments required as a result of this type of unilateral departmental decision, the 
uncertainty over the imposition of atoll on the Stoty Bridge, and the effect on 
funding availability for other capital works in progress ofthe unexpectedly high rate 
of expenditure on the University works, meant that Kemp was stiU negotiating the 
fmal programme approvals early in 1940.** The Premier had made much ofthe value 
of departmental co-operation and the use of interdepartmental committees m 
securing a balanced range of projects selected on merit. In assembling his first co-
ordinated programme, Kemp found co-operation to be noticeably lacking although he 
had a generally productive relationship with Treasuty officials. As for the 
interdepartmental committees he had the power to convene, wiiile they later became 
a notable feature of Kemp's adminisfration, initially they were a politically useful, if 
largely nominal, component of promised project investigations. 
Kemp's first year as Co-Ordinator-General demonsfrated the tentative nature of his 
confrol over the widely disparate elements tiiat made up the co-ordination process. 
Any question of abuse of powers lay in the political sphere ratiier than with Kemp, 
^ Ibid, 14.7.1939 
*' Kerr, op cit., pp.224-25; Rogers, Memo to Kemp, 25.10.1939, R.MO. 307, QTA. 
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who was fiilly occupied testing tiie viability of his delegated powers. However, of all 
the factors affecting the admirusfration of his responsibilities, Govemment reaction 
to the threat of war in Europe, leading to a re-assessment of Federal-state financial 
relations and tentative moves towards planning for Ausfraha's defence, proved to be 
the most significant. 
Kemp, Report to the Chief Secretary, 13.2.1940, R.M.O. 307, QTA. 
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5, 
WORLD WAR TWO AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 
During World War Two and the post-war reconstmction period, tiie key goals and 
features, of state pubhc works admmisfration were co-ordination, planning and 
Commonwealth subsidies. Under wartime conditions, civil works programmes were 
deferred indefinitely in favour of defence works. Co-ordination and planning of 
public works on a state-wide basis were essential to securing Commonwealth 
fundmg assistance for constmction projects that not only served militaty purposes 
but also made some contribution to the State's infi-astmcture development. To 
achieve these goals required confrol of information and decision-making on pubhc 
works, technical, financial and managerial skills, capacity for forward plarmmg and 
determming priorities, and effective communication witii political, bureaucratic and 
private sector representatives. It was also vital to plan for the post-war revival of 
public works activity in a way that would maximise the opportunity for instituting 
new goals and confrolling the direction of post-war development pohcy. The most 
important factor, however, proved to be the capacity for implementing the approved 
works programmes. In Queensland at that time, Kemp was the one senior official 
who came closest to demonsfrating these requirements. Moreover, he had the 
confidence ofthe Premier and senior Ministers, was respected by all groups with a 
stake in public works, and headed an efficient construction autiiority which had an 
established regional structure, operational links with Commonwealth works ofificials, 
and regulatoty confrol over the regisfration and movement of all fransport vehicles 
within the State. 
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During the first half of 1939, Kemp was coming to grips with the problems 
associated with preparing Queensland's first co-ordinated plan of works. They 
included alack of essential information on local authority works programmes, the 
generally unco-operative attitude adopted by departmental officials and making 
pohtically acceptable provision for unemployment relief and regional assistance 
claims. At that stage, as both the idea of forward, co-ordinated planning for State 
works programmes and the delegation of wide-rangmg, potentially coercive powers 
to one official had failed to achieve a viable measure of acceptance, the concept of 
the Co-Ordinator-General was possibly set to fail. 
On 3 September, 1939, Britain declared war on Germany and, two days later, the 
Ausfralian Prime Minister, R. G. Menzies, armounced that, as a result, Ausfralia was 
also at war. Although there was no immediate increase in militaty activity, the nation 
was now on a war footing and this necessitated a more serious commitment to 
defence planning than had previously been evident.^  
As early as 1937, the Lyons Federal Govemment had reacted to Britain s possible 
mvolvement in countering Nazi Germany's expansionist plans by launching tiie idea 
of Federal-State co-operation in preparing Ausfralia for the eventuahty of another 
world war. While there was overall support for the proposal to institute a programme 
of defence works of a developmental nature throughout Ausfralia, the means of 
fimding it became another conttoversial issue in Federal-State financial relations. 
Forgan Snutii vviio, as a delegate to the Intemational Sugar Conference in London in 
1937, was aware of tiiie seriousness ofthe threat of war m Europe, lost no time in 
submitting to the Prime Minister suggestions for "developmental works of defence 
' H. C. Coombs. TrialBalance. Melboume: Macmillan, 1981, p.6. 
229 
value in Queensland" Among them were an inland road from Goondiwindi to 
Rockhampton and the Queensland section of wdiat was essentially a franscontinental 
railway fi-om Bourke to Darwin, through Camooweal. The Commonwealth's 
response in March 1938 that it had under consideration a hst of projects, mcluding 
roads, railways and aerodromes that, "if taken in hand by the Queensland 
Govemment, would contribute to the defence ofthe countiy"^ avoided making any 
prehminaty commitment of Federal funding. This did nothing to dissuade State 
uiterests from revivmg tiie franscontinental railway "dream" first mooted m the 
1870s of connecting soutiiem ports with northem Austtaha E. G. Theodore had 
actively promoted the scheme as the means of achieving the maximum development 
of Ausfraha's primaty resources. At the Premiers Conference m 1925, he 
unsuccessfully sought support for his grand vision of a national railway loop running 
parallel with, but inland from the coast and supporting feeder railway lines to major 
ports along the route. As before, the political benefits ofthe scheme were atfractive 
to State govemments but no one, least of all tiie Commonwealth, was willing to 
address tiie massive financial and logistical problems. 
Queensland still had the historic problem of providmg development infrastructure to 
service the potentially rich mining and pastoral industries ofthe northem and westem 
regions without any guarantee of future returns on a major state coital investment. 
There were so few settlers in the north-west that even tiie Railway Guarantee system 
was not ^plicable. In 1930, Kemp had secured tiie gazettal ofthe Mount Isa to 
Camooweal road as a main road, partly to fulfil the legislative requirement for an 
equitable allocation of Main Roads Commission works among the three divisions of 
the State, but also to pursue his own goal of anticipating or pre-enpting any 
"Questions: Inland Defence Road", QPD, 1938 Vol. 172, p.603. 
230 
proposed railway constmction in a particular area Furtiier road works funds were 
allocated in 1935 but since maintenance ofthe 130 mile-long road was beyond the 
resources ofthe local authorities, it had degenerated mto scarcely more than afrack. 
The results of two conferences ofthe Commonwealtii witii State Premiers, late in 
1938, to discuss defence works plarming on the basis of a co-operative, cost-sharing 
agreement, were inconclusive. The Premiers found that the Commonwealth was 
totally unprepared for war and had no plan on which to stmchire national defence 
works planning. At the October 1938 Loan Council meeting, the Federal 
Govemment armounced that there would be no increase in loan funding to cover 
proposed defence works which were to be undertaken on a priority basis within 
normal state public works loan programmes. Not surprisingly, the States vigorously 
opposed any threat to the scope of tiieir works programmes which represented the 
principal means of addressing continuing higji unemployment levels. Moreover, 
always alert to any threat of Commonwealth intervention in areas of State 
responsibility, their Premiers were united in rejecting the Commonwealth's proposal 
to estabhsh a national committee for defence planning to "determine the priority of 
works in the States" ^  Belated efforts by the Department ofthe Interior to inttoduce a 
national plan revealed a concenfration of defence works in the southem states which, 
Forgan Smith declared, left Ausfraha's north undefended. The Premier's attack was 
dismissed as "party politics", with the Federal Defence Minister arguing that the 
north was indefensible. He likened the idea of defending tiie region to "mounting a 
defence system for the continent of Europe against invasion", suggesting that the best 
option for Australia's defence was to take the battle as far from Austtalian shores as 
^ Courier-Mail, 24.10.1938. 
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possible.* There was some justification for Forgan Smitii's claim as Queensland 
received £30,000 of a total £1.342 million allocated under the Federal-State co-
operation plan announced m May 1939, altiiough tiie State received some 
compensation in mcreased loan expenditure ^provals.^ With the State's 
developmental works programme about to be compromised by national defence 
priorities, the Premier had little option but to maintain an aggressive pubhc stance in 
tiie hope of securing a greater share, not only of defence works projects but also of 
the proposed decenttalisation of defence industries. 
Despite the Commonwealth's decision to restrict new railway constmction under the 
defence works plan to Victoria and New South Wales, support for the 
ttanscontinental railway concept remained buoyant across several states. When a 
proposal to complete the north-south railway between Adelaide and Darwin for 
militaty purposes also received some consideration at the Federal level, Forgan 
Smith committed his Govemment to funding a cormecting rail link fi-om Camooweal, 
v^ch had already been recommended in the report ofthe 1936 Royal Commission.^  
In July, he reported that the Commonwealth had tumed down his proposal for joint 
Queensland-Commonwealth fimding for both the railway and the inland road but 
added that he would discuss the matter with the Co-Ordinator General, Mr. Kemp.^ 
A few months later, the Commonwealth made available £100,000 under the 
Commonwealth-State co-operative agreement towards repairs and reconstmction, for 
defence and unemployment rehef purposes, of an inland road nmnmg fi-om Ipswich 
' Courier-Mail, 9.5.1939. 
^ Wiltshire, "Public Finance", op. cit, p. 172. 
* Report ofthe Royal Commission appointed to enquire into the advisableness of extending the 
Great Northem railway to Camooweal, (J. OXeefe, Chairman) QPP, 1936, Vol. 2, pp. 1035-64. 
' Courier-Mail, 4.1.1939. 
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to Charters Towers. Kemp's subsequent comment tiiat the road had been "tiie subject 
of vety considerable discussion with the Commonwealth"* typically understated 
what must have been an intense bargaining process. From the Commonwealth's 
point of view, it represented a concession to Queensland's unemployment problems 
and a hmited commitment to improving an existing road, while securing a possible 
future defence asset. The condition that the money was to be expended within the 
fmancial year posed few problems as the various sections ofthe road were already 
incorporated in the Main Roads' forward planning regime of projects awaiting 
funding. The decidmg factor was almost certainly Queensland's offer of a matching 
contribution v i^iile, in his role as Co-ordmator General, Kemp had it added to the 
1939-40 Main Roads allocations as an unemployment relief measure. Although 
Forgan Smith continued pressing for the Camooweal railway, the Commonwealth's 
endorsement of tiie inland road placed Kemp in a sttong position to advocate road 
projects as likely to atfract furtiier defence funding. 
During his tour of Great Britain and Europe in 1938, Kemp had observed signs of 
preparation for war. He noted that, vAale relief of unenqjloyment constituted the 
outstanding problem in all the countries he visited, some of them had opted to 
provide a temporaty solution through "feverish armament programmes" ' However, 
it was in Germany that he encountered the most advanced preparations for war, witii 
the build-up of airports and factories in the north, extensive autobahn constmction 
and, he was informed, more than two million froops under arms. Discussion at the 
Intemational Roads Conference at The Hague, where Kemp was the Ausfralian 
delegate, tended to water down alarmist reactions with the conclusion that "the 
Annual Report ofthe Commissioner ofMainRoads 1940, p.5. 
' Kemp, 1939, op. cit, p.ix. 
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necessities of militaty sfrategy fi-equently coincide in their demands with the normal 
fransport demands" °^ However, Kemp persisted in his opinion that the countty's 
autobahn constmction programme went far beyond any peacetime requirements. 
Within the year, events justified his stance. The success of Germany's Blitzkreig 
sfrategy rested on the autobahn's capacity to move mechanised forces to border 
invasion points too rapidly to allow for any effective opposition. On his retum early 
in 1939, Kemp set out in a report to Parliament the evidence to support his 
conviction of Germany's commitment to a war in Europe and the imphcations for 
Ausfralia. 
Against this background, he gave Forgan Smith considerable practical assistance in 
the Premier's efforts to raise tiie level of Queensland's importance in the 
Commonwealth's defence planning. In the wrangling over defence works aUocations, 
all tiie participants were aware that tiie States hoped to use the issue of Ausfraha's 
defence to advance their industiy and fransport infi-astmcture projects on the back of 
Commonwealtii funding. Consequently, the designation of projects as of defence 
value, and thus hkely to be implemented in the short term, became an important 
function at both Commonwealth and State levels, with a corresponding importance 
accruing to the person confrolling tiie state works programme. In March 1939, 
publicity was given to the preparation by Kemp in his role as Co-ordinator-General 
of Queensland's first co-ordinated works plan. Two months later in Brisbane, R. G. 
Menzies, the newly-elected conservative Prime Miruster, rejected any suggestion of 
Queensland's defences being neglected, as demonsfrated by the govemment's 
commitment under his predecessor, Jos^h Lyons, to "a northward move m its 
'" Ibid, p.\50. 
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defence pohcy" " For tiie 1939-40 financial year, the Federal-State co-operative 
defence works plan yielded £300,000 of Commonwealth funding for Queensland, to 
be paid to Main Roads for allocation on projects covering major aerodromes, militaty 
camps, parade grounds and rifle ranges to be constructed or upgraded throughout the 
State. The projects were designated on-going rehef works to be distributed among 
numerous local authorities through Main Roads, while the organisation's reputation 
for efficiency, akeady familiar to the Commonwealth Department of Works throu^ 
the Federal Aid Roads Agreement, ensured minimal interference on the part ofthe 
Commonwealth. That tiiese fimds were confrolled by Main Roads reinforced both its 
critical role in implementing Commonwealth-subsided works and its value to Kemp 
in consohdating his influence on state works planning. 
In 1940, the Commonwealth made progress on its national defence plans, both in 
terms of constmction and financial provisions. To provide for a projected escalation 
in defence works' expenditure, the States' co-operation was needed for a changeover 
from unemployment relief to defence works and a reduction in loan works 
expenditure apphcations.^ ^ Both were predicated on the States' providing 
information on specific works' proposals, the extent and availability ofthe labour 
force, and the c^ability of state constmction authorities to undertake defence 
projects on the Commonwealth's behalf Queensland was the ortiy State to have in 
place a cenfral co-ordinating authority, as one official, and the mechanism for 
compiling a co-ordinated works plan. In May 1940, the Loan Council appointed 
engineer (Sn) Hany Brown as Co-Ordinator of Works to conpile a list of pubhc 
" Courier-Mail, 13.5.1939. 
Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1940, p.5. 
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works projects from all States to present for Loan Council consideration. To gain the 
States' co-operation, the Council made unportant concessions in tiie matter of 
confrolling their works' programmes witiiin the consfraints ofthe national works 
plan. At the end of sbt months. Brown reported on similar problems to those Kemp 
had faced, if on a smaller scale, in initiating the co-ordination process. Despite 
dedicated efforts on his part. Brown did not obtain the detailed works proposals he 
needed to compile a comprehensive, and thus meaningful, co-ordmated plan. As with 
Kemp, Brown had the power to con^el the provision of this information but also 
opted to use it judiciously, in acknowledging how unprepared most States were to 
fulfil the comphance provisions. Some lead time was required for the system to 
operate efficiently, the situation improving when the other States, realising the 
benefits of state-based works coordination in securing loan funding approvals, 
appointed their own co-ordinators. 
In September 1940, Premier Forgan Smith opened the debate on amendments to the 
State Development and Fublic Works Organisation Act 1938 by reinforcing the 
benefits being derived from Queensland's foresight m implementing the concept of 
the Co-Ordinator-General. They included planning local authority and departmental 
works programmes to achieve efficiency in the allocation of resources, making 
provision for unemployment rehef, particularly for seasonal workers, and 
consolidating the already co-operative relationship the Co-Ordinator-General had 
with the Loan Council Co-Ordinator. The main purpose ofthe Bill was to constitute 
the Co-Ordmator-General a constraction authority in order to undertake defence 
works, giving him the same statutoty powers of land resumption and acquisition as 
'^  S. J. Buflin and C. B. Schedvin, War Economy 1939-1942 Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 
1977,pp.220-221. 
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tiie Main Roads Commissioner, and also conpellmg local authorities to notify him of 
any large loan works proposals.^ ^ The Opposition's stance was tiiat the Co-
Ordinator-General was being given greater dictatorial powers under the guise of 
facilitating the war effort, a protest against the expansion of bureaucratic confrol 
under the guise of emergency legislation that was to become more familiar during the 
course ofthe war.^ ^ Forgan Smith sfressed the necessity for Queensland to be 
efficient in its loan works applications to the Federal authorities to ensure tiie 
maximum possible approval level. As tiiis also required the work ofthe State's 
numerous constmction authorities to be co-ordmated, tiie Co-Ordinator-General was 
delegated the power to undertake constmction works or to authorise other authorities 
to undertake works on its behalf Thus, the Co-Ordinator-General's confroversial 
"coercion" power was reinforced in order to achieve a higher level of compliance 
among local and State officials than had been obtained under the previous co-
operative approach. Provision for closer supervision of local authority works, 
delegated by the Co-Ordinator-General to Main Roads, again extended Kemp's 
statutoty confrol over Queensland works programmes while highlighting the vital 
role Main Roads played in making it possible. '^  
During 1940 and 1941, allocations from the Main Roads Fund w^ich received 
payments from the State Development Fund, State loan funds, vehicle regisfration 
fees. Federal Aid Roads grants and Commonwealth defence works subsidies were 
made to numerous local autiiority areas for defence works and for the continuation of 
'" Ibid, pp.222-223; Coombs, op. cit, pp. 10-11. 
'^  S. D. P. W. O. Act Amendment Bill, 1940, pp.265-67. 
'* See, for example, R. Else-Mitchell, "Delegated and Sub-Delegated Legislation", Public 
Administi-ation (Sydney), 4, 7, September 1943, pp.298-308. 
" S. D. P. W. O. Act Amendment Bill, 1940, pp.266-67. 
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previously commenced road and bridge projects. Undertaken either by Main Roads 
directiy or by local confractors under Main Roads' supervision, these works were 
promoted and funded largely in terms of unemployment rehef In July 1940, an 
increase m militaty activity as Ausfralia prepared to participate in tiie European 
militaty campaign changed a largely static situation and presented a new challenge 
for Kemp's organisation and management skills. Having received approval for the 
provision of an altemative fransport route from the southem states to northem 
Ausfralia, the Department ofthe Army requested tiiat Main Roads join otiier State 
road autiiorities to constract sections of tiie Alice Springs-Bu-dum road to link the 
Darwin railway to the Adelaide-Alice Springs railw^. Accomparued by Deputy 
Main Roads Commissioner Crawford, Kemp personally surveyed the proposed route 
and proceeded to direct the re-organisation of Main Roads to accommodate the new 
project. Although a logistical and operational nightmare, the efficiency and technical 
expertise of Main Roads' divisional engineering staff, together with well-established 
adminisfrative routines and a co-operative relationship with Army supply persormel, 
enabled Main Roads to complete its work on schedule in December 1940. By this 
time, the Premier had abandoned the idea of a rail extension from Mount Isa to hnk 
up with the Darwin railway. Prompted by Kemp, he revived his efforts to obtain 
Commonwealth defence funds to commence grading a Mount Isa to Camooweal road 
along a route Kemp had surveyed some months previously. These surveys were 
undertaken during Kemp's 5,000 mile tour of Queensland on vy^ch he was 
accompanied by Main Roads Chief Engineer, A. R. Williams, vs^o was being given 
the opportimity to familiarise himself with the responsibilities Kemp would soon 
delegate to him. On the tour, Kemp also inspected a new Main Roads-constracted 
bridge in the Theodore irrigation area, and fravelled some ofthe inland road he had 
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successfiilly proposed to be declared a defence road and thus ehgible for 
Commonwealth subsidy. ^ ^ Forgan Smitii's proposal for tiie Mount Isa road, as 
prepared by Kemp, was backed by an appeal for the efficient use of scarce resources, 
as tiie extaisive plant and machinety, togetiier witii Main Roads staff and 
constiiiction crews tiien vulually marooned at Tennant Creek for lack of fransport, 
could be fransferred immediately to construction ofthe hnk road to Queensland. 
Although tiie Main Roads crews retumed home after the defence works authorities 
rejected the proposal, Kemp secured interim State fundmg of £20,000 for the 
commencement of prehminaty survey and clearing work.^ ^ 
By 1941, Queensland had secured other defence projects worth seven million 
pounds, the first of vsWch was the constmction and operation of tiie Rocklea 
murutions factoty. The second was the development of a major shipbuilding facility 
in Brisbane, a high priority for Kemp in fostering Queensland industrial 
development. He had previously supported the Brisbane City Council leasing Moar's 
shipyard at Kangaroo Point to Evans Deakin, as a forerurmer to a Brisbane-based 
industty capable of profiting from increased wartime shipping demand. Early in the 
year, Kemp was obliged to reduce projected allocations under the 1941 co-ordmated 
plan to the State Advances Corporation and the Rural Development Bureau, in 
addition to all Bureau of Industty works projects, in order to proceed with the 
previously qjproved Main Roads defence works allocation. The reduction in 
Queensland's Loan Council allocation announced in April 1941 had been part of an 
overall reduction recommended by Brown vs^o, frusfrated by the States' failure to 
reduce tiieir loan expenditure ^plications, had threatened to resign his position. 
'^  Tour ofthe Main Roads Commissioner, J. R. Kemp, and A. R. WilUams, MRC job file 10.5.3., 
C/DNo. 1342, QTA. 
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Brown witiidrew his resignation following promises by State premiers of a more co-
operative approach to works co-ordination in retum for greater flexibility in the 
scheme, allowing the States to vaty projects within tiie overall co-ordination 
programme prepared by Brown and ^proved by tiie Loan Council. ^ ° While the 
inland defence road terminating at Charters Towers had been given fiinding priority, 
witii total expenditure to date of over £450,000,^ ^ Cabinet approved furtiier small 
loan allocations for the Queensland section ofthe Mount Isa-Tennant Creek road, 
following Army approval of tiie project. These State allocations kept tiie project from 
closing down and, with Main Roads survey and constraction crews already working 
at sections along the surveyed route, Kemp arranged to have it declared a state 
highway, later named the Barkly Highway, to avoid having to negotiate funding 
contributions and approvals with the impoverished local authorities.^ Although the 
project's future was secured in Febraaty 1942 when tiie Department ofthe Army 
made available £80,000 and a full range of support services to the Main Roads 
camps, the available fimding was only sufficient to allow the constraction of a basic, 
single-lane gravel road and ten^oraty bridges.^ 
The tuming point in Queensland's participation in the war effort came after the 
bombing of Pearl Harbour m December 1941 brought the United States into the war. 
General McArthur subsequently refreated from the Pacific islands, and U. S. militaty 
forces estabhshed its bases for the Pacific war m Ausfralia wiiile Ausfralia, having 
' ' Main Roads Commission, 1949, op. cit. Chapters 2 and 3; Courier-Mail, 9.11.1940, 5.12.1940. 
'^ Memo, Co-Ordinator-General, re State Loan Fund, 22.4.1941,247/6/13, original on 83/1/8A, 
R.M.O. 307, QTA. 
" Questions, "Inland Strategic Road", QPD, 1941, 177, p.49. 
^^  Kemp memo, re decision on recommendation to Govemor-in-Council for works on Barkly 
Highway, No. 48 under the Main Roads Act 1920-1939.2.12.1941, MRC job file, 10.5.3, QTA. 
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also declared war on J^an, faced tiie threat of invasion from the north. The countiy 
was put on a war footing, with the formation of a War Cabuiet and a more effective 
organisation of militaty and defence operations. After the U. S. militaty command 
signalled its mtention of estabhshing forward bases in the state, Queensland 
dominated all defence works considerations. In order to estabhsh dnect haison with 
U. S. representatives on Ausfraha's defence works provisions, the Allied Works 
Council, (AWC) with E. G. TTieodore as Director, was constituted in Febraaty 1942. 
Kemp was appointed Deputy-Director of Allied Works (Queensland.) and, as tiie Co-
Ordinator-General, was responsible for all AWC constraction work v^ d^ch his 
statutoty powers enabled him to delegate to the qjpropriate state constraction 
autiiority. 
With convoy fraffic already usmg the Mount Isa-Termant Creek road, Kemp held 
discussions with Army representatives in Queensland and in Melboume to have the 
road widened and upgraded to all-weather condition, as weU as permanent bridges 
constracted for all river crossings. His position was sfrengthened by the urgent need 
for an altemative to shipping and coastal transport routes, especially as the single 
north-south railway was too close to the coast, vulnerable to flooding and also 
unequal to the anticipated volume of heavy militaty fraffic. After AWC regulations 
apparently prevented Theodore from allocating a higher priority to upgrading the 
road, Kemp renewed his negotiations with both Ausfralian and U. S. Army officials. 
His views on the urgency of completing the road's upgrading in view ofthe 
increasingly heavy convoy use were persuasive, with ^proval forthcoming for the 
^ Drake-Brockman, Director, Engineer Services, Department ofthe Army, to Main Roads 
Commissioner, 17.1.1942, MRC job file 10.5.3, QTA; Main Roads Commission, op. cit., p.9. 
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recommendations by Allied Forces' engineers for guaranteed staged fimding and 
24 
logistical support. 
After inspecting the road several months later, Kemp decided to have work 
commenced on bitumen-sealing the entire length of road as, with up to fifty convoys 
a day on a tight tum-around schedule from Mount Isa, it had proved unpossible to 
maintain the gravel surface. Despite further official protests concerning the added 
cost, as well as personnel and supply difficulties, Theodore lent his support in 
Januaty 1943, giving the Queensland section and the Termant Creek extension equal 
priority for bitumen supphes with the main north-south road in the Northem 
Territoty.^ ^ The project completed early in 1944 comprised four hundred nules of 
bitumen-sealed road, one-quarter of which was in Queensland,^ ^ with the State 
gaining a first-class access road to the remote, rich grazmg lands ofthe Barkly 
Tableland. As its militaty use declined in 1945, Kemp urged that road maintenance 
allocations be continued. Recommending that it should be a matter of national policy 
to extend the road through Cloncuny, Winton, Longreach, Blackall, and Charleville 
to hnk up with other roads and the main trunk railways, he was, in effect, suggesting 
this project as a cost-effective replacement for a ttanscontinental railway. He 
believed that such a road network would be of vital assistance in ttansporting stock. 
^^ Kemp, Co-Ordinator-General, to Colonel Drake-Brockman, 20.1.1942, MRC File 10.5.3. (Original 
on file 232/1/2A); Report, A. D. E. Services, Southem Command, to Drake-Brockman, January 
1942, MRC File 10.5.3; Dept, ofthe Army to Dept ofthe Interior, Director-General of Works, 
Melbourne, re AustraUan-American projects, priority 1 la. Mount Isa-Tennant Creek road, 
4.2.1942, MRC file 10.5.3/523, QTA. 
'^ Kemp to Theodore, Theodore to Kemp, Inter-Office memos re bitumen surfacing; No. 259, 
January 1943,No. 290,24.3.1943, No. 31,27.3.1944, AWC BP1/2, Australian Archives. 
*^ Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1944, p.3; Main Roads Commission, 1949, 
op. cit. For a comprehensive account ofthe powers, and responsibihties of Theodore as Director-
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particulariy during drought periods and tiiat, if maintained to a high standard, would 
also serve to provide the road access to foster an inland tourist industty.^ ^ 
The commitment of Main Roads' resources to defence works programmes, A^ch 
commenced under the initial Federal-State cost-sharing agreement, had expanded, 
initially as the State fransport authority with the information and adminisfrative base, 
as well as constraction capability, to provide Allied Forces fransport requirements. 
With the formation of tiie Civil Constractional Corps (CCC) and, subsequently the 
Civil Alien Corps, the problem of labour shortages on hundreds of defence projects, 
including the constraction of airstrips, harbour and port facilities, hospitals, militaty 
camps and storage depots, was alleviated.^ ^ At the same time as staff members were 
enlisting m tiie Armed Forces, Kemp made available all the Main Roads' 
adminisfrative, technical and constraction resources for AWC projects, necessitating 
a m^or restracturing ofthe organisation and provision for rapid fraining of new staff 
in all areas. The adminisfrative staff were responsible for the payment of all wages 
and salaries on the m^or roads projects, mcluding the thousands of CCC workers, 
without whom the major defence roads and airstrip projects in northem and westem 
Queensland would not have been completed. 
That there were few financial problems,^ ^ despite tiie massively increased 
responsibilities, was a testament to the durability of Main Roads' administtative 
processes. Moreover, as numerous official and personal accounts attest, tiie wartime 
General, AWC, and the political and operational difficulties ofthe appointment, see Fitzgerald, 
1994,op. c/t, pp.388-96. 
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Main Roads, 1945, p.l4. 
^^  Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1944, p.3; Main Roads Commission, 1949, 
op. cit. For a comprehensive account ofthe powers, and responsibihties of Theodore as Director-
General, AWC, and the political and operational difficulties ofthe appointment, see Fitzgerald, 
1994, op. cit, pp.388-96. 
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record ofthe Main Roads' engmeering and technical staff demonsfrated the deptii of 
the organisation's esprit de corps and exemphfied the professional ideal of service in 
the pubhc interest. Justifiably proud of his organisation and individual staff 
members, Kemp included in his armual reports for the information of Parliament, the 
admiration and gratitude expressed by U. S. militaty officials working in conjunction 
with Main Roads on the major defence projects, v^ diile takmg the opportunity to 
record pubhcly and by name, the organisation's war casualties. The value to Kemp of 
his long-standing, harmonious relationship with H A. Brace, tiie Minister for Pubhc 
Works, who had been responsible for Main Roads for over a decade, was evident in 
the public tribute he paid to Brace to mark the fransfer of Main Roads from Pubhc 
Works to the Treasurer's portfoho in May 1944.^ * 
Perhaps the most striking example of Kemp's standing with, and management of, the 
organisations under his adminisfration was tiie constraction ofthe Brisbane Graving 
(Caimcross) Dock late in 1942. Amid open scepticism among constraction 
authorities in tiie southem states that Queensland's engineers had the expertise to 
undertake the project, Kemp ^pointed a supervisoty board of technical experts. He 
delegated the dock's constraction to Main Roads and the Department of Harbours 
and Marine, and arranged for the Stanley River Works' Board's technical staff, 
directed by Nimmo, to be seconded to the project. The Co-Ordmator-General was 
officially represented by G. Watson, the Deputy Co-Ordinator-General.^ ^ The 
^' Annual Report of the Auditor-General, 1943-44, p.31, p. 153. 
^ For Main Roads staff working on AWC projects, see, for example, Kay Cohen, 1995, op. cit; 
hiterviews with Jack Savage, 9.9.1993 and 20.10.1994, Jack Gray 7.5.1993, and Lynn Wood 
6.12.1992, Heritage Group Oral History Collection, Recordings of Interviews, (Robert Isedale) 
Main Roads Library. 
'^ Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Main Roads, 1944, p.4, p.7; ibid, 1945, p.8. 
^^  Main Roads Commission, 1949, op. cit. Chapter 8. 
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technical innovations and the quality of constraction, together witii a record 
completion time of twenty-two months, represented a triumph of efficient 
adminisfration and technical excellence, adding to Kent 's stature as an adminisfrator 
and also providing the material for engineering legends. 
Once the urgency of defence works to tiie war effort abated, Theodore and Kemp 
resigned from the AWC m late 1944. Dr L. F. Loder, former chairman ofthe 
Victorian Countiy Roads Board was ^pointed to the Director-General's position, 
prior to his appointment in Febraaty 1945 to the position of Director-General of 
Pubhc Works in the newly-created Commonwealth Department of Public Works. 
Assistant AWC Director-General, C. A. Hoy, was appointed assistant Co-Ordinator-
General^ ^ to Sir Hany Brown who reported to the National Works Council after its 
estabhshment in 1943. By the end of 1943, defence works' expenditure had escalated 
to tiie extent that Commonwealth fimds allocated to Queensland had risen to over 
nine million pounds from the 1940 cost-sharing figure of just under £300,000 while, 
between July 1942 and Febraaty 1945, the AWC's total expenditure in Queensland 
was reported to be spent tiiirty-eight million pounds.^ '* 
Post-War Reconstruction 
hi the post-war period, there was an overall public expectation tiiat govemments 
would act on their promises to improve economic conditions, as much through 
reconstraction and economic development programmes as through better living and 
working conditions. In Queensland, district representatives from both public and 
^' Report cf the Allied Works Council, 1943-35, op. cit. 
^ Annual Report of the Commissioner for Main Roads, 1940, p.l; ibid, 1944, p.3. 
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private sectors, who were vying for works allocations on which local economic 
viability depended, maintained a direct, relentiess pressure on tiie Govemment for 
action. As Co-Ordinator-General and the Govemment's senior technical adviser, 
Kemp was responsible for devising sttatagems to demonsttate tiiat tiie Govemment 
was responding constractively to then demands. Annual departmental reports in this 
period presented an impressively wide range of projects as being undertaken In 
reality, fimding for them was thinly-spread and relatively little progress was made 
either on the huge backlog of basic constraction and maintenance or on new 
developmental works. It was not difficult to conclude that the State funds available 
were totally inadequate for the amount of work required even to restore or provide 
basic services such as roads and water supply to towns and rural communities, let 
alone embark on an ambitious major development programme. Despite the windfall 
increase in railway revenue during the war years, tiie situation was exacerbated by 
continumg high levels of taxation, the diversion of funds to various Trast Funds, 
particularly the Post-War Reconstraction Fund, the Loan Council's tight rein over 
borrowing approvals and Commonwealth conttol over state pubhc works 
programmes through the National Works Council. Moreover, the allocation of fimds 
did not always guarantee a result. The on-gomg shortages of plant, materials and 
labour, together with increasingly aggressive industrial action, caused frequent 
delays or postponement of works schedules. 
Whether out of confidence or necessity, the Queensland Govemment continued 
through these years to present almost the entire co-ordinated works plan to the 
Commonwealth for funding consideration. As with aU the States, Queensland 
benefited from the national pohcy goal of fiiU employment and Commonwealth 
subsidies and borrowing approvals in areas such as housing, roads, reafforestation. 
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hospitals and some health programmes. Seeking to move tiie Commonwealth from 
consideration to commitment on major development projects, Hanlon, ^^ o^ as 
Treasurer in 1944 and Premier from 1946, kept up the pressure at Premiers' 
Conferences, m frequent pubhc armouncements and in equally frequent personal 
correspondence with the Prime Minister. He relied on Kemp not only to determine 
the substance of his discussions with the Commonwealth but also to draft the 
appropriate letters to the Prime Minister, members of State Parhament and the 
various local lobby groups.^ ^ Kemp also drafted relevant enabling legislation, 
negotiated with Federal funding agencies and made well-reasoned recommendations 
for the allocation of state fimdmg resources to keep projects moving forward. That 
Hanlon fulfilled the political role and Kemp the ttaditional advisoty and mstramental 
role ofthe public official was apparent. For as long as Hanlon remained in conttol 
and convmced ofthe political efficacy of development-based policy for 
Queensland's future, Kemp was his most influential adviser. 
However, Kemp had a substantial mfluence on plannmg and implementing state 
development pohcy which derived in large part from his statutoty powers, his 
position as head of eflBcient constraction authorities and the recognition by 
politicians and private sector representatives that he had the Premier's confidence. 
He was dedicated to major mfrastracture developmait as the key to achievmg 
stability through economic growtii. His optimistic, altiiough widely criticised. 
^' See in particular, lobbying re the Burdekin scheme, statement from the Premier sent to relevant 
Ministers, north Queensland members of parhament. North Queensland Chambers of Commerce, 
City and town Councils, Shire Councils and A. L. P. branches, 22.3.1950 (typed copy), SRS 1043-
1-381, QSA. (It should be noted that, when QSA computerised its data access system in 2000, this 
new file numbering system replaced the previous Batch numbers and A/ series systems); Petersen, 
Co-Ordinator-General secretary to Under-Secretary, Chief Secretary 5.7.1950, enclosing draft 
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projections of vsiiat could be achieved by development planning on a grand scale, 
represaited an atfractive confirmation of Hanlon's own, long-standing views. 
Refiising to allow the Commonwealth to withdraw from its post-war commitment to 
nortiiem Austtalian development, they used evety means available to seU 
Queensland projects as national projects. They repeatedly invoked the defence, 
fransport, conununications, increased population and industiy development issues 
tiiat the Commonwealtii had highlighted so enthusiastically in tiie closing years of 
World War Two. Although as Butlin and Schedvin have observed, for various 
reasons, few of these post-war reconstraction plans on a national, co-ordinated scale 
survived the end ofthe war and a change in the national govemment, Queensland did 
persist with the concept of co-ordinated works plans in submitting its post-war 
reconstraction programmes to the National Works Council and to other national 
bodies, such as the Rural Reconstraction Commission and the Northem Development 
Committee. In seeking to maximise Commonwealth input, Queensland included in 
the definition of northem Ausfrahan development, the cenfral Queensland coalfields, 
railways and ports, together with the entire Burdekin scheme until, in 1948, the 
Prime Minister insisted they be excluded.^ ^ Colin Clark was highly critical of these 
manoeuvres. After reading the draft of Kemp's initial report to the Northem 
Ausfralian Development Committee (NADC) in 1946, he objected to several of its 
recommendations. He found it "ludicrous" and potentially damaging to the 
possibility of Commonwealth aid to the sparsely populated north to extend tiie 
boundaty south of Rockhampton. Moreover, he believed it to be "entirely wrong in 
proclamation bringing the Burdekin River Authority Act 1949 into force, and press statement for 
consideration ofthe Premier, 5362/50, SRS 1043-1-381, QSA. 
^ NADC Meeting, 17-19 February 1948, p.3, SRS1043-1-377 QSA. 
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principle" for tiie Queensland Govemment to seek Commonwealtii fundmg for what 
he considered to be normal components of any state works programme.^' 
However, it seemed that tiie pohcy options for securing the anticipated level of post-
war economic growth were lunited. The characterisation of Labor pohcy as "agrarian 
socialism", with its popuhst overtones, was derived almost entirely from an emphasis 
on the government-sponsored, co-operative approach to agricultural production and 
marketing located in the state's regions. The coroUaty has been that Queensland 
failed to develop a secondaty industiy capacity due to the primacy of "raralism" ^^  
This type of analysis correctly identifies one sfrand of Queensland's pohcy 
orientation but it tends to ignore the political and economic realities ofthe 1940s and 
1950s. During World War Two, m his roles as Co-ordinator-General and Deputy-
Director ofthe AWC, Kemp led other senior Govemment officials in pursuing 
opportunities for secondaty industries associated with wartime production to remain 
viable in the post-war period. The Rocklea munitions factoty, whidi was briefly 
considered for conversion to civilian production, and the continued use of 
shipbuilding and repair facilities were cases in point. In the immediate post-war 
period, Kemp stated his belief in the importance of secondaty industries to the State, 
waming that it was "vety dangerous to assert that we must plan to expand rural 
industries without due regard to manufacturing industries and markets" ^ ^ He also 
assisted the Govemment's attempts to link tiie two sectors by encouraging joint 
'^ Clark, Memo, to Rogers, Secretary, Co-Ordinator-General, 25.11.1946, 10786/46, pp.2-3, 
SRS1043-1-838,QSA. 
^ See, for example, Patrick Mullins, "Queensland: Popuhst Politics and Development" in Brian 
Head, (ed.). The Politics of Development in Australia, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pp. 138-39; 
Hughes., 1980, op. cit, pp.5-9; Gough, et al., op. cit, pp. 13-14. 
'^ Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1945, p.6. 
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ventures with outside investors to finance new projects, such as coal-derivative 
industries, in regional locations. 
To facilitate the role of secondaty industty expansion in its national development 
plans, the Commonwealth appouited a Secondaty Industries Commission in 1943, an 
initiative that was taken up by the States. Kemp chaired a special committee ofthe 
State Employment Council appointed to investigate employment-generating projects 
to be used in future discussions with the National Works Council. On this occasion, 
it had a furtiier purpose in fostering secondaty industries in northem Queensland, 
v^^ch was linked with the popularly accepted view that, for defence reasons, it was 
essential to increase the population ofthe region.'*" The committee was replaced m 
1943 by a similarly-oriented Secondaty Industries Division headed by Colin Clark 
and located within the re-organised department of Labour and Industty. However, the 
fraditional protection of heavy industiy based in the southem states and the southem 
monopoly on building materials was again asserted during the late 1940s, even as 
cripphng shortages of steel and cement continued to retard constraction and 
development plans throughout Ausfralia. This protection was extended to the coal 
industty, as demonsfrated by the Commonwealth's rejection of Callide coal supplies 
as the solution to the coal crisis ofthe late 1940s in New Soutii Wales and Victoria.'*' 
There was some validity in the claims by Brisbane-based businessmen that mdustty 
growth was hindered by a punitive tax regime and unwarranted govemment 
intervention in fraditionally private sector activities, even if the ambitions of tiiis 
sector were largely focused on the mefropolitan and south-east Queensland areas. 
^ Courier-Mail, 11.9.1943; Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1944, p.l4. 
"' For Hanlon's stance on this issue, see Hon. E. E. Hanlon, "Queensland's coalfields provide 
hmitless power potential: development would solve Australia's industrial problems", Queensland 
Govemment Mining Journal, June 1951, pp.393-97, p.399, p.401. 
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As had become evident over the long period of Labor Govemment in Queensland, 
tiie State's economic future lay in tiie development and successful marketing of its 
rich primaty resources. Ausfraha's industrial states shared with Britain the view, 
shaped in the colonial era, of Queensland solely as the provider of raw materials for 
industiy. Their view was further enfrenched as secondaty industries geared up again 
in the post-war years, and Queensland was found to lack the necessaty political 
power at the national level to change the status quo. Its most promising opportunities 
for mdustrial development lay with enterprises associated with primaty production 
and the exploitation of mineral resources. Even before the first ofthe State post-war 
reconstraction conferences in 1943, Kemp had been active in the dissemination of 
the concept, advocated chiefly by Forgan Smith, of public investment in long-term 
infrastracture development plans as essential to economic growth. Achievement of 
Labor's pohcy goals of closer settlement, increased population, and regional stability 
through the expansion of primaty resources' production, was dependent on the 
provision of an appropriate infrastracture edacity. In the post-war period, gains had 
been made, with Commonwealth assistance, in rehabilitating existing facihties or 
providing new, basic services. The provision of large-scale infrastracture for 
economic development purposes was required to move the economy forward. For 
example, where Queensland had signed long-term agreements with Britain for sugar 
and meat in the late 1940s, tiiere were doubts about Queensland's capacity to fill tiie 
orders. They arose from the lack of infrastracture such as industrial water and 
electticity supplies, and fransport access to ports and port facilities, together with 
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shortages in everything from constraction materials and wire netting to fertiliser, as 
Queensland remained dependent on interstate suppliers. 
There was general political acceptance ofthe pohcy of regional development, but the 
particular means by which it was to be accomphshed gave rise to tiie sustained 
opposition with vydiich Hanlon's plans were met during this period. Some ofthe most 
aggressive opposition arose from the mtense competition generated among the 
State's towns and regions for works allocations, while not only Labor stalwarts were 
critical of tiie Govemment's plans to involve the private sector. In his statement of 
public works pohcy ui 1945, Kemp gave private employers the major role as 
employment providers, sfressing that "fiill co-operation witii private enterprise is 
essential" to achieve full employment and economic growth. The role assigned to 
public works was "to take up the slack when and where it develops"/*^ Not the least 
ofthe opposition came from the industrial movement which believed, as it had on 
numerous previous occasions, that the Government gave preference to supporting tiie 
small, agricultural producer over improving workers' conditions. In the strike-
dominated post-war years, Kemp's view of labour conditions was govemed by the 
demands of completing a project. With Main Roads works, the Somerset Dam, Stoty 
Bridge and the University of Queensland projects, he had been confronted with union 
demands for increased pay and conditions. On some ofthe projects, he had tried to 
pre-empt industrial unrest by providing improved working conditions and 
recognising speciahst skills with pay loading. In general, he had a mutually 
respectful relationship with senior imion officials but it was necessarily influenced by 
his priorities of retaining his skilled workforce and removing obstacles to the 
completion ofthe project. 
^^ Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1945, p.6. 
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Kemp's responsibility in these years was to chart the most effective course towards 
achieving regional development to explore evety avenue that might yield a 
development opportunity and to co-ordinate the range of resources necessaty to bring 
it to fruition. With the estabhshment in 1943 ofthe National Works Council as tiie 
fiher for Commonwealth and Loan Council approvals for state-based pubhc works, 
he was concemed to encourage all state and local authorities to submit works 
proposals for funding consideration. In 1945, he placed renewed emphasis on the 
original plarming and co-ordinating fimction ofthe Co-Ordinator-General to link, in 
surprisingly human terms, pubhc works planning with the Govemment's pohtical 
objectives. As he outlined it, the aim was: 
... to ensure for the people of this State, where they may reside, and for those 
w^o will be coming home from the war, and fransferring from defence 
industries, full employment witii maximum standards of education, health, 
comfort, and general well-being. These are standards ofthe social service 
state which must be available to all at equally high levels before people can 
be induced to remain, and industries to arise, ui areas remote from large 
cenfres of population.'*^ 
Within the overall pubhc works planning stracture, Kemp ensured tiiat the campaign 
for major works projects remained to the fore. With a confidence almost certainly 
derived from his achievements in completing major defence works during World 
War Two, Kemp advanced his vision of infrastracture planning on a scale scarcely 
entertained previously in Queensland. Whetiier Hanlon had envisaged development 
projects on such a scale in his quest for the realisation of Queensland's economic 
potential was unclear, but he gave unequivocal, pubhc support to Kemp's 
projections. Out of this partnership were initiated most of tiie m^or regional 
"' Ibid,p.l. 
253 
devdopment sdiemes that came to maturity over the following decades under the 
Liberal-Countty Party Coalition Government^ 
Planning for post-war reconstraction in Austtalia began as early as 1941. That year, a 
national post-war planning and reconstraction conference heard J. J. Bradfield 
outiine his view of essential developmental works in a speech vitoch was notable for 
its infroduction of his scheme to divert the coastal rivers of northem Quemsland to 
"water the inland" and provide hydro-electric power for northem industries. He 
proposed the constraction of dams on the Tully, Fhnders, Herbert and Burdekm 
Rivers, claiming that the Burdekin scheme would generate sufficient power for the 
electrification of Queensland's main line railways. In addition, he presented a hst of 
general objectives already articulated in Queensland Parliament and in Kent's 
annual reports as Main Roads Commissioner and Co-Ordinator-General. His 
advocacy of developmental roads and a standard gauge railway to link westem New 
South Wales to Darwin through westem Queensland was less to do with post-war 
planning than with attempting to influence defence works decisions on these 
projects. Projects to counter soil erosion and to finance a national reafforestation 
programme were considered to be long-term prospects, although they were soon 
taken up by Ken^ as appropriate projects for the Bureau of Investigation of Land 
and Water Resources, to wiiich he was appomted chairman in 1943. They were 
subsequently continued m conjunction with tiie various river trasts established m the 
early 1940s and the Co-ordinator-General's schedule of regional surveys. The 
^ For another viewpoint, which assigns all credit to Under-Treasurer (Sir) Leo Hielscher, see 
Humphrey McQueen. Gone Tomorrow; Australian in the 80s, Sydney, 1982, p. 15. 
"•^  J. J. Bradfield, "Better Distribution of Population and Repopulation" in Hon Athol Richardson, 
Report of Addresses delivered before the combined bodies on 'Tost-war Planning and 
Reconstraction", 5.9.1941, "Northem Development", SRS 1043-1-838, QSA. 
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concept of "Nortiiem Austtalia" as a development zone was identified at tiie 1941 
conference as a post-war reconstraction issue. 
While the rationale for development was said to lie principally with defence 
considerations, it necessarily encompassed factors such as increased population and 
associated employment new industries and markets, and the power, water, ttansport 
and communications facilities they required. At the conference, Bradfield had been 
speaking to a prepared agenda, as Queensland was already investigating plans for 
developuig northem Queensland. Early in 1940, the "Stoty report" was submitted to 
the Premier. It was the outcome of investigations carried out by a committee, chaired 
by Colin Clark and with J. D. Stoty and Kemp among its members, into project 
proposals for possible mclusion in the state-wide, co-ordmated development plan. 
Although, at Kemp's suggestion, no further publicity was given to the investigations, 
the committee's recommendations formed the basis of Queensland's post-war 
development plan. They covered the institution of an interlocking system of sub-
committees, each of which was to be responsible for a defined district of Queensland 
to come within the ambit ofthe overall plan. A committee comprised of Kemp as 
chairman, Stoty, the Surveyor-General, and the LAB's chairman, defined and 
m^ped the district of north Queensland which was extended to include Northem 
Territoty'*^ as a forerunner to the concept of "Northem Austtalia" 
The momentum of popular ^proval for post-war development plannmg was carried 
through to a debate in Parliament m September 1941 when the "wish-lists" of 
regional representatives were given a comprehensive airing. The Govemment's 
'^  Neil Smith, Acting Secretary, Co-Ordinator-General, to Under-Secretary, Chief Secretary, 
01497/40, SRS1043 - 3 - . QSA. 
"' Address in Reply, Debate on Post-War Planning, 9.9.1941, QPD 1941, Vol. 177, p.221; ibid 
p.365,p.371. 
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pohcy was given formal standmg with the passing ofthe Fost-War Reconstruction 
and Development Act 1943. Its primaty purpose was to reserve funds through the 
operation of a trust fund under Treasmy confrol to allow immediate unplementation 
of post-war reconstraction programmes once the war had ended. In keepmg with the 
concept of state-wide plarming and co-ordination of pubhc works, the legislation was 
to be read and constraed with the State Development and Fublic Works Organisation 
Act, which was designated the principal Act. Understandably, the Bill excited 
considerable adverse comments among the Opposition. Countty Party MLA, Frank 
Nicklm, led off witii two points, the first questioning the decision to divert over five 
milhon pounds to tiie Post-War Reconstraction Fund when an unfunded debit 
balance of three and a half million pounds remained on the Consohdated Revenue 
account. He went on to argue tiiat, since railway receipts had supphed the bulk ofthe 
revenue to be diverted, the Railway Department should be entitied to a 
commensurate allocation from the Trast Fund.'*^  His point allowed MuUer, the 
Member for Fassifem in the Brisbane Valley, who had a vested interest in securing 
allocations for irrigation projects in his electorate, to reiterate the theme of 
govemment corraption. In his view, the new Trast Fund would be used for pohtical 
purposes in the same way as the defunct Unemployment Relief Fund. Proposmg an 
independent tribunal, "a body similar to the Main Roads Commission", to investigate 
and report to the Govemment on how the money should be spent he supported the 
concept ofthe Trast Fund but ortiy if recommendations for allocations were made on 
an impartial, technical basis, "away from party politics and the questions of securing 
'^  Debate on Supply, 21.9.1943, QPD, 1943, Vol. 181, p.437; Post-War Reconstraction and 
Development Bill, 1943, Second Reading, pp. 1839-40. 
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or making a seat safe" '*^  Stephen Theodore, MLA for tiie northem seat of Herbert 
who was then establishing hunself as an effective lobbyist for northem interests, 
gave his view of post-war reconstraction pohcy goals. In doing so, he set out the 
enduring elements ofthe Govemment's post-war development plan for cenfral and 
northern Queensland: 
A searching investigation should be made into development schemes that will 
be of national importance and value ... The Commonwealth Govemment has 
developed a policy of cenfralisation, wiiereas it is a policy of decenfrahsation 
that the countty needs. I can imagine no more important work of development 
than the thorough investigation of our northem rivers and the great coal 
deposits ofthe State with a view to their utihsation ofthe production of che^ 
elecfric power. ... A pohcy of urigation on a large scale is equally important 
and it is one that carmot much longer be neglected.^ " 
In 1943, E. J. Walsh, the Minister for Pubhc Lands, infroduced legislation to extend 
tiie principle of co-ordination to the management and development ofthe State's land 
and water resources. The Land and Water Resources Development Bill provided for 
the establishment of a Bureau of Investigation with the power to co-opt specialist 
advisers, and to undertake extensive investigations on which planning for 
development projects would be based. Kemp was appointed tiie Bureau's chairman, 
a surprise ^pomtment, according to Powell, smce LAB chairman, W. L. Payne, was 
the more logical appointment and had a vested interest in maintaining the fraditional 
link between lands, and irrigation and water supply fimctions. '^ Apart from his 
influential position and his considerable adminisfrative experience, which Walsh 
clearly valued, Kemp had been associated with irrigation and water conservation 
measures for some years. He assisted the advancement ofthe Border Rivers water 
"' Ibid Vl^4l. 
^ Ibid, PP.IM2-43. 
' ' Land and Water Resources Development Bill, 1943, QPD, 1943, Vol. 181, p. 1421; Powell, op. 
cit, pp. 187-88. 
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conservation project, and had contributed to the drafting ofthe Burdekin River Trust 
Act 1940, tiie provisions of vviiich were also utilised in the Herbert River Trust 
legislation in 1942. Under tiie Trast legislation, the powers ofthe Co-Ordinator-
General were delegated to the Main Roads Commissioner and the relevant shire 
councils to undertake erosion prevention works. These works atfracted the Treasmy 
subsidies infroduced for payment to local authorities for works submitted to, and 
approved by the Co-Ordinator-General.^^ The same year, Kemp had sought the 
Pubhc Service Commissioner's approval for Bridge Board staff, supervised by Chief 
Engineer, J. A. Hoh, to undertake design works and, in association with the then 
Irrigation Commissioner, C. Parkinson, prepare plans and estimates for a number of 
water conservation projects.^ ^ Moreover, Kemp's views on the need for a 
comprehensive approach to planning and developing the State's irrigation and water 
conservation projects in north Queensland along the lines initially proposed by 
Bradfield, were presented virtually as a statement of intent in a series of newspaper 
articles he wrote in late 1944.^ "* 
In 1946, the Irrigation sub-department ofthe LAB was reconstituted as a semi-
independent authority, the Irrigation and Water Supply Commission, headed by a 
sole Commissioner, hydrauhc engmeer, Tom Lang. Lang's avowed mtention was to 
inttoduce a new ^proach to irrigation, water supply and conservation, which 
involved a new direction in development projects and a complete orgarusational 
restructuring. His appointment was a direct challenge to Kemp's dommant influence 
and, Kenq) came under attack in the following months from those opposed to the 
'^  Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1954, p. 18. 
' ' Memo, chairman. Bridge Board, 17.11.1941,247.6.10, R.MO. 307, QTA. 
^ Courier-Mail, 11-14 December, 1944.. 
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excessive concenttation of admirusttative power in one official \\toch, they 
perceived, blocked more progressive measures in this area. 
During the 1947 debate on the Estimates for the Co-ordinator-General, the Premier 
was placed on the defensive, as the Opposition began a sustained attack on the 
Govemment's pubhc works spending priorities. In one sense, it was the usual airing 
by their parhamentaty representatives of constituents' complaints concerning lack of 
development progress in tiieir area, in another sense, it was a direct attack on the Co-
Ordinator-General as tiie mechanism for delivering the Govemmait's works pohcy. 
There were two related complaints, the first being that, because works were said to 
be allocated on a population basis, the allocations were overwhelmingly weighted in 
favour ofthe Brisbane area The second was tiiat tiie Co-Ordinator-General's confrol 
over the process meant tiiat many sound local authority works projects were rejected 
on his recommendation. It was claimed that the Govemment's intention was to 
create, through tihie Co-Ordinator-General, a dictatorship in local govemment 
matters.^ ^ Most Opposition speakers began by commending Kenq) for his work, 
some claiming him as a personal fiiend, but went on to condemn the Co-Ordinator-
General's confrol over the co-ordinated works plan as undermining local govemment 
autonomy. In reply, Hanlon rejected the Opposition's argument that the Burdekin 
scheme was unfair because it would bring benefits to one region above others. He 
went on to explain: 
The supervision exercised by the Co-Ordinator-General over local autiiority 
work is not merely an arbifraty supervision to give a sense of power to the 
Co-Ordmator-General. It is essential today that tiiere should be some confrol 
of all main Govemment and local authority work. It is important that no more 
work should be started than there is labour and material available to cany to a 
successflil conclusion. ^ ^ 
" Siqjply debate, 1947 QPD, 1947-48, Vol 191, p.l243. 
^ Ibid, p.\245. 
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For the first time, Kemp's integrity appeared to be questioned. Tom Aikens, tiie 
Lidependait Member for Mundingburra, claimed that Hanlon's decision in April, 
1944, was a clear example of "pork-barreUing" to win back dissatisfied Labor voters 
in northem electorates.^ ^ Aikens went on to allege a link between votes for Labor and 
the Co-Ordinator-General's funding allocation decisions. It was the closest any 
speaker had come to suggesting tiiat tiie Co-Ordinator-General and the co-ordination 
of works process were open to political influence. Aikens later denied making any 
such statement claimmg he had said; "wdien seeking votes, the Labour Party 
indulges in political blackmail", not that "the COG was indulging m political 
blackmail" ^^  
Despite other govemment speakers rising to Kemp's defence, the Opposition 
developed what was to become a constant theme of attacks on Kemp over the 
following years. Sparkes (Aubigny), developed the theme of excessive centralisation 
of control as represented by Kemp. He agreed that overlapping responsibilities made 
it more efficient to have one official as Main Roads Commissioner and Co-
Ordinator-General but then expounded on the consequences of human frailty. He 
said that Kemp was overworked, arguing that as a resuh, he made mistakes in his 
decisions and was more vuhierable to political influence. Moreover, v^ere powers 
are delegated to such a degree, it opened the way for decisions to be influenced by 
"the official's aims, >\4iether personal or professional" ^^  A final, effective ploy was 
to praise Kemp for his outstanding record of work during World War Two, only to 
" Ibid,p.\21\. 
^ Ibid,p.\212,p.\215. 
^ Ibid p. 1276 
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dismiss it as belonging in the past. The judgment was that Kemp was in poor health, 
and too overworked either to discharge his responsibilities impartially or to respond 
constractively to new challenges. What was needed to resolve the situation was to 
appoint progressive technical specialists, "better men ... to accept the responsibility 
of developing the State" °^ Hanlon's defence of Kemp was equivocal. He painted a 
picture of a totally dedicated official predisposed to working at high pressure to 
discharge his responsibilities wiiile at the same time intimating that the Govemment 
shared at least some ofthe Opposition's concems: 
I do not view with any degree of pleasure the amount of work that is imposed 
on Mr Kemp and the amount of responsibility he is canymg. As the 
Govemment's chief technical adviser he gets a great many things given to 
him for advice that normally would not be before him at all. Tod^ we have 
so many problems on our hands that all technical advisers are overworked. ^ ^ 
The responsibility for co-ordinating the planning and implementation of 
Queensland's entire post-war public works and infrastracture development rested 
with Kemp. More than that however, he was still determinedly seeking 
Commonwealtii fundmg support for a growing number of m^or projects, effecting 
investigations into the feasibility of expandmg the scope of many of tiiem, and giving 
enthusiastic consideration to proposals for private capital investment in Queensland 
development. His cqiadty to administer the responsibilities the Govemment 
continued to load on him while dectying the need to do so, was directly related to the 
operation ofthe committee system v^ich was used extensively in post-war 
reconstraction and development planning and decision-making processes at both 
intergovernmental and interdepartmaital levels. 
^ Ibid,p.l235, p.1293. 
Ibid, p.1299. 
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During the war and post-war years, proposals to fransfer state responsibilities to the 
Commonwealth, followed by their failure to be given effect through changes to the 
Ausfralian Constitution, resulted in the negotiation of Federal-State power-sharing 
agreements in areas previously the exclusive responsibility ofthe States. The 
agreements extended to matters relating to post-war reconstraction and development 
planning and involved a more conprehensive role for Commonwealth funding grants 
to the States. Analysts of intergovernmental relations have argued for tilie 
characterisation of this period as coercive federalism to signify the Federal 
Govemment's edacity to achieve state compliance through financial dominance but 
in the adminisfrative context a defining characteristic was the large number of 
advisoty and enabling committees which underpirmed any formal arrangements. As 
Wiltshire has outlined, such committees were established to achieve uniformity of 
administtation and to prevent administtative duphcation and overlapping in a shared 
fiinctional area^ ^ although, m tiie case of post-war reconstraction planning, they 
tended to be used as a filtermg or delaying mechanism on the part ofthe 
Cormnonwealth. In addition to the committees of officials which were attached, for 
example, to the Premiers' Conferences and the Commonwealth-State grants 
arrangements, Kemp was the Queensland representative, together witii I. W. Morley, 
the State Mining Engineer, ofthe Officers' Committee of tiie Commonwealth's 
Northem Ausfralian Development Committee, through which Queensland pursued its 
*^  For a summary of this viewpoint, see Ross Cranston, 'Trom Co-operative to Coercive Federahsm 
and Back?", Federal Law Review, 10, 1979, pp. 121-142; K. W. Wiltshire, (comp. & ed.) 
Administrative Federalism: Selected Documents in Australian Govemment Administration, St. 
Lucia: UQP, 1977; see also, comments by H. C. Coombs on the 1944 Commonwealth-State 
Housing Agreement which he judged to be "an illustration of effective co-operation" Coombs, op. 
cit, pp.69-70. 
*^  Wiltshire,/Wrf, p.5. 
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goal of gaining Commonwealth funding support for regional infrastracture 
development projects. 
Undertaking a comprehensive overview of British machinety-of-govemment 
committees up to the post-war period, Wheare noted how prolific they were, citing 
Churchill's reluctance to establish yet more of them since, as he observed in 
exasperation; "We are overrun by them, hke the Austtahans were by the rabbits", 
and acknowledged the difficulties of producing a clear analysis of their myriad 
forms, fimctions and outcomes.*" In Austtalia, interdepartmental committees have 
remained largely imresearched, with the work by Painter and Carey being confined to 
those relating to Commonwealth departments and functions. Interestingly, one 
criterion they identify for this form of committee is that they represent "the meeting 
of nominal equals" w^ere departments with their own areas of responsibility find 
themselves with overlapping functions, so that "co-ordination becomes a problem of 
mutual agreement ratiier than cenfral confrol by command" *^  Kerrq) was either 
chairman or a member of nearly evety Queensland Govemment "advisoty" 
committee on post-war public works and infrastracture development matters, but co-
option under tiie Co-Ordmator-General's statutoty powers was usually the basis of 
their establishment and operation Wheeler notes that, since Treasuty did not regard 
the Co-Ordinator-General's powers as threatening its own status, the relationship 
between the two departments was generally co-operative, allowing Kemp to manage 
his spread of responsibilities within a smootiily and effectively run administtative 
system. 
^ K. C. Wheare, Govemment By Committee: An Essay on the British Constitution, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1955, Chapter 1, quoting British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, The 
Second World War, Vol 2, Their Finest Hour, Sydney: Cassell & Co., 1949, p.606. 
" Martin Painter & Bernard Carey, Politics Between Departments, St. Lucia: UQP, 1979, p.3. 
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Inevitably, as witii the heads ofthe new department of Local Govemment and the 
SEC,** tiiere was some resentment of Kemp's co-ordinating role and the conttol over 
their own organisational goals it conferred on him. Wheeler argues that Kenp took 
the path of avoiding confrontation in tiiese situations because "he was m a weaker 
position than he admitted", presumably in relation to his powers of compulsion. It is 
more hkely that, given his broad experience of dealing with bureaucrats and pohtical 
representatives over issues of works co-ordination, he viewed compulsion itself as a 
weak basis for interdepartmental relationships, preferring to advance as far as 
possible towards satisfactoty outcomes through negotiation and compromise. 
The function ofthe m^ority ofthe advisoty and investigative committees under 
Kemp's direction was to gather and analyse relevant information on the State's 
proposed and actual developmental projects. The fact that the committees were 
estabhshed was used to reassure commimity interests ofthe Govemment's mtention 
to fidfil its on-going commitment to development particularly in regional 
Queensland. The specialist mput of their members provided the technical base for 
planning and developing specific projects as well as tiie rational base on v^ich 
Queensland built its case for fundmg its overall post-war reconstraction plan as a 
national development undertaking. 
In 1947, Colin Clark visited England on the Queensland Govemmait's behalf, with a 
brief to seek out and encourage potential investors in development projects in 
Queensland. Apart from some speculative response, such as the investigation by 
^ Wheeler, op. cit, p. 94, relates how Charles Chuter, the Acting Director of Local Authority Affairs 
"went over the head ofthe Co-Ordinator-General" during the 1942 defence crisis to obtain Cabinet 
approval for local sewerage works projects. Thomis, op. cit.,, p. 10. 
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British textile firm, Courtauld's, into estabhshing a rayon factoty in Brisbane,*' the 
outcome devolved onto two major projects, development ofthe Blair Athol coalfield 
and the Queensland-British Food Corporation scheme to grow food for Britam at 
Peak Downs in the Cenfral Highlands. The British Govemment had an important role 
in both of them, while the development of Blair Athol was intertwined with 
Commonwealth-State funding negotiations and the re-development of Queensland's 
port and harbour facilities. 
With the Blair Athol coalfield, Kemp had a highly visible role in promoting its 
development, taking an active part in tiie complex negotiations for funding support, 
and initiating and co-ordinating an extensive technical information base on its future 
prospects. However, his enthusiastic assessment of its value and his consequent plan 
for large-scale development as part ofthe new era for centtal Queensland, was 
sfrongly criticised as over-optimistic and unrealistic.*^ Blair Athol, near the centtal 
Queensland town of Clermont had been important during World War Two as a 
reliable source of coal supphes for the railways. Official interest commenced m 1946 
when Kemp chaired a committee to investigate tiie extension and future development 
of its coal resources. The report produced from detailed investigations carried out at 
by tiie Co-Ordinator-General and tiie Director ofthe Bureau of Industty under the 
committee's direction, was referred to the Nortiiem Development Committee. With 
that Committee's endorsement of Blair Athol's potential contribution to northem 
development Kemp pursued discussions between State and Commonwealth 
Govemments for Commonwealth assistance with large-scale, fully mechanised 
development ofthe field and the provision of ttansport access. The discussions were 
67 Ibid, 1948,pp.28-29. 
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based on the belief that, with the ready access to coal deposits the recent changeover 
to open-cut mining provided, Blair Atiiol represented tiie quickest means of 
increasing coal supplies to alleviate Austtalia-wide shortages.*^ As Kemp concluded 
in 1946, open-cut minmg at Blair Athol dehvered a higher tonnage of coal more 
quickly than traditional mining methods and offered a source of che^ power for 
centtal Queensland. However, development ofthe field to its fiill potential was 
dependent not only on large-scale mechanisation but also on the availabihty of 
fransport to ports, and adequate storage and loading facilities at these ports,'" all of 
vMch required substantial capital investment. To maintain the open-cut production 
v^le negotiations for fiinduig support continued, the Queensland Goverrunent 
placed a large order for coal. The immediate problem of obtaining plant was solved 
by Thiess (Qld) Ltd, one of a handfiil of private firms with access to the necessaty 
heavy equipment Convinced it was a viable commercial opportunity, the firm 
confracted with the Blair Athol lessees to remove the overburdai and exfract the 
coal, beginning an association with the field which was to last for a decade'^  and 
which, within a few years, was extended to the Callide field. The difficulties of 
increasing production to the levels envisaged were evident even then, as it was two 
years before the order was filled. 
While its terms of reference specified that projects investigated and approved by 
NADC were to be wholly financed by the States, this did not deter the States from 
lobbying for Commonwealth funding on the basis ofthe Committee's ^proval. 
^ Kerry Killin, Drovers, Diggers and Draglines: A History of Blair Athol and Clermont, Pacific 
Coal Pty. Ltd., 1984, p.60. 
® Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1946, p. 10. 
™ Ibid, p.U. 
" Joan Priest, The Thiess Story, Brisbane: Boolarong, 1981, pp.59-61. 
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Kemp and Moriey were the Queensland representatives on tiie Officers' Committee, 
chaired by H. C. Coombs, tiien Director-General of tiie Deparhnait of Post-War 
Reconstraction. The Coombs Committee reported to a pohcy sub-committee ofthe 
principal Committee, tiie members of wWch were tiie Prime Minister, the Minister 
for tiie Interior, and the Premiers of Westem Ausfralia and Queensland. Although 
there were benefits to be derived from bringing project proposals to the attention of 
the Commonwealth under the umbrella of northem development it was soon 
confirmed that the Committee was little more than a pohtical exercise or, at best a 
pohcy "think-tank". As Kemp commented, after it took a series of meetings in 
Canberra and Melboume tiiroughout 1946 for the Officers Committee to produce its 
first report: "(the report) should enable the Policy Committee to lay down a general 
pohcy on which a continuous and long-term programme for development can be 
based" The Committee's role was one of pohcy definition and any initiatives for 
action were to remain in the States' hands. Coombs later conceded the doubts that 
always existed about Commonwealth involvement in grand plans for northem 
development witii no provision for Commonwealth funding. NADC had been 
estabhshed by Curtin who beheved it necessaty to demonsttate Ausfraha's capacity 
to populate and develop its northem regions for defence purposes. Coombs was one 
of a number of senior officials who argued that the adverse climatic conditions and 
isolation from the rest ofthe countty necessitated unjustifiably high levels of cq}ital 
investment to realise the grand schemes so enthusiastically promoted in the post-war 
period. He confirmed that, as early as 1948, Commonwealth support for northem 
development had declined to a position of influencing economic priorities in State 
project planning. A proposal to hand over its functions to a full-time agency with 
Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1947, p. 16. 
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executive powers was rejected and the Committee was subsequently disbanded.^ ^ 
The fraditional emphasis on development in the New South Wales-Victorian axis 
was reasserted. 
It was against this background that Queensland, encouraged by British interest m 
investment in resources development investigated joint-venture opportunities for 
craittal Queensland coal and for Blair Athol m particular. Negotiations initiated in 
Britain by Sam Cochran, Queensland Electricity Commissioner, and continued by 
Hartion, led to tiie Queensland Parhament assenting to the Electric Supply 
Corporation (Overseas) Ltd Agreement Act 1947. Under the provisions of tiie Act, 
the British-based Electric Supply Corporation (ESC) was granted a franchise for the 
development ofthe field, with responsibility for field surveys, constraction of a 
township, and railway to a central Queensland port, as well as the provision of 
harbour facilities. A report produced under Kemp's direction outiining Blair Athol's 
potential production edacity and plans for an extensive export ttade was the major 
factor in the Corporation's decision to proceed with the project. 
Morley and Kemp had succeeded in having Blair Athol hsted with NADC as a 
project warranting specific development action.^ '* On this basis, talks between 
Queensland and Commonwealtii representatives continued, with hopes for 
Commonwealth support being kept alive by tiie formation of a joint Commonwealth-
State Technology Committee to examine the problems identified and prepare 
estimates of development costs. Kemp was vety much the force behind this 
Comnuttee. He directed its investigations, gathering information from both 
" Coombs, op. cit, pp.70-71. 
'^' H. C. Coombs, Chairman, NADC, to Hanlon, 3.9.1946, SRS1043-1-838, 8028/46, QSA;Annual 
Report cfthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1947, p. 17. See also, I. W. Morley. "Post-War mining 
exploration in Queensland" in Queensland Govemment Mining Journal, June 1950, pp.527-28. 
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Commonwealtii and State sources, and arranging for Queensland officials to tour 
southem coal mining areas. The development of Blair Athol was the immediate goal, 
possibly as it was already in operation. The jouit Committee concluded that, despite 
the aheady well-documented barriers to mcreased production, tiiere were "no 
mechanical or fransport difficulties that could not be overcome"7^ While this 
conclusion may have been acceptable as a long-term goal, the Conmiittee's report of 
which Kemp was considered to be the author, went on to outhne exfraordinarily 
optimistic projections of Blair Atiiol's future. He forecast armual production figures 
of 1.3 million tons after the conqjlete mechanisation ofthe field and set out plans for 
a bunkering and export frade supported by a dedicated collier fleet to ship one 
milhon tons of coal per annum to the soutiiem states. Expansion of frade mto South-
East Asia would be dependent on production levels reaching three million tons per 
aimum and the active involvement ofthe Commonwealth Govemment in securing 
these markets.^ * 
As the Peak Downs scheme also demonsfrated, Kemp was excited about any 
opportunities to introduce large-scale mecharusation for resources development For 
him, open-cut mining meant greater efficiency as it could be undertaken by a small 
group of skilled plant operators ratiier than a large workforce of strike-prone miners. 
Moreover, the new technology had already proved to be cost-efificiait under more 
difficult conditions in botii Britain and the Uruted States.^' It is not clear whether the 
report was influenced by his atfraction to these technological advances or v^ dietiier it 
was just one of a range of tactics employed to move the cental Queensland 
development agenda along. What is certain is tiiat Kemp's vision for tiie future might 
" Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1947,, p. 17. 
'' Ibid 
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have been unrealistic at tiie time but all his projections in terms of mechanisation, 
fransport and port infrastracture, and the extent of tiie export frade based on cenfral 
Queensland coal resources, were subsequently realised. 
As open-cut operations had commenced on a small, but promising scale at the 
Callide field, the Queensland Govemment also engaged British mining consultants, 
Powell Duffiyn Pty. Ltd., in 1947 to investigate Queensland's coal resources with a 
view to planning their overall development Their conq)rehensive survey and a r^ort 
on then recommendations, submitted to Parliament in September 1949, appeared to 
have little impact on the prevailmg direction of development activity. Other events 
occurring during that period had a more determining influence. Despite private coal 
interests objecting to an extension of govemment confrol ofthe industiy, the Coal 
Industry (Control) Act 1948 provided for a Queensland Coal Board to bring the 
efficiency of cenfrahsed adminisfration to coal production and marketing. The 
granting ofthe Blair Athol franchise had already raised concems about tiie 
Govemment's right to enter into agreements with private developers without proper 
assurances as to their financial stability. When there had been no fiirther work 
undertaken on the field by the end of 1949, the ESC's edacity to raise the twelve 
milhon pounds required to fulfil the terms ofthe agreement was widely questioned.^ ^ 
The Blair Athol project was further undermined by the adverse report m November 
1949 of German mining experts retained by the Commonwealth Govemment which 
concluded that on a cost-efficiency basis, there were otiier, more promising, coal 
" Ibid, \946„ p.U. 
'* For a comment on opposition to the Blair Athol scheme, see Lack, op. cit., p.342. 
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development options. Kemp remained confident having already explained that 
considerable time was required for prehminaty investigations and tests before any 
constraction work commenced.*" He produced a revised plan for a staged 
development in line with reduced production and marketing targets. While 
subsequently demonsfrated to be feasible, it was not enough to save the grand 
scheme w^en the ESC withdrew, conceding that the capital investment required was 
beyond the corporation's resources. 
The experience of Blair Athol had demonsfrated that co-ordinating fransport facilities 
to provide cheap carriage of goods to coastal ports was essential to the successful 
development ofthe coalfields. Measures were in place to improve road and rail 
access but as the problem of coal stockpiling and lack of storage on the wharf at 
Gladstone showed, port facilities along the coast were totally inadequate to handle 
the export frade on v^ich, as Kemp had outluied in his earlier report the cenfral 
Queensland development fdan depended. Govemment intervention was, 
consequently, extended to the operations of locally-constituted Harbour Boards 
vsiiich admmistered the major coastal ports on a part-time basis. Obhged to raise 
their own debenture loan funding, the Boards had been badly disadvantaged since the 
Depression years, and most of them were m arrears with debt repayments. The 
only work of any significance undertaken during tiiat period was tiie constraction of 
tiie Mack^ Outer Harbour, an initiative ofthe then Premier, Forgan Smith, to assist 
the district's sugar industty. Although facilities were installed at some ports for 
defence purposes, the high level of use and lack of maintenance funding during war-
time had, as with all ttansport mfrastracture, left them in poor condition. The ports 
" CoMner-Mji7, 6.11.1949. 
*° Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1948, p. 17. 
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under tiie confrol of Treasuty, tifrough tiie Department of Harbours and Marine, had 
fared no better 
According to Glen Lewis, the lack of political mterest m port development was offset 
by tiie "administtative initiative" spearheaded by Kemp as a component of post-war 
reconstraction planning.*"^  In 1944, Kemp chaired the Ports Inquuy Commission 
appointed to assess the financial position of harbour boards and ports and to 
recommend a long-term development programme. Clearly influenced by the Boards' 
seemingly inttactable fmancial difficulties and the mtimation of inefficient local 
administtation, the Commission's report presented two years later made a sfrong 
recommendation for the estabhshment of a cenfral authority to administer the 
development programme, together with govemment representation on the Boards. It 
also recommended the creation of a Queensland Harbour Trast to administer the port 
of Brisbane and those ports under Treasuty confrol.*^ As Kemp pointed out the 
recommendations were not new, being similar to those made by the 1937 Royal 
Commission on Transport. They represented a logical step towards dealing with the 
dauntingly expensive and complex re-stracturing requirements but t h ^ were 
defeated at tiie time by opposition to cenfralised govemment confrol being imposed 
over local authority fimctions. 
In the immediate post-war period, Kemp's priority was to consohdate the gains made 
during the war in relation to Brisbane's port facilities and ship-building industty. The 
completion ofthe Brisbane Graving Dock under extremely difficult conditions had 
been a personal triumph for him. Determined to keep it and the South Brisbane Dty 
Dock m use, he conducted an aggressive, but unsuccessful, pubhc campaign to divert 
*' Ibid, 1946, p.S. 
^ Glen A. Lewis, A History ofthe Ports of Queensland, St. Lucia: UQP, 1973, p.265. 
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a share ofthe Australian Navy's ship-repair work away from southem ports. He was 
more successful with the plan for the expansion of port facilities at Hamilton, 
including provision for coal storage and handling facilities allied to expansion ofthe 
centtal Queensland coalfields, and the development of industrial sites on adjacent 
reclaimed land. To implement the ambitious plan to develop an industrial, port and 
aviation complex in one riverside location required a high degree of co-ordination 
among departments and this was achieved under Kemp's chairmanship ofthe 
Hamilton Lands Committee formed in July 1949. Progress in establishing the 
modem port complex envisaged by Kemp was disappointingly slow and it was 
eventually overshadowed by tiie relocation of port facilities to tiie mouth ofthe river. 
However, in Lewis' view, the Co-Ordinator-General's initiative in producing tiie 
soundly-formulated 1944 plan, together with the benefits of private investment in 
port facilities demonsttated by the Hamilton Lands Corrunittee's initiatives, paved 
the way for the re-development of Queensland's ports and harbours during the 
1950s.*'* 
In 1948, Kenp was appointed Deputy Chairman ofthe Queensland-British Food 
Corporation. The Corporation was formed to develop what was generally referred to 
as the "Peak Downs" scheme, named after the pastoral property in Queensland's 
Cenfral Highlands. The scheme grew from a broad agreement between the 
Queensland and British Govemments for the production of food to help alleviate 
Britain's severe post-war food shortage. Previously, Britain's Overseas Food 
Corporation (OFC) had sought access to land in non-doUar, preferably 
*' Annual Report ofthe Co-ordinator-General, 1946, p. 8. 
^ Lewis, op. cit, p.266. 
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Commonwealtii, countries for the production of ground-nut oil as a high-energy food 
source and, to this end, had already invested in an ultimately disasfrous giant East 
African groundnuts scheme. A Corporation Mission visited Queensland early in 1948 
to investigate the possibility of establishing a similar scheme, following Cohn 
Clark's representations to the Ministiy of Food in London the previous year. The 
Mission was led by the OFC's Chairman, (Sir) Leslie Plummer, and included 
ofificials from the British Treasmy and tiie Ministty of Food. Under Kemp's 
direction, the Bureau of Investigation had surveyed the Peak Downs district some 
years before and found its badly neglected grazing lands suitable for rehabihtation 
and fliture agricultural development Co-opting an appropriate group of departmental 
officials to accompany them, he personally conducted tiie visitors on a tour ofthe 
Centtal Highlands. 
As Plummer reported soon afterwards to the British Minister of Food, the Hon. John 
Sttachey, Austtalia was unsuitable for ground nut production, but Queensland 
offered a promising opportunity for "grain and pig meat production and sunflowers 
for the oil" *^  Impressed by the vast acres of degraded pasture land lymg 
undeveloped, because local graziers believed it was beneath them to convert to 
farming, he noted the unwillingness of tiie Queensland Govemment to be associated 
with, "any work of agricultural rehabilitation that can be described as state 
enterprises ... " ** This was clearly a reference to the need for the Corporation to be 
seen as the instigator ofthe scheme in the aftermath ofthe expensive failure of 
Labor's venture into State-owned business enterprises. Premier Hanlon had been an 
active proponent ofthe food production scheme smce Clark's initial approach to the 
'^ PlummertoHon. John Strachey, Minister of Food, 17.3.1948, Queensland-BritishFood 
Corporation, (QBFC) A/19968, QSA. 
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British Govemment. Despite criticism that, in endorsmg "corporate as against family 
farmmg",*^ it went against established Labor pohcy, he welcomed the prospect of a 
British Goverrunent investment of almost two million pounds m Queensland 
agriculture. It promised a new era of opporturuties for the State Govemment to share 
the burden of mfrastracture fimdmg, while auguring well for the State's export frade 
relationship with Britain on the eve of Hanlon negotiating favorable new sugar and 
meat supply agreements. 
Kemp supported the Premier in his enthusiasm for rural development projects, but 
was also atfracted by the opportunity to test what was, for Queensland, an irmovative, 
technically-based approach to mcreasing agricultural production. Late in Febraaty 
1948, Hanlon and Plummer met to decide on the provisions for a formal agreement 
between tiie Queensland and British Govemments to estabhsh the Queensland-
British Food Corporation (QBFC). Plummer, representing the seventy-five per cent 
uivestment ofthe British Government was ^pointed Chairman, while Kemp, as the 
Queensland Govemment's representative, was to be Vice-Chairman. At the 
meeting, it became clear that, witii his capacity for co-ordmation, his access to the 
Co-Ordinator-General's statutoty powers and his knowledge of, and relationship 
with, other departments, Kent's participation was essential to the scheme's viability. 
The Corporation's dommant British membership was responsible for major pohcy 
decisions but delegated the scheme's management to Kemp. 
'" Ibid 
*' Murphy, "Agriculture", op. cit, p.216. 
^ Copy of confidential document from meeting between Plummer and Hanlon, 25.2.1948, QBFC, 
A/19968, QSA 
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Before returning to Britain, Plummer sfressed tiie necessity for an immediate start in 
order to meet production requirements. Having consulted with British Treasmy 
officials, Kemp drafted the enabling legislation vviiich Hanlon presented to the 
Queensland Parhament m March. The Queensland-British Food Corporation Act 
1948 provided for the estabhshment ofthe Corporation to operate the proposed 
scheme. The Queensland Govemment agreed to supply one-quarter ofthe required 
coital to a maximum of £500,000, with the balance to be provided by the British 
Govemment or by Corporation borrowings from other sources. The appointments of 
Plummer as Chairman and Kemp as Deputy-Chairman were confirmed, and they 
were joined on the Corporation's Board by Treasiuy Under-Secretaty, E. A. Crosser. 
On his resignation from Treasmy in 1948, Crosser was replaced by the new Under-
Secretaty, R. L. Murray. Labour and Industty's interests were represented by the 
appointment as assistant Adminisfration Manager, of Colin Clark's protege, 
economist H. Herbert. Kemp arranged for W. A. Rogers, his secretaty at the Co-
Ordinator-General, to be seconded to the Corporation as Adminisfration Officer, and 
placed the resources ofthe Co-Ordinator-General at its disposal until such time as a 
separate adminisfration was estabhshed. Kemp also took on the responsibility of 
negotiating property resumptions. After the LAB failed to negotiate the outright 
purchase of selected properties, he was authorised to utilise the State Development 
and Pubhc Works Organisation legislation to resume them, after which they were 
leased to the Corporation at a nominal rent.^ ^ In an attempt to cut off opposition to 
the extensive, and sometimes vaguely defined powers ceded to the Corporation, the 
Premier made much ofthe duty of Austtahans as "Christian, civilised people" to 
assist less fortunate countries. 
Report ofthe Co-ordinator-General, 1948, p.27. 
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Since, in the normal course of events, the LAB had responsibility for new 
agricultural settiement projects, the involvement ofthe Co-Ordinator-General in the 
Peak Downs scheme represented an unusual addition to the already extensive range 
of development activities witii which Kemp was associated. The reasons for his 
involvement appeared to be directly related to the usefulness ofthe Co-Ordinator-
General's status and statutoty powers at that time and also the qipeal to Kenp of a 
scientific approach to agricultural resource development In the end, it provided the 
means by which he was able to extend his term as Co-Ordinator-General beyond 
even the statutoty retirement age of seventy years for officials appointed by 
Parhament. 
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6. 
THE FINAL YEARS 
In October 1949, at the age of sixty-six, Kemp was re-appointed Co-Ordinator-General 
for a further three-year term. The same month, doctors unsuccessfully urged him to take 
three months rest from his public duties after he suffered another heart attack. By this 
time, Hanlon was also ill, and his health continued to deteriorate until his death in 
January 1952. But for these two sick men, both in the final stage of tilieir long public 
careers, the late 1940s and early 1950s were years of intense activity. As Labor 
straggled to hold on to office in a climate of increasing dissatisfaction with its policies 
and actions, Hanlon came to depend even more on Kemp to make good his election 
promise of economic growth through state-wide development. That this dependence was 
no secret was supported by a leading Brisbane journalist's description of Kemp at that 
time as the Govemment's senior adviser on "general affairs" who was "behind most of 
the Govemment moves in the last years for the advancement of Queensland"/ 
In the period from 1949 to 1954, several projects with which Kemp had a long 
involvement were completed. While others remained in the limbo of investigations and 
fiinding negotiations, he continued to pursue the goals of post-war reconstraction 
relating to cenfral and north Queensland development. Although he officially 
relinquished his position as Main Roads Commissioner in June 1949, any vacuum that 
H. J. Summers, "Sir John Kemp", Courier-Mail, 7.6.1951; Memo on Tour of the Main Roads 
Commissioner, J. R. Kenq), and A. R. Williams, MRC job file 10.5.3., C/D No. 1342, QTA. 
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might have been created was immediately filled by new responsibilities and an expanded 
role for both the Co-Ordinator-General and the Bureau of Investigation. Critics of tilie 
Government's enthusiasm for projects that were invariably under Kemp's confrol still 
argued that the consequence of over-dependence on one official was inefficiency. 
However, as he had done in the past, Kemp met the challenge by utilising his existing 
organisational network to accommodate any new fimctions. He kept the Main Roads 
building as his operational centre and Main Roads as his overall support base to 
maintain the short lines of administrative confrol which had always served him so well. 
Until late 1951, the offices ofthe Co-Ordinator-General were located in the Main Roads 
building. From there, he also carried out his duties as Chairman ofthe Queensland-
British Food Corporation, the Bureau of Investigation, the Burdekin River Bridge Board 
and the Burdekin River Authority.^ The appointment of a secretary to each of them 
preserved their separate identities, although the boundaries remained flexible and there 
were interchanges of personnel and duties as the need arose. The small clerical 
establishment attached to the Co-Ordinator-General provided the liaison among his 
various functional responsibilities and, with input from Main Roads' clerical and 
technical staff on a state-wide basis, freed him from involvement in routine matters. 
While he no longer had the previous formal confrol over Main Roads, he still had input 
into its operations, since it remained one of his most valuable assets when it came to 
demonsfrating that progress was being made, especially in relation to politically 
^ See, for example, letter and margin notes, G. W. Watson, for Chairman ofthe Burdekin Bridge Board, 
to D. A Crawford, Main Roads Commission, 23.1.1946, R.M.O. 315, QTA 
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sensitive projects. As well as its own construction work. Main Roads undertook design 
and supervisory work on projects for other departments and local authorities, as well as 
preliminary surveys on a range of major projects in collaboration with the Co-Ordinator-
General and the Bureau of Investigation. More than once, Kemp virtually borrowed 
from Main Roads' fiinds to finance the early stages of a project when no other funding 
was available. Technical staff were seconded to projects, and Kemp reUed almost 
entirely on Main Roads staff to provide the instant administrative stmcture required to 
establish the Peak Downs scheme. Meetings ofthe committees and authorities of which 
he was Chairman were usually held in the Co-Ordinator-General's office. The 
composition of these bodies streamlined what might have become an unwieldy planning 
and consultation process for him. Their members included senior Main Roads and Co-
Ordinator-General engineering staff and some ofthe small group of senior departmental 
officials and technical experts with whom he had worked for many years. 
By this time, Kemp took little part in the routine of compiling the aimual co-ordinated 
plan of works covering govemmental and local authority works programmes. He was 
already well-acquainted with most ofthe programmes as they had required his approval 
before submission to the National Works Council for inclusion in the national reservoir 
of works. Within the framework of post-war reconstmction priorities and the borrowing 
limits determined by the Loan Council, public works' allocations had become set in a 
predictable pattem. The routine processes were handled by the Deputy Co-Ordinator-
General, G. W Watson, assisted by the Co-Ordinator-General's Chief Engineer, James 
Holt. When the Premier directed that, on Watson's retirement, his duties should be 
shared among other staff members, Kemp received Gair's approval for Holt to be 
responsible for finalising the co-ordinated plan and to liaise with Treasury on the 
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approved loan plan. Kemp's statutory responsibility was to "fine-tune" the overall 
works programme, and its associated expenditure from various funding sources, before 
recommending it for submission for Loan Council approval. Each year, he reported in 
detail to Parliament on the factors influencing the framing ofthe co-ordinated plan. Post-
war shortages and an urgent need for housing, highlighted in 1949, gave way in 
subsequent years to rebuilding fransport infrastmcture, constmcting hospitals, and 
providing for electricity and water supply schemes,"* although the changing priorities 
remained within established National Works Council parameters. 
The discussions Kemp had in Canberra with the National Works Council co-ordinator. 
Loan Council officials and his counterparts from other states, had always been important 
in the process of shaping Queensland's works programme. They ensured that the 
programme's components were both acceptable to the Loan Council and reflected the 
State Govemment's own priorities. In the 1950 and 1951 co-ordinated plans, he 
recommended for cabinet approval provision for anticipated expenditure on the major 
north Queensland irrigation and hydro-electricity schemes, at a time when the decision 
to proceed with the schemes was still being contested. Whether or not his 
recommendations were predominantiy influenced by rational planning, political 
considerations or his own preferences, he was freading a fine line in terms of pubhc 
acceptance of his official neufrality. Acknowledged as the Govemment's most 
influential adviser whose recommendations Cabinet rarely rejected, he was as much a 
target as the Premier and the "development" Ministers for attacks on the credibility of 
^ Kemp to Chief Secretary, 6.1.1953, Minute, 5737/53, SRS 1043-1-3121, QSA 
"* See, for example Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1950, pp .1-3. 
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tiie Govemment's policy which seemed to be promoting "airy-fairy schemes" it was 
clearly unable to deliver. The difficulties of his position were exacerbated when, as Co-
Ordinator-Greneral, Kemp was obliged to announce the deferral of some ofthe approved 
works. It was a consequence ofthe Loan Council's decision to cut the overall loan 
programme, following the disclosure that some ofthe fimds previously allocated under 
the co-ordinated plan remained unspent. Kemp's response to his critics was to emphasise 
that decisions conceming the development ofthe State had to be the outcome of a 
rational planning process. Given the circumstances under which the decision was made, 
he considered it necessary to reappraise that process: 
... to probe much more deeply into the reservoir of works with the view to the 
avoidance of haphazard plarming but, on the other hand ensuring that the proper 
priority is allotted to the various projects. This policy is being adopted in the 
preparation ofthe State programme of works.^  
In the same context, he defended the controversial decision to proceed with the North 
Queensland irrigation and hydro-electricity projects, stating that it would not mean the 
exclusion from the co-ordinated plan ofthe smaller irrigation schemes for which there 
was strong popular support. It was Kemp's way of acknowledging the substance ofthe 
public debate while re-stating his conviction that the major development projects, to 
which Hanlon had committed the Govemment were essential to Queensland's economic 
and social advancement. Kemp had been the driving force behind NADC's acceptance 
and forwarding on for Commonwealth funding consideration, the five projects around 
which the confroversy cenfred; the Blair Athol-Callide coalfields, the Tully Falls hydro-
electricity scheme, the Mareeba-Dimbulah tobacco irrigation scheme, the Burdekin 
F. Nicklin, TuUy Falls Hydro-Electric Project Bill, 1950, Second Reading, QPD, 1950,199, p. 1512. 
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inigation and hydro-electricity scheme, and the south-west Queensland "Channel 
Country" development project. During his final years, it was largely to the advancement 
of these projects, and more especially their advancement under his confrol, that Kemp 
devoted his not inconsiderable personal and administrative skills. 
In November 1949, Kemp won a major victory in the bureaucratic battle for confrol of 
water resources development when the Irrigation Commissioner, Tom Lang, resigned to 
take up an appointment as Assistant Commissioner v\dth the Snowy Mountains Hydro-
Electricity Authority. W R. Nimmo, then sixty-one years old, was appointed to the 
position for a term of three years. Previously Chief Engineer ofthe Stanley River Works 
Board, and Kemp's friend as well as tmsted colleague, he would have been Kemp's 
original choice for the position. The victory was consolidated by the passing ofthe 
Burdekin River Authority Act establishing a Burdekin River Authority with 
responsibility for directing investigations and developing plans to implement the 
Burdekin scheme. A separate tmst fund was established and the Authority given power 
to borrow or to lend money. Kemp was named Chairman, the other members being 
Nimmo and Queensland Electricity Commissioner, Neil Smith. Smith was another 
potential ally for Kemp since, before his appointment as the first sole Commissioner 
under the provisions ofthe State Electricity Commission Acts Amendment Act 1948, he 
had been acting secretary to the Co-Ordinator-General. Kemp's victory represented a 
severe setback to his defractors and the numerous opponents ofthe Govemment's 
development policy. They had seen Lang's appointment to head the newly-independent 
Annual Report of the Co-Ordinator-General, 1953, p.7. 
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hrigation and Water Supply Commission in 1947 as the means of breaking Kemp's 
seemingly comprehensive control over water resources development. Under the 
leadership ofthe young, highly ambitious Lang, the Commission was expected to be 
established as the co-ordinating and confrolling authority in this field. However, several 
months before his resignation, it became evident that he was no match for the 
experienced partnership of Kemp and Nimmo. 
Lang had planned to overhaul the Commission's adminisfrative stmcture, chiefly 
through a big increase in engineering staff, in preparation for assuming total 
responsibility for the State's water conservation programme. He supported a gradual 
approach to constmction, with a preference for a programme of small weirs and dams 
that accorded with Colin Clark's plan for decentralised development based on a network 
of small mral cenfres. According to Powell, Lang was particularly critical of what he 
saw as the ad hoc nature of previous decisions made to benefit a particular area or town. 
This was clearly a reference to the Somerset Dam and other local water conservation and 
supply projects associated with Kemp, as well as the new major projects being proposed. 
However, Kemp was ahead of Lang in terms of a comprehensive plan for water 
conservation measures. Relying on Nimmo to deliver a consistently high level of 
technical analysis, he had been collating information obtained from the series of 
specialist investigative committees he had directed since 1941. His position strengthened 
by his appointment in 1943 as Chairman ofthe Bureau of Investigation, Kemp had 
extended the collection of technical data to an increasing number of regional projects 
^ For a summary of Clark's views, see Clark, Colin, Australia's Hopes and Fears, London: Mollis & 
Carter, 1958, pp.69-72, andpp.91-97. 
* Powell, op. cit, p.204, p.206. 
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which were to comprise the state-wide plan. Against this background of long-term 
collaboration among relevant Government bodies and technical experts under Kemp's 
confrol, another aspect of Lang's reorganisation, which was to build a new stmcture of 
"close liaison with other resource management agencies",^ was ill-advised and bound to 
fail. 
Critics ofthe Govemment joined forces with supporters ofthe Irrigation Commission to 
undermine Kemp's position. They portrayed the Bureau as exemplifying the 
Govemment's "hydra-headed approach"'" to water resources management, but were 
convincingly challenged by the Premier who, drawing on notes Kemp had prepared in 
response to the attacks, rejected their argument that "co-ordination means 
disorganisation" '^  During this period, there were unsubstantiated references to clashes 
between Lang and Kemp and allegations that with higher salaries and more positions 
approved, the Co-Ordinator-General had effectively commandeered all the available 
engineers. At the Closer Settlement Conference for senior Lands Department officials in 
April, Lang had been confident that, with more senior engineers on his staff, he could 
open up at least 1,000 more farms vwthin five years'^ but, over the following months, 
claimed to have been thwarted in his recmitment efforts. Obhged once again to defend 
Kemp, Hanlon diverted attention away from the cmcial issue of senior engineer 
appointments, where the Co-Ordinator-General predominated, by producing figures to 
demonsfrate that the Irrigation Commission was well ahead in overall engineering staff 
' Ibid 
'" See, for example, T. Hiley, quoted in Courier-Mail, 18.10.1949, and Tucker et al., op. cit.. pp.26-21. 
" Kemp to Hanlon, 16.1.1950, 539/50, SRS 1043-1-381, QSA 
'^  Co«r/er-Mjf//, 23.4.1949. 
285 
11 
numbers. Amendments to the Irrigation and Water Supply Commission Act passed 
soon after Nimmo's appointment gave Nimmo an advantage denied to Lang in 
delegating to the Commissioner the same power of directiy appointing senior officials 
for specific projects as the Main Roads Commissioner and Co-ordinator-General had 
exercised for many years. However, Opposition Leader, Frank Nicklin, refijsed to let 
the issue of Lang's resignation die. Claiming that the public was fed up with years of 
"investigations, plans and blueprints" but no action, he portrayed Lang as the man who 
would have cut through the prevailing bureaucratic inertia and achieved results. He said 
Lang had been "broken-hearted" and had resigned not, as Lands Minister Tom Foley 
announced, to take up a better paid position wdth the Snowy Mountains Scheme but 
because he was prevented from taking full confrol of water resources planning and 
constmction.'^  The inference that Kemp and certain pro-development ministers had 
colluded to oust Lang was clear, but Lang and his supporters had underestimated the 
sfrength of Kemp's position. They failed to acknowledge the difficulty of challenging 
the bureaucratic status quo and indeed, Hanlon's commitment to a particular 
development sfrategy which reinforced it. In the end, Lang had neither the ability nor the 
political and adminisfrative backing necessary to replace Kemp's influence with his 
own. 
'^  Ibid, 18.10.1949. 
"* Irrigation and Water Supply Commission Act and Other Acts Amendment Bill, Second Reading, 
18.11.1949, QPD, 197, p. 1689. 
'^  F. Nicklin, quoted in Courier-Mail, 11.11.1949. 
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On 1 October 1949, the renewed Meat Supply Agreement between Britain and 
Queensland came into effect. The following month the Commonwealth Parliament 
passed the State Grants (Encouragement of Meat Production) /Ic^ under which a 
generous subsidy was made available for infrastmcture measures aimed at increasing 
beef production in the south-west "Channel Countiy" Chifley had held off making any 
commitment until the Agreement was signed but subsequently supported the plan 
submitted to NADC to upgrade roads and provide watering and loading facilities on 
selected westem stock routes.'^ Commonwealth approval vindicated Kemp's long-held 
stance that improving roads and stock facilities was the most efficient approach to 
development ofthe area. In December 1947, he had presented to the Lands Minister a 
report on the Channel Country compiled over eighteen months by the Bureau of 
Investigation, the recommendations of which were used to make the case through 
NADC for Commonwealth assistance.'^ The investigation followed a new campaign by 
the Queensland, Northem Territory and New South Wales Govemments for an inland 
strategic railway linking Bourke to Darwin, with connections to existing westem 
Queensland railheads. At first glance, Kemp appeared to have departed from his 
customary advocacy of roads to recommend the railway's constmction as essential to the 
Channel Country's development However, further reading revealed that within an 
overall endorsement ofthe need for adequate fransport facilities, his real theme focused 
on the obstacles he believed put the proposal in doubt Among them were engineering 
difficulties preventing the railway being constmcted close to the major cattie fattening 
'^  Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1950, p.21. 
" Bureau of Investigation. The Channel Country ofSouth-West Queensland with special reference to 
Cooper's Creek, December 1947. (Issued February 1949). 
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properties, the unavailability ofthe huge quantity of steel and rolling stock required and, 
most importantiy, its economic feasibility. Giving a realistic assessment ofthe latter, he 
concluded; "the standing charges on the railway cost alone might well be greater than 
the total wealth produced" Another section ofthe report presented the results of an 
investigation into a complex proposal for artificial flooding ofthe Cooper's Creek 
catchment area. Lang was a member ofthe Bureau of Investigation at that time and 
subsequentiy argued that the proposal was one for which the Irrigation Commission 
should have responsibility. The report went to some lengths to show that the 
constmction of permanent storage facilities on the major rivers and an estimated two to 
three hundred dams on their tributaries was not economically viable, requiring a capital 
investment of twenty-five million pounds which was unlikely to be recouped.'' 
Although couched in terms of technical and feasibility assessments, the report's 
conclusions left little doubt about the complete irrationality ofthe project. Nevertheless, 
Lang continued to endorse it as part of his state-wide water resources development plan, 
giving it prominence in his 1949 Report as Irrigation Commissioner^ published shortly 
after his resignation. 
In discussions throughout 1948 on northem Australia development Chifley had refused 
to consider any further proposals for a frans-continental railway. Kemp's 1947 report 
was brought forward as the basis for negotiations on some form of immediate 
Commonwealth funding assistance for the beef industry. As railway constmction was 
not an option for some years to come, the way was clear for Commonwealth approval of 
'* Bureau of Investigation, 1947, p. 16. 
' ' Ibid,p.n. 
^ Courier-Mail, 25.11.1949. 
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Kemp's stock routes development plan. '^ Evan Adermann, the Federal Countiy Party 
member representing south-west Queensland, was among the critics who claimed the 
three selected routes were badly chosen and a poor substitute for a railway^^ but by 
1950, the first commercial road trains operating to the area proved the worth ofthe road 
plan. The railway lobby in Queensland was far from defeated and, in 1953, Kemp was 
asked to chair a committee to report to the Commonwealth Goverrunent on a proposed 
extension ofthe Great Northem Railway to assist the northem Ausfralian cattle 
industry. On the basis that it must be a national project, the report recommended that 
the Commonwealth bear the cost of constmction from Dajarra, then the major cattle 
tmcking cenfre for the Gulf country and the Barkly Tableland, to Newcastie Waters in 
the Northem Territory. Queensland would build the line and provide rolling stock and 
on-going maintenance. At a time when the Commonwealth had all but lost interest in 
major investment in northem development, the report's conclusion that the line would 
almost certainly lose money^ '* ensured the project's defeat. On the other hand, the cost 
effectiveness ofthe developmental road plan was favourably assessed by Canberra 
during the 1950s and, in 1961, the Commonwealth Govemment approved a £200 million 
"Beef Cattle Roads" scheme.^ ^ With its implementation, Kemp's vision of contributing 
to the economic growth of remote regions by providing the cattle industry with adequate 
road transport infrastmcture finally came to be realised. 
*^ Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1950, p.21. 
^ Courier-Mail, 26.10.1949. 
^ Annual Report of the Co-Ordinator-General, 1953, p.22. 
^^  Ibid, 1953, p.23. 
^ Bureau of Transport Economics, Road Grants Legislation in Australia: Commonwealth Govemment 
involvement 1900-1981, Occasional Paper 48, Canberra: AGPS 1981. 
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There were other satisfying aspects to Kemp's final years of public life, among them the 
completion of long-term projects for which he had the principal responsibility, and the 
conferring of a particularly significant honour. In May 1949, a visibly frail Premier 
presided over the opening ceremony ofthe University of Queensland's St. Lucia 
campus. In the presence of such public figures associated with the St. Lucia project as 
the Chancellor and former Premier of Queensland, William Forgan Smith, and the Vice-
Chancellor, J. D. Story, together with a protocol-conscious Senate, Kemp's role in the 
proceedings was a minor one. Accorded a speech as Chairman ofthe Senate's Building 
and Grounds Committee, his account ofthe origin ofthe St. Lucia site and the progress 
ofthe University's constmction was factual and dull. It lacked the usual flourish of 
visions ofthe future and scarcely reflected the initial battles fought on several fronts 
before constmction began, or the scope of his responsibilities during nearly fifteen years 
as Chairman ofthe University Works Board. Nevertheless, the occasion became 
memorable when the student, whom circumstances had prevented from completing an 
engineering degree almost fifty years before, was admitted honoris causa to the degree 
of Master of Engineering. 
At the same time, two University projects of particular importance to Kemp failed to 
proceed. By the eariy 1950s, it became clear that, despite persistent efforts to influence 
the relevant decision-makers and re-organise loan fund allocations, the case for 
constmction of a new Engineering building at St. Lucia and the St. Lucia to West End 
Bridge lacked the necessary support. Before his death in 1945, Engineering faculty 
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head. Professor Roger Hawken, consulted with him on engineering requirements at St. 
Lucia, no doubt hoping that Kemp's influence would be productive. They also discussed 
curriculum changes to encourage Govemment departments and private sector 
organisations to provide fraining and employment for engineering students. However, 
the Science and Arts faculties continued to be given precedence, with the result that 
Engineering faculty offices and student facilities remained for many years at the George 
St. campus. Before Kemp resigned as Commissioner in 1949, Main Roads offered the 
first engineering cadetships, the conditions of which tended to reflect Kemp's ovm 
experience. Although some restrictions were later applied, trainees in the early 1950s 
were granted time off for lectures and some attended University full-time for the final 
two years ofthe course, in retum for a period of bonded employment.^ ^ 
Kemp clung on to the idea ofthe St Lucia Bridge, even though the lack of political 
support evident in difficulties with funding made its completion unlikely. The Senate's 
plan for the St. Lucia site had always specified constmction of a bridge, for which Kemp 
had asked J. J. Bradfield to submit the original design. Although the bridge was 
excluded from overall funding provisions after Forgan Smith imposed a £500,000 
ceiling on funding for the University and the Loan Council failed to approve loan 
allocations for the project, Kemp saw this as a minor setback. From the late 1930s, he 
proceeded to re-allocate small amounts from other Bureau oflndustry projects for 
preliminary approach works at West End, which he arranged to be carried out in 
conjunction with approved works projects for both Breakfast Creek and Bowen Bridge 
^ J. R. Kenqj. "The Transfer ofthe University of Queensland to St. Lucia", in The University of 
Queensland: Its Development and Expansion, Brisbane: UQP, 1949, n).36-42. 
'^ Personal interview, Sir Sydney Schubert, 17.5.2000. 
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Roads. Early in 1940, he was encouraged by Cabinet's approving his recommendation 
for funding the bridge's constmction. This was based on an agreement he negotiated 
with Brisbane's Lord Mayor for the City Council to contribute one-fifth ofthe estimated 
cost of £225,000. By 1948, Kemp had to concede that the post-war shortage of 
materials would delay the bridge's constmction for several years, but he did secure 
provision in the loan programme for work to commence the following year. In 1952, he 
reported in an optimistic vein on the design being finalised and the progress of 
negotiations with the Brisbane City Council regarding cost-sharing. As, by then, tiie 
estimated cost had tripled,^ ^ it was not surprising that given the Council's substantial 
works-related debt, the number of capital works projects vying for reduced loan funds, 
as well as Kemp's uncertain status with the Gair Government support for the bridge 
evaporated. Kemp was obliged to admit defeat and made no further reference to the 
project in the Co-Ordinator-General's annual reports. 
Somerset Dam, the first ofthe major dams built in Queensland, was completed in 1954. 
Kemp had been unable to avoid the site being closed down for the duration ofthe war 
and work did not start again until 1948. Then it became a matter of negotiating a way 
through the obstacles of post-war constmction conditions to see the project through to 
completion virtually on budget.^ " He also won important victories in relation to the 
Fitzroy and Burdekin River Bridges. As a result of specific local problems, compounded 
by the pressure of wartime fraffic, both were in urgent need of replacement but had been 
^ Memo re St. Lucia Bridge, R.M.O. 310, QTA. (undated but margin note signed W. J. R. (Ro^rs) and 
^ Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General,, 1952, p. 16. 
30 
dated 3.7.1946) 
nnual eport q 
Ibid, 1953, p. 15. 
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refused an A-1 priority rating by the National Works Council, as directed by the 
Department ofthe Army. Against this background, their completion was a tribute to 
Kemp's co-ordinating skills and his perseverance in the face of national political and 
bureaucratic opposition. In the case ofthe Fitzroy River Bridge at Rockhampton, the 
Treasurer, James Larcombe, who was MLA for Rockhampton, lent essential political 
support, but it was Kemp who negotiated the public finance avenues to secure Loan 
Council approval for the necessary debenture loan on which the granting of a Treasury 
subsidy depended. Even before the project had final State Govemment approval, he 
directed funds from Main Roads allocations '^ for the commencement of preliminary 
work and, in what became standard practice, the Co-Ordinator-General's Bridge Branch 
acted on behalf of Main Roads to design and supervise the entire project. 
In a move dictated largely by the shortage of engineers in both Main Roads and the Co-
Ordinator-General department but which also had the benefit of boosting local input 
the Rockhampton City Council engineer was made responsible for the bridge's 
constmction under overall Main Roads supervision, with the option of using day 
labour or confracting out the constmction work. The stmggle to secure constmction 
materials finally won, the bridge was completed and officially opened on 27 September 
1952. Kemp and Larcombe were among the guests who attended the official luncheon 
where the Mayor, declaring that "the Govemment was fortunate in having as its adviser 
on engineering projects so eminent an engineer as Sir John Kemp ..."'' acknowledged 
'^ See Memo, witii Kevap's margin notes. Chief Accountant to Secretary, MRC, 23.4.1947,253/2/6, R. 
M. O. 312, QTA; Larcombe to W C. Ingram, MLA, 8.10.1948, 253/2/2, R.MO. 312, QTA 
^^  Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 194&, p.25; ibid, 1949, p.24. 
^^  Opening of tiie Fitzroy Bridge, 27.9.1952, V. C. Gair, Papers, MS 6909, Folder 69, NLA. 
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Kemp's seven-year campaign for the bridge's constmction. It was a particularly 
satisfying moment for Kemp at a time when his wife was seriously ill and when other 
project responsibilities were proving to be increasingly stressful. 
Development ofthe cenfral Queensland coalfields proved to be increasingly vulnerable 
to extemal influences. As strikes by southem coal miners escalated, the supply position 
in New South Wales and Victoria reached a crisis. The success ofthe Thiess brothers in 
securing Victorian interest in supplies of Callide coal spurred a renewal of 
Commonwealth interest in developing the coalfields. Discussions between Hanlon and 
the Prime Minister resulted in an inspection tour by R. G. Casey, then Minister for 
Northem Development, while further negotiations were undertaken through a joint 
Commonwealth-State Committee chaired by Kemp. By the time the ESC, through its 
nominee company, had abandoned the Blair Athol venture, the focus of immediate 
development had switched to the Callide field. To support the plan to supply the coal-
starved southem States, Kemp had already secured extra Main Roads funding for 
improved road access to the port of Gladstone and had consulted with the Commissioner 
for Railways on the Premier's preferred option of improving the Biloela-Rockhampton 
railway.^ "* However, progress on the plan was compromised by events on the national 
political stage. The Menzies-led Liberal-Countty Party Govemment was in power, the 
miners' strikes had become a stmggle against the spread of communist influence, and 
the high cost of Callide coal could not compete with the Commonwealth arrangement to 
subsidise imported coal to deliver cheap supplies. Still confident that, once the 
^ Ibid, 1949, p. 17. 
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communist influence on the mining industry was removed, coal requirements would 
again be met by the mines in New South Wales, Victoria and South Ausfralia, the 
Commonwealth agreed to subsidise road and rail improvements to the more-easily 
accessible port of Gladstone in retum for a small, annual tormage of Callide coal.^ ^ 
Although the Blair Athol plan had failed and the Callide development seemed to have an 
uncertain future, Kemp proceeded to make full use ofthe Powell Duffryn consultants 
before their agreement with the Queensland Govemment expired in September 1950. 
Proposals on which they worked with the aim of enhancing the value of cenfral 
Queensland's coal resources were the establishment of a fertiliser industry, particularly 
to assist the expanding sugar industry, with Rockhampton nominated as the preferred 
site for a factory, and the production of oil from coal. Confirming Kemp's own views, 
Powell Duffryn reported that production of Hquid fuel was techrucally possible and 
recommended that an ammonium sulphate plant be established in conjunction with an 
"oil-from-coal" plant for the production of motor spirit. The report was referred to the 
Commonwealth Govemment for funding consideration as a defence measure, although 
the primary purpose was for the State to move towards self-sufficiency in this area. 
When the Commonwealth did not respond with any show of interest, the proposal 
lapsed, since Queensland was not prepared to proceed on its own. 
*^ Ibid, 1951, pp. 15-16. 
^ Ibid,,p.\4. 
^^  Ibid, 1952, p.22. 
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Attention to the central and north Queensland ports at this time derived from the need to 
provide facilities, not only for the promised expansion of fraffic from the coalfields but 
also to handle the anticipated increase in sugar and meat exports to Britain. It was a 
situation in which natural resources development was contingent on adequate port 
facilities, while the projected export growth was used to bolster the case for increased 
port development funding. Hanlon had highlighted the significant role of ports in the 
overall plan for northem development he announced in May 1949 but wdth industrial 
unrest dominating waterfront activities. Harbour Boards remaining independent of 
cenfral govemment confrol and the Commonwealth disinterested in subsidy proposals on 
a defence basis, much ofthe forward planning outlined was littie more than wishful 
thinking. Although its recommendations for stmctural re-organisation were rejected at 
tiie time, Kemp's report represented the first practical attempt to address the outstanding 
problems of an area that, despite consensus on its importance, remained low on the 
State's list of works' priorities. Having bluntiy told the Premier that the only altemative 
was to close the ports to shipping, he secured Cabinet approval to pay off the debt 
arrears for Bowen and Rockhampton, and for the Treasury loan subsidy scheme to be 
extended to the major Harbour Boards.'^ By 1950, provision for State and debenture 
loan funding had more than trebled, wdth bortowing limits for the Harbour Boards raised 
for the first time since 1934.^ ^ As the same list of scheduled works were repeated year 
after year with no appreciable progress, these gains still fell far short of what was 
required for viable port operations. Other factors were the backlog of post-war 
restoration and maintenance work to be addressed ahead of any new constmction, plant 
38 Kemp to Chief Secretary, 9.8.1945, Serial No. 925, p.3, SRS 1158-1-4706, QSA. 
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and material shortages and, as an obviously fmstrated Kemp complained, to the lack of 
technical stafr and constmction capacity which was also compromising his plans in 
other development areas. 
Cenfral and northem Harbour Boards were increasingly caught up in the competition 
against each other for the vital road and rail access to their hinterland districts. With its 
debts written off, the port of Rockhampton had been given another boost with the 
proposed fertiliser factory and link with further coalfields development. Gladstone had 
also been nominated as the transport outiet for the cenfral coalfields and, after 
complaining about the preference given to Rockhampton, the Harbour Board was 
eventually granted a £100,000 loan subsidy for the constmction of coal handling 
facilities. Meeting with Kemp to finalise design plans. Board representatives disclosed 
that they had been unable to find a firm willing to undertake the work. In a 
demonsfration ofthe strength of his private sector business contacts, Kemp made one 
phone call which effectively resolved the matter."*' Bowen had a long histoty of being 
by-passed in the provision of major east-west transport links, although situated on a fine 
natural harbour. Reduced output from the State Coke Works, following the closure of 
the Chillagoe Smelters at the outbreak of war, had precipitated the financial crisis which 
led the Harbour Board to seek govemment assistance in 1945. Increasing the level of 
^'Order-in-Council, 15.12.1949, SRS 1158-1-4706, QSA 
Annual Report of the Co-ordinator-General, 1948, p. 15. 
"' Memo on matters the COG discussed with the Chairman and Secretary, Gladstone Harbour Board, 
6.9.1950, SRS 1158-1-4708, 7460/50, QSA 
"^  Bowen Harbour Board to Co-Ordinator-General, enclosing Board's Thirty-First Annual Report, 
30.4.1945, and Bowen Chamber of Commerce to Co-Ordinator-General, 4.12.1945, SRS 1158-1-4706, 
QSA. 
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coke output was one ofthe subjects listed for discussion at the August 1950 Brisbane 
conference between Hanlon and Casey, as Minister for Supply and National 
Development. Casey indicated Commonwealth interest in the Coke Works being 
developed using CoUinsville coal, as one of two areas "that seem to have promise" in 
redressing the critical shortage of metallurgical coke throughout Ausfralia."*' 
Kemp maintained the momentum by organising the appointment of a joint 
Commonwealth-State committee of experts in 1951 to study the proposal. Although the 
attempt to present Queensland's mineral production as a factor in resolving the national 
fuel crisis failed to secure a Commonwealth subsidy. Cabinet approved the committee's 
recommendations for improved working conditions and plant modifications. These 
proved successful to the extent that production was increased but the resulting stockpiles 
of coke failed to find a market.^ To reduce these stockpiles by using them to produce 
pig iron was behind a subsequent revival ofthe concept of a steelworks at Bowen. It had 
first been vigorously but unsuccessfully promoted as a State Enterprise in 1916 by the 
Ryan Govemment and, in the post-war period, was enthusiastically supported by Bowen 
business and union representatives. Approached by engineering firm, Hewson and 
Partners, which was seeking govemment approval to establish a private steel works, 
Kemp obtained Gair's consent to convene a small, interdepartmental committee to 
investigate the proposal."*^  Seeing it as an opportunity for Queensland to gain even a 
small steel producing plant, the committee endorsed the proposal, contingent on iron ore 
"^  Report of Proceedings at Conference on Burdekin, Mareeba-Dimbulah, Tully, Coal Production and 
44 
Western Queensland roads, 14.8.1950, 14.8.1950, SRS 1043-1-2996, p.7, QSA,. 
Annual Report of the Co-Ordinator-General, 1952, pp.21-22. 
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supplies being readily accessible."'^ However, the iron ore deposits surveyed at Iron 
Range to the north were of poor quality and no other suitable deposits were located. It 
was the same problem that caused the Ryan Govemment in 1916 to propose shipping 
ore at enormous cost from Yampi Sound in Westem Ausfralia. Although the Bowen 
project was abandoned at the time, Kemp reported in 1953 that investigations were 
continuing. It was a popular Labor issue and remained on the State's development 
agenda for the next four decades. Plans for port development at Bowen came to nothing 
and any expectation of future economic growth rested entirely on the Burdekin scheme 
going ahead. 
In relation to north Queensland projects, the constmction ofthe Burdekin River Bridge 
proved to be another complex undertaking but one that eventually had a successful 
outcome. First proposed in 1939, the project to replace the existing bridge with a new 
high-level stmcture to protect the north-south fransport link from dismptive floods was 
finally completed in 1957 The first barrier to its constmction was the negative 
assessment of its defence value by the Department of Defence which preferred the 
constmction of an inland railway."'^  Other factors contributing to the long delays 
included concerted political opposition to the overall Burdekin Irrigation Scheme, 
problems with finance relating to the Commonwealth's refusal to subsidise the projects, 
and on-going industrial action encouraged largely by the scarcity of skilled workers. In 
his 1949 pre-election campaign, Hanlon emphasised the bridge's importance to the 
'*' Memo, Kemp to Premier and Chief Secretary's Department 10.4.1952, and, 21.4.1952, Minute, Kenq) 
46 
to Chief Secretary, 3638/52, SRS 1043-1-3028, QSA 
Minute, Kemp to Chief Secretary, 15.6.1953, Serial No. 3103, 4763/50, p.2, SRS 1043-1-3028, QSA. 
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Govemment's overall plan for north Queensland development, with Cabinet support 
demonsfrated by approval for the increasingly large project allocations Kemp 
recommended in the annual co-ordinated plan of works. While constmction ofthe sub-
stmctiire proceeded under the competent supervision of Main Roads' Chief Engineer, D. 
J. Garland, Kemp's time was spent trying to resolve a range of management problems. 
From the commencement ofthe actual constmction work in late 1947, there were 
frequent stand-offs between resident engineering staff and union representatives as the 
latter threatened stoppages to gain variations in the award rates. Demarcation disputes 
and allegations of communist infiltration ofthe site also had to be addressed as well as 
the problem of giving preference to unskilled retumed servicemen in a district where 
there was already high unemployment. As with the Somerset Dam and Stoty Bridge 
projects, the shortage of skilled plant operators and the need to maintain permanent work 
gangs left Kemp with no altemative but to approve union representations for differential 
wage rates and increased allowances, to avoid the delays associated with contesting the 
claims."*^  
When the Govemment's opponents declared the lack of progress to be tantamount to a 
broken election promise. Cabinet was sufficiently concemed to support Kemp against 
local business groups and the Federal Govemment in making good his threats to arrange 
for supplies of steel and cement from overseas. Official post-war policy at both Federal 
and State levels was to encourage secondary industry by restricting imports, while 
'*^  For an overview ofthe role ofthe military authorities, see Kerr, op.cit, p.228. 
'* See, for example, G. F. Paricer, AWU organiser to T. B. Ryan, AWU District Secretary, 15.1.1947 
(copy), R.M.O. 323, QTA; Kemp Memo re "Dispute between A W. U. and Resident Engineer, 
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Brisbane firms, although lacking the capacity to meet the demand, had been awarded 
confracts to supply steel and cement for the major developmental projects. Moreover, 
interstate deliveries were reduced to a tiickle, owing to the prolonged coal industry 
stiikes. Federal confrol of allocations giving preference to soutiliem states, and lack of 
shipping. There was no public outcry when, during 1950, an English firm was awarded 
the confract to supply the steel for fabrication ofthe bridge spans. In a politically adept 
move, the Govemment linked its approval for the importation of steel and cement for the 
bridge and other major projects with the importation of building materials to meet urgent 
housing, hospitals and local authorities' requirements."'^  Whether or not this was Kemp's 
initiative is unclear since, while it helped to alleviate the supply crisis, it carried a high 
financial risk. As he reported: 
It was necessary to exercise keen judgment in endeavouring to cope with the rise 
and fall of overseas markets, which, at times were subject to remarkable 
vicissitudes, resulting in the possibility of a gain or loss of thousands of pounds 
in one particular consignment.^ " 
His confidence in the technical skills of his engineers was rewarded when their 
innovative approach to a stmctural problem resulted in the first use in Australia of high-
tensile bolts in fabricated steel stmctures. In the end, it proved impossible to make up the 
time lost on constmction and the bridge was not completed until three years after Kemp 
retired in 1954. 
Burdekin River Bridge", 25.8.1949, Kenpto R. L. Murray, Under-Secretary, Treasury, August and 
September 1949, 254/6/4, R.M.O. 323, QTA. 
'" Annual Report of the Co-Ordinator-General, 1953, op. cit., p.20. 
°^ Ibid 
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hi 1953, Kemp was given the responsibility of winding up the QBFC food production 
scheme at Peak Dovms, although it was not until after his death in 1955 that the 
disposition of assets was finalised and the project formally terminated.^' Although Kemp 
was not personally singled out for criticism, inefficient "top-heavy" administration was 
identified as a major factor in its failure.^ ^ 
From the first the Opposition had reacted with hostility to the Peak Downs scheme. 
Under the enabUng legislation, the powers ofthe QBFC included, in addition to 
conventional corporate provisions relating to land and confracts, the authority to bortow 
and lend money, and, "to do anjrthing and to enter into any transaction ... which in their 
opinion, is calculated to facilitate the proper discharge of their functions or is incidental 
or conducive thereto" What was perceived to be an extraordinary generosity with 
delegated powers and an ill-considered investment of public funds provoked attacks by 
the scheme's many opponents both inside and outside Parliament. They played on 
prevailing public fears by characterising the scheme as "Communism in embtyo -
collective farming, which was a feature ofthe Soviet system" "^^  While there was no 
substance to the coUectivist argument, it appeared that Labor was abandoning the small 
farmer in favour of a govemment corporation. Hanlon moved to distance himself and the 
Govemment from the Corporation's adminisfration by emphasising its autonomy, with 
'^ "Food Corporation Affairs Would Up", Brisbane Telegraph, 13.12.1956. 
^^  Penelope Rogers, "The 'Failure' ofthe Peak Downs Scheme", AJPH, 10,1964, pp.74-75. 
*^  Queensland-British Food Production Act 1948, Section 12 (3). 
^ Lack, op.c/Y., p.364. 
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the Deputy-Chairman clearly made responsible for advising the Govemment on intemal 
management matters. 
One aspect ofthe Co-Ordinator-General's role that fuelled these criticisms was his 
responsibility for obtaining the building materials and agricultural machinery necessary 
to meet the stipulated production targets. As part ofthe initial negotiations, Plummer had 
obtained the Commonwealth Govemment's guarantee ofthe required supplies being 
made available but given the import shortfalls and competition with other States for 
Ausfralian plant and machinery, making good the guarantee rested on Kemp's 
negotiations with Federal regulatory bodies.^ ^ While little in the way of building 
material was needed, the delivery of tractors and headers to Peak Dovms was essential to 
begin cultivation. Hostile producer groups had derided Hanlon's assurance that the 
Corporation's orders for tractors would not compromise those already placed for 
Queensland farmers. Deciding to adopt a factual approach to the issue, Kemp told the 
president ofthe Queensland Graingrowers' Association that just twenty-nine out ofthe 
six thousand fractors landed in Queensland in the previous four years were for the 
Corporation. Probably fmsfrated by what he believed to be unjustified criticism, he 
urged farmers to show some initiative in addressing the problem by following the 
Corporation's lead and using the contract system.^ ^ It was an impractical suggestion, but 
the whole issue was, in fact, a sore point with Kemp, since the Corporation's fractors 
were not delivered in time to start the first season's ploughing. In view ofthe shortages. 
^^  Hanlon to Maher, QPD, 1948, 193, p.20. 
^ Plummer to Strachey, op. cit. See also, for exanq)le. Reports ofthe Co-ordinator-General, 1948, p. 12, 
1951, p.6. 
" Townsville Daily Bulletin, 10.5.1949. 
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he was fortunate to be able to contract out the work to Thiess Brothers, with whom he 
was then having discussions about the development ofthe nearby Blair Athol coalfield. 
Although their initial contact in relation to AWC projects had been less than cordial, Les 
Thiess was impressed by Kemp's diplomacy in acknowledging the difficulties Thiess 
faced as a confractor, and they had subsequently developed a mutually beneficial 
relationship.'^  
In Januaty 1949, after the Premier retumed from a convalescent holiday in New 
Zealand, Kemp arranged a meeting with Hanlon to report on the project "so dear to your 
heart" Despite the planting and harvesting failures ofthe first year, Kemp appeared to 
be buoyant about the scheme's future. Although there was resentment in other 
departments at his "poaching" of senior officers, Kemp proceeded to arrange their 
secondment to the Corporation, being particularly pleased at his success in securing, as 
general field manager at Capella, Charles MeKeon, the highly respected Director of 
Agriculture. There being virtually no improvements on the resumed properties, as Co-
Ordinator-General, Kemp was authorised to utilise the resources of several departments, 
including Railways, Agriculture and Stock, and the Irrigation and Water Supply 
Commission, to address the problem of providing basic infrastmcture and services 
within a very short timeframe. He relied heavily on the assistance of Main Roads' staff 
in areas that had nothing to do with roads, to the extent, it was said, that Main Roads 
virtually "ran the place" ^ ° While making a point of commending the high level of 
departmental and staff co-operation, his observation to Hanlon that"... the managerial 
^ Priest op. cit, H).37-39, 3^.99-100. 
® Kemp to Hanlon, 27.1.1949, QBFC, A/19968, QSA 
^ Don Young Personal hiterview, 28.3.2000. 
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team selected by me ... has worked together in magnificent fashion emulating the spirit 
of wartime", gave some indication ofthe intensive efforts required to achieve these 
gains. As had been his practice with major projects, Kemp commissioned studies by 
experts in a number of relevant fields, then followed them up by co-ordinating the 
establishment of a Scientific Committee, under his chairmanship, to plan on-going, 
experimental and research work. At this stage, Kemp appeared to accept the initial 
setbacks as to be expected with such a scheme. He remained confident that before the 
end ofthe statutory seven year period, it would pass beyond the experimental stage to 
make a substantial contribution to agricultural practice, as well as closer settiement 
development in other marginal areas. 
The project was already under way when the Corporation invited fresh controversy with 
the claim that it made commercial sense to graze cattie on the undeveloped properties 
and fatten them on sorghum stubble. The QBFC thus signalled its intention to move 
beyond the original intent ofthe Peak Downs scheme and establish a potentially more 
profitable cattie-fattening industry. To fund this move, Plummer chose not to ask Kemp 
to make a formal approach to the Premier. Instead he used a progress report he 
forwarded to Hanlon in March 1950 to propose an increase of £125,000 in the 
Govemment's capital investment, to be matched by a proportionate increase in OFC 
flinding.^ ^ The Govemment's agreement to the proposal was formalised in amending 
legislation brought before Parliament in November. It was an opportunity for the 
Opposition, led by Country Party leader and successful farmer, Frank Nicklin, to expand 
on the widely-held view that the unsound farming principles, on which the scheme was 
'^ Kemp to Hanlon, op.cit., p.2. 
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proceeding, guaranteed its failure. Making use ofthe familiar theme of socialistic 
enterprises, Nicklin set out the details of its shortcomings to date. No pig-meat or 
sorghum had been exported to Britain, crop production had not risen despite a good 
season and, while some cattie had been sold on the local market, no breeding 
programme had been established. He rejected the argument that the Corporation's move 
into the cattie fattening industry, for which the extra funding was required, was based on 
a sound commercial decision. If, he concluded, the scheme was paying its way, it should 
be able to fund any expansion of its activities. Although praising the quality ofthe crops 
grown, other speakers questioned the need for such a high level of capital investment to 
test whether the Cenfral Highlands was suitable for growing sorghum. '^ They were in 
agreement that some ofthe initial, ill-conceived decisions were responses to the pressure 
to produce quick results, but went on to predict that the legacy of these decisions would 
be a continuation of unacceptably high production costs. 
A second amendment provided for the Corporation to recover the value of its 
improvements or fixed assets in the event ofthe land being sold. Although its logic was 
not disputed, it opened the way for speculation that the British Govemment was 
preparing to withdraw from the scheme.^ "* Despite Hanlon's denial at the time, 
subsequent developments affecting the OFC gave this view increasing credibility. 
Earlier in the year, Sfrachey was transferred from the Ministry of Food, Plummer 
resigned in June and was replaced as Chairman of both the OFC and QBFC by Sir 
*^  Plummer to Hanlon, 10.3.1950, QBFC, A/19968, QSA. 
^ Queensland-British Food Corporation Act Amendment Bill, 1950, Second Reading QPD, 1950, 
pp. 1230-32, p. 1233, pp. 1240-42. 
" Ibid,p.l23S. 
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Donald Perrott at that time a deputy secretary in the Ministry. During 1951, after the 
Conservative Party was retumed to govemment in Britain, support for OFC projects 
diminished, especially after the full extent ofthe failure ofthe East African scheme 
became known. The OFC was dissolved and its partnership with the Queensland 
Govemment fransferred to the Ministry of Food. Debate on the necessary amending 
legislation in the British Parliament included complimentary references to the work of 
Kemp and his staff in managing the Queensland property. A similar amending bill was 
passed without debate in the Queensland Parliament.^' 
In August, the scheme lost another of its early supporters after Hanlon became seriously 
ill and Treasurer, V. C. Gair, was named Acting Premier. Gair had endorsed the 
Govemment's investment in the scheme but in the broader sense, he never matched 
Hanlon's dedication to the advancement of regional, agricultural development. It was 
not surprising that the Board's Annual Report published in September 1951 announced a 
reconsideration ofthe Corporation's aims. Even prior to the 1950-51 season, the Board 
had recognised that the all-out effort to meet production targets had weakened the 
Corporation's financial stmcture. It had not been possible to grow sorghum at an 
economical price, nor was the scheme likely to fulfil the aim of increasing food supphes. 
In the circumstances, the Board decided it would be pmdent to abandon the original 
targets and give priority to securing the financial viability ofthe scheme. The Board 
appointed an Advisoty Committee with an independent chairman to review the 
Corporation's operations. At a meeting held soon after Hanlon's death in January 1952, 
*^  Ibid, p.2132. 
^ See Kenneth W. Knight "Edward Michael Hanlon" in Denis Murphy, et. al., 1990, op. cit. p.445. 
^^  Memorandum from Sir Donald Penott, 4.8.1952, QBFC, A/19968, QSA 
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a memorandum presented by Kemp and Perrott was considered along with the results of 
the review. Although recommendations for changes with a view to the scheme's 
continuation were favourably received, it appeared that the British members ofthe 
Board had already decided to terminate Britain's involvement. Justification was couched 
in terms ofthe Corporation's aims. The Board referred to its "mandate under the Act" to 
ensure that the Corporation operated within its means and declared it was not authorised 
to engage in "an experimental and developmental project" Thus, to avoid further losses 
accming to British and Queensland taxpayers, it recommended that the Corporation be 
liquidated.^ * 
The Queensland Govemment appointed its ovm committee of experts to examine the 
Board's recommendations. Backing the suggestions for changes put forward by his 
managers, Kemp argued that the scheme's capacity to recover from the initial setbacks 
had not been fully tested. Despite his opinion that, in the light of its many positive 
aspects, the scheme should be allowed to continue for the full seven years, the 
Govemment agreed with the Board's decision. As a resuh, R. L. Murtay, former Board 
member and Under-Secretary ofthe Queensland Treasuty met with his British 
counterpart in London to negotiate with Ministiy of Food officials over the terms of 
liquidation. Under the "Heads Of Agreement" reached between the two Govemments in 
Januaty 1953, the Corporation was to be wound up as from 30 September 1952 and the 
British Govemment, on relinquishing all rights to the Corporation, was to be paid an 
^ Overview ofthe activities ofthe QBFC, p.7, QBFC, A/19968, QSA No date but probably conqnled in 
preparation for the QBFC (Winding Up) Bill, December 1953. 
® Rogers, op. cit, p.79. 
308 
agreed share ofthe value ofthe Corporation's fixed assets. A schedule of repayments, 
the last of which was due in 1957, was also dravm up. 
With the powers and functions already held by him as Co-Ordinator-General under the 
State Development and Public Works Organisation legislation, Kemp was the logical 
choice ofthe British Board members to manage and confrol the Corporation's affairs 
during the winding-up period. It was, however, not an automatic choice for the 
Queensland Govemment as Kemp was approaching his seventieth birthday. Ms 
appointment as Co-Ordinator-General had been renewed on a three-year basis since 
Januaty 1946 and, in September 1951, he had written to Gair, then Acting Premier, 
asking for some indication ofthe Govemment's intentions regarding the re-appointment 
of himself and G. W Watson, the Deputy Co-Ordinator-General. Both were then past 
the official sixty-five year retirement age. Apparently uncertain of his standing with 
Gair, he declared his willingness "to continue in office if so desired", and felt the need to 
add: "I would also like to remind you that I am also Deputy Chairman ofthe QBFC" ^' 
Cabinet decided he would be subject to the same mles as judges and set his retirement 
date for 6 October 1953, his seventieth birtibday. During these months, there was the 
further uncertainty of being detached from his comfortable organisational base in the 
Main Roads building in Albert Sfreet. Following Hanlon's request that the Co-
Ordinator-General move to offices near him, Kemp's adminisfrative headquarters were 
moved to the Executive Building into rooms previously occupied by the Irrigation and 
™ "Heads of Agreement Reached During Negotiations between Officials of the United Kingdom and 
Queensland governments", 8.1.1953, QBFC, A/19968, QSA 
'^ Kemp to Gair, 6.9.1951, 8309/SRS-1-1043/1 B305, QSA 
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Water Supply Commission.'^ ^ After Watson retired in December 1952, Gair refiised to 
approve a replacement and directed that his duties be shared among other senior 
officials. Cabinet approval of Kemp's suggestion tiiat the Co-Ordinator-General's Chief 
Engineer, James Holt, take over responsibility at this point for the co-ordinated plan of 
works , paved the way for Holt's subsequent appointment as Co-Ordinator-General. 
The Queensland Govemment's priority during these years remained the securing of 
Commonwealth financial backing for the ambitious regional development projects on 
which so much of Hanlon's 1949 election platform had been based. Labor was retumed 
to govemment but the victoty was tainted by a questionable electoral re-distribution "^* 
and allegations of "pork-barrelling" in the allocation of high-cost projects. The election 
campaign had emphasised the co-operation between the Commonwealth and Queensland 
Govemments in "pursuing a co-ordinated plan" for northem development under which 
priority was given to the provision of "adequate water, efficient transport and ample 
elecfric power" Hanlon's claim that the Prime Minister had pledged his support for the 
north Queensland irrigation projects was met with a high degree of scepticism. In 
Parhament his most vocal critics were the Brisbane-based Liberal Party representatives, 
who were pressuring the Govemment to give priority to secondaty industty 
development, and Countty Party representatives from the Darling Dovms and Maranoa 
who wanted priority to be given to their districts' small irrigation projects. They were 
Minute from Public Sendee Commissioner to Secretary, Department of Public Works and Housing 
13.7.1951, 6215/SRS-1-1043/1, QSA 
''^  Minute from Kemp to Chief Secretary, 6.1.1953. 275/ SRS-1-1043/1, QSA 
'^' See Hughes, The Govemment of Queensland, op. cit, ip.88-90; Knight, op. cit. ip. 445-46. 
" Townsville Daily Bulletin, 30.5.1949. 
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not diverted by Chifley's subsequent confirmation of his assurances to Hanlon in 1948 
and 1949 that, subject to a favorable report from Commonwealth investigating experts, 
he would recommend a fifty per cent subsidy to his Cabinet^^ especially as the 1949 
talks were held on the eve ofthe Federal election. In their view, providing for 
Commonwealth representation on the newly-created Burdekin River Authority was 
meaningless and, when Hanlon took the debate a step further by declaring his 
Govemment's commitment to cany out the projects, with or without Commonwealth 
funding, they saw it as further evidence that the Govemment had lost its grip on 
economic realities. 
Queensland's on-going efforts to enlist Commonwealth support suffered a severe 
setback after the Liberal-Countty Party coalition under the leadership of Robert Menzies 
won govemment in December 1949. Chifley's commitment to northem Ausfralian 
development had clearly waned since the immediate post-war years, but Menzies had no 
interest at all in the concept of Commonwealth Govemment intervention in the region. 
At his first Cabinet meeting on 20 December, he went ahead with Chifley's plan to wind 
up the Department of Post-War Reconstmction and combined two of its divisions in a 
new Ministry of National Development. His appointment of R. G. Casey to this outer 
Ministty gave some credence, according to Menzies' biographer, A. W. Martin, to the 
77 
persistent mmours of leadership rivalry between the two men. Casey's lack of 
enthusiasm for his portfoho was offset by the "vety able think-tank" he had inherited 
''^  Hanlon to Menzies, 5.4.1950, (copy, no top number) SRS-1- 381, QSA; Brisbane Telegraph, 
18.4.1950. 
^^  A W. Martin, Robert Menzies A Life, Volume 2, 1944-74, Melboume: Melboume University Press, 
1999, p. 130. 
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from the Labor adminisfration, but the appointment of an Ausfralian-bom official 
seconded from the British Treasuty as head ofthe department clarified its policy 
position. The interests of British investors were considered paramount. In view ofthe 
waming issued by the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canberra that 
"developmental programmes were putting a strain on the Australia economy and 
78 
contributing to acute inflation" , its function was to reject or, at the least, contain these 
programmes. 
By the early 1950s, as Martin points out Menzies was convinced that the threat of 
intemational communism would escalate into a third world war. Australia would again 
need to prepare its defences, and he made a promise to cany out the necessaty measures 
to place the countty "on a semi-war footing" ^' Queensland had persisted in presenting 
its northem development projects to the Commonwealth in terms of their national 
defence value but if the Govemment had hoped for a favorable outcome from Menzies' 
views, it was to be disappointed. During the debate on the Tully Falls Hydro-Electricity 
Project Bill in November 1950, Nicklin made the point that if Hanlon was serious in his 
efforts to gain Commonwealth assistance, his continual public abuse ofthe Menzies 
Govemment was inexplicable. In response, Hanlon revealed what he saw as the anti-
States stance of Menzies and Arthur Fadden, the newly-appointed Federal Treasurer, 
who had now reneged on his pre-election support for north Queensland development At 
the Premiers Conference in August 1950, he said, the Prime Minister and Fadden tried to 
*^ Quoted in Martin, ibid, p. 153. 
79 Ibid,p.\%l. 
312 
stop the States from going ahead with development projects on the basis tiiat all tiie 
money available on the loan market was needed for defence purposes.*" 
During this period, Hanlon had to contend not only with Commonwealth rejection and 
local political opposition to his state development plans but also with the unrelenting 
campaign by central and northem regional groups for the speedy implementation ofthe 
promised projects. Kemp was the official on whom he was increasingly dependent to 
chart a path through the political and technical obstacles towards the realisation of his 
aims. It may well have been that it was Kemp who convinced him that it could be done. 
By this time, Kemp had survived the threat posed by Lang and his supporters, while 
CoUn Clark's influence as the Govemment's principal economic adviser had waned. 
After Clark resigned as Director-General ofthe Department of Labour and Industiy in 
1952 and left Queensland, Kemp had no challengers for the position ofthe 
Govemment's most influential adviser. For his part, Kemp's looming retirement added 
to his determination to remain in confrol of canying through the ambitiously plarmed 
engineering projects, the scope of which surpassed the earlier achievements ofthe Stoty 
Bridge and Somerset Dam. It was at this stage that the stories grew of Kemp dominating 
plarming meetings with violent outbursts to get his own way, leading to later 
assessments that his use ofthe Co-Ordinator-General's powers had become unduly 
coercive.*' 
^ Tully Fall Hydro-Electticity Project Bill, Second Reading 1950, QPD, 1950, 199, p. 1516. 
'^ K. Cohen, "J. R. Kenq), a Queensland Enguieer-Administrator", Paper given at meeting of Heritage 
Unit InstiUition of Engineers, Queensland Division, 20.4.1999; Powell, op.cit, p.210; Minnery, 
"Modelling Coordination", op. cit, especially p.259. 
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Signing it as both the Co-Ordinator-General and the Chairman ofthe Bureau of 
Investigation, Kemp submitted a report to the Premier on the Burdekin Inigation, 
Hydro-Elecfricity and Flood Mitigation Project in August 1949. The report set out the 
Bureau's investigations into the separate aspects ofthe scheme, the plans for its staged 
development and the predicted outcomes, and concluded with a recommendation that it 
be referred to the Commonwealth for fimding consideration. It provided the basis for the 
talks between Chifley and Hanlon conducted outside the Premiers Conference in August 
which resulted in Hanlon's claims ofthe Prime Minister's support for the project. The 
immediate outcome was the appointment of a Commonwealth departmental committee 
to conduct further investigations and report on the feasibility ofthe project. It included 
representatives from the Treasuty, the Regional Planning Division ofthe Department of 
Post-War Reconstmction and the Bureau of Agriculture and Economics and was headed 
by Dr. L. F Loder, whom Kemp knew well. He had been Chairman ofthe Victorian 
Countty Roads Board before taking over from E. G. Theodore as Director-General ofthe 
AWC in the last year ofthe war. He was then appointed Director-General ofthe new 
Department of Works and Housing*^ and later assumed the responsibilities ofthe 
National Works Council Co-Ordinator. 
Kemp was occupied not only with managing the Premier's approaches to the 
Commonwealth but also with devising responses to allay the fears ofthe northem 
interest groups that the plarmed projects would come to nothing. Under the direction of 
Stephen Tully, MLA for Tully, local business, community, union and Labor Party 
^ "Burdekin River Plan", Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 14.9.1949; "Allied Works Council Report for 
the period July 1 - February 15, 1945", pubUshed by authority ofthe Minister for Works, Hon. H. P. 
Lazzarini, "AlUed Works Council administtation", E. G. Theodore, Papers, op. dt 
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branch representatives had written directly to Chifley to enlist his support while 
maintaining the pressure on Hanlon to keep them informed about any progress in the 
Commonwealth-State negotiations.*' The Premier's publicly expressed hopes for a 
positive outcome were not sufficient reassurance and, in March 1950, Kemp prepared a 
further statement accompanied by explanatoty plans for Hanlon to distribute to all the 
north Queensland organisations. The message was positive, again emphasising the value 
ofthe Burdekin project in bringing new industries and increased population to the 
region. It also addressed the issue of continual delays by referring to the necessity of 
thorough prehminaty investigations in view ofthe high costs involved,*"* but also 
blaming the delays on the infransigence ofthe Menzies Govemment and, in particular, 
the negative role of Treasurer Arthur Fadden, then the Member for the Federal electorate 
of Herbert. As Hanlon wrote in a letter circulated to the northem groups, the 
Commonwealth Committee's report completed in November 1949 was apparently only 
tabled in Federal Parliament in April 1950, "under pressure as to the attitude ofthe 
Federal Treasurer (Mr Fadden) and others towards the scheme" *^  It was evident that 
representatives of both the Chifley and Menzies Govemments used delaying tactics to 
avoid making any binding commitment to the Burdekin scheme while telling Hanlon 
that they were actively working towards an early decision. 
In Opposition, Chifley stated that, after the Committee's prehminaty report had 
estimated the cost ofthe scheme at twenty-nine million pounds, he had asked Hanlon to 
have his engineers and technical officers prepare a detailed report on the proposals for 
^ See, for exan^le, S. Theodore to Hanlon, 6.7.1949, (copy, no top number) SRS1043-1-3012, QSA 
^ Kemp, draft statement for the Premier, 22.3.1950, (copy, no top number) SRS 1043-1-381, QSA 
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further investigation by Commonwealth experts. According to newspaper articles at the 
time, that report had not been received until twelve months later owing to the Co-
ordinator-General being occupied with the QBFC scheme.*^ While Kemp was certainly 
involved in establishing the scheme at that time, discrepancies in the scenario blaming 
him for hindering the Commonwealth's intention to proceed with a serious evaluation of 
the Burdekin project raise doubts about the validity ofthe accusation. Kemp's first 
report, which Hanlon took to Canberra in August 1949, is ignored, while there is no 
mention ofthe difficulty the Queensland Govemment experienced in obtaining copies of 
the Commonwealth investigative committee's report as well as subsequent notations 
made by its members. In May, 1950, Kemp drafted a letter for the Premier to forward to 
Menzies requesting copies ofthe report in order to evaluate the Commonwealth 
Committee's conclusions before he finalised an updated Queensland report for 
87 — 
publication. Even if he was attempting to retrieve a situation brought about by his 
overloaded work schedule, it was still well short of twelve months since his first report 
and the Commonwealth Committee's report were completed. Menzies responded 
politely to Hanlon's aggressive representations during these months but refused to give 
any undertaking of Commonwealth support. In July 1950, the Queensland Govemment 
refused to wait any longer for his decision and decided on a commitment to the Burdekin 
*^  Premier's Department circular, signed by Hanlon, 13.6.1950, SRS 1043-1-381, QSA. 
^ Brisbane Telegraph 18.4.1950; Courier-Mail, 19.4.1950. 
^^  Kemp to Under-Secretary, Chief Secretary's Office, 11.5.1950, Serial Minute No. 2131, 3713/50, 
SRS1043-1-381,QSA 
316 
project by announcing the proclamation ofthe Burdekin River Development Act 1949,** 
Kemp having drafted a press statement to accompany the announcement. 
In the same period, regional groups in the Caims area were also exerting pressure on the 
Govemment to proceed with the promised Tully Falls Hydro-Electricity project. Kemp 
presented the project as the first stage in the development of a State electricity grid, to 
link up with the proposed Herbert River hydro-electricity facility, the Townsville steam-
powered station and then to similar facilities in south-east Queensland.*^ He retained 
overall confrol ofthe process of developing the project but was less involved on a day-
to-day basis than he was with the Burdekin project. The SEC under Commissioner Neil 
Smith, in association with the Caims Regional Electricity Board, was in overall charge 
ofthe project, while the detailed investigative and prehminaty constmction work was in 
the hands of Watson, the Deputy Co-ordinator-General, and James Holt, as acting 
Deputy Co-Ordinator-General.^ ° The investigative powers ofthe Co-Ordinator-General 
were delegated to a committee chaired by Nimmo which produced a report on the 
"Utilisation of Water Resources from the Tully River to the Herbert River" The report, 
submitted in November 1949 to Acting Premier Vince Gair, was signed by Kemp. It 
concluded with his recommendation for Cabinet approval ofthe project and for its 
adminisfration to be delegated to a new authority, the Tully Falls Hydro-Electricity 
Board, to include representatives ofthe SEC, the Caims Regional Electricity Board and 
the Co-Ordinator-General. As wdth the Burdekin report, Kemp's advice was to make the 
Secretary, Co-Ordinator-General to Under-Secretary, Chief Secretary's Office, 5.7.1950, 5362/50, 
SRS1043-1-381, QSA. 
*^  See, for example. Annual Report ofthe Co-Ordinator-General, 1949, pp.28-29. 
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report widely available so as to ensure not only that all interested organisations were 
kept fully informed but also to substantiate the Govemment's commitment to 
implementing the project. The following day, the SEC's report on the Tully scheme, 
which made similar recommendations, was submitted to Gair. It was accompanied by a 
letter from W. Moore, Minister for Mines and Immigration, urging the Acting Premier to 
pass on the report immediately to the Co-Ordinator-General for his advice in order to 
expedite Cabinet approval.^' 
Despite the backlash experienced over the Stoty Bridge financing and constmction 
artangements, the Govemment did not initially present the Tully project for 
Parhamentaty approval. The project went ahead on the basis of an Order-in-Council 
giving effect to Cabinet's approval ofthe appointment ofthe Tully Falls Hydro-
Electricity Board and confirming the Co-Ordinator-General as the designated 
constmction authonty. However, separate legislation was necessaty to provide a sound 
legal base for the delegation of this authority and to give the Co-Ordinator-General 
appropriate loan-raising powers, as discussions Kemp and Watson had with Treasuty 
officials identified the importance of debenture financing for the project. '^ With Cabinet 
eager to answer Townsville MLA Tom Aiken's point that the hopes of "thousands of 
^ See Watson to Acting Chief Secretary, 14.12.1949, Serial Minute No. 2022,10276/49, SRS 1043-1-
2995, QSA. 
" W. Moore, Minister for Mines and Immigration, to Acting Premier Gair, 24.11.1949, 09882/49, SRS 
1043-1-2995, QSA. 
^ Petersen, Secretary, Co-Ordinator-General, to Corrunissioner N. Smitii, 17.1.1950, 591/50, SRS 1043-
1-2995, QSA. 
^ Kemp to Chief Secretary, 20.2.1950, 01397/50, SRS 1043-1-2995, QSA; Kemp, Minute to Chief 
Secretary reporting on the First Meeting ofthe Tully Falls Hydro-Electricity Board on 27.3.1950, 
17.4.1950,2831/50, SRS 1043-1-2995, QSA. 
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fanners of north Queensland" for the long-promised electricity supply rested on the 
Tully hydro-electiicity scheme,'"* Kemp was able to consohdate the Co-Ordinator-
General's control over the project. At the same time, the organisation's technical 
dominance was sfrengtiiiened by the appointment of Nimmo, the acknowledged 
hydrology expert, as professional consultant. Kemp himself made the public 
announcement ofthe Govemment's decision to commence work on the first ofthe 
project's seven stages, estimated to cost over seven and a half million pounds. Having 
confirmed the imminent removal of plant, equipment and staff to Tully from the nearly-
completed Somerset Dam, he gained Cabinet approval for interim Treasuty advances of 
up to £200,000.'^ 
The planning of sfrategies to obtain a Commonwealth subsidy continued throughout this 
period. Kemp had initially advised that each project should be presented separately to 
the Commonwealth as being more effective than an overall, non-specific approach. He 
gave priority to the presentation ofthe Burdekin project to the Commonwealth but, in 
Febmary 1950, admitted in a letter to the Premier that no useful purpose would be 
served in waiting any longer for the Commonwealth's decision on the project. Hanlon 
acted immediately on Kemp's suggestion that he now approach the Prime Minister 
requesting a Commonwealth subsidy of one-third ofthe cost ofthe Tully Falls Hydro-
Electricity project but Canberra failed to respond to any of his letters. With the next 
Premiers Conference due in August, the Premier again asked Kemp to advise on the hst 
Thomis, op. cit., jp.38-39. 
^ Kemp, Minute to Chief Secretary, 17.4.1950, op. cit; Tully Falls Hydro-Electricity Project Bill, 
Second Reading 1950, op. cit, p. 1510. 
^ Kemp to Chief Secretary, 1.2.1950, 00702/50, SRS 1043-1-2995, QSA 
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of development proposals to be placed on the conference agenda, although he 
subsequently decided Queensland's interests would be better served by having private 
discussions with the Prime Minister. 
This course of action was pre-empted by Casey's arrival in Brisbane, accompanied by a 
group of senior Commonwealth officials headed by Loder, now Director-General ofthe 
Commonwealth Department of Works, for a conference with Hanlon and his senior 
officials on 14 August. The conference was a watershed for Queensland's hopes of 
Commonwealth financial participation in the designated projects. With only twenty-four 
hours scheduled for the visit however, Casey was in control ofthe outcome from the 
start. While he acknowledged Queensland's wealth of "exploitable natural resources", 
he set the terms ofthe discussion wdthin a competitive framework by pointing out that 
all six states had a programme of development.projects for which they wanted 
Commonwealth assistance. He deflected Hanlon's aggressive attempts to talk up the 
national value ofthe projects by constantly referring back to his officials and their 
doubts on the issue of economic viability. Although there was some support for the 
Tully project, the overall message ofthe conference was the Commonwealth's concem 
over the lack of firm data on anticipated retums, given the high level of capital 
investment required, particularly for the Tully and Burdekin projects. Supported by 
Nimmo's unchallenged technical expertise, Kemp spoke at length on the issue to reject 
the inference that the projects were overly ambitious and unsoundly based, and also to 
reinforce the need to view them as a whole. He referred to his experience as Chairman of 
the 1936 Royal Commission on Electricity Supply in New Zealand to point out that the 
hydro-electricity scheme there was considered "hopelessly over-capitalised" at the time 
but the size ofthe market for cheap power had subsequentiy vindicated the initial 
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outiays. He pressed home the need to integrate irrigation with hydro-electricity 
generation to avoid water "mnning to waste" and stressed that his plan to "get power as 
we go", so that "as we lift the dam we are continually making more land, more water 
and more electric power available" would produce an economically feasible result.'^ 
While Kemp was able to counter Casey's attempts to force some concessions in relation 
to the Callide coal railway and Mareeba-Dimbulah schemes, the only positive aspect of 
the conference was the Minister's approval ofthe proposed beef roads scheme for south-
west Queensland. 
Neither Casey's visit nor the pressure Hanlon maintained in the following months 
yielded any commitment on the Commonwealth's behalf The Tully Falls project, for 
example, remained "under consideration" well into 1953, with Gair keeping up the flow 
of direct correspondence with Menzies which Hanlon had initiated. In an urgent 
telegram to Casey on 28 November 1950, Hanlon had explained that he wanted the 
Commonwealth's decision in order to make an announcement before his trip to London 
to finalise the sugar agreement. Casey took a month to reply, expressing his regret that 
he was still not in a position to give a decision. He was hopeful that reports on the 
projects on which Loder and Kemp had been working would be presented to Cabinet in 
the near future, but concluded that consideration ofthe Tully project would have to wait 
on a decision on the Burdekin project. The proposal on the Bowen coke ovens was 
shelved, although he held out some expectation of Commonwealth support for the 
^ Report of Proceedings at Conference on Burdekin, Mareeba-Dimbulah, Tully, Coal Production and 
Westem Queensland roads, 14.8.1950, SRS 1043-1-2995 (also on SRS 1043-1-2996), QSA. 
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Mareeba-Dimbulah irrigation project, consequent on the findings of an imminent report 
by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics on Tobacco Production.^ * 
In this way, the Menzies Govemment did not reject the major projects out of hand. It 
kept the Queensland Govemment's hopes alive throughout this period by persisting with 
the stance that Commonwealth officials were still assessing the proposals. Loder made 
several visits to Queensland to confer with Kemp on the Burdekin project and to 
persuade him to refine the data he was assembling to meet the Commonwealth's specific 
requirements. However, Kemp persisted in supplying a mass of detailed technical 
information in a determined effort to keep his original grand plan intact. He contended 
that with Commonwealth backing and the employment of "overseas constmction 
resources", a reduced section dam, together with a township, local roads, amenities and 
power, could be completed by 1955. To maximise the hydro-electric potential ofthe 
scheme, he considered the dam should be taken to the originally planned height of 
seventy-five feet by the end of 1957.^ ^ While Loder was supportive, his colleague on the 
technical committee, J. G. Crawford, Director of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
favored irrigation works to expand local tobacco production while rejecting as 
uneconomic any Commonwealth investment on the Burdekin main dam. With this 
verdict he ensured that "the dam scheme was dead" '°° Although its future was 
decidedly uncertain, Kemp used the reports generated through the Burdekin River 
Authority to keep the project on the pubhc works, and thus the political agenda. The Co-
Ordinator-General effectively subsidised the on-going investigations and prehminaty 
^ Casey to Hanlon, Telegram 29.12.1950, 10603/50, SRS 1043-1-381, QSA. 
* Kemp to Loder, 14.12.1950, (copy, no top number), SRS 1043-1-381, QSA 
'°° Ken, op. cit, p.232. 
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work, with the expenditure allocated under the Co-Ordinated Plan of Works reaching 
just over two and a half million pounds in 1953 '"' Armed with the Co-Ordinator-
(jeneral's statutoty powers as a constmction authority, he directed Hydraulic Branch 
staff to proceed to the preliminary design stage for the hydro-electricity and flood 
mitigation components, going so far as to have them prepare plans and specifications in 
readiness for tenders to be called for the constmction ofthe confroversial Burdekin Falls 
main dam. 
Problems with the viability of the Clare Irrigation scheme did little to reassure the 
Commonwealth on the subject ofthe Burdekin project. A Soldier Settlement scheme, 
providing initially for forty-four irrigated farms for the production of tobacco, was a 
joint proposal between the Commonwealth and State War Service Land Settiement 
authorities, and implemented by Lang in his final months as Irrigation Commissioner. 
The LAB and the Co-Ordinator-General approved the scheme as an experimental or first 
stage within the overall Burdekin Valley irrigation development. Intent on expansion, 
the Lands Minister, Tom Foley, ignored the waming given by Kemp in his capacity as 
Chairman ofthe Burdekin River Authority only to receive the same advice when he 
consulted Nimmo. As Nimmo confirmed, it was unsafe to undertake expansion ofthe 
Clare area without providing more water storage and, even then, the cost of water for 
farming would be abnormally high. He then referred the Minister back to Kemp who, as 
Co-Ordinator-General, was negotiating with the Commonwealth War Service Land 
Settiement authority for fimding support to commence work on a temporary storage dam 
101 Annual Report of the Co-Ordinator-General, 1953, p.25. 
^"^ Ibid, 1951, p.7. 
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which was eventually planned to be absorbed by the Burdekin dam.'°^ The Clare scheme 
was unusual in that settiers were given some fraining in fanning and, before they took up 
the blocks, the Main Roads Commission built cottages and much ofthe tobacco 
processing plant. However, as with most other soldier settlement schemes throughout 
Australia, a range of factors contributed to poor production results at Clare and, by 1953, 
many ofthe settiers had abandoned their farms. There was pubhc pressure for relief 
measures to be instituted and, in response to a request for advice from the Premier, 
Kemp recommended financial support provisions to be made available through the 
Agricultural Bank. Kemp used the lessons ofthe Clare scheme to shape his 
recommendations, which Cabinet approved, so that they were applicable not only to 
relieving the plight ofthe Clare settlers but also to avoiding similar difficulties in 
planning any new irrigation settlements in north Queensland.'"^ Cabinet was, by then, 
committed to allocating State-generated funds for the Clare, Burdekin and Tully 
projects, as well as a future commitment to the revised Mareeba-Dimbulah irrigation 
scheme, without receiving any confirmation of Commonwealth assistance. 
Having waited in vain for a favorable decision from Casey, Hanlon had introduced the 
Tully Falls Hydro-Electricity Project Bill to Parliament on 24 November 1950. Kemp 
was responsible for drafting the enabling legislation, the purpose of which was to place 
the arrangements made under the previous Order-in-Council on a legal basis. Constraints 
on the Co-Ordinator-General acting as a constmction authority included a requirement 
'°^  Nimmo to Foley, Report on Clare hrigation Area, dated 28.2.1951, received 21.5.1951,4256/51, 
104 
SRS 1043-1-2863, QSA. 
For a detailed coverage ofthe Clare Irrigation Scheme, see Kerr, op. cit, j5).235-38. 
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for Cabinet approval for all tenders and major purchases and, somewhat ironically, given 
tiie accusations previously levelled at Kemp of commandeering all the available 
engineering expertise, for all senior engineer appointments. The Premier's insistence 
that Queensland was capable of funding the project attracted immediate condemnation 
from Opposition members. Although some northem MLAs referred to the Barron Falls 
Hydro-Electricity scheme which, despite being commenced under a similar financial 
cloud, had been paid off within twenty years. Opposition leader, Frank Nicklin, rejected 
the Premier's "heroic statements" conceming the State's capacity to fund these massive 
development outiays solely through State-raised debenture loans.'°^ 
Once again, Kemp was placed under considerable pressure as the Govemment depended 
on him to retrieve its public standing by orchestrating some visible action on the much-
vaunted projects. In some respects, there was nothing new in the scope of his 
responsibility as the major projects ofthe 1930s and the all-out defence constmction 
programme during World War Two demonsfrated. However, this time the scale of works 
was massive as was the capital investment required and, in contrast to World War Two, 
there was no Commonwealth financial backing. Finally, as the senior Govemment 
adviser and the principal enthusiast for a programme of development works 
unprecedented in Queensland histoty, he had the primaty responsibility for its 
implementation. With the Tully project, Kemp could confidently leave the day-to-day 
operations admirusfration to his own senior staff who were assisted by their counterparts 
in Main Roads. In confrast, realisation ofthe Burdekin scheme became his obsession. 
'°* Kemp, Chairman Burdekin River Authority, to Chief Secretary, 23.2.1953, Serial Minute No. B. R. A. 
55 K "Finance and Development of Farms, Burdekin Area", SRS 1043 -1-2863 QSA. 
'"^  Tully Falls Hydro-Electricity Bill, 1950, op. c/t,pp.l511-1515. 
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Kemp, Nimmo and Smith collaborated with senior technical officers in several 
departments to compile the comprehensive "Kemp" report on the Burdekin required by 
the Commonwealth, which was presented to Acting Premier Gair in December 1951.'°^ 
He forwarded copies ofthe report to any Federal politicians and officials he thought 
might support the project and sought them out for discussions whenever his work took 
him to Melboume or Canberra. 
One of those to whom he appealed was Sir Frederic Eggleston who had been an 
enthusiastic Minister for State Development in Victoria when the Countiy Roads Board 
and other semi-govemmental authorities were first established. By this time, however, 
Eggleston had been badly bmised by his encounters with Sir John Monash in relation to 
the operations of Victoria's SEC. He now argued for these authorities to be brought back 
under central departmental control and viewed large-scale, high-cost public works 
projects as anathema to the business of govemment.'°* Beginning with a complaint that 
the report "was so voluminous and so weighty tiliat, being a sufferer from arthritis, I 
cannot handle it vety well", he went on to dismiss Kemp's position on the Burdekin and 
forcefully reiterated the negative view of his projected figures for retums on the capital 
investment already recorded by Crawford and the other members ofthe Commonwealth 
technical committee.'"^ Kemp ably defended the report in his reply to Eggleston: 
The Burdekin project is planned for implementation stage by stage. It wall be 
developed so as to become revenue producing at the earliest possible date and to 
give production at all times commensurate with expenditure. Our estimates are 
based on a 30-year developmental programme but that can be accelerated or 
"" J. R. Kemp, Report on the Burdekin River Irrigation, Hydro-Electric and Flood Mitigation Project, 
Burdekin River Authority, 19 December 1951. 
"* Serle, op. cit, nj.450-51, p.509. 
"^ Eggleston to Kemp, 22.4.1953, Sir Frederic Eggleston, Papers, Series 1, MS423/127a, pp. 1-2, NLA. 
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retarded as necessary, according to the resources available and tiie demand for 
water for irrigation and for power."" 
His efforts at the national level were to no avail, particularly as the Menzies Govemment 
was still stmggling with the threat of rising unemployment and inflation while 
attempting to maintain its commitment to increasing the defence budget. The Co-
Ordinator-General's Annual Report for 1953 gave a vety positive coverage of work in 
progress on both projects, recording a total of nearly two million pounds spent to date on 
the Tully works centred around constmction ofthe Koombooloomba Dam.'" It glossed 
over the real situation, in which plans for the main Burdekin Dam were shelved 
indefinitely and the Tully project closed down through lack of funds to pay workers. The 
workers' angty reaction was widely reported and, in response, Kemp drafted a press 
release for Duggan, the central theme of which the Deputy-Premier expanded on in a 
letter to the Tully workers. Following the lead set by Forgan Smith and Hanlon, he cited 
the projected reduction in available loan funds as behind the prospect ofthe project 
being permanentiy closed down, while attacking the Commonwealth Govemment's 
failure to provide assistance "to keep men at work in this state" Despite the 
apparentiy irretrievable fmancial position, Kemp secured approval for an even higher 
loan allocation under the co-ordinated plan in 1954 for the Tully and Burdekin projects, 
thereby enabling work to continue on both of them. His involvement with the major 
development projects wound down towards the end of 1953 as the date of his official 
retirement drew closer. 
"° Kemp to Eggleston, 15.6.\953, ibid, p.2. 
' " Annual Report of the Co-Ordinator-General, 1953,^3.10-17. 
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On 17 March 1953, the members ofthe QBFC Board resigned. Kemp's appointment as 
liquidator ofthe Peak Downs scheme was acceptable to all Board members but by early 
October, the matter was still not officially resolved. Kemp wrote to Gair that day 
ostensibly to mark his retirement, but actually to put the case for Cabinet confirmation of 
his appointment. It was almost a matter of him being reduced to begging, as he felt 
obliged to set out his many achievements during more than thirty years of public service 
in Queensland before asserting; "I am still in good health and feel my mental powers 
have not declined"."^ Almost as an afterthought he raised the matter ofthe QBFC being 
without a manager after his retirement and indicated he was prepared to continue if the 
Govemment wanted him to do so.""* In the end, it was expediency that settled the 
matter, as it would have been too complex to establish altemative administrative 
arrangements for inclusion in the pending winding-up legislation. Kemp's term as 
manager ofthe QBFC was extended for three months to the end of 1953. Following the 
passage ofthe Queensland-British Food Corporation (Winding Up) Bill tilirough 
Parliament in December, the Govemment appointed him to constitute the corporation 
sole to be known as the Queensland Govemment Central Queensland Estates, which 
confrolled the former Corporation's assets. James Hoh was appointed Acting Co-
ordinator-General at the same time. 
"^ Duggan to A. J. Clausen, Hon. Secretary, Can?) Committee, Tully Falls project (copy, no top number) 
SRS 1043-1-2996, QSA. 
113 Kemp to Gair, 5.10.1953, 8136/ SRS 1043/1, QSA 
"" Ibid 
"^ Orders-in-Council, 30.12.1953. Queensland Govemment Gazette {QGG), 1.1.1954, 1, 185. 
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The "winding up" legislation also outlined the plan adopted for the disposal of its assets, 
at the centre of which was the subdivision ofthe agricultural land into blocks of 4000 to 
6000 acres to be held under closer settlement leases, the subdivision ofthe grazing land 
into grazing farms, and the sale at auction of all stock and improvements. The debate on 
the Bill covered much the same ground as in previous debates while confirming the 
validity of many ofthe objections raised in 1950. As Treasurer, Larcombe undertook an 
emotional defence ofthe scheme, but it was too simplistic of him to claim that the 
demand by Winston Churchill's anti-Labor Govemment for the scheme to be closed 
down, prevented failure being tumed into success."^ For his part, Gair acknowledged 
the dedication of Kemp, Murray and other senior officials in canying out a difficult 
undertaking. Bringing an often stormy debate to its conclusion, he offered the rather 
mild observation that: 
... the objective was not entirely achieved and there were factors that contributed 
towards its non-success but the motive was an excellent one and the experience 
gained was vety good. 
As liquidator, Kemp achieved a vety satisfactoty outcome for the Govemment. During 
1953, he chaired a "Committee of Advice" of relevant departmental heads which met 
several times to ensure that production programmes were maintained, land titles and 
valuations confirmed, and the disposal of assets planned for the maximum possible 
retum. Through the well-judged disposal programme that was established, the 
Govemment had all debts associated wdth the scheme cleared. 
"* Queensland-BritishFood Corporation (Winding Up) Bill, 1953, Second Reading QPD, 1953-54, Vol. 
207, p. 1706. 
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The criticisms made by H. W Herbert in an article published in Januaty 1954"* were, 
consequentiy, difficult for Kemp to accept Perhaps as a reflection of his uncertain 
relationship with the Premier, he addressed his complaints to Foley, rather than to Gair. 
In one ofthe few instances where he gave vent on paper to his well-known temper, he 
described Herbert's claims as "malicious", disloyal, and ill-informed, while declaring 
tiiat: 
If Mr Herbert, publishing information he acquired as an officer ofthe 
Corporation is tmsting to his memoty, he might be excused but as an officer of 
the Corporation, he indicates a hostility which, if it existed during his period of 
employment, would not have assisted in efficient direction of such matters as he 
was required to attend to ... ,... 
He ended this highly personal attack with the view that: 
The slur cast on the Board by an ex-officer who, whilst he had many excellent 
qualifications, had not succeeded in his own effort at practical fanning, can only 
be described as presumptuous."^ 
Herbert's analysis ofthe reasons behind the scheme's failure was, with few exceptions, 
uncritically adopted by later commentators. He placed considerable emphasis on 
deficiencies in management, among which were a "top-heavy", costly management 
stmcture, cenfralised decision-making and lack of expert input into management 
decisions. Kemp rightly rejected some of these claims as misrepresenting the 
management situation. However, there was some justification for Herbert's opinion that 
'"/A/rf,p.l712. 
"* H. W. Herbert, "The 'Peak Downs' Scheme", Australian Quarterly, 25, 4, December 1953. pp. 13-24; 
see also, "Costly Lesson ofthe Peak Downs Scheme", Financial Review, 7.1.1954. 
™ Kemp to Foley, "Notes for the Muiister's information, 21.1.1954, QBFC, A/19973, QSA 
'^ ° Herbert, op. cit 
330 
the organisational stmcture, which had for many years delivered results for Kemp across 
a range of works projects, was inappropriate and, as such, a contributing factor to the 
scheme's failure. Whether the management problem was the result of extemal pressures 
and Kemp's pre-occupation with the many other development projects then being 
negotiated, or whether, although Herbert did not name him directiy, the fault lay with 
Kemp's particular adminisfrative style, remained at issue. 
There was little doubt that, faced with the urgency of commencing the Peak Downs 
scheme as well as keeping up with his other project responsibilities, Kemp rehed on the 
organisational system, tested over the years with Main Roads and used increasingly in 
the work ofthe Co-Ordinator-General. He also had confidence in his team of managers 
and the experts, well-established in their specialist fields, whom he arranged to have 
seconded to the Corporation. Dissatisfaction among the staff became apparent after the 
initial period of intense activity, when they began to settle into routine yet had to deal 
with the scheme's emerging problems. The highly-centralised, decision-making 
stmcture, under which all decisions were referred through Rogers to Kemp, did not 
allow the flexibility required to respond quickly and effectively to situations at the local 
level. At the same time, most ofthe staff continued to work in the dedicated way that 
drew so many public tributes. Herbert's resentment may have stemmed from a lack of 
administrative authority. He was responsible for preparing the valuations for property 
acquisitions and, although expecting a senior management position, he remained as an 
assistant manager under Rogers. G. W Calder was another manager who was publicly 
critical ofthe scheme's management. A civil engineer and barrister who had been on the 
MRC staff, Calder was appointed field manager at Capella in November 1949. The first 
manager, W J. Young, died of a heart attack after being wamed by doctors not to retum 
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to Peak Downs as tiie sittiation had become too stressful for him. He had been with Main 
Roads since the 1920s, served as the AWC's Engineer Liaison Officer witii the militaty 
authorities in Queensland and, following his appointment as Queensland's first Housing 
Commissioner after the war, was seconded to Peak Downs. Calder was also seconded 
from his position as Chief Engineer, Department of Harbours and Marine.'^' Twelve 
months later, as the first indications appeared that the scheme might not proceed, he 
cited "top heavy management" as his reason for resigning to become the new general 
manager for Thiess Brothers. The managers and agricultural advisers who stayed on 
chose to air their concems in consultation with Kemp. After nearly two years' 
experience, they were better-equipped to assess what changes were needed. The 
delegation of decision-making powers to the Corporation's regional and local offices 
and simplified accounting procedures'^ ^ were among their recommendations which 
Kemp presented to the Board's review committee. Some of them were already in 
operation when the decision was made to terminate the scheme. 
The 1952 report ofthe Board's Advisoty Committee effectively absolved the 
Queensland management from any blame for the scheme's difficulties. It concluded that 
they arose from the Board having to address two problems simultaneously. The first was 
to grow a new type of crop in a marginal rainfall area previously untested for 
agricultural development while the second was to estabhsh a farming system on a scale 
never before attempted in Ausfralia. In the Committee's view, the initial targets were 
never achievable. The efforts to meet them not only meant a "heavy load" for the 
121 
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Fourth Report ofthe QBFC, 1950-51, QBFC, A/19973, QSA; North Queensland Register, 10.9.1949. 
Priest op. cit, p. 110. 
123 
Rogers, op. cit, p.78. 
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Corporation's senior executives but no time for the process of trial and ertor required to 
develop "an economic model of production" '^ '^  What may have been implied but 
remained unstated was the adverse effect ofthe requirement to refer all operational 
decisions to the British Board members for approval. Although, under the initial 1948 
intergovemmental agreement, they determined poHcy matters while delegating authority 
over the scheme's operations to Kemp, in reality he was obliged to wait on their consent 
to evety operational proposal. When Kemp was negotiating with owners over property 
acquisitions during 1949, there were expensive delays, with daily telegrams going back 
and forth, before Kemp finally persuaded the Chairman to approve his proposals. 
Herbert had taken to London a "vety candid report" on the scheme's viability in the 
wake ofthe first season's disasfrous production figures and Kemp was under constant 
pressure during those months to demonsfrate the positive results needed to reassure the 
British Parliament and the press. 
In October 1949, the announcement that, owing to his deteriorating health, doctors had 
ordered Kemp to take three months rest, went on to confirm that he was not only 
continuing as head ofthe Corporation but also maintaining a full work load. Two 
months later, he retired as Main Roads Commissioner in order to devote his energies to 
his other public responsibilities. Kemp's health problems, which had first become 
serious in 1947, raise questions about his capacity to maintain the administrative 
dominance and consequent effectiveness to which evetyone had become accustomed. 
'^ ^ Report of tiie Advisory Committee, QBFC, 4.8.1952, A/19973, p.2, QSA 
'^ ^ See, for example, Conrespondence during June and July 1949, Kemp to W. J. Seawright owner of 
Braniber Downs, QBFC, A/19973, QSA 
^^ Kemp to Rosa, OFC, Weekly telephone report, 19.7.1949, A/19973, QSA 
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They may have provided an explanation for his reliance on a familiar yet, in this 
instance, inappropriate management stmchire. If his position of absolute organisational 
authority was weakened, it would have affected the system of delegation dependent on 
his legendaty short lines of confrol and contributed to the unusual situation of managers 
going public with their complaints. His personal attack on Herbert displayed an 
uncharacteristic lapse in judgement when he confrasted Herbert's failure as a farmer 
with his own success as a grain grower in Victoria. This reference to the Mallee wheat 
farm he worked with his father before 1920, and another reference to his contribution in 
1932 to the expansion of wheat growing on the westem Darling Downs, were 
inappropriate attempts to establish himself as a grain production expert.'^ '^  
In the cmcial period when the scheme was being reviewed to determine its future, Kemp 
may well have lost the forceful edge that had carried him successfully through many 
similar situations. By then he was becoming "yesterday's man", a senior official who 
had commanded considerable power but who was now reaching the end of his pubhc 
career. As political power passed to new leaders, he no longer enjoyed the same level of 
confidence or even respect as had been evident when Hanlon was Premier. At his prime, 
when it came to a decision on the future ofthe Peak Downs scheme, Kemp would have 
persuaded the Queensland Govemment with a sfrong case for its continuation for the 
full, seven-year term. In its 1952 report the Advisoty Committee proposed a simple 
explanation for the perceived failure. It stated that, in hindsight, the Board's mistake was 
to proceed with the original plan as approved by the British and Queensland 
'^ ^ Courier-Mail, 4.10.1949. 
' ^ Kemp to Foley, 21.1.1954, p.3., A/19973, QSA. 
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Governments. At the time, Kemp was unlikely to have had doubts about proceeding 
with the scheme or, indeed, about his organisation's capacity to carty out the OFC's 
plan, and would have advised Hanlon accordingly. He was accustomed to working on 
projects with high initial costs, establishment problems and long lead times before they 
started to show some retum in terms of public benefit. As he had said in a public address 
at the time, early setbacks were to be expected and the scheme's potential benefit to 
agricultural development in Queensland warranted a substantial capital investment.'^ " It 
was ironic that, despite its apparent failure and the general endorsement of Herbert's 
criticisms, all costs were recovered. Private sector stalwarts such as the Thiess brothers 
and fiiture Coalition Govemment Treasurer, Liberal Leader Thomas Hiley, regarded the 
Peak Downs scheme as worthwhile and, in the long term, successful in opening up the 
Cenfral Highlands for private enterprise.'^' 
Kemp's belief in the benefits the scheme represented for the district never wavered as 
evident from a report he submitted to the Premier just prior to his death in Febmaty 
1955. After outiining his efforts to obtain the best sale price for the Corporation's cattle, 
he was still looking to the future in noting that, 'Vith the wonderful rains recentiy 
received, our pasture and water position has been sfrengthened" Rogers has suggested 
that vdthout the British Govemment's financial involvement the scheme would not have 
gone ahead. While this is largely self-evident with the size ofthe British investment 
ensuring the adoption ofthe OFC's plan, there was a wider background to the 
'^ Report ofthe Advisory Committee, 1952, A/19973, QSA 
"° J. R. Kenp, Address to United Services at Victoria Barracks, op. dt, QSA 
'^ ' Priest op- at., p. 110; see also Killin, op. dt, p.65. 
'^ ^ Kemp to Gair, 24.2.1955, QBFC, A/19968, QSA 
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Queensland Govemment's decision to proceed with what was always going to be an 
experiment. While it was outside the terms of reference ofthe NADC, tiie Peak Downs 
scheme embodied the Queensland Govemment's commitment backed by development-
oriented departments such as the Co-Ordinator-General, to investigating and utihsing all 
likely avenues for financing natural resources development. There has been equally 
compelling evidence that, without his administrative skills, technocratic orientation and 
obsessive dedication to the realisation of his own vision, the groundwork for 
Queensland's escalated rate of economic development over the succeeding decades 
would not have been laid. 
That the working relationship forged between Hanlon and Kemp was based on achieving 
shared goals was illustrated in the foreword Kemp wrote to the report on the Burdekin 
project which he presented to Acting Premier Gair in December 1951. 
The unwavering faith ofthe Hon. The Premier, Mr E. M. Hanlon, M. L. A., in 
this and other highly developmental projects in Queensland has made possible 
the essential work of investigation and research in regard to both the engineering 
and production problems."^ 
Kemp's tribute was also to be a farewell as Hanlon, who had virtually retired from 
politics, died two months later. When the Premier became seriously ill early in 1951, he 
had encouraged Cabinet to put aside Labor's traditional aversion to imperial honours 
and nominate Kemp for a knighthood. In the Queensland Honours List published in June 
that year, Kemp took his place alongside Federal Treasurer Arthur Fadden as the only 
Queenslanders on the list.'^'' Shortly afterwards, he was accepted as a member ofthe 
conservative Queensland Club. By the end of 1952, however, he had suffered serious 
'^ ^ Kemp, Report on the Burdekin project op. dt, Foreword. 
"^ Townsville Daily Bulletin, 7.5.1951. 
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setbacks in both his personal and professional lives. He did not enjoy the confidence of 
Gair, the new Premier, while a clearly ambitious Foley, wdth Irrigation added to his 
ministerial responsibilities, preferred to consult directiy with Irrigation Commissioner 
Nimmo. 
In October, after the death of Iva, his wife of forty years, Kemp's health broke down and 
it was several months before he was fully recovered.'^ ^ While he had retained his 
position as Co-Ordinator-General throughout 1954 solely for the purposes ofthe Peak 
Downs scheme. Cabinet lost little time in approving measures aimed at undermining the 
Co-Ordinator-General's administrative independence. In October 1954, when he was in 
Melboume for his marriage to Aimie Tullock, his former secretaty, Gair piloted an 
amending Bill through Parhament to give permanent operation to the State Development 
and Public Works Organisation Acts in place ofthe previous, seven-year, renewable 
periods. The legislation also took the first step towards bringing the Co-Ordinator-
General under the operations ofthe Public Service Board by deleting the provision 
whereby both the Co-Ordinator-General and the Deputy Co-Ordinator-General held 
office at the pleasure of Parliament. To broaden control over the co-ordination of public 
works, the State Development and Public Works Organisation Council was established, 
comprising the Premier, the Deputy Premier, the Treasurer, and the Minister for Lands 
and Irrigation. The Council was supported by an Advisoty Committee of senior officials, 
chaired by the Co-Ordinator-General. Other members were the Pubhc Service 
Commissioner, the Irrigation and Water Supply Commissioner, Electricity Supply 
Commissioner and the Under-Secretaries ofthe Departinents of Treasuty, and 
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136 Agriculttire and Stock. Given Kemp's long-standing competition with the Railways 
Commissioner and the Lands Adminisfration Board Chairman to influence decisions on 
the direction of developmental planning, it was perhaps surprising that they were not 
members ofthe committee. 
Kemp died in Febmaty 1955. As the honours they awarded him confirmed, he had won 
the respect of his professional peers, while, in Queensland, he was characterised as "the 
state's busiest man", the beneficent public official who had worked tirelessly, and at 
great personal cost, in the public interest. It was a friendly joumalist sketching the 
elements of his personality, who probably came closest to identifying the attributes that 
made Kemp so successful in persuading people to endorse his views: 
Sir John Kemp is a shy man who says little, and says it softly but firmly. He 
sucks his pipe and thinks a lot. But when he gets on to some of his favourite 
schemes, such as the Peak Downs food project or the development of Cenfral 
Queensland, as "the Ruhr of Queensland", he can be more than eloquent.''^ 
"^ Sultzer, Winterthur&Cie, Switzerland, to Kenqj, handwritten letter, 11.11.1952, SRS1158-1-56, 
QSA. 
Annual Report of the Co-Ordinator-General, 1954, p.5. 
Summers, "Sir John Kerrqj", op. dt 
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CONCLUSION 
If any confirmation is needed ofthe extent of Kemp's admmisfrative power and the 
bi-partisan fear that, in him. Labor had indeed created an adminisfrative dictator, it 
lies in the speed with which the govemment ofthe day moved in 1949 and again in 
1954 to bring tiie Main Roads Commission and the Co-Ordinator-General under 
parhamentaty confrol. It is a moot point wiiether or not these moves would have 
succeeded if attempted several years earher, before age and ill-healtii blunted his 
competitive edge. At the time they occurred, they were inevitable, reflecting the 
reality of Kemp's situation, as well as changes in the pohtical climate and in popular 
perceptions of his effectiveness. In short, Kemp had had his day, and drcumstances 
dictated new participants, as well as new conflicts and alliances, in tiie decision-
making process to take advantage ofthe prospect of a redistribution of adminisfrative 
power. 
There were certainly politicians and officials who, backed by their respective client 
interest groups, had been corr^jeting to expand their influaice in Queensland's 
developmental policy process. Over more than twenty years, Kemp had led the 
competition, progressively outmanoeuvring both aifrenched and new challengers, to 
become tiie adminisfrative gateway to decision-making on the overall direction and 
selection of pubhc works and infrastmcture development projects. Moreover, his 
vision of rationally-planned pubhc works development programs that delivered 
economic and social benefits was adopted and realised by later govemments, with 
the principal organisations he had founded and consohdated retaining a decisive role 
in the current developmental pohcy process. Even after the exercise of ministerial 
responsibility was ostensibly sfrengthened and a change of govemmait in 1957 
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promised a change in ideological focus, the empne of organisation-based mfluence 
Kemp had built was not broken up, nor has the range of statutoty powers delegated 
to the heads ofthe organisations been revoked. During the Bjelke-Petersen 
govemment's years in office, the Co-Ordinator-Gaieral remained an important 
instrument for the delivety of tiie large-scale infrastrarture projects which 
characterised the Govemment's development orientation. The majority of them were 
initiated under previous Labor govemments and, as they represented the cenfral pillar 
of Kemp's vision for the State's economic development he battled against 
considerable opposition to have work on them commenced and their funding 
continued. 
After the subsequent fragmentation of its design and constmction expertise, the Co-
Ordinator-General's department survived the frend towards replacing tiie technical 
specialist with the managerial specialist through the recruitment of senior officials 
with credentials in both sfreams. The promotion ceiling imposed on professionals in 
the Queensland pubhc service had obhged many of them to gain 
generalist/managerial qualifications in order for them to move across to the 
adminisfrative division and thus be eligible for the most seruor appointments. In 
apparent confirmation of Taylor's contention of seventy years ago that engineers 
epitonused the value of scientific management in the advancement of industrial (and 
post-industrial) societies, engineers more than other professionals have been 
appointed to managerial positions in a variety of fimctional areas. Witii a flatter 
adminisfrative stmcture and a functional emphasis on mvestigation, assessment and 
co-ordination, the Co-Ordinator-General as a bureaucratic organisation was revived 
as a ministerial power base and, as the Department of State Development has a 
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cenfral, enabling role in tiie current Labor Govemment's new round of pubhc works 
and resources-based development plans. 
As for Main Roads, Kemp's other organisational base, in the late 1990s, a generahst 
adminisfrator replaced an engineer as head of tiie departinent for tiie first time since 
its establishmait in 1920. However, after short-lived attempts to subsume its semi-
independent status within broader departmental groupmgs. Main Roads retains the 
dominant role in the admmisfration ofthe state's roads pohcy and continues its 
involvement in Co-Ordinator-General projects. Although railways and air services 
are important components ofthe state's fransport network, they remain secondaty to 
roads and road fransport, while tiie political importance of roads' pohcies has been 
reinforced by the perceived influence of commimity opposition to pohcy decisions 
on recait state election outcomes. 
Roads were Kenp's entiy into Queensland developmental issues. He was given the 
responsibility of bringing order to the chaos that characterised Queensland's roads 
adminisfration in 1920 by implementing the Countiy Roads Board model with v^ diich 
he was familiar. He had the political support necessaty to secure legislative backing, 
as well as support from the many primaty producers for ^\iiom the railways had 
failed to provide the fransport services tiiey were promised. However, the decisive 
plan of action he espoused, vvhich passed rationally but lightly over a formidable 
range of obstacles, was greeted with scepticism and, mdeed, its failure was widely 
anticipated. In the circumstances, the newcomer to Queensland, clearly ignorant of 
the barriers in the way of its development might have been dismissed as irrelevant 
but the patii of development Kemp represented provoked opposition from both 
politicians and officials. What was cmcial to his future was his ability to demonsfrate 
official neufrality and to manage the political opposition arising from competing 
341 
ministerial uiterests, constituency demands, enfrenched developmental policy which 
favoured tiie railways and agricultural and mirung expansion, and tiie Labor 
Govemmotit's symbiotic relationship with tiie labour movement. The opposition 
from career officials derived from the necessity to support the pohcy status quo in 
order to protect themselves and the organisations they headed from any threatened 
redistribution of adminisfrative influence. 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Kemp expanded his vision to enconpass planrung 
for Queensland's overall economic development refining the details of its 
implementation and presenting it in evety pubhc fomm available to him. His 
prominent role in the massive wartime works program, the completion of which 
confoimded critics in the Melbourne-based defence works plarming authorities and 
stirred Queensland's nationalistic pride, made Kemp an unusual local hero. The 
number of his defractors increased in the heady climate of post-war reconstmction, 
with his large-scale regional developmental proposals considered to be financially 
unsustainable and discriminatoty in their apphcation, while giving him an 
unprecedented level of power witiiout responsibility. He was an easy target for 
accusations that he was suffering from "gigantomania", or excluding all other 
considerations to build monuments to engineering excellence, although the success 
of an engineer's career has always been judged by the calibre ofthe constmction 
projects with which he has been associated. 
There is no doubt Kenqi was impressed by the large-scale infrastmcture projects he 
saw in operation on his 1938 overseas tour. In the Scandinavian countries he visited, 
with similarly daunting demographic and geo-physical problems as Ausfralia faced, 
tiie goal of economic development was being successfully addressed through a high 
level of govemment investment in fransport infrastructure and major, hydro-
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electiicity projects. As with the projects he inspected in Canada and the United 
States, he saw them as proof that techrucal innovation and engineering excellence 
dehvered pubhc benefits on a national scale. The regional development programs in 
tiie United States had the most obvious and lasting influence on him The plan he 
favoured for nortii Queensland development might have been inspired by J. J. 
Bradfield's revolutionaty "mland rivers" scheme, but tiie detailed proposals for 
constmction ofthe Burdekin Dam and associated development ofthe Burdekm 
catchment area were modeUed on the United States' regional development programs 
facilitated by the constmction of massive, envu-onment-altering dams. These 
programs were commenced as unemployment relief works, adding to Kemp's 
conviction that the outcomes of large-scale, government-sponsored developmental 
planning made a cmcial contribution to the pubhc interest. He had an imshakeable 
confidence in Queensland's engineers, never doubting their capacity to undertake the 
similarly vast constmction projects on which the realisation of his proposals 
depended. While his approach gave civil engineers and technocratic organisations the 
critical role in the enabling process, it departed from the accepted stereotype ofthe 
engineer's "mechanistic" approach to problem solving in demonsfrating a 
comprehensive appreciation ofthe State's socio-economic circumstances. 
In accoimting for Kemp's rise to adminisfrative power, some significance can be 
attached to his personal attiibutes and the effect of their apphcation to his 
professional responsibilities. As with so many ofthe opportimists before and after 
him, Kenq) came to Queensland to further his personal and professional ambitions. 
From the first, his career path lay in public service, not in private industiy and, 
although he readily absorbed the techrucal fraining and ethos of his profession, he 
343 
was never gomg to be anything more tiian a journeyman engineer. In accepting an 
appointment as shire engineer in a marginal farmmg area, he conceded tiie reality of 
employment options for young engineers who did not have the backing of uruversity 
qualifications, business cormections or outstanding design skills. However, the 
personal skills that contributed to his achieving a position of adminisfrative influence 
in Queensland were already being demonsfrated and, even when exercised in the 
context of a small rural shne, conformed to the theoretical model of professional-
technocratic characteristics. At Karkarooc, he evinced a self-confidence that enabled 
him to expand his shire activities into areas that were beyond his technical 
competraice and experience. He revealed a talent for organisation and management, 
had effective communication skills, and was highly motivated to achieve operational 
goals which might or might not have been set by his employers. Moreover, vviien 
frying to obtain State Govemment co-operation on shire works proposals, he leamt 
the value of direct consultation supported by well-researched techrucal data. 
Impatient with inefficiency and inaction, he held to the conviction that raigineering 
and technological irmovation held the solutions to the shire's economic problems. 
However, his obvious ambition to take on more exacting responsibilities did not sit 
well with the Karkarooc coimcillors but he found absorbing new challenges in his 
position with the Countiy Roads Board vs^ere wartune staff shortages meant a r^id 
promotion to senior aigineer. Although he appeared to be risking his career 
prospects in Victoria by moving to Queensland, Kemp was realistic enough to know 
that further promotion would be slow in coming, given tiie competition he faced 
from more highly quahfied and experienced roads engineers in Victoria's relatively 
closed professional circles. It is a matter for conjecture vs^ether the Queensland 
Govemment representatives wanted what they tiiou^t was a relatively unimportant 
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and thus malleable engineer, for the appointment or whether they preferred a man 
v^ose self-confidence and enthusiasm for new challenges made him more likely to 
succeed in v^at by any measure, was a daunting undertaking. 
The attributes and influential life events that shaped Kemp's "adminisfrative style" 
largely predated his arrival in Queensland. Since they were essaitially similar to 
those commonly associated with powerful businessmen or bureaucrats, 
"adminisfrative style" on its own does not explain why, as an individual, he acquired 
and exercised adminisfrative power. Kemp can be identified witii the theoretical 
model of a technocrat exercismg technobureaucratic power. He was a member of a 
professional elite wiiich was distinguished by a particular professional ideology and 
which commanded social status and respect by vutue of confrolling information and 
skills considered indispensable to society. His career also confirmed organisation and 
organisational position as sources of technobureaucratic power. Technocratic values 
and goals were synonymous with organisational goals and, since tiie organisations 
were estabhshed for specific technical purposes, their adminisfration was dominated 
by technical specialists, hi addition, the delegation of discretionaty powers was 
predicated on superior expertise, together with the impartiality conferred by 
professional values and a rational-technical basis for decision-making. These factors 
also allowed the orgarusations and Kemp, as their adminisfrative head, to institute a 
coercive authority based on dependence over other participants in the particular 
functional area. 
What has been undervalued is the importance of Main Roads in estabhshing Kemp's 
right to a place in Queensland's developmental decision-making process and enabling 
him to discharge his ambitious range of admirustrative responsibilities. Main Roads 
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was his adminisfrative and operational base. Effectively self-funded, its operations 
demonsfrated Kerry's capacity to plan and implement works programs in the face of 
unforeseen cfrcumstances, wiiile fulfiUmg pubhc expectations of political 
independence. The organisation was his enfree to a mutually beneficial relationship 
with local authority representatives. Its regional operations and liaison network 
provided the stmctural base on which the continuation of Federal roads funding was 
dependent and gave Kemp his first important role in Federal-State financial relations. 
In all his areas of responsibility. Main Roads provided adminisfrative support 
services and, in addition to constmction and supervisoty work, the highly-skilled 
technical staff was used to undertake preliminary investigative studies on major 
infrastmcture projects. The organisation provided a professional fraining ground for 
engineers and a consequent dissemination of professional standards and values, 
particularly at tiie local govemment level. Moreover, by the 1940s, the Main Roads 
Commissioner's statutoty powers were surprisingly comprehaisive and, although 
tifieir application was confined to a specific functional area, they included regulatoty, 
investigative, coercive and co-ordinatmg powers. The ultimate proof of its value to 
Kemp was its record of achievements m relation to Queensland's wartime defence 
works since, without the organisation, his successful unplementation ofthe works 
program would have been impossible. 
The Bureau oflndustry clearly represented a source of power for Kemp as it enabled 
him to move btyond the relatively narrow field of transport adminisfration. It 
provided lasting monuments to his technocratic skills, as did the Allied Council's 
Queensland operations, while consohdating his status in pohtical and professional 
circles. However, if Main Roads has been under-valued as a source of adminisfrative 
power, the Co-Ordinator-General has been relatively over-valued. Theoretically, the 
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position carried delegated powers that represented an unprecedented concaifration of 
adminisfrative power in one ofGcial but the reality of tiieir apphcation produced a 
lesser outcome. The essence ofthe concept ofthe Co-Ordmator-General was the 
efficiency of cenfrahsed, forward plarming ofthe public works and developmental 
programs v>*iich Forgan Smitii and Hanlon endorsed as the key to productive 
economic development It is not surprising that the concept failed to win popular 
support. Its implementation threatened the independence of local government 
compromised the expectation of immediate, and thus pohtically important gains and, 
given the convention of three-year terms of office, demanded a commitment of 
executive govemment confidence. The powers of co-ordination formally delegated to 
Kemp should have enabled him to confrol the planning activities of all govemment 
agencies and local authorities but comphance and co-operation levels remained 
problematical, with his goals often competing with tiie goals of other statutoty 
authorities also headed by influential professional specialists. 
As the experience of technocrats in other states had shown, the most beneficial 
arrangement for the exercise of technocratic power was a partnership with the head 
of Treasuty. Kemp established a working relationship witii Treasury officials but 
their own orgarusational power goals precluded an acceptance of shared goals. They 
dismissed any attempt to use co-ordination as a means of subordinating Treasuty to 
tiie Co-Ordinator-General since, witii the requirement for Treasury to approve tiie co-
ordinated plan of works, they were confident they retained the superior co-ordinating 
role. Finally, it was as Co-Ordinator-General that Kemp was subjected to sustained 
attacks on his professional and personal mtegrity. Although pubhc officials were 
often named in parhamentaty debates, the intensity ofthe attacks conducted under 
parhamentaty privilege was virtually unprecedented. Although, as witii Kemp, the 
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State Insurance Commissioner was attacked for possessing a level of power 
perceived to place him beyond democratic confrol, the references to hun did not 
extend to questiorung his personal integrity. 
One issue that arises from Kent 's technocratic power is the legitimacy of his 
autiiority. It appears tiiat the threat his confrol over Queensland's pubhc works posed 
to those with a stake in the distribution of dedsion-making power was the potential 
capacity it gave him to exert power beyond legally-determined limits. Informal 
authority is a well-recognised outcome ofthe effectiveness of personal skills and 
technical superiority in an area of pohtical disinterest. Kemp usually succeeded in 
having his proposals to extend his autiiority legitimised through his skill in building 
an influential support base and persuading the Premier ofthe day to have them 
converted into formal legislative provisions. Since leadership is often cited as botii a 
source and a demonsfration of technocratic power, there is also the issue of 
identifying Kemp as a leader. As with other saiior officials, the cultural acceptance 
of autiioritarianism and the fraditional hierarchical confrol structure of public 
bureaucracies meant that organisational position gave him leadership status. 
However, it was through his professional ethos that he displayed the authority tiiat is 
said to characterise a leader, securing the loyalty and respect of staff and colleagues 
by the exan^le of hard work, dedication and unwavering behef in professional 
values. In the public arena, he did not exhibit the fraditional charismatic leadership 
derived from the dominance of personahty. It may have been a case of "the iron fist 
in tiie velvet glove", but tiie image of him as a modest professional man, 
preoccupied with the progress of his engineering projects, was less threatening and 
more conducive to co-operative relationships than one of an aggressive, power-
seeking, public service mandarin. 
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Most commentators on the subject have concluded that technocratic power is 
maximised where there a "pro-development" political climate and sfrong executive 
govemment This was an apt description of Queensland in this period, made more so 
by the abolition of its second parhamentaty chamber or "House of Review" From 
this perspective, Kemp's position of administrative power was simply an outcome of 
the political environment with perhaps a contribution from the Machiavellian 
concept of good fortune. However, the particular environment that fostered this 
situation produced some variations to this conventional view, one of which was the 
compact "world" of state govemment adminisfration and its comparatively few 
participants. Within the state, he did not have to contend with the level of 
competition for influence evident in New South Wales and Victoria, and also, for 
example, deliberately created in regional development adminisfration in the United 
States. It was a potential source of confrol over the developmental policy process, 
with the small numbers making up the state's political and admmisfrative elites 
giving Kemp opportunities for influential access on both a personal and an official 
basis. It also enabled him to dominate the advisoty committee system which, through 
the application of his co-ordination and co-option powers, had achieved an 
unprecedented importance in developmental policy deliberations. That it was a 
fimction ofthe state environment was illusfrated by Kemp's efforts at the national 
level where, despite his respected status in the area of roads' policy, he failed to 
influence the course of Federal govemment decision-making in respect of 
Queensland's development goals. 
Another variation relates to the characterisation of Queensland populism as "the 
politics of development", and the reality of Queensland's development status. Some 
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tiieorists have moved on from development to under-development to explain the 
Queensland brand of populism but to an extent this approach ignores the simple 
logic ofthe process of societies developing from pioneer to modem status. 
Development pohcy issues have dominated the politics of all Ausfralian states but 
unlike Queraisland during this period, some of them had the industrial capacity to 
advance from total dependence on primaty production for economic growth. Since 
the State consistently failed to atfract substantial private sector capital investment in 
secondaty industty development its economic survival depended on the small 
producer producing, while political survival depended on facilitating the conditions 
to maximise production and marketing. A State-generated development orientation 
was perpetuated by the susceptibility of Queensland's economy to often 
unpredictable extemal influences and a continuing "grass-roots" concem with 
economic instability. 
Kemp's particular adminisfrative role challenges the proposition that govemment 
bureaucrats represent an obstraction to the reciprocal benefits of direct 
commurucation between politicians and constituents, or leaders and supporters, from 
which popular power is said to derive. He was accepted by both groups as an 
important channel of communication and an official with a reliable capacity for 
decisive action, even as ministers found it expedient to characterise him as tiie 
obstmctive bureaucrat as a means of explaining delays in delivering election 
promises. Govemment promises for economic development became constituents' 
demands for increased govemment intervention but judging from the number of 
schemes proposed years before but never proceeded with, the adminisfration had 
lacked the necessaty expertise to bring them mto operation It is not strictly accurate 
to porfray Kemp as a technocrat who owed his powerful position to a pro-
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development environment. Rather, by demonstrating that developmental schemes 
could be achieved, with significant political benefits, he bolstered the confidence of 
political leaders ofthe era in the efficacy of promoting large-scale development as 
tiie comerstone of economic growtii. While tiiere is no doubt he benefited from an 
increasingly pro-development political environment he played a major role in 
making it happen. 
Since publicity was one ofthe principal mechanisms by which Kemp reinforced his 
standing in tiiis environment its potential as a source of adminisfrative power is one 
aspect of this era of Queensland developmental politics that would repay further 
study. Although heads of semi-govemment authorities were permitted to comment 
publicly on tiieir respective areas of responsibility, few could match the media 
coverage of Kemp's activities and views. With the possible exception of J. D. Stoty 
and Colin Clark, no public official had such a high public profile. In the days before 
television and information technology, community access to information was 
principally through an extensive local radio and newspaper network, which tended to 
report on govemment pohcy armouncements and activities in the context of their 
effect on local issues. From the begirming, Kemp had recognised its value, becoming 
as adept as most politicians in establishing a working relationship with journalists 
and using the media as an effective tool of communication and influence. 
One can only speculate on the reasons for Kenp being largely unknown today, 
despite this hig^ public profile, acknowledged position of admirustrative power and 
demonsfrated input into the planning and implementation of major infrastmcture 
projects in Queensland. Analysts may still dismiss a technocrat such as Kemp as 
occupying the instmmental, advisory role associated wath the conventional. 
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•Westininster' concept of a govemment official. Or, put in another w^ , he represaits 
a part ofthe machinety of govemment vvliose function is assumed and who, despite 
the evidence presented here, is ultimately subject to the dictates of a democratically 
elected 'master'. The obvious corollaty to this approach is to focus on the pohtical 
arena as the locus of decision-making power. 
The adoption of a broader analytical approach which acknowledges the significant 
role of technocrats and other specialist officials in the pohcy process would enhance 
tiie understanding of their adminisfrative power and contribute to a more realistic 
assessment of both Labor and developmental pohtics of this period. 
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